ML18082A619
| ML18082A619 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 06/23/1980 |
| From: | Johari Moore, Paton W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8006240505 | |
| Download: ML18082A619 (65) | |
Text
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e UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 6/24/80 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC &
GAS COMPANY (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1)
Docket No. 50-272 Proposed Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 NRC STAFF PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE FORM OF AN INITIAL DECISION Janice E. Moore Counsel for NRC Staff William D. Paton Counsel for NRC Staff June 23, 1980 0-1
'9£, '70 \\'
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- J
TABLE OF CONTENTS PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE FORM OF AN INITIAL DECISION Page I.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.........................................
1 II.
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT.....................................
6 A.
Colemans 1 Contentions 2 and 6.............................
6 B.
Lower Alloways Creek Township Contention 1................
19 C.
Board Questions 1 and 3...................................
33 D.
Evidentiary Hearing Concerning a Gross Loss of Water Accident...................................................
37 E.
Testimony Offered by Lower Alloways Creek Township........
39 F.
Zirconium Fire or Oxidation...............................
43 G.
The Difference in Consequences............................
50 H.
The Postulated Accident...................................
52 II I.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW............................................
56 IV. ORDER.........................................................
58 Appendix A, List of Exhibits
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC &
GAS COMPANY (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1)
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Docket No. 50-272 Proposed Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 NRC STAFF PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE FORM OF AN INITIAL DECISION The Staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Staff), in accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.754 and the Order of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Board) issued on May 9, 1980, hereby submits the attached proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in the form of an initial decision.
I.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT (1)
This proceeding concerns the application of the Public Service Electric and Gas Company (Licensee) for an amendment to the operating license for Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1.
The application for this amendment was filed on November 18, 1977.l/ The amendment in question would change the technical specifications for Salem Unit 1 to allow an increase in the storage capacity of the spent fuel pool for that facility from 264 to 1170 spent fuel assemblies.
11 The application in evidence in this proceeding is a revised application dated February 14, 1978.
See Licensee's Exhibit 1.C.
- (2)
A Notice _of Proposed Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License was published in the Federal Register on February 8, 1978.
43 Fed.
~- 5443 (February 8, 1978).
In response to this notice, the State of New Jersey filed a petition for leave to participate in this proceeding as an interested state under 10 C.F.R. § 2.715(c).
The Township of Lower Alloways Creek (the Township), the Sun People - Alternate Energy Advocates, and Alfred and Eleanor Coleman (the Colemans) also filed timely petitions to intervene. This Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Board) was established on March 16, 1978 to rule on petitions for leave to intervene and to preside over the proceeding in the event a hearing is ordered.
The members of this Board are Gary L. Milhollin, Chairman, Frederick J. Shon and James T. Lamb, III, Members *.£/ The State of Delaware sought leave to participate in the above-captioned proceeding as an interested state on May 17, 1978.
(3)
The petitions of the State of New Jersey and the Township of Lower Alloways Creek were granted in an Order dated April 26, 1978.
The State of Delaware was given leave to participate as an interested state during the Special Prehearing Conference.
(Tr. 14.) The Colemans' petition was granted by Order dated May 24, 1978.l/ The petition of y
Mr. Lester Kornblith replaced Mr. Glenn 0. Bright, the original Board member on March 8, 1979.
Mr. Kornblith was replaced by Mr. Frederick J.
Shon on June 27, 1979.
In its Order dated April 26, 1978, the Board stated that the Colemans' interest, were it to be presented in a manner which complied with the formal requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 2.714, would be acceptable. There-fore, in its Order Following Special Prehearing Conference dated May 24, 1978, the Board dealt only with the Colemans' contentions and did not again discuss the demonstration of their interest in the above-captioned proceeding.
e the Sun People was denied in the Order Following Special Prehearing Conference.
(4)
Neither the State of Delaware nor the State of New Jersey filed any contentions or presented any witnesses in this proceeding.
(5)
The Township of Lower Alloways Creek originally filed 11 contentions.
- In its Memorandum and Order dated April 16, 1978 the Board found the Township's first and third contentions to be acceptable.
Contention 1 relates to the consideration of alternatives to the proposed action; Contention 3 concerns storage of fuel at other reactors on and off Artificial Island.
The Board stated that Contentions 7 and 8 concerning increased impacts on the spent fuel pool cooling system and the residual heat removal system appear to contain proper subjects for valid conten-tions if further developed and clarified. The remaining Township contentions were rejected for various reasons. 4/
The Township's request for reconsideration of the Board's rejection of Contentions 4 through 11 was denied.
(Order Following Special Prehearing Conference at 4 (May 24, 1978).) The Township later withdrew Contention 7.
(Letter of June 22, 1978 from Carl Valore, Jr., to Gary Milhollin.) Contention 8 as reworded by the Township was rejected by the Board.
(Memorandum and Order dated August 2, 1978.) Of the remaining contentions, Contention 3 These contentions covered a wide variety of areas including creation of a pennanent waste repository, sabotage, and perfonnance and surveillance of spent fuel pool components.
e was dismissed by the granting of Licensee's motion for summary disposi-tion. Therefore, only the Township's Contention 1 remained to be litigated. This contention states:
The Licensee has not considered in sufficient detail possible alternatives to the proposed expansion of the spent fuel pool.
Specifically, the Licensee has not established that spent fuel cannot be stored at another reactor site. Also, while the GESMO proceedings have been terminated, it is not clear that the spent fuel could not by some arrangement with Allied Chemical Corp.
be stored at the AGNS Plant in Barn-well, South Carolina.
Furthermore, the Licensee has not explored nor exhausted the possibilities for disposing of the spent fuel outside of the U.S.A.
(6)
The Colemans originally filed 20 contentions.
(Petition to intervene dated March 11, 1978.) These contentions were later amended by counsel for the Colemans and reduced to 12 contentions.
(Amended Petition to Intervene dated May 11, 1978.)E-/ Contentions 2, 6, and 9 were accepted by the Board.
(Order Following Special Prehearing Conference at 5, 9 (May 24, 1978).) Contentions 2 and 6 relate to the structural integrity of the racks, fuel cells, and Boral material.
Contention 9 relates to the consideration of alternatives to the proposed action.
The remaining contentions were rejected for various reasons. (~.)ii The Board also y
Contention 12 consisted of two parts.
Part B of this contention later became Contention 13 for purposes of its admission as a contention in this proceeding.
These contentions dealt with subjects such as the occurrence of hurri-canes, sabotage, spent fuel pool leakage, exposure to radioactivity, economic impacts of the expansion, and procedures for decontamination should fuel need to be stored at the facility after expiration of the operating license.
stated that Contention 6 was accepted with the understanding that any evidence pertaining to this contention which might be considered would be deemed part of the evidence relating to Parts A and B of Contention 2.
(lE_. at 5.) The Colemans requested reconsideration of the Board's ruling concerning Contention 13, and the Board granted this request and admitted Contention 13 as a contention to be litigated in this proceeding.
(Memorandum and Order (July 18, 1978).) This contention requests discus-sion of the cumulative impacts of expanded spent fuel pool capacity.
On February 27, 1979, Licensee filed a Motion for Summary Disposition with regard to all of the Colemans' contentions. This Motion was granted for Contentions 9 and 13.
(Memorandum and Order at 12, 19 (April 30, 1979).) Therefore, only Contentions 2 and 6 were litigated in this proceeding.
Evidentiary hearings were held on May 2 through May 4 and July 10 and 11, 1979 on the remaining contentions.
(7)
By Order dated April 18, 1979, this Board posed three questions to the Licensee and the NRC Staff arising out of the Three Mile Island accident which occurred on March 28, 1979.
In a conference call on April 19, 1979 the second of these three questions was withdrawn.
In addition, all parties were given leave to respond to the two remaining questions.
At the hearings which took place on May 2 through May 4, 1979, the Staff's motion for a continuance filed on April 26, 1979 with respect to responses to the Board's questions was granted.
(See Tr. 774.)
On June 1, 1979, the Staff filed an objection to the portion of the third Board question which states: "If an explosion or 'meltdown' occurred at Salem; to what extent would that affect the spent fuel pool?"
6 -
(8)
Evidentiary hearings were held on the first Board question and on the portion of the third Board question to which there was no objection on July 10 and 11, 1979.
During these hearings the Board posed an addi-tional question to the parties which was responded to in writing by all parties to the proceeding except for the State of New Jersey.
In a Memorandum and Order dated February 22, 1980 the Board ruled on various motions for reconsideration and motions to reopen the record filed by the Colemans.
In addition the Board ruled on the Staff objection to a portion of the third question posed in its Order of April 18, 1979.
In ruling on this objection the Board modified its third question.
The new question thus posed was designated Board Question No. 5.
Evidentiary hearings were held on this question from April 28 through April 30, 1980.
(9)
By Order dated May 9, 1980 the Board granted the motion made by Licensee during the above-mentioned evidentiary hearings to close the record in this proceeding.
I I.
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT A.
Colemans 1 Contentions 2 and 6 Contention 2 states:
- 2.
The Licensee has given inadequate consideration to the occurrence of accidental criticality due to the increased density or compaction of the spent fuel assemblies.
Additional consideration of criticality is required due to the following:
- A.
deterioration of the neutron absorption material provided by the Boral plates located between the spent fuel bundles; B.
deterioration of the rack structure leading to failure of the rack and consequent dislodging of spent fuel bundles.
Contention 6 states:
- 6.
The Licensee has given inadequate consideration to qualification and testing of Baral material in the environment of protracted association with spent nuclear fuel, in order to validate its continued properties for reactivity control and integrity.
(10) This Board previously stated that Contention 6 was admitted as a matter in controve.rsy in this proceeding with the understanding that any evidence pertaining to this contention which may be considered shall be deemed part of the evidence relating to parts A and B of Contention 2.
