ML19344E094
| ML19344E094 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/19/1980 |
| From: | Linder F DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LAC-7095, NUDOCS 8008260619 | |
| Download: ML19344E094 (3) | |
Text
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D DA/RYLAND d
COOPERAT/VE eo aox sir 2eis EAST Av SOUTH
- L A CROSSE. WISCONSIN 54601 (608) 788 4000 i
August'19, 1980 In reply, please refer to LAC-7095 DOCKET UO. 50-409 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation AT'IN :
Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Operating Reactors U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
SUBJECT:
DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR (LACBWR)
PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-45 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO FACILITATE 10 CFR 50 APPENDIX J REVIEW
Reference:
(1)
NRC Letter, Crutchfield to Linder, dated May 19, 1980.
(2)
DPC Letter, LAC-7057, Linder to Crutchfield, dated July 28, 1980.
Gentlemen:
Your request for additional information (Reference 1) required justification for performing Type C leakage testing using water rather than air as a medium for testing.
Justification that the affected systems will remain intact and liquid-filled following a LOCA for two of the isolation valves was included in Reference 2.
Justification for testing two other isolation valves with water is included as Enclosure 1 to this letter.
The remaining valves dis-cussed in Reference 1 will be tested in the future using air as the medium.
If there are further questions, please contact us.
Very truly yours, DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE f
U Frank Linder, General Manager FL:LSO:af cc:
J.
Keppler, Reg'. Dir., NRC-DRO III I/[
8008260
ENCLOSURE 1 DECAY HEAT STARTUP WATER REMOVAL Valve No. 56-25-001 (Reference 1, Item 5, of Paragraph 2.1)
Your letter states that:
Nevertheless, hydrostatic testing of these valves may be found acceptable because there are some ayateme which are designed to remain intact and liquid-fitted foltoving a postulated lose-of-coolant-accident.
For these systems, testing uith water as a medium is more appropriate than testing uith air or nitrogen since it more cloes ty approximates the post-accident environment.
If hydrostatic testing of these eyetema le to be employed, Justifi-cation must be provided that the available fluid inventory is sufficient to maintain a vater seat on the isolation valves during and following an accident based on the cater leakage-rate timit of the test."
The decay heat syatem is designed to remain intact and water-filled following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident, therefore, testing with water as a medium is more appropriate than testing with air or nitrogen since it more closely approximates the post 1
accident environment.
The acceptance criteria on the Type C leakage test is 0.62 gallons per hour.
The water supply required to compensate for the accept-able 2sakage for 30 days following an accident is 446 gallons.
Pricary coolant contained in the reactor vessel maintains a positive head of water on the decay heat startup water removal line due to the difference in elevation between the reactor vessel and the line.
The decay heat system piping leading from the Forced Circulation Pump suction line to the Decay Heat Startup Water Removal Valve holds approximately 750 gallons of water.
Therefore, even if the reactor vessel water level fell below the Forced Circulation outlet nozzle during the transient, the available fluid inventory, con-sidering all available sources, is sufficient to maintain a water seal on this isolation valve during and following an accident.
We have concluded that hydrostatic testing of the valve is the proper method.
In addition, IE Information Notice 80-20, " Loss of Decay Heat Re-moval Capability at Davis-Besse Unit 1 While in a Refueling Mode",
cautions against losing decay heat removal capability.
Since the decay heat system at LACBWR provides the primary method of temoving decay heat from the reactor, it would not be beneficial to partially drain the system in order to test with air. )
ENCLOSURE 1 PRIMARY PURIFICATION RESIN SLUICE Valves Nos. 54-24-019, 54-24-020, 54-24-021, and 54-24-022 (Reference 1, Item 7, of Paragraph 2.1)
The Primary Purification System would be utilized in a post-accident situation to remove dissolved and suspended solids and obtain optimum reactor water quality.
As the system is designed to rem:2in intact and water-filled following a postulated loss-of-roolant accident, testing with water as the medium is more app 3:opriate than testing with air or nitrogen since it more closely approximates the post-accident environment.
The acceptance criteria on the Type C leakage test is 0.62 gallons per hour.
Water enters the Primary Purification System from the bottom of the reactor vessel. The resin sluice line isolation valves are at low points in the system, there-fore, the reactor vessel maintains a hydrostatic head of water on the system and a water seal on the isolation valves and hydrostatic testing of the valves is the proper method.