ML19221A324
| ML19221A324 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/04/1979 |
| From: | Higgins J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMM NUDOCS 7905210278 | |
| Download: ML19221A324 (7) | |
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REPORT OF ACTIVITIES AT THREE MILE ISLAND J. C. Higgins Reactor Inspector s
Wednesday, 3/28/79 through Wednesday 4/4/79
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Times On Site _
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Wednesday 3/28:
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Thursday 3/29:
11:30 AM - 2:45 FM Friday 3/30:
8:00 AM - 6:30 PM 11:30 PM - Midnight
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Saturday 3/31-Midnight - 9:00 AM 11:00 FM - Midnight
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Sunday 4/1:
Midnight - 9:00 AM 11:00 PM - Midnight I
Monday 4/2:
Midnight - 9:00 AM 11':00 PM - Midnight Tuesday 4/3:
Midnight - 9:00 AM 11:00 ni - Midnight Wednesday 4/4:
Midnight - 9:00 AM 2.
Summarv of Activities a.
Centrol Room Surveillance During *he 8 day period on site from 3/28 to 4/4,1 acted as one of the IE reactor operations inspectors in the Unit 2 control room.
.I observed p1b t evolutions in progress, monitored system parameters, observed plant personnel performance and communicated this information to Region I and IE:HQ via the established phone link.
I also participated in the various meetings of licensee supervision, frequently in the control room during these eight which took place days.
I provided co=ments and reco=mendations to plant supervision,,
where appropriate, based on my own cbservations and ir formation transmitted through the NRC phont link.
After the arrival of the NRF 159 133
g technical review personnel I provided them with various
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~~n types.of_information and acted at times as an interface between. w them and licensee personnel.
b.
State and Press Contacts During ph&first two days of my stay (3/28 and 3/29), along --
with,C..Gallina, t. Friess and K. Abraham, I provided various state officials and members of the press with briefings on the status._
l of events at Three Mile Island.
On 3/28, we briefed Lt. Gov. Scranton and his aides, held about a one hour press conference and then briefed Gov. Thornburgh.
On 3/29 we briefed
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both the;Lt. Governor and the Governor together with their aides and then held another press conference lasting about one hour. Late in the evening of 3/29, I provided the Governor's Office with an update on the extent of core damage as best known at that time.
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Comme n ts recarding licensee and systems operations a.
Licensee Operations p-
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Licensee personnel in general reacted in a calm professionai h _
manner during the times I was in the control room.
On 3/28, houever, there was uncertainty as to how best to proceed to,,
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bring the p_lant from the unique situation it was in to a
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normal cold shutdown lineup.
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Comments on Systems and Licensee Procedures for Long Term Followup 1.
Emergency Plans should contain contingency programs for g
plant security and personnel radiation / contamination monitoring:
During the first couple of days of the incident at TMI, both programs were somewhat disorganized.
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2.
Design requirements for control room habitability should be reviewed:
The great majority of activity released from the core was contained within the reactor building, yet there were several hours on 3/28 when respirators were required in cont 1 rooms of both units due to high activity levels.
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Control rooms need improved communications:
During an extended incident as this where plant systems are in unique situations, plant personnel need extensive assistance from outside personnel such as licensee management, NS3 vendors and NRC.
There were insufficient lines to maintain adequate concrunications throughout the early phases of this incide.nt.
4.
Review design requirements for a remotely operated reactor -
coolant system drain:
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During the early phases of this incident the Pressurizer.
x t-was filled solid and the normal letdown path was not
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ope rating ~ ~ satis fac torily.
The licensee thus had no reliable means of reducing pressure while controlling
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' the plant in a solid condition since there was no remotely "'-
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5 _. Review design requirements for H2 recombiners:
If shielding is required to run the recombiner it should I
be installed during construction, not after an accident has occurred. Also if recombiners cannot be run with graater than 5% H2 at the inlet then they should be designed with
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capability for influent dilution to allow operation with higher H2 e neentrations in containment.
6.
Review design requirements for alarm panels:
The radiation monitoring panel in the control room has one common alarm for all channels.
When this alarms, the operator cust-then go to the bank of monitors and see which one individually has alarmed.
However, in an accident situation
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'where many readings are already high and in an alarm ~. ~ '
condition there is virtually no way for the operator to distinguish what the new alarm is or exactly how the. radiation situation has changed to' give him the new alarm.
7.
Review design requirements for Reactor Coolant Pu=ps' (RCP's)
Seals:
As a result of the core da= age, the reactor water became very highly radioactive.
In this situation it was desireable to
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contain all of this water and gas inside containment.
- However, because seal injection to the RCP's had to continue, letdown flow external to the containment had to continue; resulting in en- - '
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continued activity brought outside containment.
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and gas created waste storage and processing problems and contributed to the continued off site releases.
Note:
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.. :- a was a gas.. release from the Makeup Tank in the letdown system -
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which caused the offsite release on 3/30 that resulted in the
.. F3 evacuation of pregnant women and pre-school children.
4.
Comments Regarding NRC Operations a.
During the first day of the incident, plant supervision personnel were very busy trying to get control of the plant situation. As one of the NRC representatives in z,.,-..,.
~. a the control room, I gave priority to keeping abreast of the plant situation as it evolved and to current management plans for courses of action and passing this information en via the NRC phone link. At times this required giving a lower priority to the large number of questions relating to T
. - system parameters, status and design coming over the phones.
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_ _ _-I believe that information transmittal could have been. -
much i= proved if all com=unications had been between the control room and the Region; because regional personnel are more f amiliar with the plant arrangement, licensee personnel and are accustomed to communicating with inspectors on a daily basis.
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On Tht.rsday, 3/29/79, I was directed to meet with several arriving NRR personnel at a motel.
I waited three hours
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for their arrival and then escorted them to the site.-g n -.
N 5Af ter a few hours on site, I was requested to give another briefing to state personnel with C. Callina. At this
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stage of the incident, I did not fee 1 th.t we were the _.
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appropriate level NRC personnel to participate in state "3
and press briefings.
However, we were the only people readily available with knowledge of the incident. Weth[s~
l gave the Governor and the press our appraisal of plant and environmental conditions-as they existed. At this time the situation in plant appeared to be under contiol. -
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. ms; Af ter completion of these briefings and upon discussions with other NRC inspectArs in_the evening, I learned of the latest reactor coolant sa=ple results. These results indicated significant fuel damage.
I called the governor's press secretary and asked him to convey to the governor that
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fuel damage now appeared. quite certain.
c.- On Friday morning, 3/30/79, I'had difficulty with. g :-
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communications from the control room to the NRC in -
Bethesda. The phone connections were poor and it did not appear that plant conditions were completely understood, by personnel on the phone link.
I discussed these cocerunications problems with the senior IE representative in Bethesda at the time.
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