ML18087A794

Draft Commission Paper Transmitting Updated Status Rept of NRC Evaluation of 830222 & 25 Failures to Automatically Scram.Rept Supersedes 830314 Status Rept

ML18087A794
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	03/29/1983
From:	Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:
References
NUDOCS 8304010554
Download: ML18087A794 (41)

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From; Wi11 iam J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations.

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Subject:

SALEM RESTART STATUS REPORT*

Purpose!_\\*{;>*ro*i_provid~ the_ Commission~rs with an updated Status. ;:

• .. ~-Report of the staff evaluation of~the failure to*"

aµtomati ca 11 y scram events of February 22 and 25,

• 1983 *at the Salem Nuclear Generating.Station. The

• enclosed.revised Status Report supersedes our :.

• previous *status Report on this subject provided to.

.. **the Commtssion on March 14, 1983.* :

There has. been considerable progr~ss in resolving the short-term issues and the scope and schedule of the long-term issue~ related.to Plant Equipment ancr to Operator Trafning, 'Procedures and Review.

However, there still remains a number of details in these areas that'the.staff.believes should be re*solved before plant*

startup. -

There has been less apparen{::progress "in resolving the more compHcated and important ma*nagement-issues related to the Salem events. Staff review of the licensees actions ~nd proposed actions and related discussions with the ltcensee personnel on all remaining unresolved issties is conttnuing on a priority basis.

Details on these matters are contained in the enclosed Report.

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• Executive Di rector for Operatfons,

Enclosure:

Status Report

Contact:

Gus Lainas X-27817 *

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R. Starostedd

• FTS 488-1230

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SALEM RESTART STATUS REPORT BY THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT NOS. 1 and 2 OOCKET,NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311

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March 28, 1 983

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• SALEM RESTART STATUS. REPORT

• ..,/:.. *_._

• Contents

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• 1.

• . Safety.. Classificat~on of ~reakers

2.

• Identification of Cause of Failure

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• Ver-ificat'ion,:~*~ting.>(*-

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,, 4. - Mai nt*e:.~rfi~e'.a~d-Sur~~i\\J ance 'Procedures

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Op~rator P~ocedures,~training, and Response Issues

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l.'. Operatin-g Proce.dure for Reacto; Trips and Anticipated Transients*

.Without Scram (ATWS)

• • ._*,2*:.* Ope*ratorTraining

3. *

• Operator. Response *'.

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Minagement Issues

2.

3.

Master Equipment Li st* "

Proturement Procedures 4:

Work Order Procedures

5.

Post-Trip Review

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Timeliness of Event Notification

7.

. Updating Vendor-Supplied Information

8.

Invol~ement of QA Personnel with Other Station Departments 9~.

Post Maintenance Operability Testing 2

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.. e Salem Restart Status Report.

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I. Summary._,

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This report bri efly;de~~r-ibes the NRC and licen~ee actions to address 0and *

• ,!'*.-' *..

• resolve.equipment, operator. procedures, training and response, and management-.

• issues iden.tified by.the~"NRC ev_aluatJon of the*tw*o events at Unit 1-of the Saleni'NuC:lear Generating Station*.: that' resulted.: in failure of the 'reactor to -

trip automatically upon~ valid signal.

The second event occurred on Febru-ary.25, 1983 and led to the realization* that a similar event had occurred on February 22,. 1983. * *

~*

An NRC task force has been establfshed to conduct a se.parate longer range study of the broader implications of_ the Salem events. *Long-term actions identified.

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• herein. are applicab)e_:to.Salem b,ut*may* have generic implications. The NRC task..

• .force ~ill determine ~enerie ictions~needed for other-facilities. For the.

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Salem. facility, longer term actions developed by the task force may comple-ment the long-term actions identified herein.

Short-ter!Jl actions identifi.ed.

i~ this report must be satisfactorily resolved before plant startup.

II.

Background

On February 25, 1983 an event occurred at Unit 1 of the Salem Nu.clear Generat-

. ing Station when the reactor-trip circuit break~rs failed to automaticall~ open following receipt of a valid trip.signal from the Reactor Protection System (RPS).

The manual trip system was used to shut down the reactor. Subsequent-ly, it was concluded by the licensee that the failure to trip was caused by a malfunction of the undervoltage*(UV) trip attachments in both reactor-trip

. circuit. breakers. These UV trip attachments translate the electrical. signal*

from the RPS-to a mechanical.action *that opens t.b.e circuit breaker.

4

• ... On February 26, 1983, an NRC team was onsite to conduct initial followup and to collect preliminary information. As.a result of NRC inquiries, the licensee*:_.

determined that both reactor-trip circuit breakers had similarly failed to.open upon receipt of a valid trip signal on February 22, 1983.

The failure*to auto-matically trip on February 22 was not recogniied by the licensee until the com-puter printout of the sequence of events was reexamined in more detail.*on February 26.

Further evaluation of these events and the circumstances leading up to them revealed a number of issues that require resolution by the licensee.

and/or the 0 NRC.

This report identifies those issues and the short-term actions proposed to resolve them prior to resumption of operation at Salem Unit 1* and the 1 ong-term actions that a re needed fo 11 owing re start.

The short-term actions required for Unit 1 will also be implemented on Unit 2 prior to restart of Ur:iit 2..

• Salem Unit 2 is p~esently shut down for refueling ~nd is not presently scheduled to resume operation before Unit 1.

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The licensee met with NRC*staff on February 28*, March s,-March 10 and.March 14, 1983 to present the results of initial evaluations related to the.events.

Based*

on licensee submittals of *March Land*March 8, 1983 and on the finding*s of the *

• NRC evaluation of th.e_.Salem events.. ~,issues were. identified and ca'j:.egorized as '.

• _. *

• . *equipment:~ issue*s, "operato'r procedure*: training anct response issues, and manage-

. ment i ss~ei..They are di'scussed.. Jn.detail. i :Se'ction III of. this-report..

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Three.of.. the issues relate to.:th~ :affe~ted eq~ipment,.that is, the reactor-trip circuit breakers (Westinghouse 08~50 cir~uit ~reakers).

T~ese is?ues are 1)

• safety classification of the circuit breakers, 2) identification of the cause

. of th*e failure, and 3) verificatiOn. testing of the c_ircuit breakers."

.* 1..*

Safety* Classificatio.n of *areake~s.

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a.

During the initiai NRC evaluation>ot°the February 25 event, it was determined that m~intenance.was ~ondticted on ~he Salem Utiit 1 reactor-trip circuit breakers in January 1983; followitig a failure of one reactor-trip circuit break.er *to trip upon receipt of an RPS signal "at Salem Unit 2 on January 6, 1983.

The work orders authorizing the* January 1983 maintenance identified the maintenance* as not safety related-and not requiring quality assurance review.

As a result, itwas not clear on February 26, 1~83 what portion, if any, of the reactor-trip circuit brea'kers was considered safety related by the lic;:ensee.. *

• The reactor-trip circuit breakers contain both a UV trip attachment.and a shunt

• .*trip attachment_, but only the UV trip attachment is operated by *an automatic RPS.

trip si_~n~\\*.

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• b~.

• Action/Evaluation

This issue has been* resolved.. Section. 7.2.Ll of the Salem Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Revision 0, indicates that the Reactor Trip

' System includes the reactor-trip circuit breakers and the UV trip attachment.:: *

• The Westinghouse Solid Staie Logic Protection System Description (WCAP-7488L) also defines the scope of the system as including the reactor-trip circuit breakers and the UV trip attathments.

The UV trip attachment and the reactor-trip circuit breaker are safety-related equipment in that they are

.essential features of the Reactor Trip System, which is necessary to prevent or mitigate the consequences of a design-basis event that could result in exceeding the offsite exposure guidelines set forth in 10.CFR Part 100.

The shunt trip attachment of the reactor-trip circuit breakers in the Westinghouse design is not required by present NRC regulations to be safety grade and, although it* is provided tp perform the manual trip function, no credit is taken for this.design feature in the safety analysis (a manual reactor trip also actuates the UV trip attachment).

The licensee in a March 1, 1983 letter *to

• -~ e NRC concurred in this* understanding.

Hence, the specific issue wit~ regard to the safety classification of the reactor-trip circuit breakers is considered resolved.

Other issues concerning the manner in which the reactor-trip circuit breakers were treated from a procurement and maintenance standpoint at Salem.

are addressed under Management issues (Section III C).

The licensee has made

• a commitment "to install-new UV trip attachment.s *on all four Unit--1 circuit**~;,:.. -,.

• - breakers prior to* restart and to ver.ify that the new circuit breakers have* been.

• . properly servic'ed.and tested.

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a.

• Issue The licensee's initial determinat1on of the cause.of the failure -Of the reactor-trip circuit breakers_ (as_documented in a March 1, 1983 letter) was that there was binding and excessive. friction of the vertical latch lever of

• the*Uv trip attachment due to a lack of proper lubrication. This conclusion was concurred. in.by Westinghou~e_representatives and was based on _visual...

inspection of:the* UV tripattachment,_in-place_ testing performed aftEfr the'*_

failur.es, and previous Westinghouse experience.

lhe NRC.Has conducted an initial determination of the cause of the fail~re based on inspection of the* failed UV trip attachments and interv.iews with cognizant maintenance personnel on how the devices were maintained.

The inspection indicates th~t there were possibly multiple contributing causes of

• failure.

Possible contributors are (1) dust arid dirt; (2) -lack of lubriCation; *

(3) wear; (4) more frequent operation than intended by design; (5) corros...ion,

from improper lubrication in January 1983; and (6) nicking of la~ch surfaces

• caused by vibration from repeated operation of the breaker.

The contributors

~ppear to.be cumulative, with no one main cause.

The initial investigation.

also indicates* that all of the potential contributors to the failure of the UV trip attachments ~re age related and thai a new device would likely perfor~:

properly.. Many -surfaces* of theJatch mechanisrn.. are worn and the additional:,

friction tended to prevent proper operation.

P~oper lub~ication throughotit the life of the device might have prevented the wear that.can be seen on the sample.

These 'initial findings indicate that the UV trip attach~ent failed from bi~ding and excessive friction:

However, in additio~ to the potential contributors cited above, there remains the possibility that other UV trip attachment or breaker ~roblems may have caused the Salem failures.

Because of the importance to safety, of the reactor-trip circuit breakers and UV trip attachments, the NRC staff has prepared a more structured approach to resolving this issue.

There-fore, a laboratory testing and examination program funded by NRC will attempt to determine the precise cause of failure.

The*NRC has concluded its initial investigation of the cause of failure.. Only one other possible contributor has ~een identified that has not been previously' reported, which is the DB-sq breaker trip bar mechanism., This can contribute to higher trip forces being required if the trip bar mechanism is not properly*

maintained and lubricated.

To date, this has not been found to be a major cause of concern.

However, a longer term program to resolve this issue will consider

• this aspect.

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b.

Short Term* Actions (1)

Licensee *Action.:.

"::,_ - :*--'*'.. Westi:~~ih~~~*e":-~;~'.~:,r;ci~;°'~::d::t:h*~ ~{~~:i*t.tl'~t modificati~ns.to. ~h~ uv*.t-Hp*:~*tt~~hment... *.

• w~re made in: 19.?-~.:~apd ~g73*~;*;::.A~,.. a.:.. result*, *the-lJcensee shall confirm," in. writing*_

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. to the NRC;. that,;:~he new.UV:tr.ip.attachments now installed*in the* Salem Unfts *1-*

• and 2 hav*e*iric~t_porated.altdesign.changesmade*to these-devices~.**_The licensee.

has committed *;.to **measure_'~.and -cc)nti rm the __ force' re qui red to. tri the breaker:.

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NRC conducte*d ari initial evaluation of the cause of the UV trip attachment -

failures which included visual examination of the-devices Dy qual'if_ied personnel and determining.how the-devices were.maintained.

Based on this, -we conclude that-operation ~ith new ~evices,.;~_conjunction with preoperational testing and periodi.c.surveillance,.,

.. i.,;a_cceptable..

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c. *

• Long *Term Actions*>'

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Li_cense~ A~ti'on* *.::... 7,_:_,:*

• The NRC will require the licensee* to determine the allowable number *of opera~

tions of the circuit breakers and establish a replacement interval for the

• entire uhit or.components of the unit~ This action should be completed within -

- -six months.of plant startup. -In-addition, the Licensee shall establish a

,*

procedu.r.e for measuring the force required to trip the breaker using the breaker trip bar and the force output from the UV.trip lever.

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NRC Action

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NRC has completed the lab~oratciry*test being conducted by its consultant Franklin

. Rese.arch Center ( FRC). '":~*These tests::incl uded exarni nation* of the failed attach-.

l)lents and disassembly to determine the precise cause of failure.*-

All work was contro 11 ed by procedure. and tpe results documented including _photographs when.

applicable.* Iri addition, the staff will revi~w and approve the licensee 1s commitments re~Ulting.from his long *term program.

d.

Evaluation Investigation of the failure of the Salem Unit 1 reac~or trip circuit breakers

- to open w~en the undervoltage. trip attachments (UVT) were de-energized by the

'solid state.protection system on February 22 and 25, 1983 included review of the operating, maintenance, and surveillance testing history for the DB-50 circuit breakers used at the Salem plant.

The initial. investigatioh centered upon the UVT*attachment, howe~er, subsequent efforts included the int~raction of the UVT attachment with the circuit breaker.

The trip lev~r of the UVT attach~ent must lift.the circuit breaker:trip bar for

. opening of the circuit breaker to occur.

To date~ two possibl~ failure modes have been determined for the Salem Urtit 1 UVT* attach~e~ts. The first was ob.served_by the Licensee and by NRC personnel

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the day of and the day after the February 25, 1983 event.

This failure mode apparently occurs when latch-to-latch pin binding prevents unlatching of the UVT attachment, thereby preventing the trip lever from moving when the device is de-energized.

Shortly after the February 25 eve-nt, all but one of-the_*failed devices were lubricated and no further failures to operate could be* repeated.,

• ~he remaining failed UVT attachment was subsequently damaged an~~as not available for inspection.

~

The secon_q possible failure mode was recognized from inspection of the UVT

- attachment'* provided to ~rankl in Research Center (FRC) by the Licensee.

The*

• *latch spring on this device exerts enough force on the latch to reduce the -;

output force _from the trip lever as the friction increases between the latch spring and latch resulted from age related wear and lack of lubrication.

This

• reduced force could be significant if the for-ce required tdlift the circuit breaker trip bar is higher than normally expected.

On March 18, 1983, Westing-house Switchgear Division representatives stated that*the expected force required tb lift the circuit breaker trip bar at time of manufacture would have been a**

maximu~ 6f 31 ounces and a normal range of 20 to 28 ounces.

On March 17, 1983, FRC pers6nnel measured 28~ to 30-ounc~ lift force requirements on five of six-Salem reactor trip circuit.breakers made available for inspection by the Licensee.

These were the four Unit 2 circuit breakers, and the Unit 1 118 11 bypass circuit b_reaker. *The sixth circuit breaker, the present Unit 1 11A 11 trip, required 38 ounces of lifting force for ope~ation, indicating that redu~ed output force from a UVT attachment coupled with a high tr1p bar lift requirement is a pos-

. sible condition.

The li~ensee has committed*to measure the force required to trip the breaker using the breaker trip bar and confirm that the breakers trip with a force of 31 ounces or less.

This will be done prior to start-up. -

During the investigation, variations in construction were noted among the original UVT attachments supplied *to the Salem plant.

The device given tci FRC had a tight latch spring.

The remaining device that was made available to FRG for inspection had a much looser latch spring that exerted no force on the latch except during actual latching operations.~~-No reset. lever spring adjust-ment lock washer was found on the device provided.to FRC, whereas the remaining Salem device had the lock washer.

Discussions with NRC and Licensee personnel_

indicated that similar variations were noted in the ather UVT attachments that were no longer available for inspect-ion by FRC.-

The latch surfaces of the original UVT attachments were found to be in the as-stamped state.

Roughnes? was noted on the latch-to-latch pin face and on

_the latch-to-latch spring face.

On the device provided to FRC, this roughness on the lat~h spring side of the latch had caused a groove to be worn into the spring.

Irregularities on the latch-to-latch pin surface of the latch were noted on the FRC device and the device tested by the Licensee.

