ML19271A957

Response to Licensee 800729 Interrogatories Re Emergency Plan,Revision 2.Questions Ability of Licensee to Acquire & Analyze Offsite Radiological Monitoring Data.States Concern Re Ability to Provide Protective Action in Timely Fashion

ML19271A957
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	08/01/1980
From:	Sholly S AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.
Shared Package
ML19271A956	List: ML19271A955 ML19271A957
References
ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8008110350
Download: ML19271A957 (24)

Text

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SHOLLY, 8/1/80 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ~wcd.g Before the Atomic Safety and Licensine Board i

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In the Matter of

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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, ET AL. Docket No. 50-289 ' ' ,,. .

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(RESTART)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear [' 'U Station, Unit No. 1) . ,g3ly@?

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e .jj 6 $00 Prt-INTERVE'iOR STEVEN C. SHOLLY 3 OfSe cf th N-i.7 CSi OBJECTIONS TO " LICENSEE'S d UA$jM"M3 INTERROGATORIES TO INTERVENOR ^ - * " '

e STEVEN C. SHOLLY ON REVISION N .' ' I i,\

2 0F LICE';SEE'S EMERGE' ICY PLAN I am in receipt this date of a filing from the Licensee dated 7/29/80 entitled " Licensee'. '.aterrogatories to Intervenor Steven C. Sholly on Revision 2 of Licensee's Emergency Plan." The basis for the interrogatories is stated in the opening paragraph as the Board's Memorandum and Order of July 15, 1980.

The Board's Order is quite explicit concerning the regtirements for service of interrogatories and other discovery requests regarding Revision 2 of Licensee's E=ergency Plan. The MEMORANDUM A'iD ORDER RESUMING SCHEDULE FOR DISCOVERY AND CONTENTICNS ON EMERGENCY PLANNING (15 July 1980) at page 2 states:

. . . specific discovery requests based upon new infor=ation in revision 2 to licensee's emergency plan =ust be made directly to the party being discovered within ten davs of the date of service o_f,this f order."

The Me=orandum and Order is docketed 16 July 1980, although the date on the Memorandum and order is 15 July 1980. Applying the language set forth in the Memorandum and Order, and using the later date of 16 July 1980 as the date of service, Licensee's most recent discovery request as noted above is unti=ely s80081103 50

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SH0LLY, 3/1/50 because it was filed three days af ter the last permissible date based on the

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Board's Memorandu= and Order. All of the interrogatories in Licensee's filing of 29 July are therefore objected to on the grounds of unti=eliness.

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.\ It is difficult to understand why these interrogatories could not have been filebt.imely. First of all, Licensee has been in receipt of the contentions upon which the interrogatories are based at the latest since June 5,1980, when I filed INTERVENCR STEVEN C. SHOLLY RECCNSIDERATION OF CONTENTI0SS. There have been ;everal rounds of telephone conversations between various counsel for Licensee and =yself regarding the proposed revised contentions contained in the Reconsideration filing. Secondly, Licensee's E=ergency Plan, Revisicn 2, was served upon the parties by hand delivery on June 9,1980, and could very conceivably been in Licensee's hands before this. The Board's Memorandum and Order providing for additional discovery was served on 16 July 1980; since counsel for Licensee is located in Washington, D.C., it is quite likely that counsel for Licensee received the Memorandum and Order before I did (I rece?.ved it on July 21, 1980). That I can deter =ine, there are no mitigating circu= stances present which would excuse the lateness of Licensee's filing, nor is any argument or discussion present in Licensee's f. ling which addresses itself to this issue.

Not withstanding the objections 'o the discovery requests on the basis of unti=eliness, we now found ourselves in a predica=ent for which a remedy does not readily appear. The parties are per=itted additional discovery based on Revision 2 to Licensee's E=ergency Plan in order to obtain responses and file expanded and/or revised e=ergency planning contentions based on Revision 2 (Memorandum and Order, pages 1 and 2. Once expanded and/or revised e=ergency planning contentions are filed, there may well be a wish, not only en the part of the Licensee and the Staf f, but also on the part of the intervenors to request additional discovery on e=ergency planning =atters. If this is not provided for, Licensee will find himself in the position of being faced with potentially new

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e.mergency planning contentions without the opportunity for discovery on these contentions. Intervenors filing these contentions will find themselves in. similar circumstances.

