ML19221B060
| ML19221B060 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/31/1979 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-75-087, NUREG-75-087-09.4.4, NUREG-75-87, NUREG-75-87-9.4.4, SRP-09.04.04, SRP-9.04.04, NUDOCS 7907120334 | |
| Download: ML19221B060 (7) | |
Text
NUREG 75/087
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h[\\$h) STANDARD REVIEW PLAN M
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
\\."...,P OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
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SECTION 0.".4 TURBINE AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM REVIIW RESPONSIBILITIES Primary - Auxiliary Systems Brcnch ( A58) l Secondary - Instrumentation and Cont rol Systems Branch ('CSB) l Mechanical Engineering Brinch (MEB)
Power systems Branch (PSB) 1.
AREAS OF REVIEW The ASB reviews the turbine area ventilatic,n system (TAVS) from air intake to the point of discharge to assure conformance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 4 and 5.
The review includes components such as air intakes, ducts, cooling anits, bicwors, isolation dampers, and roof exhaust fans. The review of the TAVS includes systems contained in the turbine building and their relationship, if any, to safety-related equipment areas, i.
The ASB reviews the functional performance requirements and the methods and equip-l ment provided for air treatmert for the TAVS to determine whether the ventila ion system or portions of the system have been designed or need to be designed as a safety system.
In making this determiration, systems provided for h(ati a, venti-lating, and air conditioning of the turbine area, designed to normal industrial standards, and those systems that provide for control and filtration nf small quantities of radioactive gas leakage in the turbine area during normal plant operation, are not considered safety related fo-the purpose of this SRP sect L.
l Based on this determination, any safety-related portions of the system are revie.ed with respect to funtional performance requirements during adverse envi-ronmental occurrences, during normal operation, and subsequent to postulated accidents, including the loss of offsite power, to assure conformance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 4 and S.
The ASP reviews the safety-related portions of the system to assure that:
a.
A single active failure cannot result in
'w.,
A the system functional performance capability.
b.
Components and piping have sufficient physical separation or barriers to protect essential portions of the system from missiles, pipe whip and fires.
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c.
Failures of non seismic Category I equipment or corrponents will not result in an unacceptable release of radioactive contaminants.
2.
The ASB also reviews safety-re'ated portions of the TAVS with respect to the following:
I a.
The capability of the system t' direct ventilation air from areas of low radioactivity to areas of higher radioactivity levels.
b.
The capability to detect the need for isolation and to isolate safety-related portions of the system in the event of fires, failures, or malfunctions, and the capability of the isolated system to function undar these conditions.
c.
To determine that the quality group and seismic design requirements are met for the system.
3.
The Effluent Treatment Systems Branch (ETSB) evaluates the TAVS's functional performance to assure that the system meets acceptable 1;mits for radioactive releases during normal operations (see SRP Section 11.3).
4.
The Radiological Assessment Branch (PAC) reviews and evaluates the capabi;ity of the TAVS to meet radiation protettier cr;'eria and the radiological monitoring systems that may be associated with the 1AVS (see SRP Section 12.3).
5.
The applicant's proposed technical specifications are re>iewed for operating license applications as they relcte to areas covered in this SRP section.
I Secondary reviews are performed by other branches and the results used by the ASB to I
complete the overall evaluation of the system. The MEB will, upon request, review the seismic qualification of components and confirm that the cernonents, piping, and struc-tures are designed in accordance with applicable codes and standards. The ICSB and PSB 1
l will, upon request, determine the adequacy of the design, installatica, inspection, and testing of all electrical components (sensiag, control and power) required for preper operation.
i II.
ACCEPfANCF CRITERIA Acceptability of the TAVC design, as described in the applicant's safety analysis report (SAR), is based on specific general desir eria and regulatory guides. The design of safety-related portions of the TAVS is _ceptable if the integrated design of the system is in accordance with the following criteria:
1.
General Des 'in Criterion 2, as related to structures housing the system and the i
syv 2el being capable of withstanding the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods 9
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2.
General Design Criterion 4, with resoect to structures housing the system and the system itself Deing capable of withstanding the effects of external miss;les and internally generated missiles, pipe whip, and jet impingement forces associated 9
with pipe breaks.
