ML19340C902

Forwards 801119 Fr Notice of Revised 10CFR50.48 & New App R Re Fire Protection Program Requirements.Rule Effective on 810217 & Will Supersede Effective Dates for Previously Approved Mods Given in License Conditions (45FR71569)

ML19340C902
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	12/03/1980
From:	Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Parris H TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
References
NUDOCS 8012180148
Download: ML19340C902 (2)

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UNITED STATES

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E NES Mr. H. G. Parris Manager of Power Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Tower II Chattancoga, Tennessee 37401

Dear Mr. Parris:

The Commission published on November 19, 1980 (45 FR 76602) a revised Section 10 CFR 50.48 and a new Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 regarding fire protection features of nuclear power plants. The revised Section 50.48 and Appendix R will become effective on February 17, 1981 which is 90 days after publication.

A copy of the Federal Register Notice is enclosed (note that the February 19, 1981 date in the notice is incorrect and should be February 17,1981). Appendix R is applicable to plants licensed prior to January 1,1979.

With regard to plants licensed after January 1,1979, paragraph 50.48(e) requires all fire protection features needed to satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 to be completed in accordance with the provisions of their licenses.

On February 17, 1981, the effective date for this rule, this requirement will supersede the currently effective dates for previously approved fire protection modifications that are given in license conditions (45 FR 71569, October 29,1980).

Sincerely, OK-sy Robert L. Tedesco, Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

Federal Register Notice ces: see next page 8012180/W'

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Mr. H. G. Parris Manager of Power Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Tower II Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 cc: Herbert S. Sanger, Jr., Esq.

General Counsel Tennessee Valley Authority 400 Commerce Avenue E 118 33 Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 Mr. ". N. Culver Tennessee Valley Authority 400 Commerce Avenue, 249A HBB Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 Mr. Bob Faas Westinghouse Electric Corporation P. O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 Mr. Mark Burzynski Tennessee Valley Authority 400 Chestnut Street Tower II Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Mr. J. F. Cox Tennessee Valley Authority 400 Commerce Avenue, W10Cl31C Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 Resident Inspector /Sequoyah NPS l

c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l

2600 Igou Ferry Road l

Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379 I

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EnClO5ure I ove e 19,1980

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~B602 Federal Restister / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19 N0 4.es and Regulations NUCLEAR REGULATORY inot t.te comment term snoO: nn *

i.. c e, se. ;;r.n gen,.a. '&s.a -

COMMISSION neen extendec 2

'n 3 A A:cenan A to 10 CFR Tne Comm:ssion coes not acee rne

e

.n W u c p ;ance to CFR Part 50 NRC nas been deve: coma f:re crotecten

n. mms These general provis:cns recairements smce 19r5. The NRC me me b a numcer of 6sputes oser Fire Protection Program for Operating published comprehensae hre protecnon Meine 3;ec.hc methods adequately Muc$ ear Power Ptants swdehnes. Branch Technical Posmon n:cmpashed the mtended goal The Accecv: Nuclear Regulators BTP APCSB 9 bl. and its Appen6x A m p* noses rule is miended to prende Comnu ssion.

1976.1.icensees have compared the:r fire suffic:ent spec:f:c gu: dance to ensure protecuan programs asamst these sansia: tory resolut:en of these issues.

ACTicec Final rule.

guidelmes and have discussed their That revertmg to generahzed auidance

==aa=v:The Nuclear Regulatory denations from these guidelmes with wou:d not accompitsh the mtended Commission is amendmg its regulations the NRC staff for tile past four years purpose of the propaed ru!e.

to require certam pronsions for fire dunng the NRC's fire protection reviews The second issue mvolved some protecton m operating nuclear power of operatmg reactors. A S,sfety mstances m which the specific wor 6ng plants. This acnon is being taken to Evaluation Report and. m most cases.

used resulted m unnecessary and upgrade fire protection at nuclear power supplements to the Safety Evaluation unmtended restncnons For example.

plants licensed to operate pnor to Report. have been issued for each the proposed rule called for a -fresh January 1.19*9. by requinng resolution operatng reactor. These reports W 21er" supply. For firehzhtmg purposes.

bru u.sn water :s satisfactory and a of certam contested genene issues m desenbe fire protecton alternatives that fire protection safety evaluation reports.

have been proposed by the hcensee and

fash ja

er su; ply is urnecessary.

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EmCTIVE DATE: February 19.1981.

found acceptable by the staff as wed as 12.a@ ine pmposed rule ca!!ed for an unce ground" yard f:re mam loop-Note.-The Nuclear Regulatory unresolved fire protecton issues Cocunission has submitte'd this rule to remamma between de staff and the Chen pornons of a fee mam loop run the Comptroller General for renew as hcensea. Proposed Appenix R provided abm rand m and as 6ey enter stuctures The Comm:ssion nad not may be appropnate under the Federal the Commission's requirements for miended to pech64r runnmg pornons of Reports Act, as amended (44 U.S.C.

resolvmg those issues.Thus. it concems 3512). The date on which the reportmg only a limited number of issues denved a y mam locp above ground Other requirement of this rule becomes from the use of the earlier gmdes. The strmar changes are 6scussed in Section effective, unless adnsed to the contrary. Commission belieses that a 30. day III "S;ecific Requeements." of this reflects inclusion of the 45-day period comment penod was adequate under paa=n He third issue relates to imposinon of that statute allows for such review (44 these cucumstances.

aquaements on plants wi6 pasently USC. 3512(c)(2)).

2. Many hcensees questioned the need installed of with existing comcutments Pon rustrHan neronesADON COeffACT!

for backfittmg all the requaements of t msta3 En pmtect n featuns Dand P. Notley. Office of Standards Appendix R. They commented that they prevrusly determined by the staff to Development. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory had previously cc=1 plied with staff fire sausfy the guidance of Appen6x A to Commission. Washington. D.C. 20555.

protecton recommendations in ~ good A SB 951. Re Commssion phone 301-443-5921 or Robert L faith" and have cocmutted to or gennah arms eat. except for t.W Ferguson. Office of Nuclear Reactor completed certain modifications. They sect ns that will be back fitted.

Regulation. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory contend that the staff has properly Appendix R should not be retroacuvely

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Commission. Washmgton. D.C. 20555.

determmed that these mo6ficatons phone 301-492 "096.

provide at least the level of fire tously a ve b h staff as sverunpewrAny neroanaADOec On May protection descnbed by the guidance sat:sfymg the provisions of Appendix A 29,1980, the Nuclear Regulatory contained in Appendix A to Branch to BTP APCSB 9.5-1.

Comcussion published in the Federal Tecnnical Posit:on RTP APCSB 9.5-1.

The NRC staff had intended. m its Register (45 8 36082) a nonce of They also contend that dese onsmal proposal for Appendix R. that proposed rulemaking invitmg wntten modifications provide a level of theieq'Jnments be applicable only for suggestions or comments on the protecton at least equivalent to that the rescluuon of unresolved disputed proposed rule by June 30,1980. He contained in the proposed rule. They fire protection features. Thus. the staff notice concerned proposed amendments express the concern that the proposed had not intended the provisions of to 10 CFR Part 50. " Domestic Licensmg rule was wntten in such specific Appen6x R to require modificaton of of Production and Utilization Faculties."

language that fire protecton :ssues that previously approved features. This was which would require certam mimmum we e thought closed would be reopened not clear!v desenbed in the proposed pronsions for fire protection in nuclear and new.but not necessanly better.

rule as pu'ohshed for coctment. In f act, power plants operatmg pnor to January modifications would be required. These de Supplementary Information 1.19"9. Fifty-one comment letters were

=o6ficatons could be accomplished pub isned w:th the proposed aru!e received regardmg the proposed only by the expen6ture of cons:derable exphc:tiy mdicatea dat '[all! licensees amendments. A number of comments eng:neenng. design. and construction wdl be expected to meet the pertamed to specific requirements m the effort and at great undue expense. The requaements of this rule. m its effecnve proposed Appendix R. and these will be commenters request that de term, mejuing whatever changes result dealt with below. Howeser, there were requirements m the proposed rule be from pubhc comments?

three substantive content:ons wh:ch rewntten to specify only 6e general In deter =mma whether the spec:fic were raised by many of the commenters. requirements of what needs to be reqctrements of'Appenix R shou!d be These three comments are summanzed accomphshed-tmpcsed en hcensees with presently as follows:

These comments raise three related mstaued cr exist =g commitments to L Most commenters stated eat the 30 issues. The first relates to the need for mstad fue protection features prenously day comment penod was too short to spec:fic requirements The geneal deter =med to satisfy Appenix A to permit adequate detailed response and requirements reistmg to f:re protect:on Branch Techmcal Position BTP APCSB

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Federal Register, Vol 43. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76603 u ;-i ' a.mpcriant to reccgnize that arrangements were accepted in sorne peimdted either an oil couection system A;;en,ia R addresses on;y a portion of early fire protectica reviews. As a result or a fire sappression system. The staff ine speuf;c items contained m the more of some separate effects tests, the staff has also accepted an automatic fire rprenensive dccument. Branch changed its position on this suppression system as an acceptable Tecnnical Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1 configuration. and subsequent plans metnod of fire protection for this and its Appencis A. Appendix A to BTP have been required to provide application. The Commission has APCSB 9 5-1 has been the basic fire additional protectio i m the form of fire conciuded that fire suppression systems protection guidance used by the staff m barners cr substantial physical do not give adequate protection for fires their fire protection reviews conducted separation for safe shutdown systems.

that may be induced by seismic events.

for all operatma plants dunng the past No credit for such coatmgs as fire The Commission therefore believes that several years. For many plants.

barners is allowed by Section III.C of previously approved suppression hcensees proposed systems and features Appendix R. Appendix A to Branch systems should be replaced with oil that satisfactorily achieved the fire Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5.1 and collection systems that can withstand protection entena set forth m Appendix the proposed Appendix R recognized seismic events.