'I can forsee a time coming when, due to objectionnable discovery requests (late-filed) and due to revisions on dae emergency planning contentions upon which there does not appear to be provision for discovery, Licensee will claim that it could not effectively prepare for litigation because it was uninformed on the specifics and bases for certain contentions. To some extent, such a predicament would have been brought on by Licensee's own lack of diligence in preparing timely discovery requests, but it would also be due to the lack of provision for discovery on newly-filed contentions or contentions which have been subscantially revised.

I am not quite sure exactly what could be done about this situation, but I felt the need to explore it herein and advise the parties and the Board of what I see as a potential problem of some significance.

In spite of objections to Licensee's interrogatories in its filing of 29 July 1980, I a= providing the following responses to issues raised in those interrogatories. I trust that these responses will help alleviate uncertainties about the contentions addressed in icensee's interrogatories.

l. To the extent that Licensee does not propose to rely upcn TLD's as a basis for ec inJ protective action recoc=endations to offsite authorit'e , 8 ;pecific concern addressed in Contention 4 (i.e.,

the lack cf an on-cite TLD processing capability) does not appear to. retain validity. I ac .however left with substantial concern about the ability of Licensee to acqvire offsite radiological monitoring data, receive and analycr thia data, and provide protective

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- i action recc=mendations to PEMA in a timely fashion. At the time Contention

_ #4 was filed, I was under the i=pression, especially af ter reading the pages of NUREG-0600 referenced in the basis for Contention #4, that Licensee was substantially dependent upon offsite TLD data for data upon which to base protective action reco==endations. This no longer appears to be the case. The Revised Emergency Plan, in section 4.6.3.5, addresses to some extent how Licensee intends to acquire offsite radiological monitoring data for use in making prctective action recoc=endations.

According to the Emergency Plan (EP), "The plant has the capability to dispatch two radiation monitoring teams and receive initial monitoring data within one-half hour of the emergency declaration."

I find this assumption tenuous in a number of respects. First of all, according to NUREG-0600 at pages II-3-94 and 95, it required, during the TMI-2 accident sequence, a total of 38 minutes following the calculation of a 40 R/hr dose in Goldsboro to get an assessment team to an onsite location (survey point GE-8, 720 feet SW of the TMI-2 vent) and complete a confirmatory survey. In the event that the winds are blowing in the direction of Goldsboro when a release occurs, it will most certainly require more than 30 minutes to transmit initial monitoring data to the Radiological Assessment Coordinator. Assuming that the teams leave from the Licensee's newly created radiological group headquarters at Harrisburg Internation. . Airport, it is necessary for a team to travel by vehicle up Route 230, take a spur route to Interstate 283, get on the Pennsylvania Turnpike, travel across the Susquehanna River, exit at Interchange 13, get on Route 83 and travel south for se aral miles, exit at Newberrytown, and travel several more miles to Goldsboro. Add to the time required to accomplish this travel the time required to set up instruments in the field, obtain the initial

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radiation readings, and transmit them to the Radiological Assessment Coordinator. This scenario assumes that all equipment checks go off without a hitch, that traffic is normal or below normal, and that

- weather conditions to not impair either travel or. the setting up and taking of radiation readings. It further assu=es that there are no delays due to road construction activity and that no problems are encountered with the vehicle used by the radiological assessment team to travel to Goldsboro. If the radiological assessment team (RAT) is leaving from the island, the trip described above will take somewhat longer. I am not certain of the exact transit ti=e from the airport location, but I am reasonably certain that it would take half an hour to make the trip if conditions are f avorable.

Travel from the island to Goldsboro by water would not add =uch time, since the boat would have to travel around Shelley Island to get to Goldsb oro. Any proble=s with starting the =otor on the boat (a not uncocmon occurrence for those who are f a=iliar with motorboat motors) or with water conditions (choppy water, high winds, ice blocks, etc.)

will most certainly add to the time require to make the trip.