3.
General Design Criterion 5, as related to shared systems and com;.- ants important to safety.
4.
Regulatory Guide 1.26, as related to the quality group classification of systems and components.
5.
Regulatory Guide 1.29, as related to seismic design classification of systems and components.
6.
R gulatory Guide 1.117, as related to the protection of structures, systems and components irrportant to safety f rom the ef fects of tornado missiles.
7.
Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, as related to capabil]ty of the system to remove smoke 8.
Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1, as related to breaks in high and moderate energy piping syste outside containment.
For those areas of review identified in subsection I of this SRP section as being the responsibility of other branches, the acceptance criteria and their methods of applica-tion are contained in the SRP sections corresponding to those branches.
III. REVIEW PROCEDURES The procedures below a 'e used durir/; the construction permit (CP) review to rtetermine that the design criteria and bases and the preliminary design as set forth in the preliminary safety analysis report meet the acceptance criteria given in subsection 11.
l For the review of operating license (OL) applications, the procedures are used to verify that the initial design criteria and bcses have been appropriately implemented in the final design as set forth in the final safety analysis report. The procedures for OL reviews include a determination that the proposed technical specifications are in agreement with the requiremants for testing, minimum performance, and surveillance developed by the staff.
Upon request from the primary reviewe*, the secondary review branches will provide input for the areas o' review stated in subsection 1.
The primary reviewer obtains and uses such inputs as required to assure that this review procedure is complete.
As a result of various TAVS designs proposed by applicants, there will be variations in system requirements. For the purpose of this SRP section, a typical system is assumed l
which has fully redundant subsystems, each having an identical essential (safety-relaterb 9.4.4-3 ReV-I kh
portion. For cases where there are variations f rom this typical arrangement, the reviewer adjusts the review procedurcs given below. However, in such cases, the system design must still meet the acceptance criteria given in subsection II.
The reviewer selects and emphasizes material from this SRP section as may be appropriate for a particular case.
1.
The SAR is reviewed to verify that the system description and piping and instru-l mentation diagrams (P& ids) show the TAVS equipment used for normal operation, and the ambient temperature limits for the areas serviced. The system performance requirements are reviewed to determine the allowable component operational degra-dation (e.g., loss of function, camper leakage) and the procedures that will be followed to detect and correct these conditions. The reviewer, using results from failure modes and effects analyses as appropriate, determines that the system is capable of sustaining the failure of any active component that is required for the prevention of unacceptable releases of radioactive contaminants to the environment.
2.
The system P&lDs, layout drawings, and component descriptions and characteristics are then reviewed to determine that; Essential portions of the TAVS are correctly identified and are isolable from a.
non essential portions of the system The P& ids are reviewed to verify that they clearly indicate the physical divisions between each portion and indi-cate the changes in design classification. System drawings are also reviewed to verify the means provided for accomplishing isolation and to identify minimun performance requirements for the isolation dampers, for the typical system, the irawings and descriptions are raviewed to verify that two auto-matically operated isolation dampers in series separate non-essential portions and components from the essential portions.
b.
Essential portions of the TAVS, including the isolation dampers deparating
.intial from non essential portions, are classified Quality Group C and I
eismic Category I.
Component and system descriptions in the SAR that iden-tify mechanical and perfnrmance characteristics are reviewed to verify that the above seismic classifications have been included, and that the P& ids indicate any points of change in design classification.
.i.
The reviewer verifies that the safety-related r ortion of the system has been designed so that system function will be maintained as required, in the event of adverse environmental phenomena or in the event of certain pipe breaks or loss of offsite power.
The reviewer evaluates the system, using engineering judgment and the results of failure modes and effects analyses to determine that:
The fai:ure of non essential portions of the system or of other systems not a.
designed to seismic Categocy 4 standards and located close to essential portions of the system, or of non-seismic Category I structures that house, Rcy. 1 g,4,4_4 148 2,,4
support, or are close to essential portions of the TAVS, will not preclude oparation of the essential portions of the TAVS.
Reference to SAR sections describing site features and the general arrangement and layout drawings will be necessary, as well as the SAR tabulation of seismic design classifications for structures and systems. A commitment in the SAR conf:rming that the above conditions are met is acceptable. (CP) b.