(Order Following Special Prehearing Conference at 5.) Therefore, we will deal with these contentions simultaneously.
(11) The Licensee and the NRC Staff presented extensive testimony on the subjects of the potential for corrosion of the stainless steel racks and the Boral plates in the spent fuel pool environment, the effects of any such corrosion on the integrity of the racks and Boral plates, the problem of swelling of fuel storage cells which has been noted at other facilities, on the methods by which the swelling problem could be alleviated should it occur, and the surveillance program which will be engaged in by the Licensee to detennine the effect on the rack and Boral materials of long-term storage in the spent fuel pool.
None of
8 -
the Intervenors presented any evidence with regard to these two con-tentions. All parties and the Board conducted extensive examinations of the Licensee and Staff witnesses.
(12) The Staff's testimony was prese~ted by Gary G. Zech, the NRC Project Manager for the Salem fuel pool modification, Mr. Edward Lantz, an Engineering Systems Analyst and member of the NRC Staff, and Dr. John R.
Weeks, a Metallurgist from Brookhaven National Laboratory.
(13) The Staff testified that to achieve criticality, Keff (effective multi-plication factor) must equal 1.0.
(Safety Evaluation Report at 2-1, hereinafter Exhibit 6-B, following Tr. 367.)
Due to the uncertainties associated with calculational methods, the Staff testified that the NRC has established an acceptance criterion for the criticality aspects of fuel storage in high density fuel storage racks whereby Keff shall not exceed 0.95, including all uncertainties, under all conditions through-out the life of the racks.
(.!s!_. at 2-2.)
The Staff's witnesses testified that when any number of the Salem plant fuel assemblies, which Licensee states will have no more than 44.7 grams of U-235 per axial centimeter of fuel assembly, are loaded into the proposed racks, the Keff in the pool will be less than the 0.95 limit.
(.!s!_. at 2-3.)
Both the Staff's and the Licensee's testimony are in agreement on this point.
As discussed further below neither deterioration of the rack structure nor deterioration of the neutron shielding material will occur and so criticality considerations will not be affected for the life of the facility.
(14) Dr. Weeks testified for the Staff that no significant deterioration of the racks in the Salem spent fuel pool is expected.
(Affidavit of John R. Weeks following Tr. 652 at 2 (March 29, 1979), hereinafter Weeks' Affidavit.) The reason for this conclusion is that the racks will be constructed of type 304 stainless steel.
(15!_.)
According to Dr. Weeks' testimony, stainless steel is protected from general corro-sion by a tenacious passivating film.
(1£.) Dr. Weeks states that corrosion rates of stainless steel in a spent fuel pool environment are too 1 ow to measure.
(ls!_.)
(15) Dr. Weeks testified that stress corrosion cracking of stainless steel where it is sensitized by welding and where total stresses are high is possible under-spent fuel pool conditions.
(Weeks I affidavit at 3.)
However, Dr. Weeks believes that such a phenomenon would be rare and localized, and would be unlikely to produce sufficiently severe degrada-tion to affect the structural integrity of the racks in the Salem spent fuel pool.
(1£.) Dr. Weeks notes that welded stainless steel liners have been in service for up to twelve years, and that no failures of the liner due to stress corrosion in the spent fuel pool environment have yet been observed.
(1£.)
(16) Dr. Weeks also testified that he does not anticipate deterioration of the neutron absorption material.
The basis for his conclusion is that the Boral plates used in the modified spent fuel pool at Salem would be
- sealed in welded cavities, protecting them from environmental degra-dation.
(Weeks' Affidavit at 1.) Dr. Weeks observed that Boral mate-rial has been exposed in water for periods of up to 20 years without any significant deterioration.
(..!£.. at 3.) Boral is a cermet of boron-carbide and aluminum, clad in aluminum.
(Corrosion Considera-tions in the Use of Boral in Spent Fuel Pool Racks (January 1979) at 1, hereinafter Exhibit 8.)
Even if water were to reach the Boral plate, the boron-carbide matrix would not dissolve.
(Weeks' Affidavit at 2.)
Rather what would occur would be a pitting corrosion at the various points where the Baral came into contact with stainless steel.
When the pitting progressed into the Boral, the boron-carbide (B4C) particles would remain impressed in the aluminum oxide and hydrogen corrosion products.
(..!£.. at 1.) Dr. Weeks testified that since he does not anticipate significant deterioration of either the neutron absorption material or the rack material, he does not expect criticality consid-erations to be significant with respect to the proposed spent fuel pool capacity.
In addition, he does not expect a combination of rack deterioration and deterioration of the boral plates to have any effect on criticality considerations for the design life of the plant.
(17) The Staff estimated the amount of corrosion of the materials in the rack structure and Baral plates which would take place by extrapolating from available corrosion data. Traditionally, corrosion rates follow a straight line plot on a semilogarithmic scale.
(Tr. 693.)
The Staff testified that this semilogarithmic approach is not unreasonable and may, in fact, be overconservative.
(Tr. 694.)
(18) Dr. Weeks testified that should a storage cell leak, allowing coolant containing boric acid to enter the cavity in which the Baral is con-tained, an initial corrosion of aluminum would occur which would pro-duce some hydrogen.
(Weeks' Affidavit at 3.) The pressure generated by the hydrogen production would be capable of bulging the stainless steel can.
(19_.)
(19) The production of this hydrogen, according to Dr. Weeks, would not lead to significant deterioration of the Baral.
(Weeks' Affidavit at 4.) After exposure to* the coolant the aluminum would passivate within a week, and essentially no further general corrosion of the aluminum would occur.
(19_.)
Dr. Weeks stated that it is possible that pitting corrosion would continue at points where the aluminum comes in contact with stainless steel.
(1£.)
Such pitting should not, however, lead to a massive loss of the boron-carbide, even if the pitting should pene-trate the aluminum cladding on the Baral.
{1£.) The reasons stated by Dr. Weeks for this opinion is that boron-carbide particles are highly inert in the spent fuel pool environment.
(19_.)
In fact, according to Dr. Weeks, boron-carbide has been found to be inert to much stronger acids than would ever be present in a spent fuel pool.
(Tr. 664.)
(20) Should swelling of the stainless steel occur due to a leak in the cavity containing the Baral, Dr. Weeks testified that venting the upper end of the Baral chamber would probably alleviate any concerns over this swelling.
(Exhibit 8 at 5.) Venting could, according to Dr. Weeks,
- result in some localized pitting.
(19_.)
This pitting corrosion would, however, be less of a concern than the swelling which would bring about the need for venting.
(Tr. 720-21.)
The venting of these storage cells would release the hydrogen generated which has built up in the cell. Dr. Weeks testified that this hydrogen would not present a danger of flamability, due to the small amount of hydrogen which would be produced, and the size of the building in which the spent fuel pool is located.
(Tr. 691-92.)
The Staff testified that either venting, or the capability for venting, is desireable.
(Exhibit 8 at 5.)
(21) The Staff testified, however, that venting is not required to meet NRC safety requirements.
(Tr. 734.)
The Staff testified that the swelling which would necessitate venting is not a safety problem.
(Tr. 711.)
Rather, it would be an operational problem which would be dealt with by the Licensee.
(Id.) A safety problem, according to the Staff, is one which involves the consideration of the possibility of the release of radioactivity, or the possibility of an accident occurring which was not previously identified by the Staff or the consequences of which would be more severe than previously reviewed by the Staff. (Tr. 712.)
An operational problem is one which the Licensee must contend with in the operation of the facility.
(19_.)
Therefore, the Staff's testimony is that venting should not be required as a condition for approval of this license amendment application.
(Tr. 734.)
(22) The Licensee's testimony is substantially in agreement with that of the Staff. This testimony was presented by a panel of witnesses from the Licensee's own staff and the staff of Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc., the supplier of the fuel storage racks.
Licensee's witnesses testified that the stainless steel to be used in the rack structure has been widely used throughout the nuclear industry, and that Licensee is unaware of any corrosion or deterioration of stainless steel in environments similar to that which will exist in the Salem spent fuel pool.
(Affidavit of Edwin A. Liden (February 21, 1979), hereinafter Exhibit 2.)
(23) Licensee's witnesses testified that the manufacturing process used for the fuel storage cells has been carefully controlled, and that non-destructive tests were perfonned to insure at least 95% leak-tightness of the cells with a 95% confidence level.
(l.9...)
Mr. Liden testified that a 95%-leak-tightness rate does not mean that 5% of the storage cells will in fact leak.
(Tr. 599.)
(24) The Licensee also addressed the problem encountered with some fuel storage cells at the Monticello facility.
At that facility, according to Licensee, after installation of the fuel storage racks, a leak developed near the bottom of some fuel storage cell.
(Tr. 439.) Water entered the cells through this leak causing gases to fonn as a result of surface corrosion of the aluminum plates. This gas caused the cell walls to swell.
The proposed "fix" was to drill a small hole at the top of each storage cell to insure that such internal gas pressurization would not occur in the future.
(Tr. 439-442.)*Zl It is the opinion of Licensee's witnesses that the more stringent quality control used in the manufacturing process of the fuel storage cells, differentiates the Salem racks from those used at the Monticello facility.
(Tr. 443, 457.)
In addition, Licensee also testified that the quality assurance program will be carried out after receipt of the racks to insure that no damage was done during shipment.
(Tr. 494-495.)
Installation, according to detailed installation procedures, would be carefully moni-tored by Licensee's quality assurance staff. (Tr. 495.)
(25) Licensee's witnesses testified that the Exxon Nuclear Company perfonned experiments to detennine what effect a leak in the stainless steel
.Z/
would have on the Boral plates sealed inside the stainless steel cavity.