Secondly, the assu=ption that a one-half hour lag time between the emergency declaration and the availability of the initial radiation monitoring infor=ation is acceptable is somewhat questionnable. First, that assu=ption is dependent upon the a=ount of time required for plant operators to recognize that accident conditions exist, diagnose the accident, and assess the potential for offsite consequences. Second, it is to a large extent dependent upon assu=ptions about the ti=e lag between initiating event and initial release of radioactivity to the environment.

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. SHOLLY, c/1/SO WASH-1400, as cited in NUREG-0396, concluded that major release

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initiating event. This is the same period of time cited in the EP as the time required to dispatch RAT's and receive the initial radiation monitoring reports.

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The acceptability of all this in terms of providing timely notice to PEMA and finally to the public regarding the need for protective action in the event of an accident is highly questionnable. Under ideal conditions, the following represents in my opinion a fair representation of what could happen:

a. Initiating event occurs at t=0.

b. Operators take total of 10 minutes to recognice and declare the emergency (as per EP Section 4.4.1, page 4-2).

c. As per EP Section 4.6.3.5, page 6-7, the Emergency Director onsite dispatches two RAT's to Goldsboro; transit tine is 30 minutes.

d. RAT's take radiation readings and tra.' smit to the Radiological Assessment Coordinator, time require is 5 minutes.

e. Data recorded, and analyzed. Shows need for evacuation.

Time taken is 5 minutes, mostly to confirm from in-plant readings.

f. Phone call to PEMA and Dauphin Counties. BRP confirms

. authenticity of call; time taken is 5 minutes,

g. BRP e.nd Licensee confirm need for evacuation; ti=e taken is 5 minutes.

h. PEMA issues evacuation notification; warning is accomplished according to rapid notification provisions of NUREG-0654);

time required, 15 minutes.

The total time from initiating event to completion of notification is 75 minutes. If there is a rapidly-developing accident as postulated in WASH-1400 and releases began at t=30 minutes, 45 minutes of release

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SHOLLY, S/1/30 has already occurred by the tt:e 100% of the people within five dlles and 90% of the people within five to ten miles have been notified of the e=ergency.

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very clear way to substantially reduce the amount of time required for this process would be the installation of remotely-read, real-time gnern dose monitoring instru=entation. Such instrumentation could be designed to give readouts at least to the control room or radiological assess =ent headquarters. Presumably, it could also provide readouts to the control room, Environ = ental Assessment Command Center, and BRP headquarters in Harrisburg. The use of such a syste= would have die potential to substantially reduce the time required to complete notifications in the above scenario, a secnario which I have every reason to believe is reasonable and represents essentially ideal conditions. Under conditions where weather would hamper offsite radiological assessment activities, the remotely-read real-time monitoring system would provide even more substantial ti=e savings.

Such a system is apparently feasible. The Environ = ental Protection Agency, according to a conversation I had with Dr. Kirk on 30 July 1980, is installing such a system for its ga==a dose rate recorders and the water. effluent monitoring station at the Island. Dr. Kirk reported that he hoped the system could be on-line in 3-4 months, depending en the time frame for acquisition of the equipment.

There would be no benefit in doing away totally with the radiological assessment tea =s as a source of information. Certainly, field confirmation of the real-time conitoring system, assisted perhaps with ARAC output

SHOLLY, 8/lj80 to guide the positioning of the teams in the field, would provide additional information. However, in the event of a severe accident or a less severe accident co= pounded by weather problems or traffic problems in getting the tea =s to the field sites, a remotely-read real-time radiation monitoring system would prove invaluable in providing timely radiation readings upon which protective action reco=mendations could be based. Such a system would represent an entirely reasonable requirement for Restart, in my opinion. Based on the receipt of additional inforcation, it is my intention to include in the revised and/or expanded emergency planning contentions which are due for filing on 8 Septe=ber 1980 (Femorandum and order, 15 July 1980, page 2) a contention relating to the requirement of the installation of a re=otely-read real-ti=e radiation monitoring system as a condition for Restart.

2. I have discovery requests outstanding en this ites and will respond to the extent feasible when I have received those responses.