During testing*

of the FRC device, hesitation during unlatching was observed when voltage was gradually reduced to the coil of the device, further indicating friction in the latch-to-latch pin surface.

Photographs of the latch, latch pin, and latch spring surfaces taken on March 18, 1~83 show the irregular nature of the*mating surface.*

Subsequent to the manufacture of the Salem UVT attachments, Westinghouse changed the manufacturing procedure for the latch to include hand honing of the iatch surfaces that mate with other components.

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.e On March 17, 1983, FRC personnel examined the new UVT attachments supplied.for Salem Unit 1.. *These device~ were found to have the latch-to-latch.sp~ing sur-

. face honed._ Other surfaces could not be examined because the devices were

• mounted on the circuit.breakers.. Variations in. la,tch. spring force were noted;

• and one UVT attachment'-had.:spring.fo_rces similar: to.the *original device sup-. :.*-

plied to FRC for eval.uation;:;:...'.:**.-~-*-,?:'.;Y~:.:{'.:;:"'- *

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• on March*lS',\\1983,.Westfoghouse.Switchgear Division personnel indicated that * ***..,

quantftati ve *acceptance:*crfteri a-have. not been set. for the UVT attachments.

• • . No. ou~puf:~f !Jrce,.~requ,tf:~~e~frtY:hii.~;-.~~~:n:*:~et :-and no. q*uanti tat i ve requirement for.

mechanical. uril atchfog'-~ca:pabi 1 ity:'eX:i sts":

• In addition*,' no such requirements":,*

have been set for fie1d_testfog UVT attachment.operation and circuit brea.ker*

trip bar lifting force;:.-.<**

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The *siaff.concurs tha~ p~6perly maintained breakers and VV tri~ attachme~t will perform their intendedcfunction for~a sufficient period of time until the long

. term ac:t ion S :a re CQmp 1 eted and evaluated.

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• **:-- Whi 1 ewe. st iTl believe"'a:lT:*:of *the *possjb 1 e contributors**; dent i fi ed are cumul a.;,.

tive; wear caused by' fre~uerit use.>cif the UV trip attachment would be the most "

probable cause> Prop*er maintenance.and lubrication would have minimized the UV trip attachmen~ probl~~.~ However, since this* was not done, lack of maintenance.

and lubri~ation*would:definit~ly~cceler~te the fail~re potential.*

3. '

Verification Test{ng ~

a.

Issue On August 20, 1982, one r~acto~~trip tircuit breaker on Unit 2 failed.to operate during.surveiJlance testing.* A UV trip attachment was reinstalled on this cir-c~it breaker lfter ;~eplacing the coil, the circuit breaker was reinstalled, and

.: ', "...... ~. subs~quent post ma i n,ten,ance' tes.~i ng was. performed to est~b 1 i'Sh operability.

• .*.. *>>*.,~:;*... Similarly,.on* January.6,.1983,-a.reactor trip-OGCUrred at Salem LI.nit 2 due to a low-low steam generator level, but one~reactor~i~fp circuit br~aker failed to

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open.

The:.licensee.c_oncluded.that.the.circui'I; breaker failur.e was due to bind-ing from dir~ and corrosi~n-in the UV trip attachment.*.The UV trip attachment on *the Unit.2.circuit:*breaker, as:well.as*theUV trip ~ttachment on all Unit*1

• reactor-trip ~ircuit breakers, was-cleaned, lubricated and readjusted under supervision of a Westinghouse representative.

On February 20, both breakers*

performed satisfactorily during reactor trip events.

Since the circuit breakers again faile*d on February 22 and 25,.adequacy of the testing to ensure circuit breaker op~rability is an issue. Testing following reactor-trip circuit breaker

~aintenance or initial installation should be sufficiently tomprehensive to provide reasonable assurance that the circuit breaker will function as needed.

b. - Short Term Actions (1)

Licensee Action-*

The licensee has* conducted a program to verify proper operation of. the reactor-trip circuit breakers prior to returning them to ~ervice. The program involved preinstallation testing of UV trip attachments 25 times by the vendor.

After insfallat'ion. on the trip breakers, *the UV. trip attachment and trip breaker were

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tested ten more times.

Following this testing, a time response test of the breaker actuated through the RPS was performed.

(2)

NRC Action

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• By letter dated March 14, 1983, the licensee stated that he had-sucessfully *

• completed his short-term testing program.

The staff considers this action complete. * *

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(1)

Licensee Action The licensee has committed, to perform a**2ooa cycle bench test of a DB-50 reactor trip circuit breaker.

The test will consist of 1000 cycle trips utilizing the shunt coil and 1000 cycle trips utiliziAg the UVT.

The licensee w111 *develop and provide the NRC with a detailed test procedure and acceptance criteria by May 1983.

The intent of the testing is to verify the adequacy.of the licen.see's maintenance and surveillance program.*

(2)'

NRC Action Review ~he adequacy of end results from the licensee's program~*

d.

Evaluation The licensee has performed his short-term testing program and committed te sub-mit a.long-term operational verification program for the reactor trip breakers for NRC review by May, 1983.

Based on the successful results, of the testing performed thus far and the above commitment from the licensee, the staff con-c~udes that this issue has been satisfactorily resolved to permit restart of

• the plant.

Further action required of the licensee will be determined sub-

• sequent to the staff's review of the licensee's~Jong-term verification testing program.

4.

Maintenance and Surveillance Procedures

a.

Issue (1)

Maintanence Procedures During the review, it was determined that no specific maintenance procedure existed at the Salem facility to conduct preventive or corrective mainten-ance on the reactor-trip circuit breakers.

The maintenance conducted in January 1983 was not performed in accordance with the latest Westinghouse recommendations, which were contained in Westinghouse Technical Bulletin

• NSD-74-1, as amended by technical data letter NSD-74-2.

Additionally, no program of preventive maintenance had been conducted on these circuit breakers since original installation.

The licensee has now developed a maintenance procedure and preoperational verification program for use on the reactor-trip circuit breakers (includ-ing the UV trip attachment), which is based on all applicable vendor 9

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maintenance recommendations, appropriate quality assurance (QA) requfre-rnents, and post maintenance testing.

The NRC staff initial review of the

.*," procedures and progr*arn identified certain deficiencies.

By letter dated

. March 14,.'.1983~ :t_h~*:Ji~ensee.i.-~u~mitted Rev.ision 2*to Salem Ge.nerating *

• , ~

.. _Statio_n_ Mai ~te_nance_ Depar~111e~t.. Manua 1 Ma i_ntenance Procedure M3Q-2 to * * *, *

... *. address these deficienci,es} 1-':_The staff evalua.tion of this information

• "is discussed_.P~.1.. '?~.'-**ar:i()nc)~~e!~. input from*the staff's technical.. *

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With resp~ct'**to. surveill~~ce**'te~ting, the licensee conductec(a funct*ional **

test of one of the two* reactor-trip circuit breakers every month, so each*.

circuit breaker was tested. once every two. months... The'£.. survei 11 ance test involved tripping a_circuit>br!=aker by *use oft.he UV trip attachment.** The licensee also operated.the circuit breakers weekly by exercising the shunt

.. ~ r.~- P.:: a.~-~-~~-~:~~~~~~~}:,:;*':::*~~**_:5;,f ~fl~~#i'.i~~s~;.~;-~:;~;j ~

.. In view of*thit.. nuinber."of-f1fa.'C:t6r-irip circuit breaker* failures* at Salem~,...

• it appears that~the;period~~ surveillance testing was ineffective in dete~t ing reactor~trip tircuit*br~aker failures of the type experienced on Feb-rua_ry 22 and 25, }983 ~- **-

-~;::.. :: : > *

• .~:: : "~.... *'

. The Ji censee had pro.pose~(~onthly testing of the main reactor-trip ci-rcuit

• _*breakers by use of.the UV *trip attachment and_ weekly testing of the r:-eactor-trip, circuit breakers:by use of the shunt trip attachment.

We did not -, **

. a~Fee with the weekly testing interval of the shunt trip attachment, and,

also required that the associated bypass breakers be tested at e(!.ch refueling outage. _.

By 1 etter dated March~.-14~*:: 1983, the 1 i cerisee dese:ri bed routine testing of breakers.which specifi e~: that the. shunt trip attachment of each reactor-trip *breaker be tested_ each month/,;*",:i:hi s is in accordance -with th~ NRC staff's pr~vious recommendation, and is acceptabl~.

In.. his March 14~ 1983 letter, the licensee also states that the UV trip attachments on a 11 breakers' including the bypass.breakers' have now been.

successfully tested.

Regarding the NRC recommendation that testing of the*.

UV trip attachment of the bypass breakers be performed every refueling out-age the licensee has modified Maintenance Procedur~ M3Q-2 such that all reactor trip and bypass breakers have their UV trip attachments tested.

every. six months.

Based 6n the above, the licensee has complied with the staff's recommenda-tion concerning_testing of the UV trip attachment of the bypass breakers.

b.

Short Ter~ Action*

'. ~ _* ;

(1)

Licensee Actiori

i.

The maintenance procedure now specifies.cle~ning and vacuuming ~he equipm~nt.. This does not completely resolve the previous deficiency since it is not clear whether the entire circuit breakers room and c~b*i nets are to be cleaned.. The staff re qui res that this deficiency *.

. '- - ~. *-

10

-.. -~...

~ '

. - ~.

~:*:

be compietely resolved and the circuit breaker room and cabinets be*

cleaned prior to plant startup.

ii.--,Th~ m~intenance procedure still doe~'not ~equi~~ replacement UV attach-

.

• ments :to have successfully completed 25 consecutive cyc_les of testing*_,.:_.,

to be performed by Westinghouse.

The -maintenance procedure-or other_. * *

• appropriate documents,' e.g.' *purchase order': should be.revised to. "..

• _.* require_::all replacement UV attachments to have* successfully-been so; :. *. __,-.: *

-. _..,.. tested..

• For startup :.:th~ licensee h_as stated that *the new UV attach'.'" : * - -

<:~ments:~(currently instal)ed) have completed th_is testing.. :However,...

• _:this 'deficiency in the'::'inaintenance arid other documentation *must be*

resolved prio~ to plant startup.

The maintenance procedu~e now specifies* a 30-min~te interval between

.each of the ten cycles*of.testing required.

This test interval is in accordance wit~ the pre~ious staff recommendation.

However, the main-.

tenance procedure has.not been revised to specify an acceptance_cri-.

• :' teri a should "any_ fai_l µr,e. occur during this testing.. Previously sub-

, __,**mit'ted acceptance criteria were acceptable to the staff' but have not.

been incorporated. into the m-aintenance procedure.. However, the staff's consultant has reviewed the previous acceptance criteria and has the

• _following co~ment:

• Item 2 (of-the document previously reviewed by the staff, "Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Reactor Switchgear,.

Operational Verification Prograll!"):states that M3Q-2

• requires 10, 40, then 50 trips of the circuit breaker depending upon the-number of failures of the underyoltage trip attachment~ M3Q-2 does not contain such a require-ment.

Allowi~g any failures during testing is wholly

• inappropriate f6r,the undervoltage trip unit and Main-_*

tenance Procedure M3Q-2 should not be modified to allo.w

.:the*under~oltagi~~rip attachment to fail, no matter how~-

many successful. operations follow~:: Failure to operate -.

once during a sequence of trippings of the attachment indicates severe pr'ob_lems in the mecha.nism and places*

>~.

-the reliability of it_s function in doubt.*

The NRC staff *concurs with the abov~ comment.

Therefore, Enclosure 9 of the maintenance procedures should be revised to require that no failure of the uv* attachment be allowed.

If a failure occurs, the UV attachment being tested should not be installed.

The licensee has*

'stated that the new UV attachments have been successfully tested ten times, utilizing a 30-minute time interval.

However, this deficiency must be resolved prior to plant startup.

It should be noted, that following completion of the testing.discu~sed above, after installation -into the appropriate breaker compartment, a

• response time test of the breaker, actuated through.the Solid State Protection System (SSPS), was performed in accordance with Technical Department te~t procedure lPD-18.4.002 or lPD-18.4.005.

NRC review of these test procedures will be performed prior to plant startup.

11

')

.e-The.re*f erenced Techn i ca 1 Department Procedures; lIC-18. 011

• and lIC-18:1.010, are still being reviewed by the NRC staffw

• This*revie~. *

. :: *-"".il 1 be perf orme_d prior to p 1 ant startup.

>:*A'-~:;>*::.-';~;,~:t~-* :.,d::.***-:f r::;~;*n'.:;~,;;:>

--~;;:.-::.. ;_*_- ----.:.;:<.

.*.:'~::*'~-:-*

ii;f>Section 9.*8-discu~s~~:::_timing of the.circuit-breaker.when tripped by the*:-:>.

., \\.\\1::,*:~},(\\Jriderv.o l tag~.:'.~fi_P.;;a~-~~~hmen~:,,,_.FRC -sugge~ts that* thre7-t-i,mi ng. tests be:~f'-* *.-:*

• _ *. :;,,, performed and_ the average_ time. to be. ~ompared to. previous *tests as

'..t}c,:succe_ssive _tests'*ar:-e perfo_rmed. _This would ~llow degradation in per.:.

,:~~:,;,:,formance to '.b(:!/deter;~~~ed... A timing ~est has._been performed.on the

,;;;,~;

'i~

7.rJ~W/,c.ircy;_~~t:n:-e-~l<.er,s'.*;t'o;.~sta~Ti:~h a_;;.~~se Jine __. for futur.E!. comparison

. '30~/\\ rj.' **:"'."fi:-~\\;;)~**::':'.C;§:;;tsttf/(<,. -

-- _.,... 2~~';'.,,~;~:+t:\\:*~;y;;.. _ :.?:::}:{:c~:c.. -*~-- -'\\:.;;,;_ -. *:.: :;'/'/,:,::11~:>~~~-;;_~.:. :,

-, ;h_* :The NRC *staff. concurs with the above FRC suggestion.. The maintenance* /_ -

~~procedure and-Enclosure 7 to it should be modified accordingly.* This

.... deficiency in.,the ma:inte*nance p-rocedure *must be resolved prior to plant.

startup.**---:."~:*, *,.-"*".*. *_

k

.. \\

-iv...;: Encl.osur~

• 1 *of:.:M3cj.:.'2 ~~*~~ta.ken frorn 'the Westinghouse-Low Voltage Metai j:;-;::~&:Z*'.Encl o*sedSwi tchgear.,Ma.riua ;:;:~: This *di ag'ram incorrectly. shows.attachments

• 4:;;;~;-L,s~ch as :*the:~overcurreh'tiltrip.. deVice that are n6£. used *in-~the' 'reactor:;:,,~-"".*-

)**:)~trip Circui.t'breakers*','a:nd does_not *show the shunt trip or undervoltage**

':/""trip attachmen'ts... FRC:...suggests that an applicable diagram be included ;_*

• • • ,; in the procedure.

• c

.* ***> The -NRC. staff> concurs *.with the abqve comment. _The maintenance procedure should be modified. accordingly.. This_ de_fi ci ency must be re so 1 v~d prior to. p'l ant startup;,_>;. __ ::*:'.

v. -_,_Section 9.7 contains a caution concerning the self-locki~g screw in the moving ~ore 0

of the.UV attachment.

The mai~tenance procedure,.and other

. _ appropr'iate procedures~ should be revised to require that*a sealant be

-:;/.>~applied*to-.:.the-head... of the screw* such that field adjustments are not.-_

• . -_.-:*:>::;:'-possible without breaking thi.s seal:-, - This deficiency must be *resolved

- '-':;:::i~~;g<*pri.or:.:-.to".plant,star~up~.* :Addi-tional~Y,;,.the_licensee is.required.to*,_,:*

• .

  ..,notify the NRC in wri_ting, p.rior to,plant startup, that thes*e seals

'.'... -a re in p 1 ace -*

. J

<vi-~:-.* *Enclosure,7 of the mai ntenarice procedure should_ be revised to specify.

the acceptance tolerarice on the UV~trip attathment coil drripout vol tag~.

• • -(reference Seeton.9.7.of Maintenance Procedure 'M3Q-2).

The maintenance procedure shall als0 address the action to take if the coil dropout voltage falls below the specified limits.

This deficiency must be resolved prior to pJant startup.

• . i"***"

vii. Enclosure 7 should be revised to require notification to the NRC and take no corrective action if any data is found to be out of specifica~

ti on.

