IR 05000280/1985035
| ML18149A037 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 01/03/1986 |
| From: | Jocelyn Craig, Mcintyre R, Milano P, Petrosino J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18149A036 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-85-35, 50-281-85-35, NUDOCS 8602120487 | |
| Download: ML18149A037 (15) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Report N /85-35 Licensee:
Virginia Power Corporation Richmond, Virginia Docket No /281 Facility Name:
Surry Nuclear Power Station License No DPR-32/37 Inspection Conducted:
September 30-0ctober 2, 1985 (corporate)
October 21-25, 1985 (station)
Inspectors: ?u~
1/"t/e, P. D. Milano, Special Projects Inspection Section (SPIS)
Date
[ ?
//1l_C ~L:k~
R. P. McIntyre, SPIS r
(
Approved
, SPIS, Vendor Program Branch Consultant:
P. Farron, Nuclear Engineers and Consultants, In /3/Bb Date 1hiv
~
/-3-Bt;.
Date
SUMMARY Scope:
Results:
This routine, announced inspection involved 210 inspector hours both in the corporate office and at the Surry Nuclear Station in the areas of the utility-vendor interface, the receipt and evaluation of vendor information including 10 CFR 21 reports, and the implementation of actions determined by the licensee to be appropriate in response to vendor supplied technical informatio Within the areas inspected, several items of concern are addressed in the report for followup during future inspection One item concerning the administration of vendor provided 10 CFR Part 21 reports will be forwarded to NRC Region II for followup as a potential enforcement findin,,
- REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees Contacted Corportate R. J. Hardwicke, Jr., Mgr., Nuclear Programs & Licensing N. E. Cl ark D. S. Cruden L. J. Curfman H. M. Fonticello D. Hahn Station
- R. F. Saunders, Station Mg *J. Antigas
- D. L. Benson
- J. B. Costello
- E. P. DeWandel
- W. D. Grady
- E. S. Grocheck
- J. Headden
- J. B. Logan
- Ll, W. Patrick
- D. H. Rickeard W. Kibbler M. Haduck J. DeMarco
- E. B*rennan C. Core M. Holchkiss J. Kelly J. Stoltz L'.* Brown NRC Resident Inspectors D. Burke, Senior Resident Inspector M. Davis, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit meeting
- Exit Meeting The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 25, 1985 with those persons indicated tn Section 1 abov The licensee was informed of and acknowledged the inspection findings listed belo The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspectio.
- Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.
Control of Vendor Information Information concerning the design, operation, and maintenance of installed equipment may be provided to the utility by various mean In the case of the Surry Station, information is available from the NSSS supplier, Westinghouse ( W ), through the use of W Nuclear Service Integration Division (NSID) Technical Bulletins, and from equipment vendors via Notifications of Potential Significant Safety Issues (10 CFR Part 21) reports, and other vendor service information letters or bulletins. Additionally, prior to 1982, Westinghouse utilized another method to transmit information to W Service Representatives called a NSID Data Letter. After the Salem AHJS event, W issued an index of Technical Bulletins and provided copies of all the Data Letters to their customer The inspectors reviewed the Virginia Power (VP) program that was developed to process vendor technical informatio In the VP corporate office, W Technical Bulletins are received by the Nuclear Operations Department,-
Safety (valuation and Control (SEC) Grou Each Technical Bulletin is logged and transmitted to the Surry Statio Procedure SEC 2.1, Revision 3.0, dated April 29, 1983, 11 Processing and Control of Industry-Wide Information and SEC Safety Reviews, 11 is utilized in conjunction with Procedure SEC 2.2, Revision 3.0, dated April 29, 1983, 11 Guidelines for Review of Industry-Wide Information 11 to control review and distribution of vendor technical informatio However, Procedure SEC 2.1 is used only for those items that are identified as needing an in-depth revie Also, Procedure SEC 2.2 reviews are performed only to determine applicability of the information to Virginia Powe Thus, technical evaluations of the W Technical Bulletins are not performed at the corporate office and the -
documents are transmitted to the station for technical revie If the information should require a review-that is beyond the capability of the station resources, the station will then request the resources from Engineering and Construction (E & C), Licensing, or other corporate groups to perform or assist in the review.