(See DISCOVERY REQUESTS TO LICENSEE ON REVISION 2 0F LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN, PURSUANT T0 2 0RANDUM A'iD ORDER DATED 15 July 1980 FRCM ASL3, interrogatorycnumber 13) . It is clear frem the revisions to the EF that- improve =ents have been made in the com=unications links with offsite agencies. There retains a concern about the links with support agencies other than state, federal, and local emergency response agencies. Specifically, I am referring to ce==unications links with fire coepanies, a=bulance crews, and =edical facilities.

In_ addition, communications links with crucial contractors of the Licensee are not detailed (including Radiation Management Corporation, Porter-Gert: Associates, Gilbert Associates, Hershey Medical Center,

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Keystone Helicopter Corporation, and Pickard, Lowe and Garrick) .

It is clear that Licensee has in the past, notably during the TMI-2 acciden t, relied heavily on contractors to provide many emergency response services. The adequacy of the means for communicating with these contractors is certainly an issue which requires resolution. I do not believe that the discussion in Section 4.7.5 of the EP completely addresses this issue.

In terms of the changes which are needed to remedy this situation, a more complete description of the coc=unications links discussed above in a revision to the emergency plan would be useful. If telephone cc==unications is the sole basis for contact with these contractors and support organisations, then there is significant potential during a serious accident for losing the ability for timely co==unications with these contractors and support organizations.

An s'iitional means of cc==unications would be required to provide a level of confidance that these organizations could be reached as needed. This could take the form of radios, pagers, dedicated phone lines, or other appropriate means of co==unications. In the case of nearby organisations, travel by vehicle may be adequate if sufficient response time is available.

3. I do not " contend" what is mentioned in the interrogatory; that is to say, I do not have a contention in this proceeding which alleges this specific deficiency. In answer to the question posed by the interrogatory, as a general =atter I do not feel that there exists a basis for =aking a deter =ination that the preplanning done within die 10-mile EPZ provides a sufficient basis for emergency protective

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actions outside the 10-=ile EPZ. The experience of the TMI-2  ;

accident shows in large =easure how futile ad hoc energency planning can be. In many cases, until the planning could be accomplished, N

s e=crgency workers informed as to the nature of the plans, and N N ss the plans themselves i=ple=ented it would be too late for the plans N

to be of use for that particular e=ergency. Preplanning is clearly called for in =aking plans for radiological e=ergency response. For example, a report prepared for the Federal E=ergency Manage =ent Agency by Hu=an Sciences Research, Inc. (Evacuation Planning i;t the TMI Accident, Chenault, Hilbert, and Reichlin, RS 2-8-34, FEMA, January 1980), e=phasizes this issue well. On page 134

.of the report, in the conclusions section, the report states:

" Local E=ergency Management Agencies obviously need established plans for such a co= plex operation as a large-scale evacuatien. Where resources preclude extensive planning, local officials could utilize tne ' crisis expectant' planning code -- i.e., they could have available the reference caterials and guidelines required to develop a plan under crisis conditions."

In discussing the so-called " crisis expectant = ode" of planning, the report goes on to say that such " crash" planning " offers fewer advantages and encounter (s) core dangerous problems."

"They also resolve around the specific threat of the

=o=ent, provided that co=petant =anagers are present to orchestrate the energies available. However, they al=ost aute=atically sacrifice the coordination and in-depth knowledge required to cope with large disasters or unusual hazards."

The report suggests mini =al infor=ation that should be available to planners to support " crisis expectant" planning (page 135 of report) . These types of infor=ation are:

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s, "1. current' population data ,

2. data or esti=ates on the institutionalized and special populations requiring particular supports in an evacuation

3. notification procedures for key agencies and officials

. i 4.' resource listings of facilities, transportation resources, etc.

