ML19221B062
| ML19221B062 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/31/1979 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-75-087, NUREG-75-087-09.4.5, NUREG-75-87, NUREG-75-87-9.4.5, SRP-09.04.05, SRP-9.04.05, NUDOCS 7907120336 | |
| Download: ML19221B062 (8) | |
Text
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STANDARD REVIEW PLAN
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OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION 3ECTION 9.4.5
[NGINEERED SAFE TY F E ATURE VENTILATION SYSTEM REVIf W RESPCNSIBIL ITIE S Ffimary - Auxiliary systems Branch (A58)
I Secondary - Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch (ICSB) l Mechanical Engineering Branch (MEB)
Materials Engineering Branch (MTEB)
Structural Engineering Branch f5EB) g Power Systems Branch (PSB) 1.
AREAS OF PEVIEW The function of the engineered safety feature ventilation system (FSFVS) is to provide a suitable and controlled environment for engineered safety feature components following certain anticipated transients and design basis accidents.
The A5B reviews the E5FVS from air intake to the point of discharge to the atmosphere to assure conformance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 4 and 5.
The review i ncludes components such as air intakes, ducts, air conditioning units, flow control devices, isolation dampers, exhaust vents, and exhaust fans.
The review of the E5fVS covers all ventilation systems utilized to maintain a con-trolled eneironmer*... areas containing safety related equipment.
These include the service water pump house, diesel generatcr area, emergency core coo'ing syste.a (ECCS) pump rooms, component cooling water pump fcom, auxiliary f eedwater pump area, and other areas Containing equipment essential for the safe shutdown of the reactor or necessary to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an accident.
1.
The ASB reviews the E5FVS to detert'iine the safety significance of the sarious l
portions and subsystems. Based on this determination, the sa f etv-rel ates' portions of the system are reviewed with respect to functional performance requirements 3ssociated with engineered safety feature areas during rormal cperation, durs,g adverse environmental occurrences, and during and subsequent to postulated acci-dents, including the loss of offsite power.
The ASB reviews safety-related l
portions of the system to assure that; a.
A single active failure cannot result in loss of the system fun tional performance capabilities.
USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN stonded review see ere pr.,ered fe, the guidene. Of the o+fice.f Nociae, Reecto, Regoietion eeste.eepor.o bie for th. revi.w of oppec.tions to constroci and Operete awCieet power plen*e These documente are enedo Oweeleb64 to the puhalc es part of the Commission e pol 6c y to inform the nucleefIndustry and the 9
generel pebhc Of reguietofy procedures and policaeo Stande<d review piene are not oubetetutes foe requietory gwedes oe the Coenmession e regwistione end stonesience with theep le not regwared The seendere cowseur pian sectione are keyed to Revision 2 of the Steaderd Fe wet and Conteat of Sefety Anotvere Reposse for Noceeet Power Ptems Noe on sectione of the Stenderd Femet have e cereesponding rew+ew pien Pulp 6tched etendard rewlew p64ne wtM be fowleed pertedicealy at opproprtete to accommodate commente and to ref'ect new knformet6en end eeportence CefpHu,gette end 9999 4t0C89e fgf Inspreweeneret wHI be conside+ed end should be sent to the U S Nuclear Regweetory Comm6eeJon Omco of N xiew Reactor Reg nessen. Weeningeon D C 20 hts nomo#d 148 M " '
b.
Components and piping or ducting have sufficient physical separation or barriers to protect essential portions of the system from missiles, pipe whip and fires.
I c.
Failures of non-seismic Category I equipment or components will not result in damage to essential portions of the ESfVS.
2.
The ASB also reviews safety related portions of the ESFVS with respect to the l
foilowing:
a.
The ability of the heating and cooling systems to maintain a suitable ambient temperature range in the areas serviced, assuming proper performance of equipment contained in thete areas.
b.
Provisions to detect the need f or isolation and to isolate portions of the system in the event of failures or malfunctions.
c.