For information provided to Surry Station, other than W Technical Bulletins, the tracking function is not performed as a general rule by SEC or other corporate staf It was observed that for 10 CFR Part 21 reports, Surry Station may (1)
receive them directly; (2) may receive them from corporate staff without corporate review; or (3) may receive them from E & C with a preliminary revie As with the W Technical Bulletins, no formal reviews are performed by the corporate office on these reports without a request from the Statio The only deviation from this policy is for those reports from vendors that were initially transmitted to the original Architect-Enginee In this case, E & C performs a preliminary evaluation prior to providing the report to the station. However, in all cases, the station is the responsible organization for the formal evaluation and corrective action determined to be necessar Vendor information such as technical manual changes, service bulletins, and vendor correspondence is not processed through the corporate staf This information is received and handled, along with information sent to the station from the corporate office, in accordance with Station Administrative Procedure ADM-93, dated July 9, 1985, 11 Vendor Interface. -
Control of Vendor Documents."
Procedure ADM-93 requires that this vendor information be sent to Station Licensing where it is to be evaluated for applicability and determination/
assignment to the responsible station orgahizatio Additionally, the items are to be included in the Commitment Tracking System under Procedure ADM-48.0, dated April 15, 1985, of the same title. The program was originally designed such that a Commitment Tracking System (CTS) input would be made upon receipt of the information by the Licensing Coordinato However, due to system loading constraints, the CTS input takes place after the information has been reviewed by the responsible organization and a documentation change is determined to be necessar By this method, the product corrective actions are not being addressed on the CT The forr.,. sent by Licensing to the responsible organization via Records Management requires that a determination of whether a procedure or technical manual needs changin Equipment changes or modifications required in response to vendor technical information are not included in the syste Thus, a vendor recommendation such as a one-time inspection that does not require a change to a manual or procedure does not go into the CT Westinghouse (W) Technical Bulletins and Data Letters As previously stated, W Technical Bulletins are first recorded (logged)
by the Nuclear Operations Division, Safety Evaluation and Control Group (SEC) at the VP corporate office. This group ensures that a response is sent to W acknowledging receipt of the technical bulletin and that Surry Station acknowledges receipt of a cop However, once it has been determined that the Station has the Bulletin, the SEC group provides
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no followup to ensure that an evaluation of the information for applicability and necessary action is performed or implemente As a secondary function, all correspondence going to or received from any~ organization is recorded and a copy filed in the Nuclear Operations Department Technical Librar During a review of the correspondence file the inspectors determined that not all of the W Technical Bulletins were included, which indicates that the Library is not the holder of all interface information with Westinghous Additionally the Library log was developed to indicate whether replies to incoming correspondence had been issue However, this was not being performed and the log is now a chronological list of information received by the Library from Westinghouse or sent to Westinghouse by a Virginia Power organiza:ional uni Since the administration and evaluation of W Technical Bulletins is a station function, the processing of selected bulletins was reviewed during the inspection at the Surry Statio Using this sample, the receipt, evaluation, and the implementation, if appropriate, of the information in the bulletin was reviewe These bulletins are advisory notices of recent developments and events that pertain to the operation and maintenance and, to a lesser degree, design of the W supplied component Recipients are advised to evaluate the information and W recommendations and initiate actions as appropriat The following is a brief summary of several of the Technical Bulletins (TB) that were reviewed during the inspectio TB 85-08 - Emergency ~ydrogen Recombiner This TB informed all facilities using a W supplied Hydrogen Recombiner of a general workmanship problem that could lead to heater power supply cable insulation damag Because of this, W recommended that recipients inspect the power supply cable for specTfic signs of damage and check for evidence of burrs or other sharp edges on metal parts that could cause the If damage was found, the recommendations for repair were give Also, it was recommended that the inspection be conducted yearl In the Surry Station evaluation done by Electrical Maintenance, the actions determined to be appropriate in response to this TB were to perform a preventive maintenance procedure, HG-CP-E/Rl, "Clean and Service Control Panels-Hydrogen Recombiner," and then perform a EHR performance test, PT-3 The preventive maintenance procedure was reviewed and found to contain no specific infor~ation on the problem identified by Win the T Rather, this procedure addresses the normal step of checking for cable deterioratio The electrical maintenance technician who performed the above task was interviewed concerning the specifics of the inspection and his knowledge of the basis of the technical bulleti He informed the inspectors that he performed his task in the normal manner through an access panel covering the control circuitr In the area of cable deterioration, he was specifically looking for signs of cable overheating such as discoloration