(Exhibit 2 at 4; Fuel Storage Racks Corrosion Program - Boral Stainless Steel, March 1979, hereinafter Exhibit 5.) This program involved a review of the literature in the field, evaluation of tests done by others, and additional tests perfonned by Exxon Nuclear Company.
(Exhibit 5 at i.) This program indicated that the storage cells con-taining a hole will sustain pitting, edge attack, and internal gas pressurization.
{..!.£..)
Without this leak path the Boral plate would not be subject to degradation as a result of aqueous corrosion.
(1£..
A brief description of the problem at the Monticello facility as well as the results of venting conducted at that facility is also contained in the Monticello Inspection Report No. 50-263/79-02 at 6-7 (Exhibit 13).
at 3-1.)
If due to a leak, some corrosion of the aluminum on the Baral plate is experienced, Licensee agrees with the Staff that the B4C particles would not fall away but rather would becane embedded in the aluminum and hydrogen corrosion products.
8/
(In camera Tr. 17.)-
(26) The internal gas pressurization noted by the Exxon Nuclear Company in its experiments is not the same as the bulging which occurred at the Monticello and Browns Ferry facilities.
(In camera Tr. 22.) The type of small bulging within the Boral matrix itself noted in this program would not prevent the movement of fuel within the storage cell.
(..!s!_.)
The small bulges appear, according to Exxon, to be a self-limiting phenomenon.
(Exhibit 5 at 3-3.) This phenanenon would not affect the neutron shielding properties of the Boral according to the Licensee.
(..!s!_. at 3-4.) According to Exxon Nuclear Company those bulges were random and occurred rarely.
(In camera Tr. 23.)
(27) Licensee testified that according to the experiments done by Exxon, if there were a leak in the stainless steel allowing water to enter the cavity, there could be some minor corrosion of aluminum in the aluminum carbide matrix, and the envolvement of hydrogen gas.
(Exhibit 2 at 4.)
The worst location for such a leak would be at the bottcxn of the cell.
(1.£.)
The pressure created by the generation of the hydrogen gas could Counsel for Licensee infonned the Board of those portions of the in camera transcript which were deemed to be proprietary.
The rest,~
according to Licensee's counsel, could be made available to the public, and could be referred to the proposed findings of the parties as though not proprietary.
'j cause the inner shroud to bulge and move toward the center of the storage cell.
(Id. at 5.) The Exxon program showed that in the case of an empty storage cell, the bulging caused the deformation of the inner shroud plastically past the elastic limits of stainless steel 304, and that after being vented the inner shroud did not return to its original position.
(Tr. 739.) The outer shroud was not subject to swelling and was not deformed.
C.!s!..-)
The Licensee testified that the Salem racks were not designed based on the use of this inner shroud, so that this deformation would have no adverse effect on the safety analysis done for the new fuel storage racks.
(.1£.) This phenomenon seems to be the same as the one described by Staff witnesses.
(See Exhibit 8.)
(28) Licensee testified that even if there were fuel in the cell at the time of the leak, the deformation of the inner shroud beyond its elastic limit would not prohibit the removal of a fuel assembly.
(Tr. 751.)
According to Licensee, since the inner shroud is composed of very thin malleable stainless steel, once the internal pressure is vented this shroud could be moved back and forth.
(Tr. 752.)
It is the Licensee's position that the vertical force of moving the spent fuel would be enough to cause such movement.
(.1£.)
The Licensee also testified that
- should a leak occur when fuel is in the storage cell, it is not expected that there would be damage to the zircaloy cladding of the fuel.
(Tr. 746.)
(29) The Licensee has used the data gathered from this one year program and extrapolated it to detennine what the corrosion rates would be for the materials tested over a period of 30 to 40 years.
(In camera Tr. 40.)
Licensee testified that the corrosion program yielded semilogarithmic evidence, and that the extrapolation of this data is a standard and widely accepted industry practice for detennining long-term effects on the properties of materials.
(..!£.; Tr. 565.)
The Licensee and Staff are in agreement on this point.
(30) The Licensee has testified that if a leak develops while fuel is in a particular storage cell, the worst result would be that the fuel assem-bly could not be withdrawn from the cell with a force that is within the limits allowed for the fuel handling crane.
(Exhibit 2 at 5.)
In this event the Licensee states that semi-remote tooling will be used to provide vent holes in the storage cell annulus to relieve the gas pressure on the fuel assembly and pennit its routine removal.
(..!£.)
The Licensee testified that it prefers to rely on the leak-tightness of the cells rather than on the pre-installation venting because there is inadequate information concerning the effect on the poison materials of such venting.
(Tr. 620-24.)
It is the Licensee I s view that venting has the disadvantage of a certain loss of flexibility should future problems arise with leaking storage cells. (Tr. 620.)
If there is no fuel in a storage cell at the time a leak occurs, Licensee testified that the worst consequence would be the loss of that storage cell from service.
(Exhibit 2 at 5.)
The presence of such swelling would be investigated before fuel is loaded into a storage cell.
(..!£~)
(31) The Licensee has committed to engage in a long-tenn fuel storage cell surveillance program to verify the stability of the cell material and its mechanical integrity over its service life. (Exhibit 2 at 6.)
This surveillance will be accomplished through the use of coupons which simulate fuel storage cells placed in the spent fuel pool.
(l9_.)
These coupons will be examined one year after rack replacement and every two years thereafter.
(l9_.)
The Staff testified that the surveil-lance program proposed by the Licensee is a viable one for keeping track of corrosion in the spent fuel pool.
(Tr. 695.)
In addition, the Staff testified that the frequency of examination of the surveil-lance coupons proposed by the Licensee is adequate.
(l9_.)
The Board agrees.
(32) The Board finds that there has been adequate consideration given ques-tions concerning the deterioration of the neutron absorption material in the fuel storage cells and due to the deterioration of the rack structure itself, including consideration of the possibility of acci-dental criticality.
In addition, adequate consideration has been given to the properties of boron and the possible effects upon it of use in the spent fuel pool environment.* The Board finds that neither the long-term use of Baral in the spent fuel pool environment, nor the use of the materials which comprise the fuel storage racks and fuel storage cells present a safety concern which would require the denial of this license amendment application.
Since the Licensee retains the capability to vent any storage cell with fuel in it should that cell develop a leak no safety concern exists with respect to the use of unvented storage cells in the Salem spent fuel pool. Thus, the Board finds that, with respect to the issues raised by Colemans' Contentions 2 and 6, the facility can be operated in accordance with the proposed modifi-cations without endangering the health and safety of the public.
B.
Contention 1 Lower Alloways Creek Township Contention 1 states:
The Licensee has not considered in sufficient detail possible alternatives to the proposed expansion of the spent fuel pool.
Specifically, the Licensee has not established that spent fuel cannot be stored at another reactor site. Also, while the GESMO proceedings have been tenninated, it is not clear that the spent fuel could not by some arrangement with Allied Chemical Corp.
be stored at the AGNS Plant in Barnwell, South Carolina.
Furthern,ore, the Licensee has not explored nor exhausted the possibilities for disposing of the spent fuel outside of the U.S.A.
(33) This license amendment proceeding is a limited issue proceeding.
We are only to consider "whether the amendment itself would bring about significant environmental consequences beyond those previously assessed and, if so, whether those consequences (to the extent unavoidable) would be sufficient on balance to require a denial of the amendment application.
11 Northern States Power Company (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-455, 7 NRC 41, 46 n. 4 (1978).
In order to meet its obligations under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §4321, et~., and 10 C.F.R. Part 51 of the Convnission's regulations, and to satisfy the requirement of the Commission's Notice of Intent to Prepare Generic
20 -
Environmental Impact Statement on Handling Storage of Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel (Seen. 9, p. 21, infra), the Staff prepared an environmental impact appraisal (EIA) with regard to this license amend-ment application.
In its EIA the Staff stated that:
- the proposed license amendment will not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and that there will be no significant environmental impact attributable to the proposed action other than that which has already been predicted and described in the Commission's Final Environ-mental Statement for the Facility dated April 1973.
(EIA at 27, hereinafter Exhibit 6-C.)
(34) The Commission's regulations in Part Sldo not require inclusion in the Staff 1s Environmental Impact Appraisal of a discussion of alternatives.
10 C.F.R. § 51.7(b).
If this Board finds the Staff 1s EIA to be adequate, then it is not obligated either to consider alternatives. See Duquesne Light Company et al. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-78-16, 7 NRC 811, 816 (1978).
In addition, if the environmental impacts of a particular action are insignificant, then any alternative to that action rrust have impacts which are either equal to or more severe than those of the proposed action. Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), LBP-78-32, 8 NRC 413, 449-50 (1978).
In upholding the Trojan Licensing Board 1s decision, the Appeal Board stated:
- there is no obligation to search out possible alternatives to a course which itself will not either harm the environment or bring into serious question the manner in which this country 1s resourses are being expended.
Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 266 (1979).
I (35) In this case, the Staff concluded that this spent fuel pool modification has no significant impact upon the environment.
(Exhibit 6-C at 27.)
No evidence has been presented to the contrary in this proceeding.
Thus, the Board concludes that it is not necessary to satisfy NEPA to consider any alternatives to this proposed modification.
(36) Nevertheless, in accordance with the Commission 1s Notice relating to spent fuel expansions which was applicable at the time this proceeding commenced (40 Fed.~. 48201, September 16, 1975), the Staff 1s EIA gave full consideration to whether any alternatives were forclosed by the proposed action.
In this connection, the EIA contained a considera-tion of alternatives and a cost-benefit analysis and there was consider-able testimony at the hearings with respect to such alternatives.-~./
In its Notice of Intent to Prepare Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel {40 Fed.
~. 42801), the Commission required the Staff to consider five factors in detennining whether individual license amendments to expand the capacity of spent fuel pools should be deferred.
(Id. at 42802).