The* li.censee is required to submit to NRC, prior to plant

., startup, proposed Technical.Specification changes that require such notification ta be.made ~rior to ~ny,corrective actions being taken.

' ~ - '

viii. -The ~-ta ff re~om~ends Sect {on -9. 7. 4. of the maintenance procedure be revised to require that a static trip measurement be made on the trip bar of each of the four reactor trip breakers and the output force of all four UV trip attachments be measured each time maintenance is per-..

formed and.f~llowing installatfon of a new UV trip a_ttachment.

If the

~.

. - *;: 12.

... -~...

I.

-~---

measured trip force on any trip bar exceeds the manufacturer recommended upper limit of 31 ounces, or the output force of any UV trip attach-ment*is less than twice the measured trip force, NRC should be

. *immediately.notified prior to any corrective action.. (The upper li.mit.. *

• ,, /. of.31 ounces*,>is based on information received from Westinghouse. *

. *According to.Westinghouse; any*breaker*.exceeding 31 ounces>.trip force-.::*,*:>:.

... **is rejected'.~nd.. not sent to its client.. )

These measurements:'are

• _~:'*:*

.-'~.. required to be _performed prior to plant startup.. The maintenance pr.a".".. ><.:

• cedure, and _Enclosure.}.. to jt,.should be revised accordingly, and.

.. :*Technical,:Sp~c;;_-f_icati~n cha_nges made~to~ require NRC not.ification * *

• • '"" prior to* any" corrective :*actions~

(2). NRC Action

• . The. NRC wil i *verify the*. successful. completion of the licensee 1 s short term action.

• .As noted above.in the licensee's short term actions, the NRC will perform a review of th~ licensee's test~procedures identified in item ii.

,J I,. -*~ *

~.

(1)** Licensee Action.. : *

. l The NRc* required that the licensee incorporate results of a 1 ong-..term veri fi ca-.

tion te~ting of the reactor-trip circuit breaker into maintenante and surveil-

• 1 ance programs.

The licensee, in his March 14, 1983 letter, has committed.. to perform this.,Jong. **

. term verification testing and to review all recommendations made by his staff at.

the compleiion of this program.

The long-term operational verification program for the reactor trip ~r.eakers will* be submitted for NRC review by May 1983*.

The maintenance procedure is still ri~t explicit relative to the frequency of UV attachment lubricatiori. It should be modifi~d to require lubrication each. time maintenance is performed.

The NRC staff and its contractors have no concerns relative to the adequacy of the lubricant, but are continuing to review this subject..

• The NRC st~ff's consultants made the following comment concerning the.points of lubricant application:

The second paragraph of Item 9.7.2.2 indicates the portions of

-the undervoltage trip attachment to be lubricated; however, no mention is made of the latch to-latch spring (the copper alloy flat spring) surface, the bearing points of the latch spring pin, and the bearing points of the reset lever arm.

All. of these, especially the latch to latch spring surface, are fric-tion sources that could prevent operation and should be con-sidered for lubrication.

13

. :* ~**.....

.e I

The NR: staff cbncurs with the above comment.. Therefore~ the maintenance*

procedure sho~l~ be revised accordingly.

• In a March 22, 1983.l~tte~ to th~ NRC, Westinghouse states that a new

..~.

. Techni_cal Bulletin clar1fying.th.e.. circuit breaker* and UV trip.attachment lub-.. >-

ricants and lubricati_on points will: be issued to the licensee by--March 24; * ::_. ;

1983~~. the licensee,:i?* re.quired-:too'verify in writing to the NRC, prior to1plant'. -*

startl;p, that the circuit. breakers and UV trip attachments. have been lubricated:/;.*

in accordance with. this.;Technic(ll Bulletin, and that the latch. spr._ing-surface, ~ *

.the:.b~a_r.iiig *p.oint,s ::of.;t_h~_-*1atch. spring p)ry,. and the bearing points o.f the reset:

• leve*r-arm have beeif*"lubficated. :If theseare-riot'specified as lubrication-*

points in the Westinghouse Technical Bulletin, then Maintenance Procedure M3Q-2 should be revised to indicate so., -

~ith regard to surveill~nce testing jn ~ddition to the monthly testing of the shunt trip attachment and UV trip attachment of the *main breakers, the staff will require th~t circuit breaker timing also be performed once each month, instead of.the current ?~hedulewhich requires this test to be performed every six months, in accordan~e with *Maintenance Pr6cedure M3Q-2. -The staff also recommends a permanent test panel be u-sed when.these tests are performed.

The staff will also requirethat the licensee revise his surveillance testing pro-cedurei to include a test of ~he UV trip attachment prior to any startup, if such testing has not been performed within seven days of startup.

The licensee should submit proposed Technical Specification changes that comply with the above and that.require that-the resul~s of these tests be reported to the NRC prior to any corrective action~ if any deficienci~s are identified.

Thes~ pro-posed Technical Specification changes are required to be submitted prior to

• exceedfng 30 days of operation following plant startup.

_ (2)

N_RC Action NRC is evaluating the licensee's proposed lubricatio~ requi,ements for the UV trip attachments (Le~_,.type.of"lubricant, freq~_~ncy of lubrication, points of application, etc.).

NRC will also assure that results of long--term verifica-

~ion testing of the reactor-trip circuit breakers are adequately incorpprated.

into maintenance and. survei 11 ance programs to" determi n.e testing frequency, -. -.

inspection requirements, and lifetimes.

In his letter of March 14, 1983, the licensee has committed to submit for NRC review, by May 1983, a proposed long-term verification testing program.

The staff will *review that proposed testing program and, following its completion, verify that the results are adequately incorporated into maintenance and sur-

• veillance ~rograms.

The maintenance procedure still specifies cleaning the UV attachment with stoddard solvent.

The NRC staff and its consultants will complete their review to determine the adeq~acy of this solvent and any potential adverse effects.from its use.

d.

Evaluation Based on the staff's review and evaluation of th~ licensee's actions that have been completed, tog~ther with those acti~ns to be completed in the short term, 14

we conclude that the identified dificiencies in the maintenance and surveillance pro~edures should all be resolved prior to restart.

... \\;..

8.

Operating Procedures, Operator Training, 'and Opera*tor Response Issues

• • • <;:Examination o(the**,cirt:.umstances associated with the events. involving reactor-.

• _~trip cfrcuit*breakers~\\identified **cert.a in issues relative to procedures,**

• ... _training, and operator response.

These issues are discussed in the ~ections

,.':that follow~ 1t: should be noted that the operators' role in responding to an

.: *ATWS event is to compensate-for multiple fai.li.Jres in the reactor protection

• ' system~ :.The adetju~cy ~f the design of this system is discussed tn other sec-tions-of this report ~nd is ~ubject to Commiision rulemaking.

the purpose of

. procedures for 'ATWS is to: increase the l i k.e l i hood.-of prompt and proper operator

• actions.*

• .:~.

• 1.

.... -. a.

Emergency Operating Procedure for Reactor Trip and Anticipated Transients

\\l!ithout Scram (ATWS)

IsS:ue

• **. ::><"The NRC staff condu.cted* interv*iews with control,.r,oom operators and* reviewed the reactor tri"p and ATWS procedure (EI-I-4.3, Revisfon 7) which was used by.control

.room personnel during the February *22, 1983 and February 25, 1983 events.

These efforts revealed the following:

The operators do not, as a general practjce, take immediate action to

. initiate a manual trip based on reactor trip 11 first out 11 annunciators, nor are they directed to d9 so by the procedure.

The procedure in use required a manual trip if an automatic reactor trip

• did not occur as indicated by reactor power level remaining high or control rods failing to insert.

At* least one operator questioned the appropriateness of the ATWS

• procedure's step to trip the turbine without first verifying that the reactor had tripped, because tripping the turbine results in.a loss *of he a-t s i n k. **

• 15

~...

'.1.'

.e-.*

b.

Short-Ter.m Actions

.*. Li c~.:ns~.e. ~-~-~~f-.~_-;.::/~;:.~.:;~_'.*f:r\\:J.:~:;.: :'-.-:: __ *.*>.':,..

( a}'-.?The 1 iCensee": i f+e:qui red to* identify the i ndi cat ions *in.. the contra 1 : :

' : ' f~'room that,.*p~ov,fde{p9S.J-t{ve:indication,* w1thout operator-analysis or,*

. "..verification; t~~~;;~~!'l.**,;au_tomatic_re~ctor trip demand is present.

• -. :J.7, :-~;*~* * *, -~. *,-.: *. _*.. :,.\\:.1.. ;~:~;..'..., ;*~;.:,~~.:i~~.~.:~.. ~~~~~~i~~f.~j~i?:~0f?r~~~;*;;~}~*~*. \\... :** -~. *

~t-.~~~.J ;'.*:~~-Y~~~~~;+>: :-.

~.. *~*. :

.~*-..

1

• ~

• -'. (b) '..Th~* 1 i.c:~nsee *i_s_*.:required,:to.revise proc_edures to direct.the operators to..iriser'.t;.;.a,':m~nu~l;:~*:t:r.ip;*wl'lenever,:*ppsftive *indication of:an automatic*.:**

'trip demancf'; s )res'ent 0Wi thoutdel ayi ng' to evaluate tlie' overa:l 1 pl ant (2) d, status*~*:-.:*,.

• ...,*.. " \\**-.>*~....

J

• (c) The lieensee i.s*.req.uired to rev:iewthe oasis for the ATWSprocedure steps arid order*of::priori~y in light of the operator's concern, revise the procedure as nec.essary, and train the operators on the basis for

. the procedural steps and importance.of procedural compliance.*

' ".. >-.... ~-::'.,..

'.j.'..

~"*;,.~~*~::.;."*:~i~~~~i::~;~;;~.:":~~~~': ~!~:.~. '~..

.~" :

l

• C dy: the n cen see :n~:";~~~f~i~~~ci~*to '.train operators in t~e revised --procedures

• prior*to.r~star;t.. of Unit L

.*d NRC Action

~- *:.

(a)*_:The NRC will reVie~ the -adequacy of the licensee's revised ~rocedures and basis for th~ procedural steps and order of priodty..

(b-)... The NRC wil 1 review the adequacy of the Westinghouse Owners Group Emergency Operating Procedure Guidelines.

Evaluation This evaluation -is.divided into.twc>>.sec-tions.

The first.sec"tion dealS with

, positive~ indication: of' a -re'actor:trip demand.. :.. T.~e-second section addresses.the revised p~ocedures and. includes an evaluation of the licensee'~ revised pro-cedures relative to the-requirement. to* manually trip -the reactor upon receipt.

• -of positive indications of~a reactor trip demand.

The* licensee's revised pro-*

cedures relative to* the Westinghouse Owners Group *guidelines is also evaluated:

(1_)

Positive Indication of Reactor Trip Demand The staff'i position is based on the following definitions of reactor trip

.demand 11 and positive indication". of that demand.

A reactor trip demand is the condition of the finil output~f the'logic protion of the r~actor protection system calling for an automatic reactor trip.

(This does not necessarily mean that the inputs to the reactor protection system logic requires a trip, but only that the output.of the logic portion requires a trip.)

Confidence in the validity of* this trip demand *is based on the redundancy and reliability of the reattor protection syste~ logic. A reactor trip demand will effec~ automatic reactor trip if either reactor protection circuit breaker opens.

• Positive indicat.ion of a reactor trip demand is defined.as the information from control room indicators that informs the operator. of the present existence of a rea~tor irip ~emand. Information from th~ first out annunciator panel alone

,*1"

. ~ *.

-. i',.:.;;:;,-:

16

provides a more conservat~ve indication because it indicates either that a trip~

demand currently exists or that such a demand existed in the past. Although this conservative indication.. may result in the operator tripping the re~ctor~ ~*

when the plant's condit~or. no longer.requires. a tr1p, the staff judges* the

" frequency of these unnecessary manual*trips*to be on the order of the* number

-of trips: caus~~by.. a failure. of the.:.reactor.~'l'.'fP system, and: i s-:-tnerefore * *

.:.acceptable.. ~:>* *:* *,"_,::': '..: ' *.

• The ~~~kn~~e**.s'. prop~~~d* pcsi.tiv~ i~di~~tions_-::-~f ~ r~~~t~*~" trip are~"~*':.. cl{:p~-~~e~:~~*-...

. ;of an.;.al arrri.;on :the r~ad~br: t'rip. por,tton of.the*. first :out *annunciator '.panel_ and:**\\~'"'.,:.;>

. *'*:.(2) toncurre'nt.. sensor bistable trip 'indications (sufficient to require.a reactor'""...

• trip) on the solid state protection system (SSPS) reactor trip status panel.

Each first out annunicat.or means that the rea-ctor trip sysfem defected a condi-

'. tion requiring a trip for a plant.parameter, e.g., a low-low water level in a*

specific steam generate~. Due to.the demonstrated time respon~e of the system, it is possible that ~ t~Jp cpndition is not present long enough to cause a

• _reactor trip. breaker to open.'"* Because *the annunciator panel has a 1 ock-i n *

-: *... ~*feature: i'ndependent**of *the* reactor :tri_p system. the trip condition could clear.

• • before the reactor protectipn system, as designed, effects the trip and locks

• in.* Because the bi stables in the reactor trip system automatically reset.when

.. their sensor input no longer exceeds the trip *setpoint, illuminated bistable.

• ,,.indicators ori the SSPS status panel provide the information that"the plant *

• conditi9ns*still requires a trip.

Therefore~ although the firit out panel*

. ~*alone provides the conse!vative positive.indicati~n ~fa reactor trip demand,

• the first out annunciator toncurrent with the bi stables on the SSPS status

• panel is required for p~s~tive indication that the need for a reactor tri~

presently exists.

(2). R~vi sed Procedures The itaff review of the revised procedures addressed several areas._. The opet-

.* :ators must be able *to carry.'out the instruction5... quickly enough to successfully -:... _.*

• respond to*a.~lant transi~nt. The indicators u~b~ which ihe operator acts must

. '....... *_be sufficiently reliable to invoke proper action when necessary and not to

• , -"~*-~.

cause i~proper operator action which.affects safe ope~atio~ of the plant.

The

'instructions must have an adequate*technical*basis to provide confidence in their app~opriateness; F~nally, the procedures must be written clearly so that the operator can unders~and and implement the~ in a high stress environment.

• This includes immediate act~ons that must be committed to memory and performed before time is available to obtain the procedure.

~:. '

~

Timeliness of Response To address the issue of hew much time is available for operator actions, the staff reviewed the analJ'sis of the limiting ATWS event, i.e., ATWS involvi.ng.

total lass of feedwater.

The 1 imi ting concern* for this event is reactor cool ant system pressure.

Resul~s of the ana1ysis show that if the turbine is trfpped within about one and a ~alf minutes, after the loss of feedwater even if the reactor is not tripped, t~e pressure transient does not exceed design limits, and is therefore accept:b:e.

The analysis is discussed in Section VI of this report.

The staff reviswed the reactor trip procedure (EI-I-4.3, Revision 9, d,ated March 10, 1983) a--;d visited the Sal.em Unit 1 control room on March 18, 17

. ~. **.

• ... 9*

1983 to look ~t *the indications and controls used in the*procedure and to *walk through the inttjal steps of the procedure.

When a reactor trip i~ demarided, as indicated by the fir~t.out annunciator and.the SSPS.status panel bistable

.