especially at the crimped-on terminal connection The technician was unable to state whether the complete cable length in question could be examined from the access pane The inspectors were unable to examine the heater power supply cable during this inspectio However, in reviewing the equipment technical manual, the locations shown of the five heater banks lead to questions as to whether or not an adequate visual inspection from the access panel utilized during routine maintenance could identify the potential insulation damage identified in the technical bulleti Additionally, Surry Stntion personnel referenced the last performance test of the recombiner as a basis for accomplishment of the bulleti This test and the test results were reviewe This test involves a heatup of the unit to an operating band of 1200 +/- 50°F in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and was not successfully accomplishe A work order was reviewed which indicated that the temperature elements were tightened and adjusted, and the test was performed on April 21, 198 However, a copy of the test results for this unit showing successful completion on the above or a later date was not available for review during the inspectio TB 83-03 DB/OS Circuit Breaker Shunt and Undervoltage Coils Trip Test This TB discussed the W recommendation that the station have procedures to independently test the shunt and undervoltage (UV)
coil's ability to trip the main reactor trip breakers and the bypass trip breaker Existing Surry procedures for periodic surveillance of the reactor trip function consisted of operating the main control board reactor trip switches which would simultaneously actuate both coil trip The bulletin also provided general guidance from which each utility could develop their own plant specific procedur The acknowledgement memorandum from Records Management to the Maintenance Library was returned on June 27, 1984 indicating that changes to station procedures were not require At the time of the NRt inspection, the inspectors were informed and verified that plant procedure PC-DB-E/Rl (later changed to PC-DB-E/Al) was changed to incorporate this informatio No formal evaluation of this TB was availabl TB 77-02 - Position of Isolation Valves This W bulletin discussed the potential for formation of nitric acid Tn the reactor vessel 110 11 ring leakoff lines following a refuelin W recommended that the outer and inner leakoff isolation valves b~ opened after installation of the reactor vessel head and lowering of the water level in the refueling cana After sufficient time to ensure line drainage, W recommended that the outer 110 11 ring isolation valve should then be close _J
Surry Operating Procedure OP-15 has provisions to ensure that the leakoff isolation valves are verified open and the area between the inner and outer reactor head 110 11 rings are flushed of any nitric acid solution which could be detrimental to the reactor head 110
ring TB 83-01 - Reactor Coolant Pump Diffuser Adapter Bolts e.
This W TB discussed the fracture of diffuser adapter bolts discovered during inspections of reactor coolant pumps at.two different W plant W determined this was not a generic issue since the cause of the bolt fractures was traced to excessive torque and an improper lubrican W recommended that only W approved thread lubricants be used and actions employed to prevent overtorquing the subject bolt However, no unscheduled inspections of the pumps was deemed necessary or recommended by~-
Surry Station had no documented evidence that this TB had been evaluated for applicability to the Surry Statio Virginia Power personnel stated that one reactor coolant pump in each unit was inspected for broken bolts during the 10 year ISi inspectio No problems were encountered, and there are no future plans to inspect any other pumps due to the complexity of the inspectio TB-83-06 - Steam Generator and Pressurizer Manway Bolt Torque Valves This W TB recommended the use of Fel-Pro N-5000 for pressure vessel closure bolts as a replacement for Fel-Pro CSA and other thread compound This replacement also necessitated that utilities revise intermediate and final torque valves for steam generator and pressurizer primary manway closure bolt A Surry Power Station memorandum addressed this TB and stated that the applicable maintenance procedures MMP-C-RC-010 and MMP-C-RC-099 had been change The inspector verified that these maintenance prficedures included the torquing requirements listed on the T TB-84-06 - Reduced Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rates This W TB described a condition at a W PWR in which the surveillance test did not demonstrate that the auxTliary feedwater system (AFW)
system could deliver its design flow at a pressure coinciding with that expected during a Loss of Normal Feedwater (LONFW) accident analysi The recommended action was to verify that the measured AFW flow rates are consistent with the pressure conditions specified in the design criteri The Surry evaluation performed by Operations personnel stated that TB 84-06 was not applicable because flow rates are never measured during the performance of the surveillance activitie AFW Pump discharge pressure is the only parameter measured during AFW surveillance, which is done in the recirculation mode at Surry Statio The issue described in this TB addresses the verification of the ability of a safety-related system to perform as designe The evaluation of this TB was inadequate in that it did not address the function of the system but only of one componen The Surry Technical Specification requires measurement of the system pressure while in the recirculation mod No evaluation was performed to determine whether this surveillance is sufficient to demonstrate that the AFW system will perform its intended function (i.e., deliver rated flow at design pressure to the steam generators).