A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and began to that there were plant-umque Th-technical basis on which these promptly implement such features and configurations that required fire three sections are based are further systems.

protection features that are not identical discussed in Section !!!. " Specific Satisfactory features anc systems are to those listed in Section III.G of Requirements." of this preamble.

already m place and m operation m Appendix R. For these cases. fire

3. Most commenters stated that the many plants. There is a reasonable protection features were developed by implementation schedule contained in deerpe of uniformity among most of the licensee and described in a fire the proposed rule is impossible to meet these appresed features for all factitties hazards analysis.Some of these for any of the operating plants. The smce thes were reviewed against the arrangements were accepted by the staff commenters further stated that if the same cntena of Appendix 5 to BTP as providing equivalent protection to the implementation schedule in the effective

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APCSB 9 5-1. In general. the features requirements of Section !!!.G to rule is the same as that in the proposed previousiv approved by the NRC staff m Appendix R.

rule. the Commission must be prepared its reviews of fire protection usma the Requirements that account for all of to either shutdown each operstmg entena of Appendix A to BTP APCSB the parameters that are important to fire uclear power plant or process 9.5-1 provide an equivalent level of fire protection and consistent with safety

'*{P {'{U'{then concluded that

,e protection safety to that provided under requirements for all plant-unique the implementation schedule should be the specific provisions of Appendix R.

configurations have not been developed.

re en o a w d'

Thus. the further benefit that might be In light of the expenence gained in fire

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provided by requinng that previously protection evaluations over the past four stated that "all fire protection and approsed features be modified to years, the Commission believes that the modifications identified by the staff as conform to the specific language set licensees should reexamine those necessary to satisfy Criterion 3 of forth in Appendix R is outweighed by previously approved configurations of Appendix A to this part, whether the overall benefit of the early fire protection that do not meet the contained in Appendix R to this part or implementation of such previously requirements as specified in Section in other staff fire protection guidance approved features, which in many cases Ill.G to Appendix R. Based on this (except for alternate or dedicated are currently being installed.

reexamination the licensee must either shutdown capability) shall be completed Nesertheless, as a result of its meet the requirements of Section !!!.G of by November 1.1980 unless, for good contmuing review of fire protection Appendix R or apply for an exemptinn cause shown, the Commission approves matters. the NRC staff has indicated to that justifies alternatives by a fire an extension." (proposed paragraph the Commission that there are hazard analysis. However. based on 50.481.(c)). The Commission went on to requirements in three sections in which present information. the Commission state its intention in the Statement of the protection afforded by Appendix R does not expect to be able to approve Consideration to the rule that "

.no over and above that previously exemptions for fire-retardant coatmas plant would be allowed to continue to accepted. may be desirable. The used as fire barners.

operate after November 1.1980. or Commission has decided that these The seccnd relates to emergency beyond an extended date approved by requirements should be retroactively lighting.Section III.J of Appendix R calls the Comission, unless all modifications applied to all facilities. This decision is for 8-hour emergency lightmg. whereas (except for alternate or dedicated not meant to reflect adversely on in some cases less than 8-hour shutdown capability) have been previous licensee or staff evaluations:

emergency lighting has been accepted as implemented."

rather its purpose is to take fully into satisfying Appendix A to BTP APCSB The Commission has reconsidered the account the mcreased knowledge and 9.5-1. While an adequate level of safety implementation schedule and has expenence developed on fire protection may be provided by less than an 8-hour determined that it should be modified matters over the last several years.

supply, an 8-hour system would provide for the followmg reasons:

The first of these sections is related to added protection and would generally

• After reviewmg the comments and fire protection features for ensunna that involve only a small cost. The the information developed as a result of sntems and assoctated circuits used to Commission therefore believes that completion of fire reviews over the past 4 mese and mamtam safe shutdown are licensees should upgrade the previously 6 months. the staff has informed the free from fire damage. Appendix A to approved facihties to satisfy the 8-hour Commission that the date of November DTP APCSB 9 51 permits a combination lighting requirement of Appendix R.

1.1980 is not possible because the of fire. retardant coatmgs and fire The third relates to protection agamst effective date of the rule will be after detection and supression systems fires in nonmerted contamments that date.

without specifymg a physical separation involvmg reactor coolant pump

+ The staff has informed the distance to protection redundant lubncation oil lSection 111.0 of Commission that it wou:d expect systems (Appendix A. D.1(2)). and such Appendix R). The proposed rule

. virtually alllicensees to request

76604 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations exemptions if the new implementation Section Ill. we provide a summary of the automatic water suppression system dates do not provide an appropnate Techn. cal Basis for each requirement.

throughout the plant.

penod of time for complying with the followed by a summary of the public An ensured mammum volume of water requirements of Appendix R. The time comments and a statement of the staffs is set aside and dedicated for fire and manpower resources needed by the disposition of those comments, protection uses to be available at all licensees to prepare such requests and umn agaen of oder smuhaneous Section /. Introduction and Scope water uses in the plant. This water by the staff to formulate recommendations on these requests.s This section has been revised as a volume is dedicated for fire service by not warranted from the standpoint of result of comments to melude a means of separate storage tanks or timely fire protection improvement.

discussion of the importance of safe separate pump suctions from a large

• The revised implementation shutdown capability and the distmetion body of water. When common tankage schedule provides a careful balance of between requirements for " safety.

is employed for fire service needs and these considerations, calling for the related" equipment and equipment other water services, the fire pump remaining fire protection modifications needed for " safe shutdown."

suctions must be at the bottom of the to be implemented and installed on a Section //. Cenera/ Requirements tank and other water supply suctwas phased Schedute that is as prompt as must be located at a higher level to can be reasonaoly achieved.

This section ha: been substantially ensure that the minimum dedicated The revised schedules distinguish rewntten as a result of comments to water volume is set aside for fire between requiremen:s imposed for the provide a concise summary of general protection needs. Administrative first time on the licensee by Appendix R requirements. The specific requirements controls by themselves. such as locked and those requirements already imposed were consolidated with the appropriate valves to ensure adequate water supply in license conditions or Technical parts of Section III. " Specific for fire fighting needs, are deemed Specifications issued prior to the Requirements." except that the credit unacceptable at nuclear power plants.

effective date of the rule. For given for 50-foot separation has been Comment Resolution requirements imposed by Appendix R.

dropped.

including the items "backfit" to all Section III. Specific Requirements Many commenters stated that we were being too restrictive by stipulating plants, the schedule provides a reasonable time after publication of the The requirements m. this rule are an underground yard fire main loop and rule for completion of required based upon pnnciples long accepted fre A wa. uoolies. Our intent was modifications. For requirements already Mthin that portion of American industry only that a yrrd fire main loop be imposed by license conditions providing that has been classified by their furnished. We have deleted the for implemention after November 1.

insurance carriers as, Improved Risk,,

specification for an underground loop 1980. the Ccmmission has reviewed or " Highly Protected Risk". In each of since special conditions may dictate that these schedules and has found that in these cases, the Commission has part of the loop be above ground or some instances the allotted time for decided that the overallinterest of inside safety-related buildings. Such completion of the required modifications public safety is best served by arrangements are acceptable.

may be excessive.Thus, for fire establishing some conservative level of With regard to the specification for a protection features other than those fire protection and ensuring that level of fresh water supply the staff was l

covered by Appendix R. although the compliance exists at all plants. The attempting to avoid potential plant l

Commission has extended the fcNwing is a list of the specific problems that are not associated with compliance dates beyond the November technical bases and resolution of public fire protection. From a fire protection l

1,1980. date in the proposed rule, the comments for each of the specific standpoint. salt or brackish water is l

Commission has added a requirement requirements in Appendix R.

acceptable for fire suppression provided that limits the compliance schedule in A. Water Supplies for Fire the fire protection system is designed existing licenses if such schedules Suppression Systems TechnicolBasis.

and maintained for salt or brackish I

l extend beyond what we now believe One of the basic fire protection water. The requirement for fresh water i

should have been a reasonable schedule requirements for a modern industrial supplies is therefore d:opped. Other initially. Relief from such limitation may site in the United States is a separate operational probicms.mrelated to fire be granted by the Director of Nuclear water distribution system for fire protection that may result from the use l

Reactor Regulation upon a showing that protection with dual water supplies.

c,f alt or brackish water for fire there is good cause for extending such Duplicate water supplies are required to suppression activities are outside the date and that public health and safety is ensure uninterrupted fire suppression scope of this regulation.

not adversely affected by such capability allowing for single failures Several commenters took issue with extension.

and periodic maintenance and repair of the requirement for two separate It should also be noted that for vital portions of the systems. Duplicate redundant suctions, stating that some licensees whose license conditions water supplies may consist of separate pla.ts t.se a single large intake structure imposed a schedule with a compliance suctions for fire pumps from a large on a lake or a river for all water date of November 1.1980. or other date body of water such as lake, nyer, or requiren.ents. The requirement for prior to the effective date of 150.48, the pond or from two water stwage tanks.

separate intake structures was not Commission has suspended such For nuclear power plants, the intended and the rule has been clarified.

compliance dates by promulgating on distnbution system is required to consist Several comments called for deleting October 29.1980. a temporary rule of a loop around the plant with suitable the requirements for dedicated tanks or i 50.48 (45 FR 71569). which will be valves forisolating portions of the use of certical standpipe for other water superseded by this rule.

system for maintenance or repair services when storage tanks are used for To better understand the nature of the without interrupting the water supply to combined service-water / fire-water uses, public comments received and the staff's the various fire suppression systems in on the basis that this is overly restrictive resolution of these comments. the the plant. Thus, with dual supplies and a and other ways are available to ensure followmg section will consider each loop concept, an adequate water supply a dedicated supply such as weirs, section of Appendix R to this part. In - ~ can be ensured to each manual or suction location, etc. Two separate but l

Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. Novembcr 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76605 related issues are mvohed here. The hour water supph is considered by a visually irdaatmg r kev. operated first is the requirement for dedicated adequate. It shouid diso be noted that (curbi vane." arte inere was an water storage tanks for fire fightmg this mammum dedicated water volume is opportunity to comment on this purposes. The suggestion that the based on maximum flow rates. Since document.

requirement for dedicated tanks be most fires are controlled and D.ManualFire Suppression Tecnmcci deleted was rejected for the reasons extmguished with much smaller flow Basis. Considerable reliance is placed stated in the preceding Techmcal Basis.

rates, this requirement realistically on automatic fire suppression systems The other point deals with ensunng represents a dedicated water volume far throughout a nuclear power plant.

mmimum water storage capacity for fire in excess of two hours.

However. manual fire fightmg activities suppression activities when storage B.Ssctionc// solation Valves.

often can control and extmguish slowly t:nks are used for combined service.

C. Hydrant / solation Vo/res developmg fires before an automatic fire water / fire-water uses. rte term Technicc/ Basis. These two suppression system is actuated. In

" vertical standpr b other water requirements are similar and can be addition, fires that are controlled or s:rvice" simply means that the suction treated together. Proper valving is extinguished by automatic systems for other water uses in common storage required to isolate portions of the water require a certain amount of manual tanks will be located sufficiently high to distnbution system for maintenance or response. Also, some areas of the plant ensure the minimum water volume repair without mterrupting the water do not warrant the installation of needs for fire suppression activities. If supply to manual or automatic fire automatic fire suppression systems.

the commenters were assummg that suppression systems inside the plant.

Manual response is the only fire

" vertical standpipe" referred only to Valves are similarly required to permit suppression available for these areas:

pipes inside the tank, this is not the isolation of outside yard hydrants from thus, it is important that manual fire case. In fact a standpipe extenor to the the water distnbution system for fighting capability be present in all storage tank is more desirable smce any maintenance or repair without areas of the plant. and that standpipe Izakage would be immediately evident.

interrupting water supply to fire and hose stations be located throughout On an mternal standpipe a leak in the suppressicut systems inside the plant.

the plant. The s:andpipe and hose pipe could actually allow depletion of Visually 1.

icetmg valves such as post stations are to be located so that at least the water otherwise to be reserved for indicator valves are preferred so that one effectise hose stream can be fire uses. The rule has been clanfied to the position of the valve can be readily brought to bear at any Iccation in the allow physical alternatives for water determined. However, key-operated plant containing or presenting a hazard supply dedication but to preclude valvec [ commonly known as curb to structures systems, or components exclusive use of administrative controls valves) are acceptable for these important to safety. They are to be for ws purpose.

purP ses where plant-specific supplied from the fire water supplv Some commenters objected to the c nditions warrant t, heir use.

system except for those inside O' #CU#" ## "

containment. which may be connected requirement that other water syste.us

1. 1. ^ M'"Y C "*'

''d used as a backup water supply for fire that the requirement for." approved to other reliable water supplies tf a protec; ion should be permanently

• "'D C#8 "C

" C separate penetration into containment cannot be made for fire water service connected to the fire main system and suggested that it would be suffic:ent to

$fn pe i$ with needs.

c

,a provide a water supply capable of being respect to who should give the approval. Comment Resolution connected to the fire main system within The Commission has accepted this suggestion: the rule now requires that Several commenters suggested adding tin minutes of the loss of normal water supply or pumps. The rule does not sectional control valves shall be a sentence reading " Standpipe and hose address backup water supplies. The provided to isolate portions of the fire stations are not required if sufficient requirement means that. if another main for maintenance or repair without iustification can be provided that water system is used as one of the shutting off the entire syste:n. Post adequate fire protection featurs s have redundant water supplies. it must satisfy indicator or key-operated valves are been provided to account for a given fire all of the requirements of the fire mentioned as two examples of area." This suggestion was rejected. The protection water supplies. Additional acceptable valves.

staff has taken the position that the b:ckup supplies need not meet these C.HydrantBlock Valves-Comment minimum requirements are that at least sequtrements.