The essential portions of the TAVS are protected from the effects of floods, I;urricanes, tornadoes, and internally and externally generated missiles.
Seismic design, flood protection, and missile protection criteria are dis-cussed and evaluated in detail under the Section 3 series of the SRP.
lhe l
location and design of the system, structures, and fan rocas (cubicles) are reviewed to determine that the degree of prM cr. tion provided is adequate. A commitment in the SAR to the effect that tle system is located in a seismic Category I structure that is tornado missile and flood protected, or that components of the system will be located in individual cubicles or rooms that will withstand the effects of both flooding and missiles, is acceptable.
c.
ihe essential portions of the system are protected from the effects of high and maderate energy line breaks.
Layout drawings are reviewed to assure that no high or moderate energy piping systems are close to essential portions of the TAVS or that protection from the effects of failure will be provided.
The means of providing such protection will be given in Section 3.6 of the 9
SAR and procedures for reviewing this information are given in Secticn 1.6 of the SRP.
d.
Components and subsystems necessary for pren nt ng unacceptable release of radioactive contaminants can function as required in event of loss of a
offsite power.
The system design will be acceptable
.e TAVS meets r'ini-mum system requirements as stated in the SAR assuming a failure of a single active component, within the system itself, or in the auxiliary electric power source which supplies the system. The sal is reviewed to see that, for each TAVS component or subsystem affected by loss of offsite power, the resulting system flow capacity will not cause the loss of direction of air flow f rom areas of low potential radioactivity to areas of higher potential radioactivity. Statements in the SAR and the restlts of failure modes and effects analyses are considered in verifying that the system meets these requirements. This will be an acceptable verification of system functional reliability.
4.
The descriptive information, P& ids, TAVS drawings, and failure modes effects analyses in the SAR are revie<ed to assure that ess(nLial portions of the system can function following d u gn basis accidents assuming a roncurrent single active failure The -:.cwer evaluates the analyses presented in the SAR to assure the functionofreq'iredcomponents,tracestheavailabilityofthesecompoefpbvon 14B 3
9.4.4-5 Rev I
system drawings, and checks that the SAR contains verification that minimum system isolation or filtration requirements are met for each accident situation for the required time spans for euch case the design will be acceptable if minimum system requirements are met.
IV.
EVAUATION FINDINGS The reviewer verifies that suf ficient information has been provided and his review supports conclusions of the following type, to be included in the staff's safety evaluation report:
"The turbine area ventilation system (TAVS) includes all components and ducting from air intake to the point of discharge. Based on the review of the applicrqt's proposed design criteria, the design bases and safety classification for the turbine area ventilation system and the requirements (if any),or system performance to preclude any adverse effect c, safety related functions during all conditions of plant operation, the staff concludes that the design of the turbine area ventila-tion system and auxiliary supporting systems is in conformance with the Commission's regulations as set forth in General Design Critorion 2, " Design Bases for Protec-tion A,ainst Natural Phenomena," General Design Criterion 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Bases," General Design Criterion 5, " Sharing of Structures, Systems and Components," and meets the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.26,
" Quality Group Classifications and Standards for Water, Steam, and Radioactive-Waste-Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants," Regulatory Guide 1.24, "Saismic Design Classification," Regulatory Guide 1. l'7, " Tornado Des Classifi-cation," Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, " Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," and Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1 and is, therefore, acceptable.
V.
REFERENCES 1.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General D..ign Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protec-tion Against Natural Phenomena."
2.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Bases."
3.
10 CFR Part 50, f ppendix A, General Design Criterion 5, " Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components."
4.
Regulatory Gui.
.26, " Quality Group Classifications and Standards for Water,
Steam, and Radioactive-Waste-Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants."
5.
Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification."
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6.
Regulatory Guide 1.117, " Tornado Cecign Classification."
7.
Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, " Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants 9
attached to SRP Section 9.5.1.
8.
Branch Technical Posit,ons ASB 3-1, " Protection Against Postulated Piping failu es in fluid Systems Outside Containment," attached to SRP Section 3.f;.1, and MEB 3-1,
" Postulated Break and Leakage Locations in Fluid System Piping Outside Containment,"
attached to SRP Section 3.6.2.
1
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