Some Licensing Boards have weighed these five factors in their decisions.
In the proceeding before us, however, none of these five factors have been directly made matters in controversy. Therefore, we did not explictly consider them beyond the extent discussed in this decision to which the Staff 1s EIA, which does discuss the five factors, also bears upon the issues in controversy in this proceeding.
In August 1979, during the pendancy of this proceeding, the Final Generic Environmental Statement on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel {FGEIS), NUREG-0575, was issued.
Copies were furnished this Board and the parties under cover of a letter from Staff Counsel dated August 20, 1980.
As a result of the issuance of the FGEIS, discussion in the Staff EIA of the five factors set forth in the GEIS Notice is no longer required, the "interim period 11 referenced to in the GEIS Notice has expired.
We note, moreover, that the FGEIS, NUREG-0575, finds that as a generic matter for all nuclear facilities there are no generic problems associated with the spent fuel compaction and that they are economically and environmentally acceptable.
e (37) The Staff's testimony on this issue was presented by Mr. Gary G. Zech and Mr. T. Jerrell Carter, Jr. This testimony is contained in the EIA which follows Tr. 367 in the record, and in the affidavit of Gary G.
Zech (March 30, 1979), following Tr. 999.
The Staff in its EIA dis-cusses the alternatives of reprocessing the spent fuel from Salem Unit 1, storing the fuel from Salem at an independent spent fuel storage installation, using the fuel pool at Salem Unit 2 in either its reracked or unreracked condition for storing fuel from Unit 1 after Unit l's pool is filled, storing fuel at another reactor, and shutting the reactor down.
(Exhibit 6-C at 13-19.)
In addition, the Staff testified as to the feasibility of storing spent fuel outside of the United States.* (Affidavit of Gary G. Zech (March 30, 1979).) The Staff found that the alternatives considered were either not viable, or unreliable due to the uncertainty of their availability before the Salem Unit 1 pool became full.
(Exhibit 6-C at 20.)
. (38) The Staff testified that without the reracking of Salem Unit l's spent fuel pool, that unit's pool would be filled after the 1983 refueling outage.
(Tr. 1026.) According to the Staff, the Unit 2 pool if not reracked would be full after the 1984 refueling outage.
(.!_g_.)1..Q./
1.QI These numbers were changed from those which appeared in the Staff's EIA at 2 because of a letter sent by the Licensee to the Board.
The contents of this letter were testified to by the Licensee.
(Tr. 1104.)
Licensee testi-fied that the number of fuel assemblies to be discharged at the time of each refueling will be reduced.
(Id.) After the first refueling 40 assemblies were discharged.
(..!.9_.)
Afte~the second refueling 52 assemblies will be discharged.
(Id.)
For future refuelings, the Licensee will discharge 56 assemblies.
Clef.)
The Licensee testified that this reduction changes their calculations o-:r-when the Unit 1 and Unit 2 pools will be filled somewhat.
(FOOTNOTE CONTINUED)
(39) In discussing the alternative of storage of spent fuel at an inde-pendent spent fuel storage installation the Staff pointed to the many uncertainties which surround this alternative.
(Tr. 1006.)
For exam-ple, any estimates of the length of time necessary to construct an independent spent fuel storage installation have assumed the expedi-tious resolution of licensing and environmental problems.
When and whether this alternative will be available is a constantly changing situation.
(Tr. 1053.)
The Staff witnesses stated that even should off-site storage become available in time for it to be of use for Salem Unit 1, there is no indication that Salem would be one of the utilities given priority with respect to its use.
(.!.9_.)
The Staff also pointed out that it would be unlikely that the environmental impacts of this alternative would be less than the minor impacts associated with the proposed Salem modification.
(Exhibit 6-C at 16.)
In addition, the Staff testified that this alternative would be more costly than the modification.
(.!.9_. at 20.)
The Staff quoted figures for the cost of construction of an independent spent fuel storage installation of between $24 and $54 million.
(..!£!_.)
The proposed modification of the Salem Unit 1 spent fuel pool is estimated to cost approximately $3 million.
(1.£. at 15-16.) With respect to the alternative of storing the spent fuel froo, Salem Unit 1 at an independent spent fuel storage (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED}
The Unit 1 pool would be filled after the 1983 outage and the Unit 2 pool would be filled after the 1984 refueling outage.
(Tr. 1105.)
These numbers agree with those put forward by the Staff.
(Tr. 1026-27.)
In addition the Licensee testified that if Unit 1 were reracked the pool would be filled in 1999 and Unit 2 if reracked by the year 2000.
(Tr. 1105.)
installation, the Staff testified that this alternative would be more costly than the proposed project and would not be available to the Licensee in sufficient time to make it a reliable alternative.
(Exhibit 6-C at 14-16, 20.)
(40) The Staff testified that the alternative of either the use of the unreracked Unit 2 pool to hold Salem Unit l's spent fuel when Salem Unit l's pool became full, or the alternative of reracking the Unit 2 pool and not the Unit 1 pool would not be preferable to reracking both of the pools.
(Exhibit 6-C at 16-17.) Especially with respect to reracking the Unit 2 pool but not the Unit 1 pool, the Staff bases this conclusion on the fact that there is no certainty that this alternative would extend the Licensee's ability to store fuel for long enough to enable them to find space for their spent fuel at some interim facility.
(Tr. 1137-38.)
In addition, while awaiting the availability of an interim facility, fuel would be building up in the Unit 1 pool.
(ls!_.)
(41) As a plant gets older, according to the Staff, the occupational expo-sures encountered in reracking a spent fuel pool would be higher.
(Tr. 1144.) Therefore, if by the time the reracked Unit 2 pool were filled there was no interim facility available and it became necessary to rerack Unit 1, there would be higher occupational exposures involved in the action.
(Tr. 1145.)
In addition to the presence of more fuel, the Staff pointed to the fact that the racks would be contaminated, the possible presence of radioactivity on the sides and surface of the pool, and the possibility of having to move fuel to do the reracking as additional reasons for higher occupational exposures resulting from waiting until a later time to modify the Salem Unit 1 pool. (~.) The Staff also stated that if only the Unit 2 pool were to be reracked, movements of fuel from Unit 1 to Unit 2 would be involved (Tr. 1136),
as well as a movement of fuel from Unit 2 to Unit 1 if Unit 1 were reracked after the reracked pool at Unit 2 was filled.
(Tr. 1151.)l!./
(42) The Staff testified that the possibilities for disposing of the Salem Unit 1 spent fuel outside of the United States are to be considered non-existent.
(Zech Affidavit at 2.)
This conclusion is based on the government's nonproliferation policy of weapons grade radioactive material.
(Id.)
This policy calls for the discouragement on the part of foreign countries of the separation of plutonium from irradiated spent fuel assemblies.
(Id.) Any large scale shipment of spent fuel by*
a utility to a foreign country would not be permitted if it were engaged in reprocessing.
(Id.) There was no further discussion of this alterna-tive by any other party to the proceeding.
l!_I The Staff has estimated that the Licensee may expend up to 110 manrem in occupational exposures during the time the unreracked Unit 1 pool and the reracked Unit 2 pool would be filled.
(NRC Staff Response in Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration of Dismissal of Colemans' Contention 13, affidavit of Jack N. Donohew, Jr.) These occupational exposures must be compared with an occupational exposure of 2 to 5 manrem which would be incurred in the reracking of Salem Unit 1.
(Id. at 3.)
This estimate does not include the occupational exposures which would be incurred should Unit l's spent fuel pool be reracked at a later time, thus necessitating the transfer of some fuel from Unit 2 back to the spent fuel pool at Unit 1.
l (43) Although the alternatives of reprocessing and reactor shut down were not raised as contested issues in this proceeding, the Staff addressed them in its EIA, and we will discuss them. briefly here.
The Staff testified that due to the national policy deferring reprocessing, this would not be a viable alternative for the reracking of Salem Unit 1.
(Exhibit 6-C at 16.) As far as the alternative of shutting the reactor down, the Staff detennined that due to the cost of replacement power such an alternative would be far more expensive than the proposed action. (~at20.)
(44) The Staff views its role with regard to all of the above-mentioned alternatives as that of evaluating the proposal presented to it by the Licensee in its application for an amendment to its operating license.
(Tr. 1007.) The Staff takes the position that it is not required to choose the alternative which would necessarily give the lowest occupa-tional exposure, for example, but rather to look at a particular pro-posal to determine whether it confonns to the requirements of the Commission's regulations and in this connection to determine whether the exposures involved in the carrying out of that proposal would be as low as reasonably achievable.
(See Tr. 1143.)
The Staff has testified that the environmental impacts from the proposed action would be insignifi-cant.
(Tr. 1136.) Therefore, according to the Staff, there is no reason for the Staff to deny the Licensee's proposal (Tr. 1136), or to recommend the pursuit by the Licensee of any alternative to this proposed action.
(Tr. 1139).
e e (45) The Licensee also presented testimony on this issue.
(Exhibit 2 at 9-13.)
The Licensee's witnesses were Mr. Edwin J. Liden and Mr. Robert P.
Douglass.
As mentioned above, due to the reduction in the number of fuel assemblies to be discharged from both Salem Units 1 and 2, the unreracked pool for Salem Unit 1 would be filled after the 1983 outage (Tr. 1105) and the unreracked Unit 2 pool would be filled in 1984.
(.!,9-..)
If both units were to be reracked the Unit 1 pool would be filled in 1999, (..!£.), and the Unit 2 pool would be filled in the year 2000.
(.!,9-..)
Salem Unit 1 would not have a full core discharge cap-ability after 1996.
(Id.) The Licensee testified that it is important to maintain a full core discharge capability in order to be able to inspect the internals of the reactor.
(Tr. 866.)
Licensee's witnesses pointed out, however, that whether or not such capability is retained does not involve safety or environmental matters.