Resolution. A number of commenters one effective hose stream that will be One commenter asked why only a made suggestions for rewording this able to reach any locaticn that contains two-hour water supply is required when section. This section has been clarified or could present an exposure fire hazard the Browns Ferry Fire lasted well over to state the requirement for capability to to the safety-relate 3 eq'noment. The two hours. All of the investigations of isolate hydrants from the fire main Commis. ion concludec Nat no analyses the Browns Ferry Fire clearly show that without disrupting the water supply to can identify hazarde so carefully that if water had been used immediately, the automatic or manual fire suppression this mammum requirement can be fire would have been extinguished much systems in any area containing or further reduced.

carlier. Indeed once the manual fire presenting a fire hazard to safety-related E. Hydrostatic Hose Test Technical l

fighting activities were started with the or safe shutdown equipment.

Sosis. Fire hoses should be l

use of only one fire hose stream, the fire One commenter suggested that this hydrostatically tested periodi: ally to was extmguished within one-half hour.

requirement be dropped in its entirety ensure that they will not rupture during The staff would find unacceptable any since it "is a new requirement which has use. The requirement for a mir.imum test condition in which a postulated fire that not been subjected to the peer review pressure of 300 psi comes from NFPA I

could threaten safe shutdown capability process." This suggestion was rejected No.190 (National Fire Protec': ion I

could not be controlled and extinguished on the basis that Appendix A to BTP Association Standard No.19%

within two hours with any combmation APCSB 9.5-1 contains the following Standard for Fire Hose) a nationally of manual and automatic fire sentence: "The lateral to each hydrant recognized consensus standard. This.

suppression actmties. Therefore a two-from the yard mam should be controlled standard contains other guidance for the '

i

76606 Federal Register R u. No. 225 Wedresday Nm etnher 19 19m Ru:es and Rntulatmns use and < xe f 're hm. N - a esten m J wr was onusd be iFrBs&B m Techn:rm mdustrm< End setul retained The fm..zarus.sne sis mas

!b,Mwmuern mdustnai plants C"U I" d '"P C'" sumession swe n.

win mpw ement cost salues C. < vnt lieso.urum but this would be m additmn to 'he fire approuhms those of a modern nuclear Atant commenters pointed i..r the detection ss Stem pacred Wettnc generatma station base erroneous usage of the term 'senit e g pm.yyy g. Sav Shutdown a fdl. time fulls aquipped fire pressure] rather than "operarme Capability Techival Basis. The department. mcludma motonzed fire pressure in this requirement. The objectr.e for the protection of safe apparatus. Because of the reduced miended meaning for this requirement is shutdown capabihty is to ensure tnat at severity of fire hazards in a nuclear that all hoses would be tested at a least one means of achieving and generating station as compared to a pressure greater than the maximum maintairiing safe shutdown cond'itions manufacturing plant. the Commission pressure found m the fire protection will remam available dunna and after beheves that it is not necessary to water distnbution systems. The correct any postulated fire in the plant. Because mandate a fully staffed fire department, termmology is "operatme pressure The t is not possible to predict the specific Howes er. manual fire response rule has been so changed. In addition.

conditions under which fires may occur capabihty is required at a nuclear plant the staff added a specific mimmum test and propagate. the design basis '

and a properly equipped and fully pressure requirement of 300 psi to eneet protectise features are specifted rather

'ramed fire hngade will satisfy this need. The Commission has determmed the NFPA standard than the desian basis fire. Three One commenter also pointed out that different means for protectma the safe

' hat a bngade of fise persons constitutes hoses should be mspected for mddew' shutdown capabihtv outside of the mimmum size sufficient to perform rot. cuts. or other damage Although this contamrnent are acceptable. The first the actions that may be required by the is a valid Comment. it is not an means is separdtion of redundant safe brigade durma the fire. azid to proude unresolved issue with any hcensee so it shutdown trams and associated circuits some maram for unanticipated esentsJ need not be covered by this rule. In bv means of 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated barners.

Similarly. the traming requirements hsted are considered the mimmum addition. such inspections are already The second means is a combmation of needed to ensure that the fire brigade bems performed in accordance with the separation of redundant safe shutdown pbnt s Techmcal Spec.ficaitons.

irams and associated circuits by a 1 will be aUe to function effectively F Automatic Fire Detecten Techmco/ hour fire rated barrier and automatic fire dunna a fire ernerigency.

~

The proposed rule required emergency Basis. Ihe requirement that automatic suppression and detection capabdin for breathmg apparatus without specifying fire detection systems be installed in all both redundant trams. The third means.

areas that contam safe shutdown or the number of such pieces of apparatus.

which may be used only when safety-related systems or components redundent trains and associated circuit's The rule has been modified to specify the personnel for whom such apparatus o ows generally accepted fin are separated by PO feet or more of clear is to be provided and to specify reserve protection practice. Installation of such space. requires automatic fire fire detection capability is mdependent suppression and detection systems in R Fire Bncode-Comment of any requirements for automatic or the area. An alternative or dedicated Resolution. Niany commenters suggested manual fire suppression capability in an safe shutdown capability mdependent of changmg this requirement to a simple area.The purpose of these detection the fire area is required if fire protection statement that a trained and equipped.

systems is to give early warnmg of fire for safe shutdown capability cannot be nommal size. site fire bngade of fise conditions in an area so that the fire provided as outlined above. For cables persons be provided on each shift unless

~

brigade can initiate prompt actions to mimmize fire damage withm the plant.

and equipment needed for safe a lesser number is justified. This shutdown located inside of noninerted rec mmended change was rejected by Comment Reso/ution contamments. a lesser degree of fire the Commission for the reasons stated Alany commenters suggested that the protection is permitted because in the Technical Basis.

words " automatic fire detection transient exposure fires are less likely Some commenters objected to the capability" be substituted for inside containment dunng plant exclusion of the shift supervisor from

" automatic fire detection systems" on operation Section 111.51. " Fire Barn.ers, the fire bngade. The commenters felt the basis that. as worded. the discusses the technical basis for the 3-that the shift supervisor should go to the requirements are too hmiting. They hour barner. and Section I!!.L fire and provide the benefit of his stated that an automatic spnnkler

" Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown expertise and authonty. The rule would system with appropriate alarm check Capability." discusses the techmcal not prevent this. However, the shift valves and central alarm features basis for safe shutdown capability supervisor may hate to go elsewhere provides acceptable detection /alarmma Comment Resolution dunng the course of a fire that adversely capabihty. Several commenters claimed affects plant operation. The fire brigade that a separate detection sy stem is not Ntany commenters suggested that the leader must stav with the fire bngade needed in areas covered by spnnkler first paragraph be changed slightly and and be assigned no other systems equipped with fusible Imk the rest of this section deleted. The responsibihties dunna a fire emergency.

spnnkler heads. A fusible hnk has a basis for their contention is that the rule therefore. the shift supervisor must be time delay before it actuates. However.

should state simply the requirement t excluded from membership on the fire more importantly. a smoldenng protect cables or equipment of systems brigade.

locahzed fire that could do damage may necessary for safe shutdown of the plant

1. Fire Bryade Troinmg-Comment not generate enough heat to melt the and leave specific tmplementation Resolution. Niany commenters have fusible link. Whde we do not disagree details m some other type of document.

that the alarm from an automatic fire We have modified this sectian by

% is discussed at tength m the NRC stafrs-suppression system serses as removing the listmg of considerations.

n aiumn of hmum rire Br sade sh,ri sire.

ad to a inwn are milabie from David notification that a fire exists. we deletmg Table 1. and revisma the concluded that the nunimum -

wordmg to provide clanfication.

['r

$ mis En*g"[En r

as c.

requirement for a separate fire detection H. Fire Brigade.

as3s

Federal Restister / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 / Rules and Resulations 76607 c.

i NRL pu unn cessar) de: si.

bre emergen ) and coerat as.moae moc.acation*.u ::rou.e vernatac r W. n; r sm f.c requ:remants for

n sa e p'.an* snutoown snoui not also shutdown n s; ems are estensise.

W m.ns'ru:::en. f;te fctmg nas e to De cencerned with !;gntmg m tn+>

dedicated s)s:em that is essentiad) a m

m h:,a :nL Some area. The >:iali cost differentiai mmmum cocabilits safe snutdown tram cow'ers 'e.t inat these r*quirements betw een 2. hour supply and the and is independent of those alread) were more detailed than an}thmg the substantial additional protection eustm2 mas be prosided. This mmimum Cem:ssi n has pubbshed with regard afforded by the 8-hour supply does not capabihty is required to maintain tne to aperater 'rammg The Commission w arrant reducmq this requirement. The process sanabies within tnose sa'aes here points out that most of the Commission has decided to require an G-predicted for a loss of offsite power. The ms estigations of the TM1 accident hour battery power supply in all areas case ofIcss of offsite power is assumed identified madequately tramed needed for operation of safe shutdown because fires in certam cart 'astances operators as an important factor and equipment and m access and egress (e g electncal distnbution system 4) that work is now bems done in this routes.

could cause or be related to such a loss.

area. The fact is not that the trammg K. Admmistrative Controls Techmcol Fire damage to cold shutdown capability requirements spelled out here for the fire Bosis. The fire protection program uses is limited to damage that can be brigade rnembers are excessive when admmistrative controls for fire repaired within ?2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to provide a compared to trammg requirements for prevention and prefire planmng. The margin in achievmg cold shutdown reactor operators, but that fire bngade stems hsted in this section are generally conditions. Consideration is given to tramma is further along m development, accepted within the fire protection associated circuits because most plants and trammg parameters that are commumty as mmimum requirements were not designed with this concept m essential to a comprehensive program for an effective admmistration of the fire mmd. Should either the alternata e or have been identified.

protection proaram. Controls are placed dedicated capability be required to J. Emegency Lghting Techmcc/

on the storage and use of combustible function because of a fire,it must not be Bcsis Emergency lightmg is required m matenals to reduce the fire loadmg in disabled by fire damage to associated all nuclear power plants. Battery-safety related areas and on igmtion circuits. Also, this capability does not powered hehts with capacities of 18's to sources to avoid careless operations.

have to meet the smgie failure entenon

hours is usually sufficient for Procedures are used to control actions because it is only one of severallevels emergency egress. However, the postfire to be taken by mdividuals who discover of defense. Seismic Category I critena is emergency hghtmg requirements m a a fire and by the fire bngade for the not imposed because fires that would nuclear power plant are of a different development of preplanned fire fightmg require the installation of alternative or kmd. The need is for lightmg that aids strategies and actual fire fighting dedicated shutdown capability are not

'he access to equipment and techniques.

seismically mduced.

t eYto eff ct Comment Resoludon Comment Resoludon op ra e b a t pers safeplant shutdown dunng plant Many commenters stated that this Many of the commenters stated that emersencies. Because such activities requiremer't was much too detailed for a this requirement exceeded the scope of may extend over a considerable '. nod regulation. Some stated that the Appendix R by defining alternative of time both during and after the fire. it requirements should apply only to those shutdown requirements. They stated is prudent to provide 8-hour battery arris having safe shutdown equipment.

that the time requirements are excessive emergency lighting capability to allow Other commenters stated that a simple and should be dropped. They also sufficient time for nonr.al lighting to be statement that admmistrative contend that this regulation does not restored with a marum for unanticipated procedures should be established to take into account the many plant control the vanous fire hazards reviews bemg conducted under the events.

throughout the plant was sufficient. and Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP).