5. standby plans for creating redundant ce==unications syste=s

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and for rapid expansion of co==unications capabilities

6. adequate crisis-planning and operations centers -- preferably a well-equipped EOC

7. planned =easures for reaching and warning the public

8. checklists and instructions for those who =ay be charged with specific crisis-planning or operational functions" Some of this infor=ation may now be available, but this is largely because in fact sc=e of the counties within 20 miles of IMI have had to prepare emergency response plans as a result of the TMI-2 accident. Unless there is continuing e=phasis on maintaining these plans with up-to-date information, even this minimal effort will be of little use during an actual future e=ergency; in fact, outdated information could actually lead to serious hazards if such infor=atica leads to improper conclusions about what could or could not be accomplished in terms of protective actions. Clearly, the best way to keep the infor=ation and plans up-to-date is to require the inclusion in the E=ergency Planning Zone of areas bayend the proposed 10-=ile EPZ.

4. First of all, I believe that Licensee =isinterprets the thrust of Contention SC, at least the =anner in which 1 view it (representatives from ANGRY =ay have a slightly different view; I cannot represent their views on this particular point) . Contention 8C's intent is

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to require the adoption of a non-uniform Pluce EPZ which takes into account those items specified in the revised contention. This is opposed to the uniform adoption by the Co=monwealth of Pennsylvania x

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• ss Plume Exposure EPZ for TMI and all other nuclear plants in the N N Cc==onwealth. Such a narrow view of NUREG-0396 requirements (and as affir:ed in NURE-0654) thwarts one of the basic points that the task force involve was trying to make -- i.e., that in general 10 miles represented a good basis, but that the EPZ at each site should be somewhat tailored to take into account certain prevailing local conditions which have previously been discussed at length.

From the standpoint of the local plans outside the 10-mile EPZ, the adequacy of these plans will be addressed in a separate contention or subcontention of #8. To the extent that Licensee is relying on this planning to take care of the emergency response needs of people outside the 10-mile ~ circular EPZ proposed by the Commonwealth and the Licensee, these plans do not represent a sufficient basis to resolve concerns about their adequacy.

The plans contain untenable assumptions, for instance, relating to the timely availability of state and federal resources to accopodate " essential uneet" needs of the counties and local governments. The revised county plans are under analysis at this time, therefore, additional specific ce==ent is not possible.

5. I regard the development of the information requested in this interrogatory to be the responsibility of the Cet=onwealth and the local counties, and the responsibility of the Licensee to

SHOLLY, 8/1/S0 ensure that the means exist whereby protective measures can be taken in timely fashion for people in the C'.ty of Harrisburg. The fact that such a large concentration of population is cut through by the arbitrary 10-mile circular EPZ proposed by the Cot =onwealth and the Licensee is a prime example of the misapplication of the principles set forth i

in NUREG-0396 and affirmed in NUREG-0654. It is totally naive to expect that the remainder of the City of Harrisburg will sit in their living rooms watching the world go by when the portion of Harrisburg within the proposed 10-mile circular EPZ is evacuated. It si= ply will not occur.

It is therefore reasonable that the entire City of Harrisburg and d2e adjacent urbanized areas be included within the Plume EPZ. It is simply a reccgnition of reality.

The concerns here are largely related to warning tines and capabilities and to evacuation times. Once warning has been accomplished, sheltering in place should not be a =ajor problem, if the people have been forewarned about what they should do in such circu= stances. There dees not appear in the revised emergency plans, that I am able to deter =ine, sufficient information to be able to determine that warning capability exists in the entire City of Harrisburg, although it may well exist; there is si= ply no way of knowing fro = the avail,able information which I have seen. The concern about the time required to evacuate the entire City of Harrisburg is a very substantial concern. I as awaiting estimates of how long a period of time this is estinated to take under a variety of circumstances.

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In terms of the ability to receive information about the 1

Emergency Plans themselves, this capability does not seem i to me to be any different outside the 10-=ile radius than ss -

's inside, except for non-English speaking sub-groups of the N

population and the Old Order Amish, who are not a part of ss the larger society in the area and do not participate in s

normal channels of coc=unication. However, I feel that there is a very real problem present for all the county plans in that there has been to the best of my knowledge no substantial effort expended to explain the plans to the residents of the counties. Certainly this cust be accomplished before Restart, and continued on a regular basis for new residents, and as a refresher for continuing residents of the counties. PEMA has published an informative booklet about emergency response during nuclear incidents called "What You Should Know About Nuclear Radiation Incidents".