• indicators,*.the.procedure.'.i.nstructs the operator to manually initiate a reactor

.. trip.. using either of.tpf;:.two. *protecti.on. system J-handle :trip switdie~.. *.;lf a reac~or: ~tri_P*~.~es *nat*'::o¢_cu~,::th'.~j~rotecur~ in~tructs the *operator_;to _t_hen per-:*:*-*' * *

. ~-

0 r~.-~~s~::J~~~*Lfsl~::~4Tufu~::hl~.:'.I0'0~:l3;}~};;~~~];*i:~~~:~I~

0

~~:~[:i.~s.=_****~-<.l/~T*~,****.* *.*.*.*.. ::***,;**;*)~I::".f;(f*** *.... _.::.:~

a:.. ma~ua.l ly,.. initi.atei!a.:*::reacto*r.:,trip_';usi.ng. the; other pro~ection.*systenk<.. *

~~~:~x*;*}~~!2

_". *

> \\ ~.;:d2~~~?~ ~-cil~~f 1~,~;}~~-sf *..*... -~*~W~rt{. ~ ')[e,,;*:r~li~t~~~~~rYtt~'~i*}::\\:'} '° * * * :

t'.'.ir

:',~; * * * * * *.. ~*~; :tc/~t5;.*

open the*reactor.:*trip breakers,using the.individual-breaker

. control-:circu1t:pushbutton switches;.

• ,* -~*.

• c. * -~anua l ly ~rip t~~?~'.~~bi ne.,<

• '..* :-<"~ ~.-.*. *

.-. * *. ~ ~

• d.

open the breakers:*.supplyfng powe_r to the rod drive MG. sets,. and.*

. '** '.:.*:*:.*~

. "~; *.. : .,.?:*".:::' * ~;,;~~:*~~~=-~?h;~>;\\:t~:st-};;;7~'-\\1:6*.. *: **.. * :.... *..

... e: '.~*:-manually 'in it iate~:safety~ inject ion~-

11*>-*.;*~ :...,*

~

.. ' *:.. ;.',*\\\\"":'. ".-:;:

-~... -

• .All.the.se ai:tjons *a~~~-;~:~~formecFin_ the ~ontrol room on the main control board~ '

. If these actions do no~~result*i~ a reactor trip, instructions are provided to

. trip. the reactor-and ~tu~rbine *fr.om -locations outside the control room.

' ' -~~- -,/_:;::."'-' '..<. -. - -

1*~, 7-..

• .Staff, review in.dicated.)tb~t 'the SSPS s.tatus panel *is located and arranged in a manner*that*sho'uld require only-a.fewsei:onds to recognize a reactor trip demand. __ Jhe staff walk.through of the Unit l control room demonstrated that the oper.ator could perform all. the necessary control room actions in less than*

half a minuti.

Therefore~ *we conclude ~hat the instructions provided*for.

manually tripping the reactor and turbine can be followed well within the time

_,

• available for.the limiting analyzed ATWS event.: The ?mall :size of:the Salem.

. control* rooms (Units~l:~nd 2) ~nd the r~lationship of the ma1n control board

>>and 'SSPS status panel'.~perJ11it.rapid operator..scann.ing of displays necessary

.. *.for this event and rapid.operation of.a 11 cont rd Ts.required.

No genera 1 izati eris should be made from these finqings to **other control r:ooms or _the use of other:

• procedures in*these:control rooms.*... *

'7-.;;j'.:.. *****:* *. *'

• . D~te~ti~~ a~d Identifica~ion* of the First Out Arin~nciator Review of the first out annun~iator panel operating sequence showed that a

_first out*sign~l provides two unique coding methods to direct the operator 1 s attention to a specific annunc;iator tile. The first is the auditory signal

• with a specific pulse*rate and.frequency variation unique to the first out panel.

The sound draws the operator's attention to the fact that an annunciator is active while the sp.ecific pulse rate and frequency is meant to identify the first out panel.

Identification by auditory coding.is useful only if a.limited number of*

different signals must be learned by.the operator.

The recommended limit is nine for all auditory signals located in the control room, including plant evacuation, fire, security, computer alarms, annunicators, etc.

s*ince there are more than twelve distinct auditory alarms in the Salem control room, the significan~e of the first out. panel audit_ory alarm is diminished and should not

-~- :.

~ *..-..

. < :.' ~':.*. "..

~.. -..

18

'

:*, *, -~'

t I:*...,.,:*'

• • ::*, **::~-~h>:_.L;. *".;*.. ;:h:; ;.~, -**<--~'.. ;;~*:,'.'.,;*,,:i;)ii:.r**:

• be credited as an aid to panel identification. The first out panel demarcation in the control room provides adequate reference such that a flashing tile within its bounds should ensure identification as a first out. annunicator:

I***.:-}

. The second methbd*ti~{E~ding i~ inte~~**ed to identify th~ specif;/.'.~;;~t,.~ut t'i1e **;.:

.. *.**.*withi_.n the."fir_.st.ol.i~:.Panel.. This* i.. s:.-aci:o~pl_1.she!'d".by~ "i.:lluminatirlQ-two red bu'l_bs:<;~;_.~;\\*~~,:.~\\.. --

along*with, _the.two ~hile bulbs illumi~ated on:all activated tiles.:.. The net>

'*"~*:.<:~::...

resul(i s. a: first oli"t:'indi cat ion that'* appears:'*:*fo' be pi rik when viewed* :under.:. * :':;f,:*Jt>::. *..

normal aml;>ient.. control':room nlumination. *T_hjs. color is not easily discrimi:...:)~~:7i 1 :*;:f':'*

• ':: riat~c:fj{from*'.t.hat

• o.fz:.i,i_lumlnated.*,:w~i ~e,;.ti l es* on-:_'lhe.same* pane i ~--* *In.*addition, _.*-the;::.*.*:~3:'+~**

NRc::coTor visfon tesf1n*g.*:requirements* for operators may not.be.. sufficiently :_~-*... :**::"*

• discriminating or:uniformly applied to detect*a color vision deficiency, thus** *

• exacefbating t~e potential problem of quick first out tile identification.

~

The licens~e's proc~du~~ involvirlg positive indications of a reactor trip demand does not depend on identification of a specific annunciator tile on the first out panel, only ~n detection of any reactor trip annunciator. on the panel.

Beca~se 6f~;h~ numbef;6f different audio sighals used in the* control room, the.*

• • operator *may riot-be immediately aware::..that a*f:irst out annunciator has acti-. *

• vated, but the audio signal is adequate to alert the operator to scan the annunciator panels.**. Thus, the: deficiencies in auditory and visual coding-for i.dentific*ation should not.significantly affect* operator performance of the emergency procedure; ***These defi ci enci es may affect post-event :operator actions and are.expected to be.~ddressed within the ~ontext of the detailed control

• .*room design. review....

Reliability of SSPS Status Panel Indications Based on discussions with Salem personnel, and observations made during' the*

control room walk through, several issues about status indicator lights were identified. Although the first out panel is powered from an uninterruptible_:

power. supply, the.SSPS/status panel is powered from a. miscellaneous AC (MAC)

.,,,,*.bus.*< Each status panel indicator consists of a;-J.ight fix:t,ure which can contai.n' *

• up to four.miniature bulbs.

Each indicator appea~ed to be vertically parti-tioned so that two bulbs may.be placed *on each side of the partition. It was.*

not clear from our discussions with plant personnel whether all light fixtures

• • ** * ** were vertically partitioned.** According to operations personnel, only two bulbs*

are used in each indicator. This is necessary to reduce the heat generated within each indicator fixture and to reduce the load on the associated power supply.

However, control room observation from a human factors standpoint did

. indicate that one bulb was sufficient to provide a visible indication of annunciat~r status.

The bulbs in the indicators are tested once each shift, and both trains of the status panel are functionally tested each month when performing surveillance tests on the reactor protection system.

A burned out bulb is detected by*

observing a dark side on the indicat_or surface~

Concern *about reliance on SSPS status panel indication originated in the Unit 1 control room with the observation that a number (at least 10) of the status panel indicators appeared to have a burned out bulb (one side of each indicator was dark), although *this was not confirmed by examining each indicator.

An

~dditional issue was the placement of bulbs in the indicators. With one bulb.

~..

• 19

• .r*

1---.-

. :. ~*:.

Technical Ba-sis,of ATWS Procedure*.

• ... Human Factors Review-- of 'Procedure

'"' A human_.f.actor~ and technical r~vi"e~ \\..;as conducted-- of the ATWS portion of-the..

• license_E;!_1_s Reactor Trip 11 procedure(EI-I-4.3, Unlt f, Revision 9, March.10,

. 1983). ln addition, the entire procedure was reviewed from a human factors standpoint... A number of human :factors discrepancies were identified, *including lack of internal consistency,.logical ordering of steps, and con:vention used

.::.... :-for-emphasis.-

None'.of*t~e discrepancies identified W9-rranted revision of the

. _.: *-- procedure pd or to. restart:

Th~se di sc.repanci es were discussed with the

.... <~*.::::::,> :1-fcensee' *on. Ma:rch'-23( 1983,. and.the. 1 i censee.'~:agr.i;_!.ed _to consider them as. a.part.-. _-

qf his.. progr~m for ~pgrading emergency operatin~'procedures (EOPs).

This*

~.:,:.upgrade.program will-revise e'isisting EOPs, using the.Westinghouse Owners Group

~-._-Guidelines, as part of the ongoing.Three Mile.Island Action Plan to upgrade all.

. *plants' EOPs. -.All plants'~ sch~dules-for the EOP upgra~e are due to the NRC by*

-April 15~ 1983, in accordance ~ith Generic Letter 82-33.

The Owners Grou~ i~ currently*revi~ing the emergency p~ocedure guidelines based.

on NRC staff comments, internal review, and results of the verification/

. va 1 idation program.-.. rhe staff expects to complete its review of the guide 1 i nes

• n April *1983. *It is

  .anticipated that the revision to *the guidelines will be.

completed in June 1983.

When completed, implementation of the revised guide-lines will be audited by the staff.

In coriclusion, ou~ review included the timeliness of operator response, reli-ability of the indication~, technical basis of the procedure, and the human factors of th~ procedure.

Bas~d on this review, the staff cannot tonclude that the revised procedure.is acceptable unless the reliability of the indications relied upon for manual trip can be established.

The staff's concerns on reli-abi 1 ty of the SSPS s~atus pane 1 i ndi ca tors include the power supply for the*

lights, SOl:Jrc_e of the signal for tbe ligh_ts, and the methods which will be used

• *"1*"

. - ~ *: '.. -

. * /. :' *: ~. *. -..

~.

~ "'-.

. 20 '

-. °!."

~~ :*--

~... :

• • ~ -*

to ensure the operability of the lights.

The staff will complete its review and describe its evaluation of this concern in a subsequent report.

2.

Operator Training :_._.

~ *,*

a.

Issue - ::r:....-;~

-~....*

~ -

Interviews condutte'd b~/.itie NRt>:~i th~ the *1 i'censed op~ra:i~:~~ :_::who w~:r~ onshi ft ; : ; ' ' '

during t~~ two events indicate a'-lack of familiarity with *the functions.of the

.. *'. annun¢i ~tor~. andHng,i.caiorsyas.sociated w.ith*:the* Reactor* Protection.System,.;*.,. *...

.. (RPS).

The itifervi ews. alSo *revealed that. the operators*'who were onshi ft 'during.s.:' *~

--. the February 25. event did not recognize that a failure of the RPS had occurred.

until appr6ximately 30 minutes after the event.

Specifically, the operators interviewed were not able to state whether ttie reactor-trip":..indicator light (red) on the RPS mimic status pi~el indicated a demand for or confirmation of a breaker trip iction.

• Interviews also indicated that at least some operators questioned the validity of annunicators until they could be confirmed by inde-

. * *.*pendent.indication. This* perceived**need to verify caused the operators not to**.

• ~

• take imme.di ate action to *manually* triJi the reactor ba*sed on annunciator i ndi ca--*

tion and verification of reacto~ power level remaining high and/or multiple control rods failing to insert *on February 25, 1983.

Based on*staffre~iew~ it is. apparent that training in the areas~ of the RPS and

• its associated indications and alarms is necessary.

- *

• A revi~ed op~rating proc~dure.for rea~to~ trip~ Ef-I-4.3, which includes

, Anticipated Transients Without Scram. (ATWS) has been implemented.

The revised

~**

procedure directs the operators to initiate manual trip when a reactor trip is demanded as indicated by annunciations on the first out annunciator panel and t.he *SSPS statu~ pane 1.

b..

Short-Term:Acti~ni*

(1)

Lic~n~ee Actions (a) The licensee shall conduct training on the *revised procedures prior to restart of Unit 1.

(b) The licensee shall conduct additional training on the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and its associated indications and alarms (specifically whether these are 11demand 11 or 11confirmatory 11 ).

(c) The licensee shall review the February 22 and 25 events with all operators.

(2)

NRC Action NRC will evaluate the adequacy and ~ompletion of remedial training prio~ to Unit 1 and Unit 2 restart.

c.

Long-Term Action (1)

NRC Action 21

• • ,: ~.

. ~'

~ - -

NRC staff will iudit the licensee's requalification program.

(Date to be*

determined by Region I ).'. ** *.

'.~_il~.:'.',~-(

. ' ~

' ' -~ ~.. - ->-*. *~*... '..,.

f j'.f,;0ii~:'*~~:

1 u~~;~c~~f,~~;;t~i* *.; :

'~~;W{ik:ib:ii;i !;i*~'~ ' ~:~;., i~> "

';\\l:j)t~",:):~;~::">.. Ttii s.ev.aluat.ibif.~fs:: the 'NRC' short.;;.term ai:ti on 'item *and" it addresses'~ the 1 i censee Is.*::,,.*

1'\\r;:'*~~~.<-,..--

'":""*:~l.:1-* *.. -.*-,.. _.,*,,.

-*~-~-,_,

~11;:::;.:.;::/-~::,,.:,".short-t.er01. act.~.2rs*..

• The.. ;l! ~~.~_see' s... snor-t*:term action i terns.are. d! scus.sed in.

.~~--**.

'i'i;h1.;,::,~* '.three sect*1ons;:.,.:_("l)*tr~1n.i.ng.. on the revised procedure, (2)*training on.the.*.. * * *.

+/-~\\~_~

,"::~* /)y:<RPS, -and ;.(3}'**revi ew-. of.:.thetFebruary.22.and 25 events... Iri. addition, :~comments--.-<> * *

~w~

1

~;~'.:;?~~l;~?~:~~i~-~~~,~~~::~~;~"

1i:~~*~-~-~6~~-f~~'~:~~~~f~~f.£fi~~~*~I;~~:l~*r*;;

1

~~a-~~-~~~~~~~~~!~*:~?rF~~:11y,...

w;,:;

• the, 1 icensee actions to be.compl e.ted.. pri:or. to.Unit 1 and 2 restart are fr.\\? '

'.,* i dent if i ed ~- : :* '{::>}:: '..

• • • );~~;;;~;.,,~.;;

-:: _;71,* :.~

j

\\

• ~

The Salem Nuclear.Training* Center Staff deveioped an ATWS Training Program**

which was.. conducted for 5_6; l icen_sed**. personnel.. Six training sessions, of

approxi.mately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> in.:)eng~h.~.::wer,e conduct~d. on March 10, 11, and 15, 1983~:.

At, the".:,c:oncl us i.o!\\~:of. each:~'{e:S.~ i pn *;:;Jl".a i,nee,s*; we.re eva 1. uated by a wrttten **.

,,.:'>c:exami nation~.

• A;;grade:oJr8o%~ wafreqti'ired.for>!pa:Ssi ng.* **rn.*addi t; on*, 12***

. operators. undergoing the'l'.r~.. normal/requalification training were. required to.

. "take.a~.~~

11 upgrade"~ exam ~:to;address. *NRC concern~';~**-**

As: pa~~ :o.f this *:pr:ogra~}~-~~-~-,~rai ~ees *were.. "t~ lked through;, the* re vi s*ed steps of. :**

EmergenGY Instruction EI-1..,.4.3 *(Revisions 8 and 9).

The. trainees were also**

given *a.refreshe~ on the,; RPS *and associated in.di cations and alarms;:*_,

.. Definitions* of "demand".:and *,."confirmatory" ~signal 5* were introduced and.

di scuss_ect.

The anatomy,:of an ATWS was discussed as we 11 as a thorough review of the.February 22. and 25 events.*

,r

~ *..

. This training program covered ttie r~quired subje_c~ matter, however,* some

.*.:concerns still.*exist.. :.. ::<.** -**- * **'"*-: >

• ,,~.

,*:,,,,:\\,~~,jM: *":-..

,:..,. -, -~" o

• • -*J>~......

• • Revised EI ~i.:*4. 3:**.. ;~~:;~;~;ft<~,:,~x:;*,.::.;,:f:(,;,.. **. : ; :......

.. - ~. *~

• • _*The trainees wereask.ed**.. to,li~t-.t.he 7 :steps t~at'an operator~is reql.l.ired to"..<>

perform tf an automatic r~actor tr~p has not occurred;. to ~anually trip the~.

reactor:> While*this:i.s 'a*valid question (operators are required to have these' steps memorized), 'a random sampling of 5 test results showed that only 1 trainee':,".

listed these steps without error.

For th_e remaining 4 trainees, as well as*...

• other trainees, no retesting of this test item was required, and no remedial assistance *was provided. *The trainees, while they may be able to list the 7 steps of tpis revised procedure, were not given any opportunity fo_r practice or

-~equired:to undeigo performance testing.

RPS and Associated Indications and Alarms*