Cmnment Resolution that the details could be spelled out in a It is generally understood that cold Many commenters stated that the regulatory guide or some other similar shutdown is the ultimate safe shutdown requirement for emergency lighting is document.

condition and that. for each fire area.

overly restnctive in three specifics: first.

Minor changes have been made in the different means may be used and may that emergency lighting is unnecessary wording of this requirement for be necessary to achieve cold shutdown.

in many of the designated areas; second. clarification.

Because a fire in certam areas at some that the requirement for sealed beam or L Alternottve ondDedicated plants would have the capability of fluorescent i. its is overly restnctive:

Shutdown Copobdity.

disabling systems required to achieve third, that the requirement for individual Techmcol Bosis. In some locations both hot and cold shutdown it is

8. hour battery power supply is (such as the cable spreading room) necessary to specify the minimum excessive. Three commenters within operatmg nuclear power plants. it capability and time requirement for each recommended a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> battery power is not always possible or practicable to condition necessary to achieve safe supply: five commenters recommended a protect redundant safe shutdown shutdown. We agree that evaluations plant specific power supply: and one systems asamst adverse effects of fire or bemg made under the Systematic commenter recommended that there be f:re suppression activities only through Evaluation Program (SEP) may also call no permanent installation.

the use of fire protection features for alternative or dedicated shutdown e

These sussestions have been accepted because the redundant safe shutdown capability for reasons other than fire m part L:gntmg umts with 8. hour systems m a given fire area are too close protection. For example. seismic, battery supplies are to be provided m all to each other. Alternative shutdown floodina. or emergency core coolma i

areas needed for operation of safe capabihty has usually been required to requirements resultmg from the SEP may shutdown equipment and m access and be mdependent of the control room, require additional modifications. Each egress routes thereto. The reasoning cable spreading room, switchgear rooms licensee should be aware of the status of benmd the requirement for an 8-nour and cable nser areas because redundant the SEP so that the requirements battery power supply is that there can systems in these areas are not resulting from SEP can be effectively be a great deal of other activity dunne a adequately separated. When plant.

mtegrated with those relat:ng to fire -

76608 Federal Rexister LLa L25/Wedmh %wm'arr 19 two Rules and Regu;ations pre to, to 'he "Wnt soviK required N "nwre ufe shutdown the notional consensus s!.indard.mi llowner. N Comm:sse has dended capabuts The w of.41.heur bm ner :n for testme and ratma these r.abm that 'he modific ations required to con l unction h aamatic fire penetration seals. Since the c.sbin compWe the fire protettion program suppressic

, j detection capability for conduct the heat through the barra r

should not be deferred until the SEP each redundant tram of safe shutdown and since the cable insulation is reuew is completed.

equipment is based on the followag combustible. the acceptanc% cntena of M. Fire Barners.

considerations. Automatic suppression the ASTM Standard E-119 relating to Techmca/ Basis. The best fire is required to ensure prempt. effective temperature on the unesposed side must protection for redundant trains of safe application of suppressant to a fire that be appropriately modified.

shutdown systems is separation by could endanser safe shutdown g,,,,,f g,,,jyfg, unpierced fire barners-walls and capability. The activation of an ceiling-floor assemblies. Because these automatic fire detection or suppression Some commenters suggested that this barriers are passive fire protection system does not occur until sufficient entire section be deleted and replaced features. they are mherently reliable smoke or heat has been deseloped by with the followmg two sentences:

provided they are properly mstalled and the fire. Therefore. the Commission is

" Penetration seals shall provide the maintained. Fire bamers have been requinng a 1. hour bamer to ensure that equivalent protection which is required used successfully for many years to fire damage will be limited to one tram of the fire barrier. Evaluation of the subdivide large potential fire losses into until the fire is extinguished.

penetration seals based upon a design smaller. more acceptable nsks. Even fire These requirements have now been review and relevant test data or barriers with openings have successfully incorporated in Section !!!.G, " Fire qualification tests may be made." The interrupted the progress of many fires Protection of Safety Functions /

commenters felt that sufficient test data provided the opemnes were properly are available to permit evaluation of C#**#"'N#88/"U""

protected by fire doors or other design requirements without full-scale

.icceptable means.

Several commenters made a number mockup testing and that many of the Fire bamers are " rated" for fire of suggestions of an editonal nature.

items spelled out in the regulation. such resistance by bemg exposed to a One suggestion was to add "or unless as the wa9r hose stream test, were too

" standard test fire". This standard test other fire protection features have been detailed and did not belona in the hre is defined by the Amencan Society provided to ensure equivalent regulation. The Commission hcs for Testing and Matenals m ASTN E.

protection"in the first paragraph. where reconsidered this issue and revised the 119. " Standard for Fire Resistance of three-hour rated fire bamers were rule to (a) require the use of Building Materials." Fire bamers are stipulated unless a lower rating wa9 noncombustible materials only in the commonly rated as having a fire justified by the fire hazards analysis.

construction of fire barrier penetration resistance of from 1 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Most T!'e Commission feels that this adds seals. (b) require fire barrier penetration

" Improved Risk" or "flighly Protected nothing in the way of clarification and sesis to be qualified by test; and (c)

Risk"(as classified by msurance the suggestion was not adopted. The require such tests to satisfy certain carners) industnal properties in the second paragraph requires that acceptance criteria.

United States require fire barriers to structural steel formmg a part of or O. Fire Doors.

have a resistance rating of to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

supporting any fire barrier have a fire Techmca/ Basis. Door openmgs in fire While a nuclear power plant has a resistance equivalent to that required of walls constitute another breach that low fire load. the potential the barrier. An example was given of must be protected. Fire doors that have consequences of fire are senous.

metal lath and plaster covering as bemg been tested and rated for certain fire Therefore, the Commission has selected one means of providing equivalent exposures are installed to protect these 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> has been as an acceptable protection. Several commenters stated openings. Fire doors frequently T'.I to mmimum fire resistance ratmg for fire that they thought this was too narrow protect the openings in which ney are bamers separating redundant trains for and would be interpreted by some installed because they are not fully i

safe shutdown systems. This will give people as the only acceptable method closed. Various methods are available to I

ample time for automatic and manual permitted. Since the example seemed to licensees to ensure that fire doors are in i

fire suppression activities to control any be confusing. a decision has been made proper operating condition and that they potential fire and for safe shutdown to eliminate it. Other comments to the will be closed dunng a fire. These activities to properly control the reactor. effect that the requirement was options are listed in Appendix R.

Many operating plants. or plants that excessively restnctive with reg.rd to Comment Resolunon are already built but that are not yet fire bamer penetrations, including fire l

operating. have both trains of safe doors and their associated frames and Many commenters stated that this shutdown equipment located in close F.rdware. and ventilation systems have requirement is too detailed and should proximity and a single fire could been acted upon by the staff and the be deleted. Minor editorial changes have damage or destroy the functional requirement as it had affected these been made in order to more clearly state capability of both redundant trains. If items. was deleted.

the requirements.

spectfic plant conditions preclude the N. Fire Barner Cable Penetranon Seal P. Reactor Coolant Pump Lubncation installation of a 3. hour fire barrier to Qualification.

System.

separate the redundant trains. a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> TechnicalBasis. Unpierced fire TechnicalBasis. Each reactor coolant i

l fire bamer and automatic fire barriers offer the best protection for pump motor assembly typically contams I

suppression system for each redundant separating redundant trams of safe?y.

140 to 220 gallons of lube oil. Oil leaking train will be considered the equivalent related or safe shutdown equipment.

from some portions of the lube oil of 3. hour barner.

However. these bamers must be pierced system may come m contact with If the 1. hour fire barrier and automatic for both cortrol and power esbles.

surfaces that are hot enough to igmte the fire suppression for each redundant These pene eations must be sealed to oil. The resulting fire could be large. and train cannot be provided because of achieve a degree of fire resistance access to the fire would be delayed plant specific conditions. alternative or equivalent to that required of the barrier because of the time required to enter the dedicated shutdowns capability will be that is pierced. ASTM Standard E-119 is contamment. Containent air temperatare l

1

Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 205 / %dnesday. November 19 19M / Rules.ind Recubimns 76609 would mcrease, sesere iocalized pump oil collectior sistem is cosered bs Cc Mts r w f to Nrc is 4r. a sie enuronments would deseiop in the area paragraph C because i's functan :s fcr a Sent ' t.

.. mn* re..ec mn ' ;

of the fire, and a larse amount of smoke required to protect s.ifety.related parform $mn funcnons m.N oc would be generated. These ccnditions svstems rather than to perform 4 safett idennfied f or eacn hra.ireo It fo; e could affect operability of safety.related function. Because the failure of the oil

hat ans issociated non-safety c:rcuits equipment mside containment.

collection system for a seismicall) en the f:re area that could adverse!y Therefore. an oil collection system is induced oil fire snould not present a affect the identified shutdown necessary to confme any oil discharged safety.related system from performin4 equipment by feeding back potentially due to leadkage or faihae of the its safety function (Regulatory Guide disabhng conditwns (e g.. hot shorts or lubncation system and to prevent it 1.29. " Seismic Design Classification."

shorts to ground] to the power supphes from becoming a fire hazard by drainmg paragtaph C.2) the oil collection system or control circuits of that equipment it to a safe location.These occurrences should be designed, engineered. and must also be evaluated. Of course such could be random or could be seismically installed so that its failure will not lead disabling conditions must be prevented induced because the existing tube oil to a fire affectmg safety.related to provide assurance that the identtfied system piping and oil collection systems equipment as a result of an earthquake.

safe shutdown equipment will function may not be designed to withstand a The proposed rule permitted tw design basis seimic event.

alternatives-an oil collection system or as designed. These requirements have now been incorporated in Section !!!.L Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1

{a

" Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown a

i sup s states that for opera:mg plants,

, postulated fires or fire protection supprersion system because Capability."

system failures need not be considered unacceptable damage may result to the Cornment Resolution safety.related systems from the bu*nma concurrent with other plant accidents. or of il before the suppression system is Many commenters stated that this the most severe natural phenomena..

actuated and because the fire water requirement should be deleted because The basis for that statement is two fold.

supply system is not designed to many older plant designs did not First, nuclear power plants are massive withstand seismic events. In addition, consider associated circuits and this is.

structures, and essential services are designed to withstand earthquakes and these pumps are lor.3ted within the therefore, a new design requirement.

bioloalcal shield inside containment.