While not going into the usefulness of the infor=ation presented therein, the only place I have seen this document is at the visitor's center at TMI. I have certainly never received it from either Dauphin County where I work or Cumberland County where I have lived all of my life. Much needs to be done to educate the public about what is required of them in nuclear emergencies, both within and outside of the proposed Plu=e EPZ. Certainly, f cm the infor=ation presented in the county plans, the Commonwealth's plan, or Licensee's plan, there does not appear to be a substantial effort being expended in this critical area of emergency planning. This certainly impacts quite heavily on the ability of the public to evacuate the

SHOLLY, 8/1/80 area should this become necessary. ,

6. Due to the large population in and around the i==ediate area-of the City of York, should the winds be blowing in that direction in the event of an accident, the area in and around York could be expected to makeup a very substantial portion of the total population dose. It is therefore prudent to consider this region as being included within the Plume Exposure EPZ. Further, the proposed 10-=ile circular EPZ borders the York metropolitan area; there is no reasonable basis for excluding this area from the EPZ. Fbch of the discussion in response to Interrogatory

1. 5 above holds true here.

7. Many of the concerns stated in response to Interrogatory #5 above hold true here. Furthermore, as a practical matter, it simply does not make sense to arbitrarily include a portion of a political subdivision in the Plume EPZ without including the entire subdivision.

Local authorities should be providing equali protection to all of the residents in their jurisdiction. .Further= ore, the people living in these areas are not going to feel bound by arbitrary lines drawn around who should and should not evacuate. In recognizing this fact of life, the prudent thing to.do is to prepare plans which will account for all persons who will be evacuating or taking other appropriate protective actions. To fail to do so is to risk the possibility that in dae event of an evacuation, there will be far more people involved than the plan has been designed to handle. Such a situation could result in considerable risk to public health and safety, a risk which is unnecessary. This can be alleviated by pre-plann:

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SHOLLY, S/1/80 which accounts for a realistic emergency situation, not one dominated by artificial constraints such as the arbitrary 10-mile proposed Plume EPZ.

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. I have no reason to believe that a basis exists for concluding that j

\ 'ss proposed egress and access routes are adequate to carry the planned N

number of vehicles in the event of an evacuation. Further, there is no basis to conclude that the numbers of vehicles which have been assumed to be involved are accurate and depict reality. Lastly, there is no basis for assuming that conflicts will not arise in access and egress routes-in the event of an evacuation. There is simply a near total lack of infor=ation in the emergency plans upon which to base such conclusions. It is incumbent upon Licensee to de=onstrate that in fact these concerns have been realistically addressed in order to provide reasonable assurance that evacuations can in fact be carried out as planned. While responsibility for developing the plans and means to ensure that evacuations can be carried out in a timely fashion rests with the state and local governments, Licensee is responsible for ensuring that the plans have been developed and are workable. There is no basis for concluding that Licensee has done so.

9. The response for this interrogatory =ust be obtained from counsel fo r ANGRY. I have consented to the addition of the proposed Contention referred to to =y emergency planning contentions, but responsibility for developing the case for this specific issue rests with counsel for ANGRY. ANGRY and myself will be cooperating on the issue of emergency planning to assure that no repetitive direct testimony or cross-examination is undertaken.

SHOLLY, 3/1/E0

10. Despite the editorial change to Licensee's emergency plan, the contention retains basis in fact. Despite representations that the plan's contain "the same classificatica scheme as Licensee",

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's s differences in classification remain. Refer to:

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a. Annex D of the Cumberland County Three Mile Island E=ergency Response Plan.

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b.Section IX, ite: I of the Dauphin County Fixed Nuclear Facility Incident Response Plan.

c. Co==onwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Health Radiation E=ergency Response Plan which fails to contain an e=ergency classification scheme.

d.Section IV, Item F. of the Lancaster County E=ergency Evacuation Plan for Three Mile Island.

e. Part II, Section A of the Lebanon County Emergency Operations Plan, Radiation Incidents--Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant.

There are differences in the descriptions of the event classes which can lead to dif ferences in interpretation of the severity of the particular incident. The descriptions of the event classes

=ust be compatible, preferably identical, with a precise understanding articulated in the descriptions to ensure that all parties know exactly what is inplied by each event class.