In addition to the above, this evaluation appears to be an example where the wrong department was assigned the responsibility to respond to the vendor recommendation While Mechanical Maintenance was initially assigned the responsibility, Operations should have been the responsible departmen TB 85-01 - Reactor Coolant Pumps-Swing Check Reactor coolant pump motor instruction books state that the oil lift pump should be in operation during the swing check of the lower motor bearin In this TB, W recommends that the swing check operation be performed with the oil-lift pump off to ensure that the swing value obtained is representative of the lower motor bearing only, rather than the upper and lower bearings in combinatio The Surry Power Station Electrical Department Procedure for the reactor coolant pump motors has this provision incorporated into the procedur This evaluation is documented on station commitment assignment/response (SCARF) form 85-0800, closed May 15, 198 TB 85-03 - Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Coupling Advance On several occasions, plants have experienced a coupling advance which exceeded the W limits of 0.050 to 0.055 inche When this oc(urs, the couplinij has to be removed and reinstalle In this TB, W states that a coupling advance of 0.047 to 0.057 inches is consistent with the latest criteria for model 93 A-1/100 RCP Coupling advance which exceeds this parameter requires consultation with Wand/or the removal and reinstallation of the couplin The Surry Power Station evaluation of this TB is documented on SCARF 85-0802, closed July 15, 198 Mechanical Maintenance Procedure MMP-C-RC-009.1 was revised to reflect the information contained in the T TB 85-05 - Reactor Coolant Pumps No. 2 Seal Upgrade This W TB described operating experience which indicated a tendency for some No. 2 seals to intermittently 11 hang up 11 due to excessive friction between the 0-ring/channel seal and the retainer (housing)
balance diamete W has developed an upgraded design intended to optimize No. 2 seal-performance, while not significantly increasing
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the seal face pressure and resulting seal wear rat The changes involve the No. 2 seal retainer assembly, the No. 2 seal ring and the RCP seal service kit. W recommends that current inventories be depleted prior to use of the new style No. 2 sea The Surry Station evaluation of this TB was documented on SCARF Form 85-080 Procurement documents were revised to reflect the new W part number All replacement parts are now stocked separately including the individual parts in the RCP seal service ki The Reactor Coolant Pump Technical Manual drawing DWG618J776, is scheduled to be revised to include the new part number Prior to 1982, W maintained another system by which their Service Representatives-were kept informed of information by NSI This system was called the NSID Data Letter. After the Salem event, W issued Technical Bulletin TB 83-05 which included an index of all currently valid Technical*
Bulletins and Data Letters, and notification that all future Data Letters would be internal W service documents and not to be used for customer notificatio While the emphasis of the review of the W supplied technical information was from Technical Bulletins, the accomplishment of the recommendations of several Data Letters was also reviewe It was found that no formal evaluations had been conducted of the Data Letters that W had provided to V However, actions recommended in the Data Letters-selected for review had been taken.
Significant Safety Item Reports, 10 CFR Part 21 The 10 CFR Part 21 Reports can be and are received by a number of groups within Virginia Power Corporation depending upon the developing organization for the commercial and/or technical aspects bf the original purchase order for the affected equipmen The corporate contact for correspondence identified on the purchase order varies resulting in the recipient of the 10 CFR Part 21 report varyin In some cases, the reports were sent to the original* architect-engineering firm that handled the initial construction prior to the report being forwarded to Virginia Powe In several cases, the reports were addressed to a specific individual within Virginia Powe However, if the individual was no longer available, the unopened correspondence would be forwarded and the Station would never become aware of the potential safety concer The program for the processing and evaluation of reports of potential significant safety concerns from vendors is not specifically defined within the procedures at Surry Statio At best, the reports would be handled in a manner similar to that of other vendor information, such as W Technical Bulletins.