(1.Q_.)
(46) The Licensee's witnesses testified that Licensee neither did an indepen-dent cost analysis of construction of an independent spent fuel storage installation, nor investigated participating with other utilities in the construction of an independent spent fuel storage installation.
(Tr. 780, 1009-10.)
The Licensee pointed, however, to other studies done and testified that such an alternative would be an extremely costly one compared with the proposed modification.
(Tr. 835.)
An example of additional costs for the new facility would be those of installing a whole new security system for the independent facility.
Licensee's witnesses also stated that there would be environmental
- impacts as a result of this alternative which would not be associated with the proposed modification, such as the use of additional land, and the impacts associated with the transfer of spent fuel to such a facility.
(Tr. 836).
Licensee's witnesses stated that at this time they were not aware of the passage of any legislation authorizing construction of an independent spent fuel storage.installation. They were also unaware of any site selection for such a facility or ccxnpletion of the environmental impact review process.
{Tr. 838.)
The Licensee's witnesses reached the conclusion that:
11 *** on an overall basis, the best course is increasing the spent fuel pool capacity at the Salem station.
11
{Tr. 836.)
{47) Licensee also testified that it is impracticable to store Salem Unit l's spent fuel at either the Hope Creek units presently under construction on Artificial Island, or at Salem Unit 2.
(Exhibit 2 at 9.)
The Licensee pointed out that Salem Unit 2 is expected to begin operation shortly.10'
(..!£..)
Both the Staff and Licensee's witnesses testified that no technical questions remained to be resolved with respect to the reracking of Salem Unit 2 spent fuel pool.
(Tr. 1038, 822.)
Once operation begins Salem Unit 2 would have annual discharges of fuel.
(Exhibit 2 at 9.) Therefore, use of the reracked pool at Salem Unit 2 for spent fuel from Salem Unit 1 would, according to the Licensee's witnesses, impact adversely on the operation of Salem Unit 2 if no interim storage facility were available by the time the Unit 2 pool was
~ This testimony was offered in May 1979.
full.
(J.Q...)
In addition, Licensee testified that higher occupational exposures would be encountered because of the necessity of transferring the spent fuel between units, since the pools for Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 are separated. This means that fuel elements would have to be put into casks in order to be trans ported fran one pool to another.
(J.Q_.)
(48) Licensee testified that storage at Hope Creek would not be practical since such storage would necessitate the replacement of the Hope Creek racks.
(J.Q_. at 10.) According to the Licensee's witnesses, the fuel to be stored at Hope Creek is boiling water reactor fuel, and thus would be a different size fran the fuel used at Salem Unit 1.
(Tr. 831.)
In addition Licensee testified under cross-examination that Hope Creek would not be finished until approximately 1985, and Salem would have to shut down in 1982.
(1.9_. )DI The impacts of transportation of spent fuel also had to be considered with respect to this alternative.
(Exhibit 2 at 10.) Licensee's witnesses testified that after analyzing this alternative, Licensee detennined that using the Hope Creek pool to store the spent fuel from Salem would not be the best course to follow.
(Tr. 832-33.)
(49) The Licensee also pointed out that the facilities now being used to store spent fuel are not available to it. (Exhibit 2 at 10-11.)
~ It should be noted that Licensee later revised the date at which Salem Unit 1 would be forced to shutdown to 1983. Seen. 10, supra.
Mr. Liden's affidavit refers to the Staff's environmental impact appraisal 1s discussion of the tenns upon which these existing facili-ties are now accepting spent fuel.
(.IQ_.)
Mr. Liden goes on to point out that, with respect to the Morris facility, the Licensee is not one of the utilities which has a previously existing commitment which would make the Morris facility available to it.
(.!s!_. at 11.) Therefore, this would not be a feasible alternative to the proposed action.
(50) The Township of Lower Alloways Creek presented evidence on this conten-tion in the fonn of the testimony of Dr. George Luchak, Professor of Civil Engineering at Princeton University.
The main point of Dr. Luchak's testimony was that the Licensee had not adequately *considered the alternative of construction of an independent spent fuel storage installa-tion.
(Tr. 989; Testimony of Dr. George Luchak (April 10, 1979) at 2, hereinafter Luchak, following Tr. 918.) Throughout the cross-examination Dr. Luchak made it clear that he had done no independent analysis of the costs and benefits of constructing such an independent spent fuel storage installation. (Tr. 956-989.)
He did not see it as his job, but rather as that of the Licensee and the Staff to do any such analysis.
(Tr. 976.)
(51) Dr. Luchak's reason for feeling that an analysis should be made of the costs and benefits of constructing an independent spent fuel storage installation is that the increased capacity of this spent fuel pool would increase the risk of an accident with serious consequences.
' (Tr. 988.)
He refers to the presence of more long-lived radioactivity in the pool and the possibility of evaporation of the water in the spent fuel pool resulting, after a meltdown of the spent fuel, in serious consequences to cities in the area of the Salem site.
(Tr. 954.)
This Board has ruled that Dr. Luchak is not qualified to testify concern-ing accidents at the Salem facili~ affecting the spent fuel pool.
(Tr. 913.)
(52) Dr. Luchak was unable to say when an independent spent fuel storage installation might be available for use by utilities.
He admitted that everything in the area of construction of such a facility is uncertain.
(Tr. 982.) The closest estimate he could give of when such a facility might be available, although he did not know whether it was reliable, was between 1990 and 1995.
(Tr. 981.)
Dr. Luchak thought that five years for the construction of such a facility was a reasonable estimate.
(Tr. 982.)
He did not know whether any applications to build this type of facility were presently being filed.
(Tr. 981.)
(53) Dr. Luchak does not argue with the estimates presented by the NRC Staff of the costs of construction of an independent spent fuel storage installation.
(Luchak at 2-3.)
He also admitted that though he stated in his testimony that the increase in the capacity of the Salem spent fuel pool would result in additional safeguards, security and mainte-nance costs, he had made no estimate of what these costs would be, since it would be the Licensee's and not his responsibility to do so.
32 -
(Tr. 970.)
When asked whether these incremental costs would be more than those for an independent spent fuel storage installation, he again stated that it is for the NRC Staff and the Licensee to detennine.
(Tr. 971.)
(54) The evidence offered by the Staff and the Licensee indicated that there was substantial uncertainty as to the availability of an independent spent fuel storage installation by the time Salem Unit 1 would be forced to shutdown in 1984 shows that this alternative is not a viable alternative to the proposed action.
Intervenor, the Township of Lower Alloways Creek, has been unable to present any evidence which would in any way alleviate this uncertainty.
In addition, there has been no evidence presented that the proposed action would involve a significant impact on the quality of the human environment.
The Intervenors pre-sented no evidence on the feasibility of any of the other alternatives considered by the Staff and Licensee.
(55) With respect to the contested issue concerning alternatives to the proposed action, the Board finds that since there is no evidence of significant environmental impacts associated with the proposed modifica-tion, it is not necessary to consider alternatives to the proposed action to satisfy NEPA.
Moreover, although there was extensive evidence concerning potential alternatives, no alternative was identified which results in environmental impacts of lesser magnitude than the proposed action.
C.
Board Questions 1 and 3 Board Question No. 1 states:
- 1.
To what extent did the accident at Three Mile Island affect the spent fuel pool at that site?
Board Question No. 3 states, in part:
- 3.
If an accident such as the one at Three Mile Island occurred at Salem, to what extent would the accident affect the spent fuel pool? To what extent would it have mattered r~1 much spent fuel was present at the pool at Salem?~
(56) The Staff and Licensee presented testimony on these two questions.
No other parties presented such testimony.
All parties and the Board engaged in examination of the Staff and Licensee's witnesses.
(57) The Staff's testimony was given by Mr. Gary G. Zech and Dr. Jack N.
Donohew, Jr.
The Staff testified that the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TI~I-2) had no direct effect on the spent fuel pool at that facility.
(NRC Staff Response, In Part, To Board Questions at 2, June 19, 1979, hereinafter Staff Testimony, following Tr. 1133.)
The Staff testified that there was no spent fuel in the TMI-2 spent fuel pool at the time of the accident, but that even if there had been such fuel in the pool the accident would not have had an effect on it.
(l.Q_.)
The Staff testified that, though radiation levels were higher than nonnal in the spent fuel pool itself, and in the areas of the spent fuel pool equipment (Tr. 1236),
]ii The Staff and Licensee objected to the second sentence of our question No. 3, and it was not the subject of the evidentiary hearing at which the first and part of the third questions were addressed.
See Section I, supra, and Section II.F., infra.
access was not precluded.
In fact both the TM! Licensees, and the NRC Staff inspectors entered the spent fuel pool at TM!.
(1£!..)
The auxil-iary systems at TMI were also not inaccessible.
(Tr. 1233.)
(58) The Staff testified that at TMI-2 as part of the sequence of events comprising the accident reactor coolant overflowed into the containment sump, and the containment sump pump pumped contaminated water into tanks in the auxiliary building.
(Staff Testimony at 3.) These tanks overflowed in the auxiliary building, and since the water was contami-nated, radiation levels in the auxiliary building were high.
(1£!..)
(59) The Staff testified that an automatic transfer of water from the reac-tor building containment sumps to the auxiliary building could not occur at Salem.
(1£!..)
This is a result of a design feature at Salem which causes containment isolation valves in the transfer lines from the containment sump to shut automatically on the safeguards signal which starts the safety injection pumps.
(1£!..)
At TI~I-2 these valves were not designed to shut on the safeguards signal.
(Id. at 3-4; Tr. 1185.)
The Staff further testified that even if the containment isolation valves did not work properly and there was an inadvertent transfer of water to the auxiliary building at Salem, the operation of the spent fuel pool itself or of the spent fuel pool support systems would not be seriously affected.