While the trainees wer*e given refresher training on the RPS and "demand" and*...

• "confirmatory" trip signals,. the trainees were.not tested on the location of..

• .these signals,'.nor on the*listing of the-'5 "confirmatory" signals ('as stated in*

the training objectives).

Only one of the tests, the "upgrade" test for only*

12 trainees, ~equi~ed the trainee to explain the difference bet~een.these two.

signals.

To mea*sure. the accomplishment of this subject matter, all trainees. *'

should hav~ been required to identify th~ location of these annunciators,

~ '

- ~ '0 *

.- :;(:: *.._,,.

• -~-

explai;i the difference between the types of signals and list the 5 11confirma-tion11 signals.

. '~-~ ~

Revi.ew of.Fehr~*ary -22 and 25 Events

• It app~:~ts-. tha't the'-traini~:g provided for-reviewin~ the February~~ :*and 25 :> \\:-.*-_:: -*

. events was'. very-thorough.: Various reports, computer printouts and recorder

• charts were ut.. ilized... -There wer,e test items covering these event,s~ >*<: -

• --~~~***~*°;':.~:

--**~*-

. *,,,.*.~*

~I*~~~::.-*.'.,

• __ ~:~-':~tT~-s~i_ng Procedures~::;~;i;:,:*----~-

,,~

--

'For ~~~-/final ev-~lua~ion~- one of two versions of the final examin~tion was-

. *given to~each trai~ee.

Thes~ two versions were distribute4 in a~ alternate fashion.

Upon review, it is apparent that th-ese two versiohs do *not test the same subject matter~ While_ some* questions are the same, certain areas, e.g.,

alarms, are tested on one version but not on the other. *Basic educational principles.require.~that if. separate :tests are to be given, they must be equivalent.

All *s:tudents>:should.oe; tested on the same subject matter.

• '-:.~ -r,'\\,,_-;;

r.

~

I As previously stated, the 12 trainees undergoing requalification training were given an additional -11 upgrade 11 exam. -The scores received-on these two different t.ests were then averaged for* a final score (a *score *of 80% was the criteria fo.r passing)~

However~ in one case, a trainee r~ceived a 93% on t~e-first test and a 73% on.the 11 upgrade 11 test.for an 83% final score.

Thus~ the student passed.

>>Two different tests shouJd not be averaged to. make_ one final score.

Averaging

. '.. ~ >*in this manner* does" not en sure understanding of a 11 the *subject matter. -

,.'*'e l.*:.

• There ~ere 18 learning objectives* given to the trainee at.the beginning of the training program~~however, the trainees were not evaluated on all of these objectives.

To ensure successful *achievement of the subject matter, the**

'trainee's perfo'rma,nce 'should be evaluated against all established objectives:.

• Co~pletenesi:of the Trainin~ Program

-."... :*.... ~

-__ Our ~eview -0f:bpe~ating ~ractices at the Salem statiori indicate that auxiliary op.erators will perform trip functions,- contained in the last two

• steps of the ATWS sequence, on direction from the_ control room.

The steps i~clude 'manual trip of the reactor trip_~reakers and manual trip of the rod drive M.G. sets*.

Training of the auxiliary operators for these tasks is not evident.

Our r~view of the traing material and objectives indicated the instructor lesson plan and student handout materials were not referenced or indexed.

In addition, all training material does not include titles and revision dates.

Actions Required Prior to Restart Based :.:pon review of the ATWS Train-ing Program, the following are required:

(1)

Exarn~nati6ns should be returned to trainees for them to assess their s:rengths and weaknesses.

Remedial assistance can then be provided, by the licensing training staff, on an.individual basis.

23

. ")",

I:.

I I.-*.*

• • ,L',*

. e e*

(2)

Lack of operational practice on the revised procedures is a cqncern, Trainees should be given the opportunity to walk through these procedures in the control-room until-successful performance is exhibited._ This may.:*.

• be,*.done.on an

• i ndi vi dual or,: a: team bas i s.:C * *,*

.. **:.:**\\%!::~:> :/';: ~:.*>;;l;:,::;'~'-Cf.Y;-~:.*:< ::*:~.H?*;;{~:xX\\ ~ * * -Y::**.

• • (3)

Lack of adequate 0.ev;a,1µati_on/of)~!afoee ori.'.the* RPS. and*assoCiated.. **....

...,.*in,dication~_:and*~-alarms,.i~.:ar,iot:h.e.r:. concer.n.<.*:,:rrainees should be evaluated*

,... ~'on the.locati:on. oJ;annunciators;~alarms,:'eti::**~;and the types of signals*,;:_

• ~xhibited.. '.'.i:*J,nd_tvJd_~a.l. _Qf_.:~earr,i.:.wa.*1 ~:'."throug~*s~.. in_ the controLroom would be

• • <:~h,~;~.x. ~~JJ,~n~~;;~~:~{,~'~.. ~~~-~*~f ;t~-~,~~y-:~!~-M.~t~~ ! 0 n*~fiBt 1

T:<::,:":x*:~,:;.

.' -.: *.. * ::***< ~ :$~~,7~~\\;,:z.~:;:, ;-*

• (4)* PSE&G shouid:rev.iewauxillary.*ape~ator training*progra~s and as.sur~that*.

• • all-designated *operatcirs*;*kno\\.(the.l~cation.and know ho~ to operate trip *

• mechanisms for the ATWS procedure:.

• ~**

• . -: ~:.

~

~..

(5)

PSE&G should review.the s_ource.*of material cont.ained in the ATWS training

. and lesson plans to.ensure-that it is current and properly referenced..

• The~

• .:*objective*s.**for>thi*s<tffWS:'trai.. nfng.-should... also' be referenced iri ~the _student.

• ** handouts:~*and :;n.str_lictor"ieS"Sciif.. _:plans/;

. _.: :-,.~

Upon -s~tisfactory'... com~leti6-n or'fhe -~b~ve. requ'i.red actions; the 1 icensee' s ATWS......

Training Program will be. acteptable for resta~t*of Units 1 and 2.

3.

• Operator *Responsei *

~-.

a.. :Issue.. ****.

Interv~ews conducted at the Salem Nutlear Generating Station disclosed the following:

• In* both* events~: *the. ope'rators* took 20 to 30 secd~ds to eva 1 uate the

• overall plant status* and,jnitiat*e a *manual:reac~or trip".

For the *first**.

event,::this:*evali.Jation beg'an*"with*tl'ie eleci:r*ical bus:transfer failure.'

This evaluation"was* necessary.because the loss of the elettrical bus..

~: **.. '*... **- ",.

resulted in a.large number of.ala~ms, and Joss of equipment *and

,indicators.

By coincidence, the time taken for this evaluation was nearly.

• identical to**the,time :'ittook:'for the plant conditions to degrade to the

~: '

~oint of causing the reactor trip system to provide an automatic reactor trip signal~* "

tiurin~ the first event, after an operator was* directed to manually tr~p

. the reactor, the J-Handle switch was not operated properly.

When the shift suprevisor ordered a manual trip,* the operator inadvertently pulled off the J-handle, which then had to be reinserted to perform the manual trip.

This erroneous action was due to the operator 1 s lack of familiarity with this switch.

The nearly coiricident automatic trip signal may have contributed.to the* operator's failure to recognize that the automatic trip system. had ca 11 ed for a* trip *and had failed to trip the reacto.r prior to.'

the manual trip.

For the second event, t~e evalua~ion of the plant status began when the*

reactor_tri~ annunciator actuated.

This evaluation determined t~at a reactor.trip was necessary based on ~lant parameters and control room

~ ~-""... ; '-~... : *.... :.... '.

• ,. 24

I indicators.

This time could have been reduced had the operators recognized sooner that a positive trip demand existed.

~

There was. positive indication of the reactor protection system failure*.*. *::,*

• ** during the sec'onp event*; including first:out annunciators.and SSPS status)::,

• '.panel indicati_ons. *However,- the operator_s *neither understood nor trusted:<-***..

the indications.:. Because of th.is,* the operators unnecessarily* reevaluated*i~*._;*.** *.*

.. *:,;_.. plant s~atus}.*,_Jhe operators manually tripped the*reactor in response to..~:.':::.\\**

.. : ~

• their evaluatjon* of the.plant,. status and control room indications-:and not~_:r;::.;,.*,.. *

.: *. _,:: _'.::,1;~,~c~<:~ *. -~*~ci~;de}I~~g~~~~C~--~~dft~~-~~~l~-~J:~Te**._~f -~;~~-}~act~~-- ~ro~~-~:t_i __ ~n *. s)!s:~~~*to **. **._.. "~l~~~j~'.?;._:_,.-

~, *~..

~ :

. '* :* -~*,M:_:::~>-**::*

'. ;* /.,_*~ *~ *.- '

... The NRC *was initially. informed by licensee instrumentation and control.

personnel. and maintenance personnel 0 that the first outr*panel* and SSPS logic systems are highly*reliable~

Based on this information and the NRC's understanding of the~e*systems, the NRC coocluded that the informa-

• ~tion provided in the Salem control room (i.e., first out panel alarms,

• illuminated.RPS status displays~ and safety grade instruments) was adequate..

t6,;erfa.ble*,ope.rators to immediately identify an Al"WS event.

Subsequent tc>>.. -:.

. this initial conclusion. and basecf on NRC questioning o.f the licensee on

.* March 3 and 4, the l i e'en see conducted tests which indicated that short '

• dura.tiori signais (less than 10 milliseconds) could *procduce a reactor trip

~- annunciation* on the first out pane 1 and a computer printout* i ndi cation of:

.. a reactor trip; without fully initiating the reactor prot~ction system.

• * *:However, after reviewing the test results, the licensee concluded that the

• _.... system was functioning as designed and required trip signals of longer*

• du.ration to actuate the reactor-trip ci rel.ii t breakers and 1 eek in the

~eactor protection system.* Accordingly, the current design 9f the first out panel can result in operators questioning the reliability of.the*

information provided on this.panel.*

. ;-***.*'Based on the a'~ove, the NRC concluded that for the February 22 event,.the

• .. ;--operators' respo_nse was*prompt. and fully s~~isfactory. For the event on., *

.... February 25, taking into account the deficiency in_ the reactor trip procedure and deficiencie~ in training that resulted in (1) operators failiri~*to recogriiz* a reactor trip demand and (2) the operators failing'.

to understand the control room ~ndications, the operator's.response time

'was reasonable.

b.

Short-Term Actions

• (1)

Licensee Actions The licensee was required in addition to the training required in B.2, to caution operators on the use of the manual trip 11J 11 handle control.

(2).NRC Action None.

c.

Lon~-Term Actions (1).

Licensee Action 25

~ *: '..

~..

. _.}.. :.

a.*

(a)

The liceQsee is required to evaluate alternative means to permanently

• secure the ~J handle to.the switch as part of the Detailed C6nt~ol Room

.~,.,.

Design Review.::... ;*>*... :':*

• <:.* ;~*..,*...

• ~:-.*:.;.

• -:~.

~~*

~>.. *.;:::;-/). ; * :, : l **r,_

• ::*. :. ~ * ~,~~~::~t.*;~-;~:.~*\\;)::::'.

1~!~~"r~ ;._.:::~.;;:-~* -.. --::.::.~~<tj{~,~;\\_;~-~~~:<:;:!~x~:-~~- ~-, -,

__,-*;~--~::*.:~... ~/!:: '..*:*. -"-~. <;.

.~::.~~<> -*>_.-~ ~'-_.. * -....

-,~.__,~.-..

';~;*

-:!:.~'. *(b} *The licensee. is*.re*quired,*.;~~)~)reevali.Jate the design of; the first out panel

.~t,;*.:;;,:\\-!~'._'.:_:**f*

system wi.~h-regard to the/reliability of.*:in'formation.. *present'ed to-;'*.. *,-

~~"l~~i.~Z.1, *:;~~~Jit!~i~~j~r,itf j~~i~:~~~\\~~;7°m'.

0 J0F1~~~

1

• ,~* :,'{'L, ), ;\\ *'

• .. **-r'*~*;: *:'"~'~.:.The* NRC.*,i"fl:J;reva'l iJate::*theCJ*1 c'eris'ee1 'S'*'ffndln!fs***'arid *corrective -act'i ons "re lated' to'*-...,..

~::>.-._:ii,1:d~~.* the. long.:.termJicensee act.forl's'.~laS:' par.t of the NRC review of.the licensee'.s:

• Detailed Control Room Design.R.eview*~,_;This review will be completed within two*

~*months following:receipt of ihe. lfcensee~s submittal~

• '.:~

• .:J:*,-

_'_;:;;_~*\\.-:'"

.. ;f*.:...

• \\:~'*-.--,.-*"*~ <:~_.' :-".-: *....

",.\\*..,-.* !,,.

I

d.

Evaluation.. -

~: :':\\"~ *;~ ~ :::<* ~

- _::'.'::To *. fulfi 1 (::*:th~;:,:1-i ce:~s.e.e~:*f: sh~,~~:~~:f.~:'°~c~ i*o-n::.r.~qui rement ~: th~* 1.i.ce~see... -i ssued :to

• each.:1 i ceris'ed.c opera~or.. :a --di re-i:ti\\ie':':dest'ri bi rig:*.the problem* and proper: operation_

of the J~handle,~witch::: The.staff considers,:this action acceptable for restart.

- The licensee***5-long-t:erm* actiOn,-will-be parts* of the Detailed Control Room**

Design Review..

The schedule for this review.will *be provided to the NRC by the

.licensee on or before~April 15,-'1983 in accordance with Generic Letter 82-33; The de~~iencies identified d~ririg th~ revie~ of circumstances surrounding these events raises the question of the responsivene~s, practices, and capabi-~

'lity of licensee management at.. the.corporate and station level.

Additionally, a number of specific management issues directly related to the failure of the

• riactor trip.br~aker events. were also ident{fied: _ The*~ssues *discussed in

• th*i:s*section_*are.:

--:.~..-..... ;..1,:*<~-:~--**

• .~:-;-.

-; -.., **:-.*...,... ~

. *<.*'~*:::--..

.;*:~.*~_;_*:~~:E_-~-~..

"'-----L:*~*~~~:/~f;.\\~*: -* *

• .* *.::r.~.:r.;..,

L

. Overai 1 Management':-capabfl ity and Perf~;*~~'rfc'e _

.

~ -~:.. '_ ~*.

~,;::."*:

2: :.

• Maste.r. Equipment Li_ st.. -

• .,~ J~.: *

~-, -..

3.

-~

4.

Work Order Procedures

5.

Post Trip Review

6.

Timeliness of Event Notification

7.

Updating Vendor:Supplied Information

~.. -:.

• 8.

Involvement of QA Per.sonne l with* other Station. Departments

~*. r

• 9; Post Maintenance Operability Testing

~. :..

• . '--~

' r.*,'

~* *....*.,... *-.

• .. ~.. '_.:.

• 1.... ~.'... ~.'

• -,: ~**

-~

~...

-*:*: *~~;-~:::~}~:*j*_::;'"'.~~*

~; :~~-~-~;.~,~'.. _.:: -*~*/.

~--

Based on NRC review of information provided by the licensee in letters dated March 14 and March 15, 1983 and inspections and meetings at the Salem site, th~ following*issues *are considered. resolved for restart:

6.

Timeliness' of Event:.Noti.fication*

~ '

.: :. 7.

'Inv~ l~~ment of QA Personnel with other: Stat ion Department's*.

'~*.......,. ' :

• . *. ",1-.,~:

"y,,

• .. *-,:.':-'.:-~*;,.*.:,,.=:.. *

"--~ -::* J'-"...

~:... ;:~:~-~~~r*~::*~*x~~,~:;-~:.~*:\\~~;:~~i---~~~(~:'.!L~--*t_~:~_::~sr...

__.. -~.. -~.:: :< :._ ::*..... ~-:........, -*: *... -: -_,, ::_~:~~:,}:- -... -**. -.~* -..

~d~;,::~:-~/.,~ ~:'.*: *:..> _ ".

• . Eva:luatfotis addressing e*ach resolved issue -are "1ncluded with the-15.sue in;*this

• .report.' For ~he-remaining management issues which are not yet resolved, no

.'evaluation.is included* nor are the requir~d actions updated to reflect licensee commitmerits.

The remaiiiing evaluations will -be provided in* a firral report b~fore* restart of either. Salem unit.

• ~

L Overa 11 Management* Capability and Performance

'"*'"'~:-* ;,-*;.;; -*......,, :. ~ -*~* '"

. :*.\\ -.

__ : a.-> Iss.ue 0 * ---*

~ "*.- '~-

. ~-.

. -'~- :,

• -- Historically*,.. PSE&G management* has not displayed the expected aggressive * *

' ~ffort to self evaluate and redirect efforts to correct internally identified.

• prob1'ems.

However, the *licensee ha.s responded to* the specific evaluations**. * *

• -conducted by external organizations such as *JNPO, NRC and consultants.

Each

. of these are discussed below..

.{*

• -~.:~~*.. ~1. '--*. '**~.. * "'* "......

The 1981INPO evaluation identified opportunities for improvement in nume-r:-ous,*

areas.including: staffing, personnel safety practices, adherence to procedures, control of documents and design.changes, ava.ilability of technical support,.

ope~ating practices with respect to inoperable alarms and tagouts, shift *.

t~urnover procedures., and* goals. and objectives. *

.Based:o'n~continuing oqservation,the licensee r~_sponded positively t~ selected findings by.various actions although the effecffveness of these actions has been less than_ expected._

\\"

The area *of preventive maintenance,.beyond that required by technical sp,eci-fications, was also raised as an issue by INPO in 1981.

The licensee instituted:_'

a program to be responsive to this INPO conc~rn, but the recent 1982 INPO report still contains Findings and Recommendations and identifies a target date for*completion of this* effort in February 1983.

It should be,noted that the reactqr trip breakers were identified by the licensee for inclusion in this program.*