The ability of the safety features equipment in the areas being serviced by the ventilation system to functinn under the worst anticipated degraded ESFVS system performance.
d.
Capability of the system to circulate sufficient air to prevent accumulation of inflammable or explosive gas or fuel veor mixtures from components such as storage batteries and stored fuel.
The capability of the syston to automatically actuate components not oper-e.
ating during normal conditions, or to actuate standby components (redundant equipment) in the esent of a failure or malfunction, as needed.
f.
To determine that the quality group <ind seismic design requirements are met for the system.
3.
The Accident Analysis Branch (AAB) esaluates the ra1iological consequentc5 of airborne contaminants resulting frcm accident conditions (see Appendix B to SRP Section 15.6.5).
4.
The Effluent Treatment Systems Branch (ETSB) evaluates the effectiveness of the ESFV5 filters to remove airb. ne contaminants prior to discharge to the environment (see SRP Section 6.5.1).
ETSB also rev;ews and evaluates the capability of the ESFVS to detect and control leakage of radioactive contamination f rom the systera, as described in SRP Section 11.5.
5.
The Radiological Assessment Branch (RAB) reviews and eva.uates the radiation protection criteria of the tsfVS. as described in SRP Section 12.3.
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6.
The applicant's proposed technical specifications are reviewed for operating license applications as they relate to areas covered in this SRP section.
1 Secondary reviews are performed by other branches and the results are used bj the ASB l
to complete the overall evaluation of the system.
The SEB determines the acceptaoility of design analyses, procedures, and criteria used to establish the ability of seismic Category I structures housing the system and supporting systems to withstand the effects of natural phenomena ach as the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE),
probable maximum flood (PMF), and tornado missiles. The MEB reviews the seismic c ification of compo-nents and confirms that components, piping, and structures are designed in accordance with applicable codes and standard <
The MTEB will verify that 11 service inspection requirements are met for system comp.ents and, upon request, will verify the compati-bility of the materials of construction with service conditions. The ICSB and PSB l
determine the adecuacy of the design, installation, insp : tion, and testing of all electrical componente (sensing, control and power) required for proper operation.
l II.
ACCEPTANCE CRITE;IA Acceptability of the ESFVS design, as described n the applicant's Safety Analysis Report (SAR), is based on specific general design criteria and regulatory guides.
The design of safety related portions of the ESFVS is acceptable if the integrated design of the systems is in accordance with the following criteria:
9-1.
General Design Criterion 2, as related to structures housing the system and the system itself being capable of withstanding the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods.
l 2.
General Design Criterion 4, with respect to structures housing the system and the system itself being capable of wi'hstanoing the effccts of external missiles and internally generated missiles, pipe whip, and jet impingement forces associated with pipe breaks.
3.
General Design Criterion 5, as related to shared systems and components important to safety.
4.
Regulatory Guide 1.26, a3 related to the quality group classification of system components.
5.
Regulatory Geide 1.29, as related to the seismic design classification of system components.
6.
Regulatory Guide 1.117, as related to the protection of structures, systems and components important to safety from the effects of tornado missiles.
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9.4.5-3 Pev. I
7.
Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, as related to capability of the system to remove smoke.
8.
Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1, as related to breaks in high and moderate energy piping systems outside containr.ent.
For those areas of review identified in subsection I of this SRP section as being the responsibility of other branches, the acceptance critr cia and their methods of applica-tion are contained in the SRP sections corresponding to those branches.
III. REVIEW PROCEDURE'-
The procedures below are used during the construction permit (CP) review to determine tnit the design criteria and bases and the preliminary design as set forth in the preliminary safety analysis report meet the acceptance criteria given in subsection II.
I For the review of operating license (0L) applications, the procedures are utilized to verify that the initial design criteria and bases have been appropriately imnl eented in the final design as set forth in the final safety analysis report. The procedures for OL reviews include a determination that the content and intent of the technical specifications prepared by the applicant are in agreement with the requirements for system testing, minimum performance, ar.d surveillance develuped as 6 result of the staff's rt. iew.
