ML20032E000
| ML20032E000 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Marble Hill |
| Issue date: | 11/12/1981 |
| From: | Shields S PSI ENERGY, INC. A/K/A PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF INDIANA |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| IEB-81-02, IEB-81-2, NUDOCS 8111190483 | |
| Download: ML20032E000 (4) | |
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November 12, 1981 SERVICE
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Mr. James G. Keppler, Directer Docket Nos.: STN 50-546 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission STN 50-547 Region III Construction Permit Nos.:
799 Roosevelt Road CPPR - 170 Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 CPPR - 171 Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 IE Bulletin No. 81-02, Supplement 1
Dear Mr. Keppler:
The subject Bulletin Supplement addresses the potential failure to close of 3 and 4 inch low pressure and 6 inch through 18 inch gate valves manufactured by Westinghouse Electro-Mechanical Division (W-EMD).
Public Service Company of Indiana, Inc. (PSI) has been informed by Westinghouse that some of the W-EMD valves supplied to Marble Hill are affected. The identification of the affected valves, their planned service, the maximum differential pressure at which they would be required to close, and the safety consequences of the valves failure to close are provided in Table 1 attached hereto.
Westinghouse informed PSI that plant specific modifications for the two Marble Hill Units should be available in the second quarter of 1982 and the actual modifications could be implemented shortly thereafter.
The PSI manpower expended in the review and preparation of this response was approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />.
It is estimated that corrective action will necess-itata. an additional 25 to 30 PSI manhours.
8111190483 811112 PDR ADOCK 05000546 G
PDR NOV 16198h P. O. Box 190, New Washington, indiana 47162 812. 289.1000 6#// sk
w SERVICE INDIANA Mr. James G. Keppler, Director November 12, 1981 If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at your convenience.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF INDIANA, INC.
By S. W. Shields Senior Vice President-Nuclear Division STATE OF INDIANA
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COUNTY OF JEFFERSON )
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public, in and for said County and State, this 12th day of Novenber, 1981.
__4Md A-w L s My Commission Expires: April 5, 1983 My County of Residence:
Jefferson LY/sko Attachment ec: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 E. R. Schweibinz, P.E.
J. J. Harrison 4*
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P g2 1.cf 2 TABLE 1 AFFECTED VALVES FOR USE ON MARBLE HILL UNIIS 1 AND 2 VALVE W-EMD MAX. 4P (PSI) AT.
PLANNED LOCATION MODEL WHICll REQUIRED SERVICE
_,NyJBER REFERENCE TO CLOSE CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE TO CLOSE VCT Outlet LCV-ll2B,C 4GM72FB 100 Failure of either of two valves in-series to close reduces redundancy of providing isolation. Alterna te valve will provide isolation.
RWST to-LCV-ll2D,E 8CM72FB 200 Failure of.either of two valves in Suction CCP parallel from the RWST to the suction of the CCP's reduces redundancy of providing isolation of i
RWST during the recirculation phase following a LOCA. Isolation will be' provided by a check valve in series with the two paths.
RHR Suction 8701B 12CM88SEH 700 Failure of either of the two inner Isolation isolation valves in series to close (Inner) 8702B reduces the redundancy of providing isola tion.
Isolation is provided by closing the outer valve.
RHR Suction 8701A 12GtG8SEH 700 Same as 8701B/8702B except for Isolation 8701A closing the inner valves.
(Outer)
RHR Discharge 8716A,B 8GH74FE 300 Failure of either of the two valves in series to close reduces redundancy of providing low head train separation during cold leg recirculation phase following a LOCA. Train separation can be achieved by closing other valve.
i ATTACHMENT
Pzg2 2 cf 2 e
TABLE 1 AFFECTED VALVES FOR USE ON MARBLE HILL UNITS 1 AND 2 VALVE W-EMD MAX. 4P (PSI) AT PLANNED LOCATION MODEL WHICH REQUIRED SERVICE NUMBER REFERENCE TO CLOSE CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE TO CLOSE RHR Heat 8804A 8CM74FE 300 Failure of valve to close precludes Exc hanger realignment of RHR for normal Discharge to operation.
(Valve is opened for CCP Suction recirculation phase following a LOCA).
RHR Heat 8804B 8CM74FE 300 Same as 8804A.
Exchanger Discharge to SI Pump Suction RWST to S1 8806 8GM72FB 200 If valve fails to close, backflow Pump Suction into RWST would be prevented by a check valve.
(Valve is closed for recirculation phase folI9 wing a LOCA).
CCP Suction 8807A,B 6CM72FB 200 There ace two valves in parallel SI Pump 8924 (8807A,B) in series with one valve Suction Crossover (8924). Failure of any of these valves to close will not preclude isolation.
S1 Pump 8923A,B 6CM72FB 200 If either valve fails to close, the Suction other valve will provide separation.
Cross Connect (Valves are closed to provide SI pump train separation).
RHR Cold 8809A,B 8GM78FN 200 Valve is closed for switchover from Leg Injection cold leg to hot leg circulation.
Failure of valve to close will degrade flow to hot legs.
ATTACHMENT
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