Based* on the 1982 INPO report additional findings were identified in the areas of industrial safety,.use of the computer tagging system, backlog of work.

. orde~s~ drawing revisions and plant modificat1ons, adherence to ~stablished radiation protection procedures and-policies, and material and housekeeping conditions in the auxiliary building and.intake structures.

Four SALP as.sessment were conducted by the NRC during the period October 1980

-October 1982.

The *earlier assessments identified weaknesses in the areas of:.*

oesign change documentation, engineering.support responsiveness, health physics,

~-

27

.=*_

~. -

physical secur.ity and overall management followup to numerous a*reas. _The*

later SALP ass~ssments acknowledge licensee management attention t6, and improvements_ in the area_~.-C?f, design c.ha_nge tracking_ and documentation* and health physjcs._ Physi~al_security;* despite several_ initiatives on-the part.of-

<the l i cehsee: to improv*~;-~'.~he -area'~\\c_ontinued.:tQ be wealc >Very recently, the* -

l; censee:*: ha_'s_, d_edfCated*'_c.6hsi dera:bJ e_,)~*esources-_to* _phys; cal :securi t.Y which, ; r _ * -_<..

' properly tirip l emented;,:'.shoul d f aciJitate _ a>number *of hardware improvements 'and._.*--_:°:

add several-managers* t'o:'the, orgar:iii~~fon:::to 'more: effectively monitor_ security ;_:--

a_~t ~-v~1l,~1f ~~0 L'~-~ ~~.~'.~;~;t~1E~~-'~~'.-~J~i1{~il~~i~~~~-x~,-~--\\::~{:.~--:: :'._*:.. < ---:.(~ :::~:-* \\ ----:-: --._,-.,~:-.~;;;;L}~'F:_--~::.*: :

• most:'_~; sibl e *rn-;t,*; atiVes *made-*o,Y':*'the*':l i c-~fr1see are" organi zat; ona:r.-*..:During

- * -the licensing process:;:for_.*salem: U~i-~--2*:_in* 1981,' the licensee made a decis-ion

-,:/:to place*-all activit.ies,:*'-i.nc'li.Jding<engineering under a single vice president.*

• *.- Commitments.*were *made 'to* relocate "these activities from the""*~corpotate offices *in* __.

Newar*k,: New,Jersey to:~the.site located'in.. _Southern New Jersey.

While the licensee was hopefuLthat_such_ reloi:ation of the eng.ineering staff, including QA personnel, to t~e site-would.pfove more e~fective, the process has moved

~-

_.-;. - *much more*;slOwly~thari* h_ope-d::and~~ha:s'.::e_ven_ resulted in the loss of cer-tain O' --- _*'._' perscfrinel:;,:tAs' 1 ateas':J*anuar.~/'1983~~-:'.:.tb'e QA department was placed in the

__.. _Nuclear Department,,:and,.~egan.inoy,i.ng,to-the __ si:te.. The organizational and

-- location~: changes.have.now.been.ir(transition* for almost 18 months. -Station

-~;...-;. -*.. '

organizational -changes were 'al S() -.made tb focus effort appropriately and a. -

numberof-new data management -5,Ystems :*were installed to track issues fo*r. -- -

managemen~: fo 1 lor.:up ;;*,_--;~<- _: _:_-* <*::tXt*_-_,_; --: : -

-- *:*. With -~espect*"to -~af-~t;':revie\\./-dh-~~\\ttees-~ NRC-insp~ctio~ experience has shown that the ____ onsite and offsite review committees are properly constituted, meet

-freq~ently~ and ask cogerit questi~ns. Since licensing of Unit 2, the licensee has ma*iritained a*::separate independent Safety Review Group (SRG) with a general_ -

_charter.to identify_an~L_evaluate-safety_issues._ I_n response to an NRC request,-

• • __ :,.:: tlie licensee'ha*s agreed'.~to*:evaluate'*the effectiveness-of the SRG--in terms* of

• 'types_ of ;_"issues _addressed and _more __ : importantly, the apprqach* t6 and timeliness i:,

-,_*:,~::_~=

of _the ~liCensee 11s riespci'nSe.. -to,~suth -recommendatiq.os.

~

PSE&G,management is-_-~~-n-erally.capable'and-ha~-~been willing tQ make changes to

_improve safety.

While the licensee has demonstrated his ability to react to

-.external-direction*; a strong self-assessment program h~s not been effectively carried out that would identify the specific deficiencies identified by the

'several *external review efforts discussed previously, or of equal importance; to identify_ and rect_ify their *root_ causes.

~.

Short.Term Actions (1)

Licensee Action NRC will require the.-licensee to determine whether. the currently identified proble~s with the reactor. tri~ breakers are indicative of broader based pro-blems-with the administrative and managerial control system.

Li~ensee ha~ committed to evalu~~~ the effectiveness of the independent SRG in terms of* issues addressed and resolutions.

In particular, the evaluation_

• should ad.dress t-he r9le of SRG with respect to the August 1982 and Jan_uary 1983 reactor ~rip breaker problems:

. :- ~

\\*"......

• ~..

28

~-

.~ i.

(2)

NRC Action NRc* will. review the licensee's e*valuations and will require t.he licensee to, :.

.. '* addresA_any bro_aqe_r based problems identified as. a -result of that evaluation.*

', f;:-.

",)

• .... l.:..

.. c.

\\.

... (_})

• uc~nseeA~tion:--u:J}.*,.:

. * :~*'.,~ontir.~~>;rfianageme~t -i~n{it~tives*~.. ai~e*q at imp~9yirig- ~~g~nizational re_s.pon-

- 0 *sivenes*s to identifying*: and resolving problems, particularly in the" areas

• pro~edure adequacy and. adheren*ce. *:*"

(2). NRC Action Continue to review' the adequacy' of management control and timely resolution of

• ~ pfobl~ms through an *augmented i~spection program.

...~ -,.

. -. --* ~ ~.\\,~.::;....-,_: *:' :.:: ;.. - ;.

"d. *-E:va1*uation">,_*_.:.

F

• • • Some ih~~t te~m action~ ~re incomplete, henci; this issu~ is not yet ~esolNed.

: _.:~

.. :::--*' 2.

Issue

'_,~- >

The licensee ~aintain; a Q list.that identifies. activities, structures, and system_s to which the Operational Quality Assurance (QA) Program applies.

A Master.* Equipment Li st (MEL) is used by the 1 i censee as the reference document.

• for determining the safety classification of individual equipment. *The MEL is

• .:.*,. intended to be a comprehensive.list of all station equipment and identifies

.. each item as.nonsafety :related.or.safety.related.* When preparing maintenance*.

• .. work.orders~ the MEL is ;consulted :to determine if QA co_verage of.the work is-:~ ***'***

neces.sary.

• Licensee andNRC re.view identified tft'ree probiems associated Vi'ith

• • • the MEL.

• These 'problems are, 1) the accuracy and completeness of the docu-

.... ' ment, 2). issuance as a noricontrcill ed. document,. and 3). 1 ack of understanding by.

plant personnel of its proper :us~.

The MEL was derived from engineering source documents and a construction program document called Project Directive 7 (PD-7) and was provided to station

.. Personnel* by the Engineering Department as a reference document in July 1981.

Prior td i~suance of the MEL, the PD-7 was used as the reference document. The.

MEL, however, was not issued as a controlled document,- therefore verification of its accuracy and completeness on issuance was not assured, and it was not*

updated in the plant as necessary.

The reactor-trip circuit breakers were not included in the MEL.

,In addition, some personnel were not familiar with how.

to use the MEL for determining the classification of a particular piece of equipment.

Maintenance personnel acknowledged that reference was made to PD~7 on occas.ion during the January - February 1983 period.

29

~ '. ~,. -...

.. :. ~ ~. - -

-~-* ~--~~~~~-'--~~'--~----:~-'-~~"--~~-~*-'-~-'-'-=-'--'~~

• I_"*'

'. -~,.

b.

Short Term Actions.

1.'"

. *;: ~~.:* ;

'~. -~,:..*_~.:,"..; :;:*~:*--

~

• . 6~.,.

~ )~,t~~~;~:~~~~i~~~t!~p;'.~~:~~,,>;S.

~. *-::*

N.RC* wilL.require that the licensee. verify the coinpletene.ss and accuracy of. the(*

• MEL and** rei ssu'e.. lt as a con.trolled documenL

..:....-*.-*i

_,~-*-;>~:*.

': ~/\\'""<,

(2)

NRC...Action NRC ~,-~\\{:;;confirm co~~l~iXon -~/~:r~~~*l.icens*:*~;:s.. lon~-term action.

. d.

Evaluation

• SGme*.:shor;t *term.. act.ions are.iri~omplete, hence,.this issue.;s not yet resolved~.

• .,.. :;~~~-~~rein~-~t.::P~~~e*~*~;~L*;;.x;?/t::.<~

-.:*,1** *;._* **. ::,.

• a. *

• r~sues *

• • .A review of safety and q*~~li'~~:*:~.~lassification~ for" the reactor trip breakers:"'.

indicate*s that the.*licensee's.,.e.stablished management and administrative controls allowed the procurement of replacement components for a* safety system with a

• quality. less than that of the original design:

This is evidenced by procurement activities concerning the purchase of reactor trip break*ers and replacement

.components conducted during the period from June 1, 1981 to March 1, 1983.

One ~xample involved the issuance.of a purchase order for a spare reactor trip breaker on June l, 1981.

Contrary to the established administrative controls; the breaker was classified incorrectly; the proper review and approval was not conducted; and no QA requirements were imposed as required for the original equipm~nt;.. Subsequently, on September 15, 1982, the classification fo~ the same*6rder:was changed to an eve~ more inappropriate classification without the required review and approval ~rocess. As a result of these activities, the purchase~ breaker was received and placed into storage, without further use, without appropriate documentation that would demonstrate suitability for its use had it been ~equired.

'\\*

n'",

30 '....

.* - ~ ~

,.~

1 J

e Ali subsequent purchases for reactor trip breaker components consistently*

utilized the ini~ial incorrect classification.

A spare coil. for a uv* trip

.. attachment purchased in this manner may have been utilized on August 20, 1982.. :.

>.. - Though the procurement re vi ew,;:focused on the. reactor -trip breaker_, the licensee 1 s

. * *:*... : ' :activities 'in the area for *othe*J'.' safety related components could have. resulted~:..

. \\~~;_ ':. * *

• in similar ci rcums~ances e:Xl.sting for pl ant safety systems

.. * ~~: :::: : *:~. : * * : *: ::.:** * *......

• b, Short T~-~~~-Act1:6n~s. : *.* :~:~;~*~:(:

>{i ). : '(i ~ ~n ~ e~~;, ~~.::~*-*~~.?... ~*~,,~.*~.;~f.'.*.-~(~~;:_i,~f'_.~;_.~_;_*.~--,~.f... f.~-.:~i.:... ~~~-'-*.~.;.~.. ~;i_:.~;~_.:,_y;_ :_-~_,c_:*

.. ~\\' -. --**.. -;:::'*.

• ~,

'..... -,~ -*":

,;_~,.....,,..,

.,..,~-- *::

. NRC ~ill *r~qLir~:*~-~-~:**~~~ ~i:2*e*~-s~e has* mad~ *a c.ommitment to. have the procure.:.*::-

0meni. pr6cedure~ *ev~luated ~nd modified as required to en~ure that the appro

~

priate classification is being-applied to ite'ms and/or services i'mportant to safety.

• • .. *.. ~*-~(2) NRC Action*

• ~. -. ~.-*... ----~~.;i.;*~--t

• ~.~~~~F::_.. '.

.:~,.*-***.

• ~*

~.,,._; __

~.

• -.N-RC will*.::v~"f;*iy(that* the' 1ii:~~~;*see***has-~evaluated. and rrrodified'procurement procedures as neces*sary~*-* ;, > -.

c.

Long Term Actions (1) iicensee A2ti~~

The.licensee wi.11 r~v-iew tiie'organization relatio~ships involved in the procure-*

ment process and assess the current management controls to.provide and ensure, that departure from expected performance of personnel involved in the procure-me~t process will be appropri~tely.flagged for. management attention~ Addition-aJ1y,-.~he licensee will formulate a plan to review and assess on a sampling*

basis the *procurement process*as :it relates to all pr.ior procurement activity on.systems-important:to~safe:ty._. The"plan w.ill address the schedule, :and

" cl-iteria 't9 be applied:for:~an-accelerated sampl;i.p~ based.upon initial finding.

. d. **.Evaluation~*., --

Some-short term act~ons* are_ incomplete, hence, *this issue... is nc:it'yet resolved.**

4.

Work Order Procedu~es

a.

Issue**.

The review identified that the personnel preparing maintenance work orders were not complying with instructions contained in the station administrative procedure. Specifically, for the work performed on the reactor-trip circuit breaker in January 1983, the engineering department was not consulted to verify safety classification, and an erroneous nonsafety determination was

• made.

Such consultation.is required if equipment is not listed in the MEL.

There was, therefore, no independent review within the maintenance organiza-tion, and the Quality Assurance Department was not.involved in the work..

. : -~:.. '

.31

Historically,.there was no requirement for QA personnel to be involved in the review of work*orders as they were processed to assure that appropriate steps were taken to assign.classification...

• It should be noted, however, that all other "work orders far* mai.ntenani:e or 'services -on the reactor trip *br_eakers_.

.....,.,........,.,,' wer~,-~ou_nd.. t.f._b,e-prop~r,iy* :9e..~{gna~ed~ safety-related. -- -.

-"... -.... - * *./;\\~!*~~:;~;.

~;~:r,,., CE.. :.s~~:Y'~~&*~~~i:nfr*:t!~;1it~:::7;:.'~,:*f.;:~'~:.*.* ***:. * *

.. **_.****-~- *.* * -~~~i~ **** *

• "' 'o ~.

• -- --( 1). Licensee Act1 on,.... ;.-::*;. ""'""'"*<~*., "* "~'ri -~'-' '""' - c*-: ~

, __... '. I

,J,.-*--;.;:,,-..... -',

~i~:~i-~1~~-:;.:fr'."~;;>r.-:;,.,f<.. ~~: :;'.,~*F:;'**.Z-:'.:\\;' 1 f',:- -:_~-:'A~-- -t~t~~~-~:;i;{if~~-~;~*r::~f:;~~f:'.*<,~---~--*:i\\,' ;-.. ;"~:/;_~:~:;< __ *

~ ::.-. -~ -. ~~---. : : -

-_.: :.. iif~{t]~-:.

tf1 1iT_.. ~;-:S::"~'-'.'.'The' J'iC:*e"nse*e *fias 'made 'i(*c'6mm'i'tm*ent-:to ;have** the QA Dep'artment-review-:'al1* *;. --

c::~,.-,;~?/':_ :;**...:non-safe~y>related work:'o~ders *prior, -to starting work, *and to implement" a

• - -;_.;;*:,ec.~ "-:program': and training to eiisure that :work order.s are.. properly cl assi f-i ed.'

-*< --.-\\*

'?°:."**

NRC wi l( requi're the* 1 ic:e-nsee to *review work orders written *si nee issuance.of *- *

.-,.-,.:... *:the.MEL for proper.classi.fication*a*nd will evaluate*sqfety consequences of those found ilflprope_rly,clas~ifted.:;~::<>

c.2)'_?::--~:~-1'.;~~-f~'~'Ti<?'."~~--**~~::*~~~~I:l}J{~-f~1~0~~?~J~:~?~::::;-

NRC. will revi e~ li c'eiisee*',s w~-~-k *~rder cl assi ficati o~* program.

-;:-~..:.

~-~ -

~Long Term Acfi oils >* *~--~ *..

-*..oc***

*Ail*. retjui red::ac~i on*s*,,w-ere_;.sh,9r.~ -term::;

'~ ;**-...... "

~ -*-**.*

.. :~~-:_:**;,

-"~*.**

d.

. Ev.al uati on*

Some ~hort t~rm act.i~ns are ;'ncomplete, hence, this issue is not yet resolved.

. - ~* -

• .(*.. '

'*.J::

.-.~ t' :~*

. '~* *-:.

~'.-~.:-*

. ~ :.

-~.

_, The Ji cen see.did_* riot determine.- that.'-there had be.en a. failure. to tr*i p.-.*~utoma~.

• tically *on February 22: until the coriiputer printout of. the sequence of events was :reevaluated on<February 26; as*. a result of NRC inq~.11r1es.

Although the.-.

licensee conducted'a review of each.trip, there was no formal procedure "for conducting a systematic review.

By lette.r dated March 1, 1983, the licensee made a commitment to develop a post-trip and post-safety injection review -

procedure. The procedure will specify the review and documentationnecessaryto

- determine the cause of the event and whether equipment functioned as designed..

- Other key 'e 1 ements of a post-trip review procedure* are 1) necessary management authorization for restart, 2) debriefing of affected operators, 3) verification

'that reporting requirements were completed, and 4) *followup review by safety committees.

Furthermore, the affected individuals who will be required by procedure'.to review the sequence of events computer printout and other event*~

records will need to receive nece_ssary training in the proper interpretation, understanding and evaluation of these records.

' -. ~. -

• .. r.. "_.,

... L. "..... ;~ ~

~ '

, 32

.. ~.....

'. ~*

~;;.*:*

b.

Short Term Actions

( 1)

• Li" c.en s*ee *Act1* on "

• 4

• ~*

-.*.::~(*1:*-~*:._. --...*,

• • • ,~-;*r;.'.. *

• ~*.::-~.*._:..'>. ;~--

.<~---...,--~;,.'.~*.**

':**** *'.*i:-, :**.*.

....

• NRC. w*il f'req.ui re. a~d {h~ ',i'iceriske *h~*s<commi tted. to de.ve 1 op and.**i~,~~~-'-i' post;..t~ip:*L.~i~~:.

and post-safety-:-injection review procedure and train. appropriate--Oper:ations,*.:,;*;x:**;,,/*'.'.'..,_

Department... personnel on :t~e* requi.~~ments prior to Unit 1 restart:~*: *

'"~'"*"'***.

( 2)