(Id. at 4.) The spent fuel pool itself is in a fuel handling building which is separate from the auxil-iary building at Salem.
(1.Q_.; Tr. 1168.)
Some spent fuel pool support systems are, however, located in the Salem auxiliary building.
(Tr. 1168.)
These systems are the spent fuel pool cooling system and the purification system.
(.lg_.)
Operation of the cooling system is not expected to be affected because of its location in the auxiliary building in relation to the tanks which would hold the water from the reactor containment.
(1£.)
The purification system would be somewhat affected because it is located nearer to the pipes of the systems through which the water from the containment sump will pass.
(1.£..)
This effect would be that there would be higher dose rates in the area of the purification system should someone have to reach it. (Tr. 1169.) This is not considered by the Staff to be a serious effect. (Tr. 1168.)
Based on the radia-tion levels in the TMI-2 auxiliary building and based on where the spent fuel pool support equipment is located at Salem and at TMI, the Staff concluded that access to the spent fuel pool equipment is not expected to be precluded.
(Tr. 1179.) There would also be restric-tions on one of the alternative water supplies to the spent fuel pool because the water would be contaminated, but this would only involve the eve holdup tank.
(Tr. 1239.)
Other make-up water sources would be available if needed. (Tr. 1207.)
In addition, valves to provide make-up water are present in the fuel handling building and could be reached without ever entering the auxiliary building.
(Tr. 1240.)
The Staff testified that its conclusions with respect to the spent fuel pool expansion as stated in the environmental impact appraisal are not changed because of the occurrence of the TMI-2 accident.
(Tr. 1249.)
(60) The Licensee presented the testimony of Messrs. Liden, Douglass, and Burricelli on these questions.
The Licensee testified, as did the Staff, that there would be no significant impact on the spent fuel pool itself at Salem were a TI~! type accident to occur.
(Licensee's Testi-mony at 2.) Access to the fuel handling building would not be precluded.
(.IQ.. at 3.)
(61) On cross-examination Licensee's witnesses testified that the water fran the auxiliary building could not reach the fuel handling building, since the two buildings are completely separated and do not communicate.
(Tr. 1268.) Water could only come from the containment to the fuel handling building through the fuel transfer tube where the valve is nonnally closed.
(.IQ_.)
In addition, there is a plate bolted across the fuel transfer tube, thus creating a second barrier to communication between the two buildings.
(.IQ_.)
(62) Licensee testified that in the auxiliary building the ventilation system is designed to prevent the movement of airborne radioactivity from one potential contaminated area to another.
(Licensee's Testimony at 3.) This is accomplished through the use of a system whereby air comes in through the clean areas such as corridors, and goes out through dirty (contaminated) areas.
(Tr. 1280.) This system is typical of those in most nuclear plants.
(lQ_.) Therefore, the gaseous activity in the auxiliary building would not contaminate the areas in which the spent fuel pool support equipment is located.
(Licensee's Testimony at 3.)
(63) Licensee testified that the spent fuel pool ventilation system is operated remotely from the control room.
{Licensee's Testimony at 3-4.) This system is located in the penetration area, which is the space between the containment and the auxiliary building outside of the fuel handling building.
(Tr. 1287.)
Even if radiation levels in this area were found to be high, temporary shielding could be used to reduce those levels to acceptable levels for access to the equipment should it be found to be necessary.
(Licensee's Testimony at 4.) Such temporary shielding is available at the Salem station.
(Tr. 1288.)
(64) Licensee concluded that the type of accident which occurred at TMI-2 would have no adverse impact on the storage of spent fuel at Salem.
(Licensee's Testimony at 4.)
In addition, any impact which did occur would be independent of the capacity of the spent fuel pool or the type of racks contained in that pool.
(19_.)
(65) There being no evidence to the contrary, the Board finds that a TMI-2 type accident would have no incremental impacts on the spent fuel pool due to its expansion.
Any effect resulting from such an accident on the spent fuel pool or its supporting systems would not be incrementally increased by the expansion of the spent fuel pool.
D.
Evidentiary Hearing Concerning a Gross Loss of Water Accident (66) In our Memorandum and Order of February 22, 1980, we directed the parties to answer the following question:
In the event of a gross loss of water fran the storage pool, what would be the difference in consequences between those occasioned by the pool with the expanded storage and those occosioned by the present pool?
The testimony proposed by the Licensee in response to our question was rejected as not responsive.
(Tr. 1376.) Testimony proposed by Lower Alloways Creek Township to be sponsored by Dr. Fankhauser was rejected as not sufficiently connected with the difference between the present and proposed storage configuration.
(Tr. 1376.)
For reasons stated on the record, we struck substantial portions of the testimony proposed by the Township prepared by Dr. Webb.
(Tr. 1377-81 and 1679-82.)
For reasons discussed belov,, we attach little probative value to the remaining portions of Dr. Webb's testimony.
The Staff's proposed direct testimony was received into the record following Tr. 1387.
(67) The Staff's direct testimony was sponsored by Walter F. Pasedag, Environ-mental Evaluation Branch, Division of Operating Reactors, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
His professional qualifications are bound into the transcript following Tr. 1387.
Dr. Allan S. Benja~in of Sandia Laboratories joined Mr. Pasedag in presenting the Staff's direct case.
Dr. Benjamin's qualifications were received into the record following Tr. 1389.
Dr. Benjamin, one of the authors of what became known in the hearing as the "Sandia Report," acted as a consultant to Mr. Pasedag.
(Tr. 1390.)
The Sandia Report was identified as NUREG/CR-0649, entitled "Spent Fuel Heatup Following Loss of Water During Storage." (Tr. 1399-1400.)
- 39*-
E.
Testimony Offered by Lower Alloways Creek Township (68) We struck substantial portions of Dr. Webb's proposed direct testimony on the basis that it was irrelevant (we stated this ground with respect to 28 portions of his proposed testimony), had already been litigated, was not sufficiently probative, was beyond the scope of the proceeding, was repetitious, was not specifically directed to the question we posed, or was not within the jurisdiction of this proceeding.
(Tr. 1377-81; Tr. 1679-82.)
For the reasons set forth below, we do not attach little probative value to the remaining portions of Dr. Webb's testimony.
(69) On direct examination, with respect to his professional qualifications, Dr. Webb testified as follows:
I have been heavily involved in the Three Mile Island accident.
I have helped advise the authorities of Pennsylvania and NRC on how best to cool down the reactor.
My advice was followed.
But it was independently arrived at by the NRC can't be established.
There is a whole history of that and I do have a documentary his-tory of my involvement in the Three Mile Island accident. That has consumed a good bit of the year since February 1979.
(Tr. 1656.)
On cross-examination by Licensee's counsel, Dr. Webb testified that his advice was not solicited by the NRC.
(Tr. 1683.)
(70) Although Dr. Webb's conclusions concerning the impacts of fission pro-duct releases depend on a knowledge of meteorology, he is not a meteo-rologist (Tr. 1687), nor has he published any articles in a meteorologi-cal journal.
(Tr. 1688.)
He testified that he had studied meteorology.
(Tr. 169 7.)
(71) Our first question to Dr. Webb asked for the background assumptions for his conclusions concerning the amount of land area that could be affected by the releases he was predicting.
(Tr. 1698-99.)
We specifically directed Dr. Webb's attention to pages 14 and 15 of the testimony dated February 1979.
(Tr. 1698.)
On the referenced pages, Dr. Webb discussed 11ruining agriculturally a land area of the size of about one-third of the land east of the Mississippi River, or certainly the entire eastern seaboard of the United States and Canada, for 100 years or more.
11 (p. 14.)
He referred to 11 high levels of gamma radiation * *
- emanating from the ground over an area equal to 150,000 square miles.
11 (p. 14.)
Dr. Webb stated that the amount of plutonium available, if dispersed uniformly, 11would have the potential for causing abandonment of about five million square miles of land, which is 1.5 times the total United States land area, including Alaska.
11 (p. 15.)
Dr. Webb also concluded that 11even if the spent fuel pool held a minimum of spent fuel--65 fuel assemblies--the potential consequences of the loss of water accident would still be extreme:
for example, a land area of the size of Ohio, or five times the size of New Jersey, could be ruined agriculturally for 100 years or more, due to Strontium 90 releases alone.
11 (p. 15.)
(72) Dr. Webb's answer to our question about background assumptions is re-ported at Tr. 1699 through Tr. 1702.
He started his answer with 11an assumed amount of curies released into the atmosphere.
11 At no time in his discussion did he address his assumptions with respect to the mechanism which could result in such releases.
We followed this dis-cussion with specific questions with respect to the "means by which radiation escapes fran the pool." Our questions were not satisfac-torily answered.
(Tr. 1706-09.)
(73) We asked the witness specifically to state whether his testimony indi-cated to what extent the mechanism for release of radiation was influ-enced by the presence of fuel four years old or older.
(Tr. 1709.)
The witness first stated he could not remember, and then referred us to page 5 of his February 27 testimony, Item E, where he quotes his testi-mony as saying that the zirconium fire "could conceivably spread to old spent fuel."
(Tr. 1710.)
He then referred us to page 3 of his part III supplement.
He agreed with Board member Shon that the portion of the paragraph that he referred to is simply a statement that once ignition occurs one must assume the fire will spread *.
(Tr. 1710-11.)
Dr. Webb then referred to an addendum in which he said he addressed the Bettis Laboratories zirconium fire.
(Tr. 1711.)
In fact, Dr. Webb's April 24, 1980 Addendum does not discuss the extent to which the mechanism for release of radiation is influenced by the presence of fuel four years old or older.
(74) Dr. Webb admitted that his failure to request the final safety analysis report for Salem was an omission in his research.
(Tr. 1719-20.)