The commenters felt that the analysis other natural phenomena. Second. the

• herefore, timely fire bngade action that will be required to satisfy this history of many fires associated witt.

w uld be difficult if the suppression requirement will be both long and recent earthquakes have been system malfuncti ns Further,if the complicated and the requirement should evt.luated. These evaluations showed suppression system becomes inoperable therefore be deleted.

that such fires usually are due to failure dunng peration. a fire watch or patrol The Commission retected these of piping or tanks of flammable gasses cann t enter the area during operation.

suggestions for the followmg reasons.

or liquide such as municipal natural gas distnbution systems or gasoline storage Comment Resolution

1. Virtually all of the fire protection modifications made to date have been and/or dispensing stations. Where such A number of commenters suggested potential fire hazards exist in nuclear that this section is too detailed and required to correct deficiencies that power plants (e.g., hydrogen for should be substantially modified. This resulted from lack of consideration of generator cooling, or oil fuel for the requirement was changed to delete the certain specific items dunng initial emergency diesel generator or station option of protecting the reactor coolant design and construction.

space heating boilers) they are design _ed pump lubncation system with an

2. The Browns Ferry fire showed the and installed to withstand the damse1 automatic fire suppression system. We necessity of divisional separation of the affects of various natural phenomena, have modified the rule to indicate that associated circuit of the control cables cnd other special fire protection features the requirement that the oil collection to prevent the disabling of safety are provided as necessary. However.

system be designed to provide systems by a single fire. This has been General Design Cnterion 2 Design Bases reasonable assurance that it will discussed with licensees dunng forProtection AgainstNotural withstand the Safe Shutdown evaluations of alternative and dedicated Phenomeno requires that structures.

Earthquake can be met by satisfytng shutdown capability and is necessary to systems, and components important to paragraph C.2. of Regulatory Guide 1.29.

ensure that safe shutdown systems will safety be designed to withstand the

" Seismic Design Classification." as be able to function properly m the event sffects of earthquakes without loss of desenbed above.

of fire.

capability to perform their safety Q. Associated Circuits.

3. The staff considers incomplete any function. Regulatory Guide 1.29.

TechnicalBasis. When considenng

" Seismic Design Classification."

the consequences of a fire in a given fire fire hazard analysis that does not e nsider the effects of fire damage to desenbes an acceptable method for area during the evaluation of safe circuits that are associated with safe identifying and classifying those shutdown capabilities of a plant. the features of light. water-cooled nuclear staff must be able to conclude that one shutdown systems.

power plants that should be designed to tram of equipment that can be used As indi:ated above, as a result of the withstand the effects of the Safe immediately to bnng the reactor to a hot comments received on this issue. it is Shutdown Earthquake. In this guide.

shutdown condition remains unaffected unclear that associated circuits have m paragraph C.1 applies to systems that by that fire. The staff must also be able fact been adequately considered by are required to remain functional to to conclude that damage to one train of licensees m their reviews usms the ensure heat removal capability; equipment used for achievmg cold guidance of Appendix A to BTP APCSB paragraph C.2 applies to systems that do shutdown wtll be limited so that the 9.5-1. To ensure that the associated not have to remam frunctional for that equipment can be returned to an circuits are considered all operatmq purpose, but whose failure could reduce operable condition withm 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. (See nuclear power plants will be required to the functioning of those systems covered Technical Basis for Section !!I.G.

meet the requirements of Section !!!.G of by paragraph C.1. The reactor coolant

" Protection of Safe Shutdown -

Appendix R.

• 6610 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations C neralCements Resolutwn:

shutdown capabihtv The Commission comments recen ed on the proposed Seural commenters contended that does not agree. We bebese that the regulations. other commenters Commiss:on regulations mandate that Commission s oserall fire protection demonstrated a thorough understanding an adiudicatory heanne be conducted pr gram int lymq estensive plant.

of the proposed requirements.

pnor to a fmal decision. One commenter specific fire protection modifications Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of labeled the regulation an " order" within that are based on guidance set forth in 1954. as amended the Energy the meanma of the Admmistrative Branch Techmcal Position BTP APCSB Reorganization Act of 1974. as amended.

Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 551(61)( APAl 9.5-1 and its Appendix A and the and Sections 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the and asserted that to CFR 2.004 of the spec fic requirements of Appendix R to Umted States Code, notice is hereby Commission's reaulations. Order for res Ive disputed issues provide utven that the following amendments to Modification of 1.icense." applies to this adequate fire protection.

Title 10. Chapter 1. Code of Federal One commenter stated that the Regulations. Part 50. are published as a rulemakma proceedmg.

The Commission disagrees with these ambiguity of the proposed regulation document subject to codification.

comments. A " rule"is defined in the with recard to critical items requires

1. A new i 50 48 is added to read as that it be renoticed. The commenter follows:

APA to mean "the whole or a part of an ee c th e P t ons o the agency statement of general or di d

I SO

N'"**'*"-

particular apphcability and future effect such ambiguity. They were Section III.G.

(4) Each operatmg nuclear power designed to implement or Section III.N. and Section III.Q. We have plant shall have a fire protection plan presenbe law or policy,,, (5 U.S C.

551t41) The agency action questioned rev ewed these examples.

that satisfies Cntenon J of Appendix A here is clearly one that treats similarly In reference to the first example, the to this part. This fire protection plan commenter stated that the first shall descnbe the overall fire protection situated licensees equally and that aragraph of Section !!! C identifies program for the facility, identify the fe u reIents For those licensees whoalternative shutdown capabilitv as an vanous positions withm the licensee's have not already provided an equivalent pt nal pr iective feature and that organization that are responsibile for the level of fire protection. certam specific paragraph !!!.G..c then identifies program. state the authonties that are alternatne shutdown capability as a delesated to each of these positions to fire protection features are required.

minimum fire protection feature. We do implement those responsibilities, and Vanous of these requirements would not agree with this statement. The first outhne the plans for fire protection. fire apply to approximately 40 facilities. The paragraph of Section 111.G identifies detection and suppression capability, commenter s charactenzation of the rule alternative shutdown capability as one arid limitation of fire damage. The plan as an order. along with the assertion option in a combmation of fire shall also desenbe specific features that to CFR 2.204 mandates a heanng protection features for a specific fire necessary to implement the program before the rule becomes finalis area. Paragraph III.G.3 mdicates when desenbed above. such as admirustrative incorrect. On its face that regulation this option should be used.

controls and personnel requirements for (which does grant a hearing nght)

In reference to the second example, fire prevention and manual fire applies only to Commission orders that the commenter stated that Section !!!.N suppression activities. automatic and modify a license.8 it does not apply to requires a pressure differential across manually operated fire detection and requirements promulgated through a the test specimen dunng the testing of suppression systems, and the means to rulemakmg action conducted in fire barner penetration seals but fa'ils to limit fire damage to structures, systems.

accordance with the requirements of define the pressure differential. This or components important to safety so applicable law.

comment is incorrect.The pressure that the capability to safely shut down Several comtnenters contended that differential called for by the proposed the plant is ensured.8 the environmentalimpact had not been provision was the maximum pressure (b) Appendix R to this part establishes adequately addressed. One commenter, differential that the barrier would fire protection features required to citing the requirements in Section Ill.A expenence in the specific plant satisfy Catenon 3 of Appendix A to this of Appendix R for two water supplies installation. In any event. the part with respect to certain generic i

and two separate redundant sections as requirement for pressure differential issues for nuclear power plants licensed examples of requirements mvolving during such testing has been deleted to operate prior to January 1.1979 environmental issues, contended that since only noncombustible matenalis Except for the requirements of Sections the Commission relied upon its staff's now being used for such seals.

III.G.111.[. and !!!.O. the provisions of

" unsupported determmation that.

In reference to the third example. the Appendix R to this part shall not be

[

pursuant to 10 CFR l 51.5(d). an commenter stated that Section !!!.Q is applicable to nuclear power plants environmental impact statement.

totally lacking in definition. We do not licensed to operate pnor to January 1.

i appraisal. or negative declaration is not aaree. Footnote 6 references Regulatory 1979. to the extent tnat fire protection required. The Commission has Guide 1.75 and IEEE Std 384-1974. The features proposed or implemented by considered Section Ill.A and has further latter document is a commonly used considered the remaming requirements mdustry standard that defines

.sauc r,r, pro,ecnon gu,danc, for nuct,ar power of Appendix R and ren~2ms conymced associated circuits and provides piants is contatned n two NRC documents:

that the regulations are not substantive guidance for ensunng that such circuits Branch Technical Position Auuhary Power a

and are insignificant from the standpomt do not compromise the independence of Conuruon 9:em Branch BTP APCSB 9 5-1.

of environmentalimpact.

the shutdown circuits they are

• • • • P"'"'"""""'""N"'""*"

One commenter suggested that all associated with.

NiedNy7s'd'"

plants be required to mstall dedicated Based on the above examples and our

. Appenais A to sTP APCSa o s.t. -c.iactines review of the other provisions of the for Fire P otecnon for Nuclear Power Plants

'tt snoi.id aiso ne noted taai i:204 :s cod.f:ed m proposed rule, we do not believe that M"ed Pnw to W 1. W6 ~ fw plants Mat wwe cpera' ins or under vanous stases of desisn er Subpart B of to CFR Part The uope of Subpart 8 the tuje as proposeg was amgiguous so construenon before July 1.19'6. dated Ausust :s.

i.s soecirkady omited to cases ininated by the staff as to require renoticing. Moreover, it 19-6.

..,,,,,,, 9mrements by oroer on a ticenwr rio CF1t :20m al) ; Emphasis sepphed )

should be noted that. based on other Also we Note 4

Federal Register > Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. Nosemeer 19. 1980 i Rules am iteciations ~6611

~

m i e w nur been uepted by the after the effer' ur date nf this sect:en det.tmmes aco e ng % the NRr e ;tf.n satisfying the prov:sions of and Appendis R to this part:

hcensee :nat t* i're ". :ond caf;se for Aca. maa A to Iltanch Technical (il the first refueima outaae:

• stcndina such da'e.ind th.it the puchc (a) a.otner plannec outage that lasts health and eatet :s not ads erielv Ntm IITP APCSB 1 %1* retlected in a

statf fire protection safety evaluation for at least 60 days; or affectec % se atens:on. Estensions reports issued pnor to the effective date (iii) an unplanned outage that lasts for of such date snail Nt exceed the dates al this rule. or to the extent that fire at least 120 days.

determmed by paragraphs Iclit t through protection features were accepted by (4) Those fire protection features that (c)(41 of this section.

the staff m comprehensive fire require pner NRC approval by (1) Those fire protection features that protection safety ev=luation reports paragraph (c)(5) of this section. shall be involve revisions of administrative f

issued before Appendix A to Branch implemented withm the followmg controls. manpow er channes. and Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1 schedule: Dedicated shutdown training shall be implemented within 4 was published m August 1978. With systems--30 months after NRC months after the date of the NRC staff respect to all other fire protection approval: modifications requinns plant Fire Protection Evaluation Report features covered by Appendix R. all shutdown-before startup after the accepting or requirina such features.

nuclear power plants licensed to operate earliest of the events given in paraaraph (2) Those fire protection features prior to january 1.1979 shall satisfy the (c)(3) commenemg 180 days after NRC involvmg installation of modtfications apphcable requirements of Appendix R approval; modifications not requinns not requinns prior approval or plant to this part including specifically the plant shutdown--6 months after NRC shutdown shell be implemented w: thin requirements of Sections Ill.G. !!!.l. and approval.

12 months after the date of the NRC (5)1.icensees shall make any staff Fire Protection Safety Evaluation lif O.

m difications necessary to comply with Report accepting or requinna such (c) All fire protection modifications these requirements in accordance with features.

require to satisfy the provisions of the above schedule without pner revtew (3) Those fire protection features.