~~~\\;~~{i ~n

. *..*. :.'.*....... <. ;.:*.*........,'._,.* :~.*.::*.:.~.~--:,*_*_-.*.'.,*.:,\\.***.:*'.:.*. :.:.l.'.:*:.\\_:.... :_._::.:.(

_... ~ -_:,. :~~~:-~~:~-:+;~~~z~~-~~:~.~*~:{ 1Z~.:~!~Z~i1.~*-::::-:--:~~;;; *.:

• -_:~ * **.,

,.. r NRC will review the icensee' s post,-trip and post-safety injection review

"'.

*,,..* *. procedure' to'.'_e~*sur~ ~~.:-*.~ey_ elemep~s noted above are adequately addressed.'

• !t-..

c.

Lo~g Term Actions All required actions were short term..

• ~*:"* : *ct? :\\~E*v*~1 u;~*f i:d~ **i<~-;Y.;\\~~~~~:::: :~ss~:\\ *

., **; __ )_*,.

In response.to 'this* issue, the,licensee in hi*s.March 14,1983 letter submitted Administrative *Directive.(AD) - 16, Revision 1 dated March 13, 1983 entitled 11 Post.Reacto*r Trip/Safety Injection Review and Startup Approval Re.quirements 11

• AD-16 provides *for*'a* formal post trip and/or. post safety injection review to

• be, performed *by the Senior Shift Supervisor and the STA qualified shift super-

• viso~:;Specific~areas~to be reviewed.and documented include:

1) conditiori of= the unit: prior:to the event, 2) personnel assignm~nts, 3)

~volution~~in progress ~hich cci~ld have contributed to the eVent, 4) major

'equipment,* p'r'otectfon and control systems out of service or inoperaple at the -

.. t.ime o.f. the event 5). mode of event initiation (i.e manual or automatic), 6)

• sequence o,f events (SOE) compiiter< printout and other.a 1 a rm printouts, 7)

.... :,>controJ.'roo.r:n recorder. :charts*,* 8):~larms received.which were unusual for the

• • ... **event or'other e'xpected alarms which were not received, and* 9) required

• . corrective actions to be _completed prior to st~rtup.

.* !,. '. *.,.,~-.~~-*\\,._::~::~---

• -*,;~

The above information; as well as a narrative of the event, will be documented

• • on Form AD-16-A, and the SOE printout, recorder charts and other event records will be included with the report.

.The staff has reviewed the ~it:ensee 1 s post trip and post safety injection review pro~edure to determine that ~he key elements noted in 5.a. above have been adeq~ately addressed.

These key elements are:

1) that sufficient event review will be conducted to determine the cause of the event and whether equipment functioned as designed;

2) that necessary mana~ement auth~rization for restart is specified;

3) that debriefing of appropriate personnel is required to be conducted;

.4) *.that reporting requirements are required to be completed; 5)" that ~ ~ollowup review by safety committees is required to be conducted; 33

• ~.

• I.*..

6)