11. Licensee's Revised Emergency Public Infor=ation Plan does very little to address the concern set forth in Contention 8(G) . The issue here'is not so =uch the =echanics of the plan, but the basic credibility of the source of the information.

12. The major re=aining ite= which the Revised EP has left to cover in regard to this contention is the specific qualifications of these contractors to provide the services indicated in the plan. Additional information on the scope of the services is also required, i.e. ,

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for what length of ti=e can dae resources indicated in the plan be ce=mitted, what restrictions exist regarding the utilization of the services intended to be provided, and under what circumstances 1

might these services be unavailable when needed by Licensee.

13. The descriptions of the capabilities of the state and local agencies are still lacking in important details. For instance, the description of BRP on pages 5-19 and 5-20 of the EP does not include the fact that BRP has a full-time nuclear engineer, and does not detail the capabilities of the remainder of the Bureau in terms of accident response. Additional inprovement is required, but progress has been cade since the first draft of the Licensee's EP was made available to the parties.

14. The following letters of agreement are identical or very nearly so to the letters that were in the old EP:

a. GPU

b. PEMA (formerly State Council of Civil Defense)

c. York County

d. Lancaster County

e. PA-B RP

f. U.S. Coast Guard

g. Conrail

h. NRC These letters provide no = ore information in the nature of indicating a clear concept of radiological response operations than do the letters in the old plan.

Further, the following letters of agreement fail to indicate either

SHOLLY, 8/l]80 sufficient details on specific cc =itments or fail to indicate a clear concept of radiological response operations:

a. Middletown Fire Depart =ent, Liberty Fire Co. #1

b. Rescue Hose Co. #3

c. Union Hose Co. #1

d. Bainbridge Fire Co pany

e. Borough of Middletown Police Department In addition, the following specific proble=s exist with letters

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lof agreement as indicated:

a. It does not appear that Licensee has executed the

" Civil Support Release and Rei=bursement Agreement" attached to the agree =ent letter fro = U.S. Army EOD Unit at Fort Indiantown Gap.

b. Despite the notation in the EP, an agree =ent letter with Hershey Medical Center has not been added to the EP (According to the EP, it would have been added in early July) .

c. There is no agree =ent letter with EPA.

d. There is no agree =ent letter with Pickard, Lowe and Garrick,

e. There are no agree =ent letters with the following despite indications in Table 11 of the EP that they are being relied upon for emergency assistance:

(1) Babcock and Wilcox (2) Scientific Applications Ind.

(3) Canberra Ind.

(4) Philadelphia Electric Cocpany (5) Pennsylvania Power and Light (6)~ Public Service Gas and Electric Co=pany

15. Providing a brief section describing the responsibility of the state Agriculture Depart =ent to provide for agricultural, dairy and food product control does not sufficiently address the

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requirements imposed by NUREG-0396 (and now by NUREG-0654) .

_ There is no description of the means by which such controls can be imposed (i.e., the legal authority for imposing such controls, the =echanism by which controls are i= posed, how the public is to be informed, etc.) . There is no description of how the plan is to work, nor is there any indication that Licensee has made any atte=pt to evaluate the efficacy of the plans to deal with the Ingestion EPZ requirements. There is no indication that letters of agree =ent have been executed so that the subject counties know what their responsibilities are under the plan.

' Finally, the Agricultural E=ergency Response Plan referred to in the interrogatory has never been served on this intervenor to the best of his recollection. An evaluation, therefore, of any infor=ation contained therein is impossible.

16. I am unaware that the require =ents delineated in Section 4.6.6.1 of the EP are applicable to anyone but employees of the Licensee since the E=ergency Director has no authority to authorize radiation dose levels for other persons (to the best of my knowledge). If the ED has such authority, it should be clearly delineated. If the ED does not have such authority, it is clear that the cencerns raised by the contention have not been met.

Further, die concerns relating to whether the support organizations are aware of radiation exposure guidelines and understand their i=plications has not been addressed at all by the EP.