Appendix R to this part or directly and approval by NRC except for including alternative shutdown affected by such requirements shall be m difications required by Section !!!.G.3 capability, involving installation of corr.pleted on the followmg schedule:

of Appendix R to this part. I.icensees modifications requirina plant shutdown (11 Those fire protection features that shall submit plans and schedules for shall be implemented before the startup mvolve revisions of administrative meeting the provisions of paragraphs after the earliest of the followmg events controls, manpower changes, and (c)(2) (c)(3), and (c)(4) within 30 days commencmg 9 months or more after the trainina. shall be implemented within 30 after the effective date of this section date of the NRC staff Fire Protection days after the effective date of this and Appendix R to this part. I.icensees Safety Evaluation Report accepting or section and Appendix R to this part.

shall submit design descriptions of requinns such features:

(2) Those fire protection features that modifications needed to satisfy Section (i) The first refueling outage:

involve installation of modifications that !!!.G.3 of Appendix R to this part within (ii) Another planned outage that lasts do not require prior NRC approval or 3C days after the the effective date of for at least 60 days; or plant shutdown shall be implemented this section and Appendix R to this part.

(iii) An unplanned outage that lasts within 9 months after the effective date (6)In the event that a request for for at least 120 days.

of this section and Appendix R to this exemption from a requirement to comply (4) Those fire protection features part.

with one or more of the provisions of involving dedicated shutdown cap 6bility (3) Those fire protection features.

Appendix R filed within 30 days of the requinns new buildings and systems except for those requinng pnor NRC effective date of this rule is based on an shall be implemented within 30 months approval by paragraph (c)(5) of this assertion by the licensee that such of NRC approval. Other modifications section that involve installation of required modifications would not requinng NRC approval prior to modifications that do require plant enhance fire protection safety in the installation shall be implemented within shutdown, the need for which is justified facility or that such modifications may 6 months after NRC approval.

in the plans and schedules required by be detrimental to overall facility safety.

(e) Nuclear power plants licensed to the provisions of paragraph (c)(5) of this the schedule requirements of paragraph operate after january 1.1979. shall section, shall be implemen:ad before (c) shall be tolled until final Commission complete all fire protection startup after the earliest of the following action on the exemption request upon a modifications needed to scrisfy events commencmg 180 days or mor, determination by the Director of Nuclear Cntenon 3 of Appendix A to this part in Reactor Regulation that the licensee has accordance with the provisions of their provided a sound technical basis for licenses.

'Canricanon and sundance with respect to per.n..itne alternauves to sausfy Appendix A to such assertion that warfants further

2. A new Appendix R is added to RTP APCSB W1 he been provided in four other staff review of the request.

10 CFR Part 50 to read as follows:

S op r n'ary Guidance on Informanon gY

.'R f

F o tio Appendix R-Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to Needed for Fire P otection Evaluation." dated Safety Evaluation Reports referred to in g,,,,,y3,3g.,

Orecoer 21 1976 unie Tecnmcal specificanon? dated May paragraph (b) of this section and 1: ter supplements to such reports. other than I. Introduction and Scope Nuc.w Pf ant Fire Prorection Funcuonai features covered by paragraph (c). shall This Appendix apphes to beensed nuclear Responsi%t.es Admimstrahve Control and be Completed as soon as practicable b 21 powe Mecmc generahng stations that were

" ".'"e'R equiremems for Orerat'"8 no later than the completion date oP"at na pnor to January 1.19*9 except to

#'d'""'"*

the extent set forth in paragraph 50 481b) of

• Wepo Currently specified m license conditions

'Ns pm With respect to certain tenenc R e. curs d.'ed Mav tt :s?a.

A F re Pro!echan Safet) Esaivation Report tnet or technical specifications for such issues for such facthties it sets forth fire

%. heer %ed for eacn operanns plant states no" facility, or the date determmed by protection features requred to satisfy d

Nf! s a n fiI, roUctUn

'Ne paragraphs (d)(1) through (d)(4) of this Cntenon 3 of Appendix A to this part.'

nuest section, whichever is sooner. unless the rum.ca once me f.cility sausfies tne.pprepnat, repremeras of Appeedit R to inis part Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

'see focincie 4

76612 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 2." ! Wednesday. Nos ember 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations Critermn 3 of Mpendis A to than part program shit establish the tire protection a Alternctive or Dedicated Shareca >

specihes ena' ' Strutures. sssieme and pokey for the protect,on of structures.

Capabt/ sty componen's impcrtant to safety snall ba sy stems, and components important to safets in areas where the fire protectan feaves descened and located to minimire. consistent at earn plant and the procedures equipment.

cannot ensure safe shutdown capabsts m with omer safets requirements. the and personnel required to implement the the esent of a fire in that area aitername or probabihty and effect of fires and program at the piant site.

dedicated safe shutdown capaciht) s.aC tie espiosions "

The fire protection program sha!! be under prouded.

When considenna the effects of fire. tnose the direction of an individual who has t;een M Specific %umments s> stems assoristed with achieving and delegated authonty commensurate with the mamtainma safe shutdown conditions responsibihties of the position and who has A. Water Supphes /Or f re Suppressmn assume maior importance to safety because available staff personnel knowledeeable m Systems d mage to them can lead'to core damage both fire protection and naclear safety Two separate water supphes snail be r:sulting from loss of coolant throuah boiloff.

The fire protection program shall estend provided to furmsh necessary waier volume The phrases "important to safety." or the concept of defense.m-debth to fire and pressure to the fire mam loop

" safety.related." will be used throughout this protection in fire areas important to safety.

Each supply shall consist of a storaae tare Appendix R as applymg to all safety with the followmg objectives:

pump. pipmg. and appropnate isolation and to present fires from startmg-control sakes. Two separate redundant functions The phrase " safe shutdown" will e

be used throughout this Appendin R as e to detect rapidly. control. and extmguish suctions m u.s or more intaka structures epplymg to both hot and cold shutdown promptly those fires that do occur; from a large body of water (nver. lake. etc.)

functions

• to provide protection for structures.

will satisfy the requirement for two separated Because fire may affect safe shutdown sy stems, and components important to safety water storage tanks. These supplies snall be systems and because the loss of function of so that a fire that is not promptly separated so that a failure of one supply will systems used to mittaate the consequences of estmguished by the fire suppression activities not result m a failure of the other supply design basis accidents under postfire will not prevent the safe shutdown of the Each supply of the fire water distnbution conditions does not per se impact public plant.

system shall be capable of providing for a szfety. the need to hmit fire damase to B. Fue Hozords Anolysis penod of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> the msv.imum expected systems required to achieve and maintam A fae hazards analysis shall be performed water demands as determmed by the fire sife shutdown conditions is greater than the by qualified fire protection and reactor hazards analysia for safety.related areas or need to hmit fire damage to those systems systems engineers to (t) consider potentialin other areas that present a fire exposure requ. red to mitigate the consequences of situ and transient fire hazards. (2) determme hazard to safety.related areas.

d: sign basis accidents. Three levels of fire the consequences of fire m any location in When storage tanks are used for combined damage hmits are estabhshed accordmg to the plant on the abihty to safely shut down service. water / fire. water uses the mmimum the safety functions of the structure, system.

the reactor or on the abihty to mminure and volume for fire uses shall be ensured by or component; control the release of radioactivity to the means of dedicated tanks or by some environment: and (3) specify measures for physical means such as a verticai standpipe fire prevention, fire detection fire for other water service. Admmistrative s v i,,,,,oo u

suppressiort. and fire containment and controls, including locks for tank outlet moisruao.a

_ on. v.a e manciwe -, to alternative shutdown capability as required valves, are unacceptable as the only means

• • • ao' waaa **" ** for each fire area contaming structures, to ensure mmimum water volume.

" Q,""j ",,

systems, and components important to safety Other water systems used as one of the m accordance with NRC guidelines and two fire water supphes shall be permanently e =. a.m.,. e, a.ng. =a

=8u'eg an.ooew. w. '

regulations, connected to the fire main system and shall Cet h - Bom sas W mampai nl

=

C. Fire Prevention features be capable of automallC ahgnment to the fire Fire protection features shall meet the mam system. Pumps, controls. and power

,q 9,

oswena av. was. =..nceuinne sa o.w. w. aus a m.se muss following general requirements for all fire supplies in these systems shall satisfy the ta m'"*d so mat 8 *** a w areas that contam or present a fire hazard to requirements for the mam fire pumps. ' Die

'*"**n'*n*,,*'*

structures, systems, or components important use of other water systems for fire protection to safety.

shall not be incompatible with their functions Dae e som van m.aemere a.c v

1. In situ fire hazards shall be identifled required for safe plant shutdown. Failure of

^"""*

""*'**"*"""***"c**

and suitable protection provided.

the other system shall not degrade the fbe U,."'.'.,",

e"sse"'"w' oe"u*r.'

2. Transient fire hazards associated with main system.

=.

normal operation. maintenance, repair. or B.Sectionallsolation Volves modification activities shall be identified and Sectionalisolation valves such as post

' raw.,. os na wom,. w... ** * * >*a na ehminated where possible. Those transient mdicator valves or key operated valves shall

", *1.c".,m*,"o in.u7.'.*m".rn. h.nw."e*".u'c".'

• fire hazards that can not be elimmated shall be installed in the fire mem loop to permit m'" *,

a e an i

ca ** be controlled and suitable protect;on isolation of portions of the fire main loop for 7,W*M ",'M"."n e.=*",m,.Eniaa-a "..T provided.

maintenance or repair without interrupting m.

=.

au=***

1 Fire detection systems. portable the entire water supply.

C.'a""m"'* ".i. Yea'a*=Ici.svah* c"o"n"e."w'. " extmguishers and standpipe and hose C. Hydront Isolation volves

~

u oe=eaa==<=we=* w avmamume oma stations shall be installed.

Valves shall be mstalled to permit isolation

4. Fire barners or automatic suppression of outside hydrants from the fire mam for The most strmgent fire damass limit shall systems or both shall be installed as mamtenance or repair without interruptmg apply for tnose systems that fallinto more necessary to protect redundant systems or the water supply to automatic or manual fire than one category Redundant systems used components necessary for safe shutdown.

suppressirn systems m any area containmg to mitigate the consequences of other design i A site fire bngade shall be estabbshed, or presentmg a fire hazard to safety-related basis accidents but not necessary for safe tramed. and equipped and shall be on site at or safe shutdown equipment.

shutdown may be lost to a smgie esposure all times.

D. Manual fire Suppression fire. However. protection shall be provided so

6. Fire i ection and suppression systems Standpipe and hose systems shall be that a fire withm only one such system will shall be designed. installed. matntamed. and mstalled so that at least one effective hese not damage the redundant system.

tested by personnel properly quahfied by stream will be able to reach any location that experience and trammg m fire protection con'ams or presents an exposure fire hazard

11. Cencro/ Requirements systems to structures. systems, or components A. fire Protection Progrom

7. Surveillance procedures shall be important to safety.

A fire protection program shall be estabbshed to ensure that fire barners are m Access to permit effective functionmg of astabbshed at each nuc! car power plant. The place and that fire suppression systems and the fire brigade shall be provided to all areas components are operable.

that contam or present an exposure fire

Federal Register / Vol 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76E13

'azard to structures. systems. or compo: ents hour ratma. In amtmq fee detectors a,c an Ins'!tute for Oe.ipationa; Sa6>'s inrt

m

ortant to safen automat:c fire suppressmn nsiem she ae Heabh-apprnal fow 3 m m *e t' %

5'andpite and hose stations snail be mside :nsta!!ed m the f.re area Bureau cf %nes) snail be rmsicad W f:re PWR :ontamments and SWR contamments Inside nonmer+ed contamments one of the bnaade damage contro!. and controi teor,

' hat are not mer'ed Stancpipe and hose f;re protection means specif:ed moose or one personnel. At ! east to masas snol be stations msade contamment may be of the followeg fire protection means snail available for fire bnaade personnei Conrrol connected to a high qua; tty water supply of be provided room personnel may be furnished breathina sufficient quantity and pressure other than J. Separation of cabies and equipment and air by a manifold system piped from a the fire mam ioop if plant-specific features associated non. safety circuits of redandant storage reservoirif practical Service or rated present extendmg the fire mam supply inside trams by a honzontal distance of more than operstmg hfe shall be a mmimum of one half contatnment. For BWR drywells. standpipe 20 feet with no mtervening combustibles or hour for the self-contamed units.

and hose stations shall be placed outside the fire hazards:

At least two extra air bottles shall be dry well with adequate lengths of hose to

e. Installation of fire detectors and an located on site for each self. contained reach any location inside the dry well with automatic fire suppression system m the fire breathing unit. In addition, en onsite e hour a1 effective hose stream.

area; or supply of reserve air shall be provided and E. Hydrostot/c Hose Tests

f. Separation of cables and equipment and arranged to permit quick and complete Fire hose shall be hydrostat2cally tested at associated non-safety circuits of redundant replerushment of exhausted suppiy air bottles a pressure of 300 psi or SC psi above trams by a noncombustible radiant energy as they are returned. If compressors are used ma x: mum fire mam operaung pressure.

shield.

as a source of breathms air.only units wn :hever is greater. Hose stored in outside

3. Alternative or dedicated shutdown approved for breathing air shall be used.

hose houses shall be tested annually. Intenor capabihty and its associated circuits."

compressors shall be operable assumma a standpipe hose shall be tested every three independent of cables. systems or loss of offsite power. Special care must be compone'its in the area. room or zone under taken to locate the compresso* in areas free years.