. that personnel conducting the review understand information pr.ovided by

~- -

the event:records.

~~~;'{>'.:;.... * *_ -.,,<;:;~-;t',: --* _ -- *.

• -'- * - <:r*.--. ~>~- --

~~?'."/

,* __ ~} ~ased on the i riformat ion

re qui re_p~*tp _be-.provi ded,,_,on * ~arm AD-16-A~ ~- :the'.:~f act. ::*.., -':

ti~t:;~/;;_--~~;:~{.t,hat~ two* SRO licensed oper_at ions pe_r*~onne l.- ( i ~e~. t;he -senior_ shi f~ _ supervi so~>;::~~;/;_,:_

'!'~;::}/i" '.:"and *the\\STA qualified shift.*sup~rvisorJ are invo-lved. with the review; '.and the-'/:\\:.:/,.

.. --. };.~-- --_. ::requ.irement f_o_r' _speci fj c.'.r.evi ew:;;~_na_:_~ttachment:of app_lfcabl e event._,records ::(;_.:*:*}::~<~/

i~~,~~Jj;~g~?!~f ~1~~~~j~~~!~j:~:~l~~f~~!i~f~1tt:~~~~*j~~l~:}~~~it!i~:~t!~:{r~;H!~:;t,i~j~;~r

• w; th respect to il)an*ageinent authortzafi on __ for restart,. the pJ:oced~re specifies* <'

_*:that the Opera_tions -Manager (OM) m*ay-authorize*restart.following a reactor

• trip or-safety injection* 'prOvided 'that 1) the post t.rip review has been com-

_' pleted,_evaluated and revi~wed.with the OM and 2) the ~valuation clearly. : _. --

,_::;_::/ ~ ~d_i cat~S.:: the, ~a~se/*:~J -tre.:_;everi.~fr;anq ':_that __ ~.1, __ eq u:i pment_ and -systems -f unc,t i oned-

• 0'i:i:;;a s' des_lQ_rted~ *.~-:If:*~~e}cau_~_e;;p_t~~b:~_~:.ey~nt:.. has ;not~:been *c1 earJy *determined_ -or >. ': -.

-- : -there :ts a_ ques:tion,concerrifo.glthe~--pro.per: performance of' equi pinent" o'r :.systems,:.'... *. -

• the procedure specifi.e~-_-.:that-an)nvestigation be __ conducted and reviewed by the

- _. *'*Station-: Operations Review C9mmittee (SORC) prior to startup.* Restart*:following.:

- t*hese more ctjmplex events will.be:_.authorized by-the General Manager --Salem

-: "Operations after receipt 'of SDl~q_*recommendations and.a determ1 n.~ti on 'tliat the -

-*unit-can be restarted-.safelY:. ~'.;~:;:<,::_,_._.

.,,-_..... -:.:-::~*~:..

).~~~>.~~:*..

.,; ** ~-* ***** -

---

~-

_ T.he -staff, questi6ned why:resta-~f--is not always autho~ized by the General

_ Manager-*- Salem Operations since* he is the individual who is responsible J*!r _

• Technical Specification 6.1._l far**-overal1 faci_lity_operation.

The staff was*

informed that in'all cases, th~fGeneral Manager or *Assistant General M~n~ger

_wi l 1

be*_, kept in.formed of..the- _circumstances of _al'\\.event and would be able to * -

~- redirect-_:the Ope*rat1ons, Manage,r_*-s-actions, if_'ne-cessary"~-:* He.nee, al"though

• ":'*.-* speci-fic*restart: ~uthority is:.-9ra~ted*t*o,-the-OM for-clearly understood events,---

upper'Te:vel management oversigh-t/-:will' ex-ist for :*a*ll-' reactor trip *and;*safety. -<:- :- *

- i_nj e_~t,~ f]': :events.

"._: _.-:.~~;,:'.-~~,.. :':--(:;:;/~~;~;:,;~:),;~'>~::,~ **;: _

1

-~: -~ ' ___ * * --*.* :: : :'.._. > ---

_Th~ ~t~ff.also noted th~t-the_p~6ced~re specifies that individuals authorized

>-:to: assume the OM 1s,respo'n-sibilltiesmay authorize_ startup if the.OM is not':*

available.

The staff was.infcirmed that the Operations Engineer (OE) period~

. ically assumes the OM's duties when the OM is -in training.

The staff has

.. verified that the qualific~tioh requirements for the OE are the same as for* -

• _the OM per Administrative Procedure -2, which references ANSI-18.1, 1971.

. B~sed on.the above, the staff*is satisified that the procedure specifies _the appropriate management authorization for restart following a reactor trip or*

safety injection.

With re'spect ta debriefing -of apprapri ate perso_nne 1, the procedure speci fi-es,

that*fact finding sessions are conducted with appropriate personnel to determine the cause of the event, actions taken and observed sequence of events. The. :,

fact finding sessions will be conducted as part:.of the review, prior to-restart.

Th_e staff is satisifed that this element is adequately addressed.,.:

With respect to ~eporting ~equirements, the procedure specifies that a dete~

mination be made that the event was properly classified and that with'respect i

• ',' '34.. *.

'. 3 ~. -.

1

>-;i~.:~1-Xi~:~~~'.~~:~~~~.~~~~~1:;.~--~~.

~,\\ ::*<;::;*~~-1-~-f /~:~;;:**~:,~-~. *;:--::. -*' * * '~ *. ;;-~:!~~f.i:,~~/*:*~: -<~~.. :~_:*: _. -

- *;'.:;.. _; ::~/")_~ -

• *,,. -/~-~-----~_!~~ *.~....

-~.

• e

,f.*

to 7oiio... *up review by safety committees, provision is adtlressed in the procedure*

. _ to have the onsite safety committee (SORC) review all reactor trips and safety..

~- inje:::tions.** As noted above, for. those events.wher~ the cause is not clearly *:;<**::: *

• * ~**

• indicated or :there is any question. of _the proper funct*ioning of *equipment, the_c_;;_O: *<**

, SORC: wi l1 review the event prior to res ta rt. >: Fqr.. other events,,the SORC. wil lx.-:.*:':2\\__.

. review the event but not necessarily b~fore restart. *Additionally, the Nuclear_:.:;:.:

• Support -Department will a*l sp perform an. independent* review of.each reactor*?:*... <.:..*. *.

-~ *:;tri p/safety.J n'jecti on ev-ent* for :the* purpose* of determining corrective actions:;~??**: *

-::-~. -: <.)~~.:'.to: ;.prevent.* the.>type'Jo'f 'eve:nt* ~from ~feoccurri ri~f7~":A l so, the procedure* specif i e ~~~:~'.~(;>

§;~;\\-:.2:*:;\\::;JJ,fdCthat\\'£he'.'.or:1grna1>e.ve'nt:_*rev:few.. -repprt-*w;11' be~.mi'li ntai ned *on f:i le <for* future;'.*w&&~jf.7:~.*.

. ~: ... ~ ref ere nee:.. :sa se:d con the. above; the'* staff is <~at is if ed that sufficient fo 11 owiip':.:*

review 'of these' e'vents-wi ll be cori'ducted.

~-**

'*~- ~(:*~*::*'*

_,.~-

With respect.. to the review* personne 1 und~rstandi ng the i nf~~mat i o.n provided by:*

-:. the event records, the. staff. notes that the reviews are conducted by SRO..

licensed personnel who are *fal'!liliar*with the.various control room recorders

• ,and:,-~l ~rm prJ nt.o.uts ~\\.. Hof{e.ver.;~_~f _evidenced. by. the recent ATWS_ events,. _these :... :

.~i>e.rsonnel~:nrer~e-_pot:a:*s'iJ9-miljar... with-_the i_nformation* prov_ided on* the,SOE',printout* *

(sucfr as' interp_retatfo1f of.-the**tiining.JJf the;Jine enfries).

The-iicensee has.,_*

• conducted training for Operations personnel on.the SOE prin'touts.for the February'*22-and 25: events~ However,. in the opinion of the staff, this train1ng *

• 5 riot suf(icient'to ensure that these individuals have a satisfactory under-

• standfng of o*ther SOE° printouts. * 'Additi ona Uy,' operating personne 1 may not h~ve a detailed~ understandin~ of *expected response.times of equipment.. The.*.

-'> i*icensee has tridicated his intention to reevaluate the format and information provide'd.on the SOE-priiitout to make* it easier to understand and evaluate, and.

• as ether SOE printouts *for reactor trips/ safety injectiOns become available,,

to provide.additional training for Operations personnel.

The staff agrees

.... these additional measures are _useful, but until they are implemented, the*

-*s-taff. has*-requested and the licensee __ has committed to have an instrument and.. *...

cbn~ro 1 s ( I&C).supervisor. who is _kn owl edgeabl_e on the. SOE computer and under-

• stands expected equipment* response times, persona 1 ly review SOE, printouts for--

for**~a lT reactor trij:>s/safetyinjections prior*to*:*restarti.ng the* plants; 'With.

this commitment,:.:the.staff is satisifed that,personnel conducting the reviews I.

. have '.a" sufficient understanding* of the event-. records.

• AD-16 will be revised.. '.:

to reflect this commitment..

• Ba~ed on the staff's review of the elements of licensee's post trip and post*

• safety injection review procedures and for the reasons identified abov*e, the*

• staff concJudes that the post* trip review issue is resol~ed. The staff will verify that the above commitment to have an I&C super.visors review *the SOE

_printout ts reflected in the revised AD-16.

6.

Timeliness of Event Notification

a.

Issue On thr-ee occasions between January 30 and February 25,.1983, the licensee notifiea NRC of significant events belatedly.

In each case, the notification was approximately 30 minutes late.

Two of these reports were for.the February' 22 and 25 events.

Furthermore, in the February 22 event, the first notifica-.

ti~n did not contain known significant informati~n regarding actuation of

. ~ng~neer~d. s~fety features and opening of the power operated relief v~lves.

35

~.. ' '

-.*~

-~This additional_ informaticin was provided approximately 40 minutes later.

The

,-_ * -, notification procedures used by the licensee warrants further evaluation as to

.~~.. ~

~~-.'~~~the* priority assigried for ~NRC nOtification.

1

\\: *:..

• ..... :*_**~~-_.

-.~.:-

l~tJ~1:}f 1,.**~i:{~~l~i~~~t~;;~1~~:t~~jJf ;;~lir<.;. :~:: :h~r1~r/*~~~:~;

1 r~!~;; ;"*~~\\\\;*'~: *..* ~.**** *

-~':i;~: =. *1~:;~~1\\;'._NRC: wi lJ_,j~~qu1 r.*e::- the~:.1 i'C:en'S'ee _ tc>::~Feeinphas_i ze-}repo.rti ng *reqiri rements *wi th:-~l l-"-'~-~J'. *: *

~'.)~;;:}. :: :~;:t;;a:>shi ft:'.an'Cf2o~~c~ti :._'ifia_nage~eriirper~'({frne.l.: ana:;:wi'.ll.-:reeval_ua\\e 'not ifi ~at ion~.** pr.5 or.::~:;;~-:_:.-~ -_

~\\* _3;*'.lT1 1t~~

s~~~

1'~~~~~~*~~i~t:;~~~~,I* :r "

0

~t:~Ji~;" * ":'W~ * ** *****. * * * * * * * :. * *

• NRC wi 1l tarifir~~--,~h~t::-1 i-~~ns~e.~;*:<iti~rt term :acti*o~ i.s completed..,

• • '*. *~***.*.,:*; :~-; ** ** _'-.';:.~-.**-'

,~.-.,* ** ~.. :-C.. * **

-,*.-*.~-:~.;**.,.. ;...**---

~--

• • . rt!~J~~~~~~~~~~0f ~~~t~J!~~.~-~r.

__ ~-~;.~c~5',]i~~}:A?\\;.

~-

• .~*::.-.

~--*-

,*.'c.:..~;,;... -...

-~**.*:".--".-***

-__ -_*.*<*:.cL~::_.: Ev;l-~~tion:

}"?~~--~'~':'.:-

'_i*:*:~:;.:f

.<:~.~:,:J;{~*~::"-'-'.-:I~'(r~~pciri'~-~:\\~8>.thi~~,;:*:{s';t1;,~:_:th:'.!U~f;de~se*e* i ri iii:: ~:rch i~~,' *1983 1 ~tter,* fodi cated-

- _ that 'the* i"mportance of adhe:ri ng to the reportin'g requirements of 10 CFR so. 72

• .h-as been_ emphasized to-_ all operating personn-eT. *Emergency plan procedure:-_

EP_;I-l~Attachm.ent-4 has'been reviSed to rearrange-the priority of notification * **-

to the NRC.. Additionally, the emergency plan procedures have been revised-to.

• require_ designated*per~onne_l to;:i!fJmediately.start making the required.notifi-cations and reading the:fnitial:i::ontact messages upon classification of the

.{'~

,*'.-.,:~,,~.:**event., :The licensee* has_.also.:indicated that,training on the revisions :to the

'.,:1[':':)~:;~.:.;E.'.'Emergency.Plan *pfoc.edure~~.~ilfab.(conducte~:-:J>rior __ to __ startuP. for pe-,rsonnel - *.. * *

-~h;):=:.*,::_;,:;~"~-~/:i~f1-.~_c>) v~~~~,.n *-. i m.~}-~~~;;,f;~.~-.1-!?;::AgJf;_:~?:~~:;~_~"~erg:encyitF'.~-:~;_;.*:i:-~;:_:~:- __ : -_ __

. The NRC staff considers* the.licensee's; actions' noted above to be sufficient to ensure tha:t-*'the:--notifitat'ion*:re*qU:irements* of *-io *CFR 50.72-:*.will be met in the :_*_.'.

future.

"This issue is consider_e~ *resolved.* Jhe staff wil_l verify completion

c.

____,_~

.-*.of the above** noted training _prior. to restarL::

-ii_

7.

Updating Vendor Su~plied I~¥6rmation

• ~.

_a

• Issue

• c*,_

~--As a res.ult of the February 25~--1983 event and NRC IE Bulletin 83-01, the licensee indicated not being aware of the existence of two Westinghouse tech-nical *service bull~tins that provided preventive maintenance recommendations for the" reactor-trip circuit breakers.

The :two, do'cuments in question were _

_ pub 1 i shed by West i rig house* in 1974*.

The licensee-has requested documentation

-for all Westinghouseequipment:and will incorporate this information into-

. *- _station documents.

While we are not aware of any problems with other vendor

• <---documentation, an NRC staff concern is whether a similar situation ex.ists with

• - respect* to-documentation for other vendor-supplied information.

'.. - ' ~, :* .

'~

~6

*:.\\*,'

.-.1"... _

b.

Short Term Actions (1)

Licensee "Action *.

'.,:~,... _

• =* ~ :'.

. The 1 i censee has made/a; commitment to a program to upda.te existing 0documenta-

.-... >ti on on, safety. equipment and t*o ensure.. that vendor.documentation-is,under. a" *

.--~ '..-.'**' - '

.. "'***-~--*-".

c:~t ~:,~~;~~;1;;*m;, ',~,;:~:;:';'.?~;~;\\ **..*..* *'...

• 0

,'~f 0, *..

wiH:>e:v*a. lUate 1 ii:erisee Is vendor. documentation

.... -~-..

(1). Licensee Actio~

.*-The. 1 i censee wi 11 'complete. tne *above program _by December 1983. *.

-~"........,""'-".*---

• 2

)"{'w~~~~i~~*~ g:~;;->_,_;~::~3rdJ,;,;-:/~::

~ ;

~..-

NRC wil):perform inspe_ctions to verify_the implementation of licensee's program.

~ -...:.. : -

E~a l uati.on... : *-* ..

~-. ~~<.*"~,(,

~ -:

'_:,. :..c_-,_., Som~ sh.ort term acti o_n~ :are *_i ncoinp l ete, hence_,_ *.thi_s _issue is not yet re so J ved. *

.. - :*::. *.:. _*. -~. -

... -:_;...,... '.' - --.. 8.

Involvement of QA Personnel with Other Station Departments*

. ' *.. ~ *.-

a.

... rssue

• 'The "Quality Assuran'ce'oepartment did *not review maint.enance work orders

. assodated with repair: of the reactor-trip circuit-breakers in January 1983.

because~Lth~.work was"ifot;designated safety r*elate~.*;'.Furtper:examiilation

_

• determined.that the QA Department does not review for proper determination of

'*

classification the work.orders designated non~afety related by other depart7:i:.,,*..-..

.... - ments. Discussions with the licensee indicate that the QA Department has been*,,,

somewhat isolated from the activitie*s of other.departments.. - - * * ** *

• .. As a result of prior decisions~ the licen.see had initiated steps in.January 1983 to ~elocate the QA Departmerit from the corporate offices in Newark, New

• Jersey to* the site and is taking steps to increase QA.Department'involvement*

in other station activities.

Completion of this program of increased QA "involvemen~ with other statiori activities need not be completed prior to restart, because completion of short-term actions in management issues 2 and 3 is sufficient to correct QA deficiencies in the short term.

b.

Short Term Actioris (1)

Licensee Action

. The licensee had ~ commitment to institute a program to more fully integrate

- QA*activities into the overall activities.

37

~**

._J.*\\;,.:, **-. *'

~ ' - -

... ;9.

.e

c.

Long Term Actions

• t~!,c;;?<; ~~> 1 ~ ::ji~:~w;~{ i :~~~10t1~~1~e. above Q~ i ~~egrat ion p;~g ram. *

• The {\\ten see Has

.;~!

F:**:'t*.::z*.;*~,,committed*~*t:a have a consultant.'.perform an independent.\\assessment_;of.. the QA.,

/*.:C.:;:<:;;:.'. program;jncluding.:t~e.:.efJectiveness.of:its.implementation.

,,~

_:*~<-~~;-,*,.

1~'.;_.

• . *. ~-

. '.**.;* / *_.

...** ~: _.:>.,..:_, -,.,~:: ;;.-** :.,:.;

.".(

__

• Mon*itor,sJi.ce.nsee**s:*imj:>.leinentat}on,:of.*the *above QA Jntegration program.*. The.

": independent consultant***s'"assessmeh.t,*-PSE&G evaluatio.n, and.the subsequent *..

• *., _:_, *. action *plan will be.- rev.iewed by/Region. I by. August.1, *1983.

• NRC will con ti nLie.

~/.. :>.j::.;*,:* to cover:.QA;:.in.volve~:ent:;~/,iD *:_statfon :operations:*as a part**of the Salerii':inspec:tion

~;f*;:;'Y1**:~

0 9 r~:~~~~1-~"***~'~l~r~~f :~~~~;~~70; :~~~~;r~v

• et:t~~*~ * *

~* :.. "

.*~:.

.. ~:~:;p.r; or.tc{ the.se *events.;s::.ln*~:)~*s.E&G:' total corp~rate n.ucl.ear QA effort was re-.

. :<. 'organ-ized: effect i ve:*uarfuarY \\3 {:1983* :to :pl ace\\the *Ope rational Qua l it~.t':Assurance

.. J. Orgard £at) of i.nt.o~. t~e* NIJ~'l ~~t*'Divi s r"on. *: Tho.Se personner*ass i gned';~tc>'. this *,:

• • *organizati,on who.)f,ornial:ly'.. :w_orked<In the corporate :.offices in Newark:,.New

• ~.* -:~

Jersey *are in.. the~*process**af*being'.:relocated':to*. the*~site. Most of*the exist.;.

<'.Jng personnel: in the site-QA/QC organization were.absorbed into this new - :

• • • organfzation.>~.The purpo~e\\of t.h1s change.was:to provide for increaseq in-..

-~<- volvemen:t* by QA persohnel":i'n *:the* da/-to-day functioning of the Nuclear Depart-...... *

• . *. ment.*. :_such *int~gration... of alL.:QA.functions.fr1to *the Nucl.ear Department is*. *

~. e"xpected ;,fo: 1 ead to'~bette.r-:*:;.n~erface wi tti.otti"er plant personnel f or~_prob 1 em...... '... *.

. *.., *,di scussiori:.iind. res'olutto*n~[,:::.It~':;w{n:-enabl e(*aii'dftors to be more knowledgeable*

• ~;.'.~*t<**:at>out::opera-tforis;:a.:?'~c'ompa'r'ed:'.fi)~*the\\ past when':qA:~~uditorS:. were. more,~*1; kely to )

• _**;-.>.be *11generalists 11

• Aud:i~. plans are:_bei.ng changed.to place more emphasis on

• *--:... : *; -system ;effectiveness *;.(-5_::e*..,

• how **i.t. is working?)~ *. In *descri bi-ng.the; objectives...,..

• • • '~ *of this reorganization* to NRC Region I irva January 4; 1983 meeting; PSE&G *.. *

. i'nditated**that increased :daily: monitoring. and overvi*ew.were being-emphasized*'*

for a*perat.ions QA PE!rsonnel as***a part of this reorganization.

To.better :.*

'prepare for such increased*invol~ement, it wa~ indicated that in the future,~.

some QA pers.onnel would )'.'eceive operator type training up to and including.

• .simulator training:*:.

"**Since the Febru~r.{j9g3;*ATWS:,eve~{s, PSE&G has taken further steps to place:.

greater emphasis on.QA program implementation through increased observation and monitoring.

By policy directive dated March 11, 1983, QA personnel have been instructed to~place emphasis on.adherence to procedures and review of.*.

• * * engiReering *activtties *.such as design changes, procurement control.and work*.

. orders... An ongoing comprehensive review of QA Program implementing. procedures:.

and any'.necessary change~ is expected to he completed by August, 1983. *

• To *e~p-ha~ize

• the<~~i;*:tin.g* QA *pro.gram :.requi~ements and r~cent procedural. chan.ges. *

• .as a result of the ATWS events, an indoctrination/training program was conducted by PSE&G for appropriate personnel.

NRC.review of the lesson plan fo.r that.

.. >.:t.i*.'.

. -*,/,.

~*,*...

• .* -1

• f * ' *

'1 '* *' ~;

***f. ;**.

Y.*;, *** ::. **

. :.... *:._::-~: :. ~, '

-~--~ ~;.i..

• I*.......

• , *_' *:' ~ *... '

I

.e training shows that it included discussions of Classification, Work Orders and Procurement. Specifically included was use of the MEL system, criteria to be used in the.determination of safety classification for proper classification of work orders and procurement documents, and interfac~s with Nuc)ear Engineering

• to resolve any classification questions.

Numerous personnel from all major station departments attended such training sessi~ns as shown in ~ttendance

• records reviewed by NRC..

NRC staff-has verified that procedures have been.changed to requir'e. QA to review and stamp all non-safety related work orders (for concurrence that it was properly classified) prior to implementation.

Administrative Procedure AP-9 (3/10/83) and Qua 1 i ty Assurance Instruction* QA! 10-6 (3/11/83) were. found to provide for QA review of station work.orders and involv~ment in ~tation maintenance work.

The licensee has comm1tted to provide adoition:a1 detailed-training on initiation, *processing and closeout of work orders to reemphasize QA and test/retest requirements involving interdepartmental coordination by September 1, 1983.

Such training will be monitored by Region I as a part of continuing on~sitejnspection coverage. -

The licensee has committed to have an outside consultant or*ganization perform an independent assessment of PSE&G 1s QA program and new organization as discussed further under management issue number 1.

This assessment is to consist of a review of (1) the QA organizational structure and staffing, (2) the QA program content and procedures, and (3) the effectiveness of implementation* of those programs and procedures.

This review.will, by its nature, include QA department involvement and integration into other plant activities.* After review of findings and recommendations from this assessment, PSE&G.is to prepare an action plan for implementing any appropriate changes by July 1, 1983.

Through continuing inspection coverage, NRC will assure that a meaningful r~view is accomp~ished and appropriate.recommendations resulting from that review are*

promptl~ implemented.

In summary, NRC review of this area has verifiedo*:that the. licensee.is accel-erating previous plans to more fully involve QA personnel in the day-to-day

• operation of Salem 1 and 2.

Integration of QA personnel into activities covered by work orders such as modifications and maintenance will be required by recently revised procedures.

Reemphasis and retraining of appropriate personnel on proper use.of existing procurement procedures should assure proper future QA involvement in all procurement actions.

NRC has determined that the.licensee has recently taken appropriate steps to more fully integrate QA activit~es into overall Nuclear Department activities. This iisue is considered resolved for restart.

The implementation of this QA integration program will continue to be monitored over the long term in the Region I continuing inspection program.

9.

• Post-Maintenance Operability Testing

a.

Issue Past practice at Salem for post maintenance operability testing has varied.

Such testing may be specified by the preparer of the maintenance work order or 1 e'ft to the di scret i*on of maintenance personne 1.

• For safety-related equfp-ment, post~m~intenance surveillanc testi~g is done before returning the 39

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equi~ment to service.

Additional functional post-maintenance and repair testing of equipment,. such as surveillance testing, may need to be performed to *demonstrate operability as an integral part of the larger component* or system in which it must function.,

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-b~- --

Short Term Actions- >

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• Long Term Actions~;;*

'-.>_;~~~. cen~~e*--P,ct ion.

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• _

The 1 i~-~nsee wi 11 review' a~d. revi ~-e-: procedures -and.. p~act ices -as -necess~ry to >,:( ---

• ensure_ that functional testing' of t_he overall compon.ents or system is per- -. _:

- formed to demonstrate-operability prior to returning *the equipment to service:

fcillowin_g maintenance and repair.. Procedures will be revised, as necessary~

*to assure that'operation(.dep~r:tment*.pers9_nnel review the testing* prior to -

returnir(g: such equi prrient>,to"'.-~e*rvi ce > ': --

NRC* Action..:. Long-Te-rm*- * --.,_'.

. N.RC wil.lreview licen.see's re--vis~d procedure$, ~*nd thei~ implementation to -

• assure.t:hat appropriate-post '.maintenance operability_ testing is* bei_ng accom- -

-_ *.p 1 i shed before eq'uipment._is returned *to service.

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d.

Evaluation -*

• • ~

Although no' short.term -a~tions were required*,* NRC rev-iew of licen~ee 1 s proposed -

_actions to comply ~ith this issue is not yet comple~~:. Hence, this issue is*

notyet~resolved:*~

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40

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