Upon request from the primary reviewer, the secondary review branches will provide input for the areas of review stated in subsection I.
The primary reviewer obtains and uses such inputs as required to assure that this review procedure is complete.
As a result of various ESFVS designs proposed by applicants, there will be variations in system requirements. For the purpose of this SRP section, a typical system is I
assumed which has fully redundant subsystems, each havirg an identical essential (safety features) portion. For cases where there are variations from this typical arrangement, the reviewer woulu adjust the review precE; ares given below.
However, the system design would be required to meet the acceptance criteria given in subsection II.
The reviewer will select and emphasize material from this SRP section as may De apropriate for a particular case.
1.
The SAR is reviewed to verify that the system description and piping and instrumentation diagrams (P& IDS) show the ESFVS equipment used for normal opera-
- t. ion, and the ambient temperature limits for the areas serviced. The system performance requirements are reviewed to determine that they limit allowable component operational degradation (e.g., loss of function, damper leakage) and describe the procedures that will be followed to detect and correct these condi-tions.
The reviewer, using results from failure modes and effects analyses as appropriate, will determine that the safety-related portion of the system is capable of sustaining the failure of any active componer.t.
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E The system P& ids, layout drawings, and component descriptions and characteristics are then reviewed to determine that:
Essential portions of the ESFV$ are correctly identified and are isolable a.
from non essential portions of the system. The P&lDs are reviewed to vcrify that they clearly indicate the physical divisions between such portions and indicate design classification changes. Systen drawings are also reviewed to see that they show the means fcr acconplishing isolation, and the system description is reviewed to identify minimum performance requirements for the isolation dampers. For the typical system, the drawings and description are reviewed to verify that two automatically operated isolation dampers in seria separate non-essential portions and components from the essential portions.
b.
Essential portions of the ESFVS, including tha isolation <1ampers seoarating I
essential from non essential portions, are classified Quality Group C and seismic Category I.
Component and system descriptions in the SAR that irien-tify mechanical and performance characteristics are reviewed to serify that the above classifications have been included, and that the P&lDs iidicate points of change in design classification.
c.
Design provisions have been made that permit appropriate inservice inspection and functional testing of system compcnents importent to safety.
It is acceptable if the EAR information delinaates a testing and inspection program and if the system drawings show the necessary test recirculation loops around fans or isolation dampers that would te required by this program.
3.
The reviewer verifies that the system has been designed so that system function will be maintained as required in the event of adverse e,1vironmental phenomena or in the event of certain pipe breaks ce loss of offsite power.
The reviewer evalu-ates the system, using engineering judgment and the results of failure modes and effects analyses tn determine that; a.
The failure of non essential portions of the system or of other non seismic systems, components or structures located close to essential pc-tions of the system will not preclude operation of the essential portions of the ESFVS.
Reference to SAR sections describing site features and the general arrange-ment and layout drawings will be necessary, as wall as the SAR tabulati n of seismic design classifications for structures and systemr.
t.
The essential portions of the ESFVS are protected from the effects of floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, and internally and externally generated missiles.
Flood protection and missile protection criteria are discussed and evaluated in detail under Section 3 series of the SRP.
The location and the design of l
the system, structures, and fan rooms (cubicles) are reviewed to determine that the degree of protection provided is adequate. A statement t_o the.
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effect that the system is located in a seismic Cateoory I structure that is tornado missile and flood protected, or that components of the system will be located in individual cubicles or rooms that will withstand the effects of both flooding and missiles is acceptable.
c.
The total system has the capability to detect and control leakage of airborne contamina. ion from the system.
It is acceptable if the 1ollowing conditions are met.
(1) The system F/,ID shows monitors and alarms located in the system that are capable of smoke detection in the event of a fire.