Ill
- Unlike other vendor information, these reports are more than vendor recommendations and may transfer a responsibility from a vendor to Virginia Power for further determination of significance of a defect and implementation of appropriate corrective actio During the inspection, sel~cted 10 CFR Part 21 reports known to have the Surry Station as an affected facility were reviewe A summary of the reports reviewed is projected belo Conval Clampseal Valves Conval Inc. notified Virginia Power of a deficiency in Conval Clampseal Valves per the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 on October 11, 198 A materials problem was identified in Al05 carbon steel and Al82-F22 alloy steel valves of sizes l! inches and larger, manufactured during the period of February 1981 to August 198 Operation of these valves can result in a galling action between the stem and bonnet which could substantially increase operation torque and ultimately result in the inability to operate the valv The licensee was not able to locate any evaluation of this Part 21 notification or determine if these valves were installed at the Surry Statio Terry Turbine/4 11 Gimpel Trip and Throttle Valve On February 3, 1984, the Surry Power Station was notified by Terry Corporation, Steam Turbine Division, of a problem with the 4 inch Gimpel trip and throttle valv This valve may not be able to close under certain conditions of high inlet pressure and low steam flo The problem was caused by insufficient spring load which is required to overcome the valve stem imbalance at certain pressure Gimpel made available a new spring which has sufficient force to overcome this stem imbalance with full rated pressure at all flow condition '*
The Surry Station evaluation consisted of a Maintenance Department memorandum dated May 16, 1984~ and stated* that the letter is not applicable to the turbines/trip and throttle valves installed at Surr It further stated that the turbine serial numbers listed on the letter do not correspond to the Surry turbine serial number The memorandum is correct in that the listed serial numbers do not correspond to the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine However, those turbines listed in the letter were previously in service as part of the containment spray syste While the containment spray pumps are now motor driven, there is at least one turbine listed in the letter still in place at Surr Although it is not in operation, it has the potential for future use at the Surry Station.
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c.
Pacific Air Products Co. Linear Converters On March 26, 1984, Virginia Power was notified by Pacific Air Products Co. of a deficiency in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 regarding the abnormal wear of linear converters manufactured by Pacific Ai This correspondence provided customers with a maintenance program and field lubrication procedures to be employed on linear converter The Surry Station evaluation of this report was inconclusiv The documentation stated that it could not be determined whether or not there are any Pacific Air Products linear converters in service at the Surry Station. It also stated that the maintenance program and lubrication procedures would be kept on file for future referenc Foxboro Model N-Ell and N-E13 Transmitters The Foxboro company notified Virginia Power that a potential deviation in the application of these transmitters with respect to expected performance under DBE conditions when calibrated to narrow span The Foxboro letter dated February 4, 1985, was transmitted by a memorandum to the station on February 8, 198 While the memorandum and Foxboro letter were availible in the Technical Support Library, a documented evaluation was not availabl During the inspection, the NRC inspectors found that Surry does not utilize this model in a safety-related applicatio Rased on these findings and a review of the applicable procedures, the Surry Station receipt, review and evaluation of 10 CFR Part 21 reports were found to be inadequat The available procedures have not ensured that these deviations are adequately evaluated and appropriate corrective actions take This failure to evaluate and take corrective action, as appropriate, is considered a potential enforcement findin.
Other Vendor Information While the majority of the vendor technical information is received by licensees through the previously described means, there are still other mechanisms by which this information is received at Surry Statio Surry Station Records Management has made an initial effort to provide updates of equipment manuals and corrected technical information from vendor This was evidenced by copies of letters in the Technical Support Library to vendors asking if the manuals held were still vali This effort was initiated approximately one year ag In a sample of the vendor files reviewed, it was noted that replies had not been received in all case Also, several vendors that did respond stated that insufficient information on the equipment was provided in the VP letter to prepare an accurate repl *
The information that is received by this effort along with that received from vendor information notices or letters is processed in accordance with procedure ADM-9 Therefore, the comments on the administration of the system that were made in previous sections of this report also apply in this sectio While reviewing the selected vendor files within the Technical Support Library, several vendor letters were reviewed and are listed belo Enhancement of Reliability for EMO Diesel Generator Units In a letter from Morrison-Knudson Company to Virginia Power, dated January 15, 1985, recommendations to enhance the reliability of the diesels were provided along with the probable cause of a turbocharger failure that occurred in December 198 During the repair, the field representatives noted that the unit turbocharger still had the old style spring drive gear which EMO had recommended changing in 197 Also, the viscous crankshaft vibration dampers presently used are no longer manufactured by EM This style damper should have been replaced with a gear type damper in 197 The letter also discussed tests that EMO conducted which show that repeat rapid starts could cause damage to the turbocharger thrust bearin Thus, a modification to consistently supply oil to the turbocharger and crankshaft was recommende Until such time as this modification is performed, Morrison-Knudsen recommended that owners avoid repeat fast starts after 15 minutes and before 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> following a 11 hot shutdown.