F Automatic fire Detection considerauen. shall be provided; of dust and contammants.

Automatic fire detection systems shall be a Where the protection of systems whose

1. Fire Bngode Trosning mstalled m all areas of the plant that contam funct on is required for hot shutdown does The fire bneede trammg program shall or preunt an esposure fire hazard to safe not satisfy the requirement of paragraph G 2 ensure that the capabihty to fiant potential shutdown or safety-related systems or

' f this section; or fires is estabhshed and mamtamed. The components These fire detection systems

b. Where redundant trams of systems proaram shall consist of an mittai classmom shall be capable of operstmg with or wt hout required for not shutdown located in the matruction program followed by panodic offstte power.

name fire area may be subject to damage classroom matruction. fire fightma pracuce.

C. Fire Protection ofSofe Shutdc.vn ire suppressier. actmties or from t'ie and fire dnlls:

Copobihty rupture or inadvertent operation of fire

1. Instnaction

1. Fire protection features shall be provided suppression systems.

a. The truual classroom metruction shall in addition. fire detection and a fixed fire melude:

for structures. systems. and components important 13 safe shutdown. These features suppression system shall be installed in the (1)Indoctnnation of the plant fire fightmg area. room. or zone under consideration.

plan with specific identification of each shall be capable ofItmitmg fire damage so that:

H. Fire Brigode individual's responsibitines.

a. One tra.n of systems necessary to A site fire bngade tramed and equipped for (2) Identification of the type and location of achieve and memtam hot shutdown fire fighting shall be established to ensure fire hazards and associated types of fires that conditions from either the control room or adequate manual fire fightmg capability for could occur m the plant.

emergency control station (s)is free of fire all areas of the plant contammg structures.

(3) De toxic and corrosive charactenstics systems. or components imponant to safety.

of espected products of combust on.

damage. and

b. Systen.s r ecenary to achieve and The ' ire bngade shall be at least five H) Identification of the location of fire mamtam cold shutdown from either the members on each shd. The bngade leader fighting equipment for each fire area and t

and at least two brtgede members shall have familianzation with the layout of tne plant.

control room or emergency control station (s) can be repatred withm 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> sufficient trammg m or knowledge of plant including access and egress routes to each

2. Except as provided for paragraph G.3 of safety related systems to understand the area.

effects of fire and fire suppressants on safe (5) The proper use of available fire flahting this section. where cables or equipment.

shutdown capability. The quahfication of fire equipment and the correct method of fightmg includmg associated non safety circuits that bngade members shallinclude an annual each type of fire.ne types of fires covered could prevent operation or cause physical exammation to determme their should include fires in energized electncal maloperation due to hot shorts. open circuits.

ability to perform stenuous fire fighting equipment. fires m cables and cable traya.

or shorts to ground. or redundant trams of activities. The shift supervisor shall not be a hydrogen fires. fires involvmg flammable and systems necessary to achieve and maintain member of the fire bngade. The bngade combustible ligtuds or hazardous process hot shutdown conditions are located withii leader shall be competent to assess the chemicals, fires resultma from construction or p tential safety c neequences f a f te and m difications (welding). and record file fires.

nta o of h ol of advise control room personnel. Sucn (6) The proper use of communication, ensunne that one cf the reaundant trains is competence by the bngade leader may be lighting. ventilation. and emeritency breathing free of fire damage shall be provided; evidenced by possession of an operator's equipment.

a. Separation of cables and equipment and Itcense or equivalent knowledge of plant (7) The proper method for fiahting fires associated non. safety circuits of redundant safety-related systems.

Inside buildmss and confined spaces.

trains by a fire barner having a 3-hour retmg-The mmimum equipment provided for the (8) The direction and coordmation of the Structural s eel forrr:ms a part of or hngade snall consist of personal protective fire fightmg activities (fire bnsade leaders supportmg scch fire barners shall be equipment such as turnout coats, boots.

only).

protected to prgvide fire res: stance glos es. hard hats. emergency commumcations (9) Detailed review of fire fighting equivalent to tra required of the barner-equipment, portable hgnts. portable strategtes and procedures

b. 4paration of cables and equipment and ventilation equipment. and portable (10) Review of the lamt plant associated non. safety c:rcuits of redundant estmauishers. Self-contamed breathm8 modifications and correspondmg changes m trams by a honzontal Ustance of more than apparatus usmg fail face positive-pressure fire fiahtmg plans.

20 feet with no interunmg combustible or masks approved by NIOSH (National fire hazards. In add: tion. fire detectors and an Note.-Items (9) and (101 may be deleted automatic fire suppression system shall be from the trammg of no more than two of the matiu shutd wn capabdity is peded by non operations personnel who may be metaded m the fire area: or reroutma. relocatirg or mod.ficatmg of existmq anianed to the fire bngade.

c. Enclosure of cable and equipmen' and systems dedicated stiutdown capstnhty is provided associated non-safety circuits of one by metadma new structures and systems for the

b. The matruction shall be provided by redundant tram.3 a fire barner havitig a 1 function of post-fire shutdown.

qualified individuals who are knowledgeable.

s c> -

76614 Federal Register / Vol 45. No 25 / Wednesday. Nosember 19.1980 l Ruies and Reculations

'.& tr.oned m f.amma bnaade. and selecnon placement and uw of rew.r-d add.t:enal fire prritection m the espenemec e Setspes er %

' > i mr ur m the plant equipment and fire f shtms strateg:es.

u *r= c!mts procedure ed an e ;

• s n.w o' wpment as.nlable

21 Assessment of each tneade member s i Gmern the ce of isn

tion mourres bs use

.n ne.wwar 1 w r pLnt know! edge of his or her reie m ":e f:re of.a flame permit svste': *o c.)ntrol we:d.ng.

Inst urtion ea tie pr.mded to a'.1 fire f.shtit a strategy for the area assumed to f'ame cuttma, braziria or soidenna t

bngace memrwrs 4nd fire bnsade leaders contam the f:re. Assessment of the bneade operations A separate permit snail he :ssued d Revu ar planned meetmas shall be held member a conformance with estabbsbed for each area where work i, to be done. If at least ears 3 months for all bngade plant fire fightmg procedures and use of hre work contmues over more than one shift. the members to renew changes m the fire figntma equipment. mcludmg self contamed permit shall be valid for not more than 24 protection program and other subiects as emersency breathing.pparatus.

hours when the plant is operatme or for the necessarv.

rommumcation equipment and ventilation duration of a particular job danns plant

e. Penodic refresher trammg sessions shall equipment. to the extent practicable.

shutdown.

be held to repeat the classroom instniction (3) The simulated use of fire fiahtms

6. Control the removal from tne area of all program for all bneade members over a two-equipment required to cope with the situation waste. debns. scrap. oil spilis. or other year penod. These sessions may be and type of fire selected for the dnll. The combustibles resultmg from the wori actmty concurrent with the reitular planned area and type of fire chosen for the dnll immediatei) followms completic,n of the meetmas.

snould differ from those used m the previous actiuty. or at the end of each work shift.

1 Prochce drill so that bngade members are tramed in whicheser comes first Practice sessions shall be held for each fianting fires m vanous plant areas The i Mamtam the penodic housencepma sh.ft fire bngade on the proper method of siti.ation selected snould simulate the size mspections to ensure contmued comphance fightmg the vanous types of fires that could and arrarisement of a fire that could with these admimstrative controls occur m a nuclear power plant.These reasonably occur m the area selected.

8. Control the use of specific combustibles sessions snail proude bngade members with allowms for fire deselopment due to the time

n safety related areas. A!! wood used m espenence m auud fire estmamshment and required to respond. to obtam equipment. and saferprelated areas dunng mamienarice.

the use of emergency breathmg apparatus organize for the fire. assumme loss of modification. or refuehng operations Isuch as

~ der strenuous conditions encountered in automatic suppression capabihty.

lay-down blocns or scaffoldmel shall be fira fightina These practice sessions shall be (4) Assessment of bngade leader's treated with a flame retardant. Equipment or prouded at least once per year for each fire direction of the fire fightmg effort as to supphes tsuch as new fuel) shipped n bnsade member thoroughness. accuracy, and effectneness.

untreated combustible pach ma contamers

3. Dn!/s

4. Records may be unpacked m safet)-related eas if

a. Fire brigade dn!!s shall be performed m Indindual records of traimna prouded to required for vahd operatmg reasons.

the plant so that the fire bngade can practice each fire bngade member. mcludma dnll Howeser. all combustible matenals shall be as a team-cntiques. shall be mamtamed for at least 3 temosed from the & immediatel) following

b. Dnlis shall be performed at regular years to ensure that each member receives the unpackmg. Such tran.3nt combustible mtervals not to exceed 3 months for each tramms in all parts of the trammg program.

matenal unless stored m app.Ned shift fire bngade. Each fire bngade member These records of traimng shall be available contamers. shall not be left unatte.ded should participate in each dnll. but must for NRC review. Rettamme or broadened dunng lunch breaks. shift changes or other participate m at least two dnlls per year.

trammg for fire fightmg withm buildmgs shall similar penods. Loose combustible packmg A sufficient number of these Jnils. but not be scheduled for all those bngade members matenal such as wood or paper excelsior, or less than one for each shift hre bnaade per whose performance records show polyethylene sheetmg shall be placed m

) ear. shall be unannounced to determme the deficiencies.

metal contamers with tight-fittmg self-closma hre f'ahtma readmess of the plant fire I. Emergency Lightmg metal covers.

bngade. bneade leader. and fire protection Emersency lightma umts with at least an 8-

9. Control actions to be taken by an systems and equipment. Persons plannmg hour battery power suppiv shall be prouded mdmdual discos enng a fire. for esampie.

and authonzmg an unannounced dnll shall m all areas needed for operation of safe notification of control room. attempt to ensure that the respondmq shift fire bngade shu'down equipment and in access and extmguish fire, and actuation of local fire members are not aware that a dnllis bemg egress routes thereto.

suppression systems.

planned until it is begun. Unannounced dnMs K. Admimstrotwe Contm/s

10. Control actions to be taken by the shall not be scheduled closer than four Ad nimstrative controls shall be control room operator to determme the need weeks.