17. The range of audit ac;ivities conducted by the QA Department with regards to the EP and EPID is rather li=1ted according to

. /

~__ SHOLLY, :q t / iG Section 4.8.2 of the EP. It is not entirely clear who has j i

responsibility for making changes to the EP and on what basis  ;

changes are made. The specific arrangecents with offsite agencies to ensure coordination of emergency plans on a continuing N

's x s basis are not included in dae EP. The concerns evidenced in Nw

, Contention 8(Q) have not been entirely resolved.

18. The concern evidenced by this contention has been answered. Contention 8(R) will be eli=inated in the revised e=ergency planning contention due to be filed by 8 Septe=ber 1980, provided that a letter of agreement is included from Cu=berland County. ~~

19. The concerns set forth in Contention 8(S) remain valid to the extent that the letters of agreement still fail to specify =utually acceptable criteria for the implementation of emergency assistance.

The following letters of agree =ent fail also to specify the assistance available:

a. GPU

b. York County

c. Lancaster County

d. PA-BRP

e. U.S. Coast Guard

f. NRC

20. This interrogatory is objected to on grounds of untimeliness since it is an interrogatory which could reasonably have been posed during general discovery, with the knowledge that an update to the plan would have required a supplementation of the original respense.

SHOLLY, 8/1/80

21. I have not received the Agriculture Department's " Plan" and cannot therefore evaluate hea its provisions i= pact on this contention.

22. This si=ple list does not address itself to the issue raised by

• he contention.

. The history of incidents since the TMI-2 accident has served only to reinforce the problem. One can include i

in a list whatever one desires. There =ust be a clear co==it=ent from the Licensee, from the highest levels of =anage=ent down through the entire structure, to provide full disclosure of all facts when requested or when necessary to enable offsite authorities to properly evaluate the need for protective actions. This should include not only f actual information such as readings and monitoring results, but also impressions and judg=ents of control room and other personnel, including the stating of disagreements as to the interpretation of instru=ent readings and conditions. Such infor=ation cust be freely available to offsite authorities to ensure that the fullest possible range of information is available at all ti=es. This type of ec==it=ent has not been =ade, to the best of my knowledge.

23. Section 4.6.5.3 deals minimally with the issue of equipment readiness. It is not possible to conclude that this section meets this portion of the concerns addressed by Contention 8(W) until the specific procedures are made available for review. I have not been infor=ed as to whether dae referenedd procedures are available for revi2w. Section 4.6.5.3 does not deal with the issue of whether there are and will be sufficient numbers of personnel available who are trained in the use of the radiation =onitoring

SiiOLLY, 8/1/80 s

equipment at issue.

24. These le,tters of agreement do not address themselves to the legal question involved here--i.e., what is the legal basis for Licensee's assumption that Licensee can exercise control over access to the Susquehanna River within the exclusion zone of TMI-l? Means to implement warnings apparently exist by way of letters of agreement providing helicopter service. Questions remain as to the ti=eliness of such warnings. A reasonable means of notification for persons in the exclusion area would be either the installation and use of loudspeakers, or providing sirens or horns. The public would have to be educated about the use and meaning of these means of notification in any event.

25. These criteria imply that the person making the decision on what course of action is required is qualified to assess the various types of infor=ation implied by the criteria--i.e. , ceteorological conditions, dispersion characteristics of the site, radiation doses and their implications for public health, times required to evacuate specific areas where the plume is headed, etc. It is not clear that the Emergency Director has the requisite capabilities.

If reliance is placed on a number of persons to provide this input to the E=ergency Director, this should be clearly explained.

26. This contention will be dropped when the revised Contention on emergency planning is filed prior to or on 8 Septe=ber 1980.

's AFFIDAVIT: '

i

\

STEVEN C. SHOLLY, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that the statements made in response to Interrogatories from the Licensee dated 29 July 1980 are true and accurate to the best of his knowlecge and belief.

. f.

• * /

Steven C. Sholly Sworn to and subscribed before me this k day of August, 1980.

q, W O M.

Notary Public hhtda b Bowm:n. Ed3'l F3EC -

y,cm. w w e umh!?.1984 Harrnh: g. A Ca#.in C32f6 9

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