He also admitted that he had been provided some drawings by the Licensee, but he did not look at those drawings to see what the data was.
(Tr. 1720.)
(75) Dr. Webb used the word 11conceivable 11 throughout his testimony.
We asked Dr. Webb whether he assumed any probabilities when he made his calculations which accanpany the word "conceivable" in his testimony.
(Tr. 1731.) Mr. Wetterhahn counsel for Licensee attempted to particu-larize our question by asking to the witness to answer with regard to the release of the strontium and cesium in the building.
(Tr. 1731.)
Dr. Webb's response was:
I considered the likelihood (probability) and I concluded that any judgment on likelihood is unscientific and therefore pure speculation.
So I considered that matter and disposed of it in that way.
(Tr. 1731.)
At Tr. 1732, Dr. Webb clarified, in response to a question from the Board, that he (Dr. Webb) disagreed with the use of "probability" in making calculations.
(76) Dr. Webb's proposed testimony is a product of his belief that anything that is conceivable should be considered.
If a zirconium fire is con-ceivable, for example, he believes this Board should take. it into account in its consideration of the application to expand the spent fuel pool.
He would give no consideration to the likelihood of the event.
(Tr. 1729; Tr. 1731-2.)
We find that it does not produce testimony that is useful to this Board.
F.
Zirconium Fi re or Oxidation (77) A significant portion of the testimony offered by Lower Alloways Creek Township prepared by Dr. Webb addresses the possibility of and the consequences of a zirconium fire.
(Seep. 5 of Dr. Webb's testimony dated February 27, 1979; "Part I" starting at p. 9; "Part III; and "The Addendum" dated April 24, 1980 (which addresses the incident at the Bettis Laboratory in 1955).)
(78) The Staff recognized that, for fresh spent fuel, continued denial of water cooling capability could lead to oxidation and failure of the clad, and to overheating of the uo2 fuel, with the potential for the release of fission products in either the present or the expanded pool.
(Pasedag, Direct Testimony, p. 4.)
But since the proposed storage configuration would result in less natural convection there would be a higher likelihood of reaching oxidation temperatures and possible clad melting for recently discharged fuel in the proposed configuration.
(Pasedag, Further Testimony, p. 2.)
Decay time required to assure that the fuel's decay heat generation would not result in oxidation temperatures above 900°C in the high density racks is about one year.
(Pasedag, Further Testimony, p. 1; Tr. 1441.)
f (79) We asked Dr. Benjamin the difference between fire and oxidation.
(Tr. 1393.)
He responded that the term "fire" as used by Dr. Webb implied a situation involving flames, convection and spreading of flames frcxn fuel assembly to fuel assembly.
(Tr. 1393.)
Dr. Benjamin consulted with several people at Sandia Laboratories who he considered to be more expe~t than himself and with Dr. L. Baker at Argonne who is an expert on the subject of zirconium fires.
(Tr. 1393.) With a sig-nificant quantity of zirconium metal in the fortn of cladding around fuel pellets it would not be possible for a flame of this type to develop.
(Tr. 1393.)
Any burning or oxidation that occurred might result in a brightness, but it would not result in flames.
(Tr. 1394.)
Staff witness Pasedag testified that there have been many experiments in heating up zirconium in various fonns.
(Tr. 1497.) During experi-ments involving heating up of whole bundles of zirconium rods, there has never been any observation of flames leaping frcxn one rod to the next at temperatures up to about 2000 degrees.
(Tr. 1497.)
(80) The word "ignition" means a burning that is initiated and which sus-tains itself because of an inability to remove heat fast enough to be able to put the burning out.
(Tr. 1397.)
Dr. Benjamin's calculations show that ignition occurs in the newest or hottest spent fuel elements once they reach a temperature of approximately 900° C.
With reference to the Sandia Report, Dr. Benjamin testified that they continued their calculations beyond the 900° C temperature up to and beyond the tem-peratures of zirconium melting for those (newest or hottest) fuel ele-
e ments, but they did not do any calculations that would then determine what happens to the rest of the elements in the pool after that.
(Tr. 1397.)
(81) Mr. Valore, Counsel for the Township, read to Staff witness Pasedag fr001 11Dr. Lewis Baker's article or chapter on chemical reaction which is Chapter 17 of the Technology of Nuclear Reactor Safety, Vol. 2. 11 (Tr.
1510.) Mr. Va lore quoted from page 453 of the referenced material as fol lows:
- A serious incident at Bettis involves [sic] ign1tion of a large quantity of zirconium scrap stored in open segregated bins.
Flames rose to a height of 84 feet and were so intensely hot that windows over 100 feet away were cracked.
(Tr. 1511.)
Mr. Pasedag was asked whether he was aware 11at any time in your analy-sis11 of what Mr. Valore had just read.
(Tr. 1511.) Mr. Pasedag responded that he was aware of the referenced material and stated that a report issued by the Atomic Energy Convnission (AEC) on May 27, 1955, with respect to the incident at Bettis, states, among other things, 11the height of the flame can probably be explained by the burning of oil. 11 (Tr. 1511.) Mr. Pasedag also testified that he believed, just as stated in the AEC report, that the oil in the zirconium fire at Bettis contributed to the height of the flame and that primarily the smaller particles of zirconium, the powder, and the smaller chips, were the materials contributing to the burning.
(Tr. 1514.)
(
e (82) In response to Intervenor questioning with respect to the Bettis fire, Staff witness Pasedag responded that contaminants such as oil were causing the fire but that the process did result in oxidation of zir-conium.
(Tr. 1515.)
He stated that previous testimony has shown that the term 11fire 11 does not adequately describe the oxidation of zirconium even at high temperatures.
(Tr. 1515.)
He also stated that he had previously testified that flames and fires cannot occur under any cir-cumstances in the spent fuel pool.
(Tr. 1518.) The reason is that in the spent fuel pool there are fuel rods clad with zirconium--not pow-ders, shavings, chips or mill turnings.
(Tr. 1518.)
The witness later repeated that he saw no possibility of a zirconium fire in a spent fuel pool.
(Tr. 1537.)
The only possibility of a zirconium fire would involve small particles of zirconium in aggregate forn,.
(Tr. 1537.)
(83) Intervenors asked Dr. Benjamin about the Bettis fire.
(Tr. 1564.)
Dr. Benjamin responded:
This is the same question was asked of Mr. Pasedag many times.
And Mr. Pasedag's answer is the same as mine.
There was oil and contamination in the bins that could have pro-duced a flame.
In fact the report says that the flames themselves,60-100 feet in height lasted for a minute and then after that died down.
There continued to be burning, there continued to be burning around these scrap metals, but not of the flames that occurred during the first minute.
I think this would indicate that it could have been oil that was burning and when the oil overheated it could have been the Zirconium burning.
But regardless of that the other point Mr. Pasedag made was that these are scraps or particles that are stored in aggregate and that the geanetrical situa-tion is not anywhere near the same as the geometrical situa-tion in the spent fuel pool.
(Tr. 1564.)
e The Board finds that a gross loss of water fran the present or expanded pool could lead to oxidation and failure of the clad around the fresh fuel and a potential for release of fission products fran the fresh fuel.
The incident at Bettis does not demonstrate to this Board the likelihood of a zirconium fire involving flame in the Salem spent fuel pool.
(84) At page 3 of Part III of his testimony, Dr. Webb states "Once ignition occurs, one must assume that the fire will spread, especially since there is no satisfactory theory of fire in aggregates of zirconium.
The Bettis Laboratory Zirconium fire underscores this point; where that fire had spread from bin to bin--see Part I.
11 Absent probative evi-dence, this Board finds no basis to assume that "the fire" or oxidation will spread.
(85) Nor do we believe that the evidence concerning the Bettis incident is relevant to the issue of propagation of oxidation fran fuel assembly to fuel assembly.
This is because of the probability that there was oil and contamination involved at Bettis and the fact that "the geometrical situation 11 involving the zirconium "is not anywhere near the same."
Tr. 15 64.
(86) On the question of propagation other than by Zirconium fire, there was some disagreement between the two witnesses for the Staff. Mr. Pasedag testified that although heating of fuel assemblies stored adjacent to
e
- the most recently discharged assemblies would occur, the Staff b~lieved that this would not result in more than limited oxidation of the four year old (or older) fuel. This limited oxidation of the older fuel would not lead to a substantial release of fission products beyond those released fran the freshly discharged one-third core.
(Pasedag, Further Testimony, p. 2.)
{87) The following factors were stated by Mr. Pasedag in support of his conclusion, that there would be little propagation of the oxidation beyond the fresh fuel and no substantial release of fission products beyond those released from the freshly discharged one-third core:
(1) the decay of volatile fission products (other than Cs-137); (2) the primary source of energy is external to the rods; (3) the thermal insulating property of the zirconium oxide layer would reduce heat conduction to the interior of the rod; and (4) the fonnation of tem-perature gradients opposed to the direction of diffusion.
(Pasedag, Further Testimony, p. 2.)
However, Mr. Pasadag indicated that this postulated accident involved a sequence that had not been completely analyzed.
(Tr. 1409-1419.)
The Staff considers the postulated acci-dent to be a Class 9 accident that the Staff does not routinely analyze.
(Tr. 1418.)
(88) Although Dr. Benjamin agreed with Mr. Pasedag's conclusions concerning spent fuel heatup and minimum decay time (Tr. 1390), he disagreed with Mr. Pasedag's statement that there is no credible mechanism for the
- propagation of oxidation from the new fuel elements to the older fuel elements.
(Tr. 1390-92.)
Dr. Benjamin clarified that the analysis he had done in this respect was outside the scope of the Sandia Report and had only recently been done.
(Tr. 1391.)