estabhshed to mmimize fire hazards in areas for hngade assistance upon report of a fire or At least one dnll per year shall be contammg structures. systems. and receipt of alarm on control room annunciator 1

performed on a "back shift" for each shift fire components important to safety. These p nel for example. announcmg location of fire over PA system soundmg fire alarms.

bngade.

controls shall estabhsh procedures to:

c. The dnlis shall be preplanned to

1. Govern the hand!mg and limitation of the and notifymg the shift superusor and the hre estabbsh the tramma obiectives of the dnll use of ordmary combustible materials.

bngade leader of the type. size. and location and shall be entiqued to determme how well combustible and flammable gases and of the fire.

the traming objectives have been met.

liquids. high efficiency particulate air and

11. Control actions to be taken by the fire Unannounced dnlis shall be planned and charcoal filters dry son exchange resms. or bngade after notification by the control room cntiqued by members of the manasement other combustible supphes m safety.related operator of a fire, for *xample assembling m staff responsible for plant safety and fire areas.

a designated location. recemne directions protection. Performance deficiencies of a fire

2. Prohibit the storage of combustibles m from the fire bngade leader. and dischargmg bneade or of indiudual fire bnsade members safety-related areas or estabbsh designated specific fire fightmg responsibihties mcludme snW1 be remedied by scheduhne additional storare areas mth appropnate fire selection and transportation of fire fightmg

't mme for the bnatade or members protection, equipment to fire location. selection of Unsatisfactory dnll performance shall be 3 Govern the handhng of and hmit protectne equipment. operstmg mstructions fellowed by a repeat dnll withm 30 days.

transient fire loads such as combustible and lor use of hre suppression systems. and use e At Fyear mtervals. a randomly selected flammable hquids. wood and plastic of preplanned strategies for fightmg hres in mannounced dnll shall be entiqued by products. or other combustible matenals m specinc areas.

gaahfied mdmduals independent of the buildmgs contammg safety related sutems

10. Define the strateeies for fightma fires m bcensee s staff A copy of the wntten report or equipment durma a.1 phases of operatma.

ait safet).related areas and areas pre,entmg from such mdividuals snail be available for and especially dunna maititenance.

a hazard to safety-related equipment. These NRC reuew modification. or refueimg operations.

Strategies shall designate:

e Dnus shall as a mammum mclude the 4 Designate the onsite staff member a Fire hazards m each area covered by the fouowmr responsible for the mplant f:re protection specihc prehre plans.

f tl Assessment of fire alarm effectner ?ss.

review of pnpesed work actmties to identify

b Fire estmguishants best suited for -

time reqa; red to notify and assemb!r fire potential transient f:re hazards and specify controlhne the hres associated with the fire

/

Federal Rettster / Vol 43. No. 225 / Wednesdas. November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76615 seccawi and bart ers between traws and

,,m e ecec xat.r cuant m : ame tre ma n' e n e m.v. -

" - N e an*s 3WRi ana oc w th:n the.esel ed.catio i."

conti's contamir a essocuted circuits of one W m 3 me re t on frr weten c

'ne p essanzer ict PWRs safe enuidown dmsien and 'ravs and

, eacn area e s:ew c! ne c P.e reactar neat remos al f anct:en sr. ail concwts contamms associated circuits or x.

ectmn access Mwn i:tts ce apso.c of acnicung and me.ri'ainmg safe shutdown caties from the reaundant c

w..m are mest I ne.) to te :ree 21

.:ecas neat rer-os al.

divis.cn. or the inciation of these associated ana r e best s'at.on or etesat:on for a The process tr:anitoring function shad be circuits from the safe snutdown equipment.

. ir f c rt ?Pe f. e All.srcese anc caress routes ca:able ni prcud.ng d: rect readings of the snell be such that a postulated fire involyms N m u r lmed ocors snow;d ee

rocess s ariseles riecessary to perform and assoc

ated c:rcuits will not present safe sw. fica!h identified m the procedure with centrol the above functions shutdown?

me ac:ropna'e precautions and methods for e The st.pportmg functions shall be M. Are Borner Cable Penetration Sco/

accass specif.ed.

capable of providing the process cooimg.

Quahficotton d Plant systems that should be managed to lubrication, etc necessary to permit the Penetration seal designs shall utihze only reduce 'he damage pctentini dunna a local cperation of the equipment used for safe noncombustible matanals and shall be f:re and the location of local and remote shutdcwn functions.

qualified by tests that are comparable to tests contrels for such management te a. any

3. The shutdown capability for specific fire used to rate fire bemers. The acceptance hy draul:e cr eiectncal systems m the zone areas may be unique for each such area. or it entena for the test shallinclude.

cesered by the specific fire f:qntmg procedure may be one unique combination of systems

1. The cable fire bemer penetration seal inat could tecrease the hazards m the area for all such areas. In either case. the has withstood the fire endurance test without occause of oserpressunrat:on or e:ectncal alternatne shutdown capabthty shall be passage of flame or tgmtion of cables on the hazards 1

.ndependent of the spec:fic fire ares (s) and unexposed side for a penod of time e %tal heat. sensitive system components shall acccmmodate postfire conditions where equivalent to the fire resistance ratma that need to te kept cool whne fiantmg a offsite power is available and where offsite required of the bemer-

ocal f;re particularly hazardous power is not availaole for ?: hours

2. The temperature levels recorded for the c.x-ouwbies that need coolmg should be Proceoures shall be m effect to implement unexposed side are anai>ted and des;anated in:s capability.

oemonstrate that the mastmum temperature f Organization of fire figt: ting br:gades and 4 If the capaedity to achiese and mamtam is suffic2ently below the cable moulation the assignment cf s;ec:al dut:es accordine to celd shutdown wi!! not be available because igmtion temperature: and oo ':te so ' hat ail fire f:shtme functions are of fire damage. the equipment and systems

3. The fire bemer penetration seal remains ces ered by any come.ete shift personnel compr: sing the means to acnieve and mtact and does not allow proiection of water ccmplement. These duties melude command mamtam the hot standby or hot shutdown beyond the unexposed surface dunns the control of the bngade. transporting fire condition shal' be capable of memtamma hose stream test.

suppression and support equiprnent to the fire such conditions until cold shutdown can be N. Are Doors scenes. appiving the extinguishant to the f:re.

achieved. If such equipment and systems will Fire doors shall be self-clooms or provided commumcation with the centrol room and not be capable of bems powered by both with closma mechamsms and shall be coordination with outside fire departments.

onsite and offsite electnc power systems mspectt semiannually to venfy that a Potential radtoiogical and toxic hazards because of fire damage. an mdependent automatic hold-open, release, and closms m fire zones onstte power system shall be provided. The mechanisms and latches are operable.

h Ventilation system opsration that number of operstmg shift personnel, One of the followmg measures shall be ansures desired plant air distnbution when exclusive of fire bngade members, required prouded to ensure they will protect the the ventilation l'ow is mod:fied for fire to operate such equipment and systems shall openmg as required m case of fire:

containment or smoke cleanng operations.

be on site at all times.

1. Fire doors shall be kept closed and i Operations requinna control room and 5 Equipment and systems compnsing the electncally supervised at a contmuously shift enameer coordination or authonzation.

means to achieve and mamtain cold manned location:

1 Instructions for plant operators and shutdown cenditions shall not be damaged

2. Fire doors shall be locked closed and aeneral plant personnel danng fire by fire; or the fire damage to such equipment inspected weekly to venfy that the doors are L Alretrative end Dedicated Shutdown and systems shall be limited so that the in the closed position:

Capabibry systems can be made operable and cold

3. Fire doors shall be provided with L Alternative or dedicated shutdown shutdown achieved withm 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

automatic hold.open and release mechanisma capability provided for a specifte fire area Matenals for such repairs shall be readily and mopected datly to venfy that doorways are free of obstructions: or snail be able to achieve and memtam ava:lable on site and procedures shall be in subcntical reactmty conditions m the effect to implement such repatrs. If such

4. Fire doors shall be kept closed and reactor. rnamatn reactor coolant eventory equipment and systems used prior to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> inspected daily to venfy that they are in the achiese and matntam hot standb> '

after the fire will not be capable of bems closed posmon.

conditions for a PWR (hot shutdown "or a powered by both onsite and offatte electnc The fire bngsde leader shall have ready BWR) and achieve cold shutdown '

power systems because of fire damage an access to keys for any locked fire doors.

conditions withm 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and maintam cold mdependnet onsite power system shall be Areas protected by automatic total flooding gas suppression systems shall have shutdown conditions thereafter. During the provided. Equipment and systems used after electncally supervised self-cloems fire doors postf:re snutdown. the reactor coolant system 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> may be powered by offette power or shall satisfy option 1 above.

process vanables shall be mamtamed withm

only, O. Oil Collection System for Reactor those ;,redicted for a loss of normal a c.

6. Shutdown systems metalled to ensure Coolonmenp power. and the fission product boundary postfire shutdown capability need not be The reactor coolant pump shall be,

mtegnty snail not be affected. t e.. there shall designed to meet seismic Category I entene.

equipped with an oil collection system if the be no fuel clad damaae, rupture or an) singie failure entena. or other design basis c ntamment is n t merted during normal pr: mars coolant boundary. or rupture of the accident entena. except where required for perati n. The oil collection system shall be contatriment boundary other reasons. e g.. because of interface with so designed, engmeered, and metalled that

The ;erformance goa;s for the shutdown or impact on existing safety sistems. or failure will not lead to fire dunne normal.sr func!: ens snall be because of adverse valve actions due to fire design basis accident conditions and tha-a The reactiuty control function shall be damage.

capacie of acntev:ng and mamtammg cold i The safe shutdown equipment and snutdown reactiuts conditions.

systems for each f:re area shall be known to

• An acceptabie method of compivms wiui this atternative would be to raeet Reeuiatory Guide. r5 b The reactor coolant makeup function be isciated from associated non. safety snal! *)e capabie of ma:ntainmg the reactcr circuits m the fire area so that hot shorts.

(

f((

t on e

e open circuits. or shorts to ground in the redundant safety divisions are so protected inas A Meed in me 5 euard Tect:rucal associated circuits will not prevent operation postulated fires effect trays from only one safety specJeanone of the safe shutdown equipment. The division.

76616 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesdav. November 19. 1980 Rules cana Resuiation-terre is reasonab e anurant e that the ssstem.

n;;i withstand he Sefe Shutdown Lirmq ua kr Such coaccoon systems shalt be capabla of codecting lube oil from all potential pressurized and unpressunted leakage sites in the reactor coolant pump lube ou systems Lee' dae shall be collected and drained to a a

s ented closed container that can hold the enure tube oil system inventory. A flame arrester is required in the vent if the flash point charactensucs of the oil present the hazard of fire flashback. Leakage points to be protects; shall include lift pump and piping.

overflow lines. lube oil cooler. oil fill and drain lines and plues. flanged connections on oil lines, and tube oil reservoirs where such features esist on the reactor coolant pumps.

The drain line shall be large enough to accommodate the largest potential oilleak.

(Sec.161b. Pub. L 83-703. 68 Stat. 948. sec. 201. Pub. L 93-438. 88 Stat.1:42 (42 U.S.C.

20011bl. 58411)

Dated at Washington. D.C this 17th day of November 19HO.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel l. Chilk, Secretary of the Commission.

(Ht Doc aum Fded It-im a 45 eml sawseo coot 7sso-et-41 l

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• See Res21aiory Guide I h" Seismic Design Classification" Pararaoh C 2