Provisions should be made for manual control of the ventilation system to facilitate smoke removal if necessary for fire fit.hting operations.
(2) The capability for isolatinq nonessentiai portions of the ESFVS by two automatically actuated isolation dampers in series is shown on the I
P& ids.
(3) The ESFVS has provisions to actuate ventilation equipment in the engi-neered safety feature areas before ambient temperatures erceed design rated temperatures of components.
d.
The essential portions of the system are protected from the effects of high and rooderate energy line breaks.
Layout drawings are reviewed to assur e that no high or moderate energy piping systems are close to essential portions cf the ESFVS or that protection from the effects of failure will be provided.
It.
means of providing such protection will be given in Section 3.6 of the SAR and procedures for reviewing this information are given in S<P Section 3.6.
e.
Essential components and subsystems can function as required in the event of loss of offsite power.
The system design will be acceptable if the ESFVS meets minimum system requirements as stated in the SAR assuning a failure of a single active component within the system itself or in the auxiliary electric power source which supplies the system. The SAR is reviewed to see that for each ESFVS component or subsystem affected by the loss of offsite power, tre resultirg system performance will nat affect the capability of any engineered safety feature equipment. Statements in the SAR and results of failure modes and effects analyses are considered in verifying that the system meets these requirements. This will be an acceptable verification of system functional reliability.
4.
The descriptive ir. formation, P&lDs, ESFVS drawings, and f ailure modes and ef fects analyses in the SAR are reviewed to assure that essential portions of the system can function following design basis accidents assuming a concurrent single active Rev. 1 9.4.5-6 148 333
failure. The reviewer evaluates the analyses presented in the SAR to assure function of rtquireJ components, traces the availability of these components oa system drawings, and checks that the SAR contains varification that minimum system isolation or filtration requirements are met f^r each accident situation for the required time spans. For e ih case the design will be acceptable if minimum system requirements are met.
IV.
EVAL 6? TION F INDINGS The reviewer verifies that sufficient information has been provided and that his review supports conclusions of the following type, to be included in the staff's safety evalua-tion report:
"The engineered safety feature ventilation system (ESFVS) includes all components and ducting associated with the system from air intake to the point of discharge to the atmusphere. Based cn the review of the applicant's proposed design criter ia, desigr.d,es,andsafetyclassificationfortheengineeredsafetyfeatureventila-tion system, and the requirements for system performance to preclude equipment malfunction in the engineered safety feature areas due to a failure of the system during normal, abnormal, and accident anditions, the staff concludes that the l
design of the engineered safety feature ventilation system and supporting systems is in conformance with the Commission's regulations as set forth in General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," General Design Criterion 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Bases," Gcneral Design Criterion 5, " Sharing of Structures, Systems and Components," and meets the guide-lines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.26, " Quality Group Classifications and 5tandards for Water, Stea :, and Radioactive-Waste-Containing Components of Nuclear Power Piants," Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification,"
Regulatory Guide 1.117, " Tornado Design Classification," Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, " Fire Protection for Nuclear Po,,er Plants," and Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1 and is, therefore,. eptable.
V.
REFERENCES 1.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protec-tion Against Natural Phenomena."
2.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Ganeral Design Criterion 4, " Environmental and Missile Des ign l'at cs. "
3.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 5, " Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components."
4.
Regulatory Guide 1.26, " Quality Group Classificatio n and Standards for Water,
Steam, and Radioactive-Waste-Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants."
m -s,j 9.4.5-7 Rev. 1
5.
Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification."
6.
Regulatory Guide 1.117, " Tornado Design Classification."
7.
Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, " Fire Protc tion for Nuclear Power Plants,"
attached to SRP Section 9.5.1.
8.
Branch Technical Positions AS8 3-1, " Protection Against Postulated Piping failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment," attached to SRP Section 3.6.1, and MEB 3-1,
" Postulated brc'k and Leakage Locations in fluid System Piping Outside Containm nt,"
attached to SRP Section 1.6.2.
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