These and the other Morrison-Knudsen recommendations are still under review by the VP engineering organizatio Charg{~g Pump Speed Increaser Correspondence from W to Virginia Power, dated February 12, 1985, described a potential problem with the lube oil pump coupling on thB centrifugal charging pump speed increase (This correspondence was neither a Technical Bulletin nor a Data Letter.)
In December 1984, two facilities suffered failures of the couplings and the intent of this letter was to notify Virginia Power of the potential proble On April 4, 1984, ~ sent an update letter on the changing pump speed increaser proble This letter included a recommendation to include the lube oil pump coupling in a periodic inspection program to monitor coupling wear and recommended that the coupling be maintained/
inspected during each plant refueling outag As of the date of this inspection, Surry had no documented evaluation of this potential problem, nor had they inspected any of the changing pump speed increaser lube oil pump couplings for abnormal wea j
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Surry Station received W TB 85-19 on October 11, 1985, which described this proble A memorandum was sent to the Supervisor of Records Management, on October 14, 1985, stating that this TB was to be distributed to the Maintenance Department to review for applicability and determination of whether procedure changes are require While the evaluation of the Bulletin is in progress, no action has been taken based on the W letter Rockwell Univalves in RTD Bypass Lines The mechanism by which this information was received at Surry Station is unique from those discussed previously, in that it was from another W information system called RADA This was a system devised by W to provide timely information of problems experienced in equipment supplied by The system is a computerized data base for rapid data retrieved from all utility outages. It is also a means by which potential problems and concerns which could affect availability or safety could be identified. If an event requires further analysis and resolution, it is assigned to a~ task grou Resolutions which identify operational, design or procedural modification are then issued on a formal 11 Radar Response
- Recently, in res*ponse to utility requests, the Westinghouse Owners Group developed the 11Trip Reduction and Assessment Program 11 (WOG-TR.A.P).
Si nee this system incorporates the objectives of the RADAR System, the RADAR System is ceasing and will be replaced by the WOG-TRAP program.
While the Technical Support Library did not have the RADAR System data base, several RADAR Responses were file Of the two, Response 84-09, "Stem Breakage of 2 11 Rockwell Univalve in RTD Bypass Line" was reviewed during the inspectio The response was received at Surry on July 10, 1984 and contained a description and an examination method to identify the proble At the time of the inspection, the licensee could not provide an evaluation of the potential problem although the Maintenance Department had responded to Records Management on September 19, 1984 that the information affected installed equipmen However, when the inspectors asked for further information, the Surry Station personnel stated that the letter was not applicable because the valves installed were manufactured by Rockwell Edwards and not Rockwel The NRC inspector performed a separate review and found that Rockwell Edwards and Rockwell are the same and that the valves installed are either Hermavalves or the Univalves; while from the maintenance documents it appears that the valves installed are of the Hermavalve variet Surry Unit 2 Instrument Air Compressors In June 1984, Surry Station requested Nash Engineering Company to provide assistance in troubleshooting the Unit 2 Containment Air Compressor The service representatives found that the A Compressor, individually, could not maintain instrument air system pressure at the desired pressur The B Compressor had the capacity but was running continuously rather than periodically unloadin The Nash Engineering report dated July 23, 1984, detailed a number of deficiencies with the compressor systems and contained recommen-dation They also recommended that the makeup water supply be
secured to a shutdown compressor, or to vent the unload line to the waste gas sytem to allow proper drainin Unlike other vendor information, this report was not processed as required by Procedure ADM-9 While these components are not classified as safety-related, recent industry problems with instrument air systems which have resulted in plant transients and challenges to safety systems necessitates this discussio.
Determination of Actual Installed Components During the inspection, it was evident that no auditable system existed where components could be referenced to actual manufacturer or model numbe An unofficial summary was developed and located in the control room for mechanical and electrical component However, this summary was not verified, nor did it contain Instrumentation and Control component Further, this listing was not available in the Technical Support Cente '*
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