He stated that although he did not believe that a fire would occur in the spent fuel pool in the manner mentioned by Dr. Webb, the possibility of the propagation of oxidation from the newer fuel elements to the older fuel elements, even older than four years old, could not be ruled out, (Tr. 1391), but that the analysis he conducted so far on that subject is not sufficient to arrive at a conclusion.
(Tr. 1437.)
(89) Dr. Benjamin 1s conclusion that propagation of oxidation is a 11distinct possibility 11 is premised on there being no change in the 11geometric configuration, 11 that is--
11no change in geometry at all in the pool ****
11 (Tr. 1398.)
Mr. Pasedag testified how 11the geometry would change as the zirconium would start to oxidize.
11 (Tr. 1410.)
When zirconium starts to oxidize, for example, it changes from a metal to a very.
refractory type substance which tends to be a good insulator.
11
{Tr. 1411.)
The change in geometry in the newer fuel would reduce the heat transfer to the older fuel and reduce the chance of propagation of oxidation to the older fuel.
(Tr. 1501.)
{90) The Board recognizes that it postulated for consideration in this case an event which is highly unlikely and which has not been the subject of
- thorough Staff analysis.
The candid presentations by both Staff wit-nesses which discussed the problem we posed from somewhat different perspectives was helpful to the Board.
Based on this evidence we conclude the possibility of fire propagation throughout the pool in such circumstances is not credible.
While propagation of oxidation by radiant heat transfer cannot be ruled out analytically, there are a number of sound technical reasons to believe that there are substantial inhibiting factors that would result in little propagation of oxidation in this fashion.
G.
The Difference in Consequences (91) There exists a potential for the release of fission products from con-tinued denial of water cooling capability for the fresh spent fuel in either the present or expanded pool.
(Pasedag, Direct Testimony, p. 4; As a result of possible overheating and clad failure of newly discharged fuel, the radiological consequences of the hypothesized accident could be large in either the present or expanded pool.
(Pasedag, Direct Testimony, p. 5.) The doses at the site boundary resulting fr001 this potential release would depend heavily on the postulated scenarios for the mechanism of the water loss, subsequent cooling attempts, building integrity, etc. (Pasedag, Direct Testimony, p. 4.)
(92) The radiological consequences froo, a spill of the spent fuel pool water as distinguished from the consequence of a release of fission products contained in the spent fuel would be directly proportional to the fission and activation product concentrations in the water.
(Pasedag, Direct Testimony, p. 2.) The Staff testified that there would be no significant increase in such releases of radioactive material to the spent fuel pool water as a result of the additional spent fuel stored in the pool.
(1.£..)
Consequently, according to the Staff, the differ-ence in radiological consequences of a spill of this water would Blso be insignificant.
(1.£..)
The Staff's evidence to this affect remains uncontradicated on the record.
(93) We asked the Staff whether the activity contained in the fuel itself would escape from the pool if the fuel melted--first in the fresh assemblies and, second, in the colder assemblies.
{Tr. 1445-46.)
The Staff described the releases to be expected from the fresh assemblies and concluded that if fuel melting is postulated, the calculations made for WASH-1400 would be appropriate, except that the consequences for one-third of a core would be one-third of those for WASH-1400--which was based on a ful 1 core.
(Tr. 1448.)
(94) With respect to the contribution to the releases from fuel contained in the older assemblies, the St~ff stated that the propagation of oxida-tion to those older assemblies would be very limited and would probably
- not be sufficient to lead to melting of the clad and certainly not to the melting of the fuel.
(Tr. 1448.) Also, the only older assemblies affected would be those very close to the fresh fuel.
(Tr. 1448.) In the assemblies four years old or older, there would be essentially none of the more volatile fission products left in the gap--they would have decayed and plated out.
(Tr. 1449.)
The possibility of fission product releases from the ol_der fuel assemblies would be very small.
(Tr. 1449.)
(95) The Staff was unable to supply us with a specific description of the consequences of the postulated loss of water accident in either the existing or expanded pool designs (Tr. 1418.)
The Staff testified that this accident is considered a Class 9 accident which is not routinely analyzed (lQ_.)
Mr. Pasedag pointed out that the expanded storage design results in less natural convection and hence a higher likelihood of reaching oxidation temperatures and possible clad melting for recently discharged fuel (Further Testimony, p. 2.)
He also indi-cated that the consequences from postulated fuel melting in terms of release of fission products in neither the case of the existing storage design nor the expanded storage design, would exceed releases calculated for reactor accidents in WASH-1400 (Pasedag Further Testimony, p. 3; Tr. 1417-19).
H.
The Postulated Accident (96) The Staff testified that the accident we postulated in our question was a Class 9 accident (Pasedag, Direct Testimony, pp. 1-5; and Further
- Testimony, p. 3; Tr. 1460 and 1628.) They further testified that even assuming that this accident happened, the spent fuel pool could be refilled with the existing make-up water capacity.
( Pasedag, Further Testimony, p. 3.) The pool could be refilled "within plenty of time to prevent an overheating of the fuel rods."
(Tr. 1577.)
- (97) At the evidentiary hearing, we denied objections by the Staff and the Licensee to the testimony proffered by Dr. Webb insofar as their objec-tions were grounded upon the theory that we were entering the domain of Class 9 accidents.
(Tr. 1357.)
We later clarified that we had taken no position at that time with respect to the question of whether a gross loss of water from the spent fuel pool.is a Class 9 accident.
(Tr. 1361.)
(98) The Staff reviewed the potential for a gross loss of water from the present and expanded spent fuel pool at Salem and could not identify any credible mechanism for loss of water from the pool which would re-sult in any substantial offsite dose consequences.
(Direct Testimony, Pasedag, p. 1; Tr. 1460 and Tr. 1577.)
(99) The largest credible leakage from the spent fuel pool would result in a maximum leak rate of no more than 710 gallons per minute (Tr. 1461 and Tr. 1650) resulting in a rate of decrease in the pool water level of 1.1 inches per minute.
(Direct Testimony, Pasedag, p. 2.)
As dis-cussed in the Staff direct testimony, this leakage could be remedied.
(Direct Testimony, Pasedag, p. 2; see also Tr. 1461-64.)
(lOO)To respond to this Board's direction, The Staff also considered a hypothetical, non-mechanistic, instantaneous loss of all cooling water in the present and expanded spent fuel pool canbined with an inability to refill the pool or provide another mode of cooling other than natural (convective) air cooling.
(Direct Testimony, Pasedag, p. 3.)
In view of the thorough review of the integrity of the spent fuel pool, even under design basis earthquake conditions, such an event is considered incredible and clearly exceeds all design bases.
For these reasons, the Staff concluded that such an event should be classified as a "Class 9" accident.
(Direct Testimony, Pasedag, pp. 3, 5; Tr. 1460 and Tr. 1628.)
(lOl)Staff witness Pasedag agreed with the following definition of Class 9 accidents which was read to him:
Class 9 accidents involve sequences of postulated successive failure more severe than those postulated for the design basis of protective systems and engineered safety features.
(Tr. 1460.)
The Staff has considered the Salem site and the design of the plant and the spent fuel pool in order to detennine whether this is an exceptional case that should be brought to the attention of the Commission as an appropriate situation for consideration of Class 9 accidents and decided that it was not.
(Tr. 1469.)
The Staff has considered the criteria contained in the Commission's Memorandum and Order, dated March 21, 1980, in the Black Fox proceeding (CLI-80-8), and has not rec001mended to the Commission that consideration of Class 9 accidents is appropri-ate for the Salem site. (Tr. 1469.)
(102)The Staff evaluated the differences in the liquid pathway between the Salem site and the typical site evaluated in detail in the Staff's Liquid Pathway Generic Study (NUREG-0440), in order to detennine whether special site specific factors might be present at the Salem site.
(Direct Testimony, Pasedag, p. 3.) The Salem site compares favorably with the typical estuary site of the generic liquid pathway study.
(Tr. 1471.) The Staff concluded that there are no site-specific peculari-ties with respect to the Salem site which would invalidate the conclusions concerning liquid releases stated in the Environmental Impact Appraisal.
(Direct Testimony, Pasedag, p. 3.)
(103)After considering all the evidence, the Board concludes that the event which was the subject of our inquiry in our Memorandum and Order dated February 22, 1980--a total loss of water from the spent fuel pool--which is considered by the Staff to be a Class 9 accident, is in fact a highly unlikely event. Considered as a whole, gross loss of water from the pool and subsequent severe damage to a substantial portion of spent fuel in the expanded pool is extremely remote, and poses no significant risk to or impact on the environment. Moreover, we find that there are no special site-specific factors or special features of the design of the spent fuel pool which would make this an exceptional case that warranting special consideration by the Commission.
(104)0n June 13, 1980, the COITITiission published a Statement of Interim Policy (45 Fed.~- 40101) dated June 9, 1980 announcing the with-
l
' drawal of the proposed*Annex to Appendix D to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 and the suspension of the rulemaking proceeding that began with the publication of that proposed Annex on December 1, 1971.
The change in policy is not to be used 11as a basis for opening, reopening or expanding any previous or ongoing proceeding.
11 (45 Fed.~- at 40103.)12./
(105)As noted in this decision, we received extensive evidence concering a gross loss of water in the spent fuel pool.
This evidence demonstrated that there is no credible mechanism to cause gross loss of water from the spent fuel pool and that even if such an event occurred it could be readily remedied with existing makeup systems.
We, therefore, find no further need on the basis of the evidence in this proceeding, and giving due consideration to the effect of the Commission's recent policy statement, to consider this postulated accident further.
I I I.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW This Licensing Board has thoroughly reviewed and evaluated the evidence submitted by all parties in respect of Intervenors' contentions, and in response to this Licensing Board's own questions.
We have also considered the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the
~ With respect to implementation of the Interim Policy, the Commission stated that 11the Staff will initiate treatments of accident considera-tions in accordance with the foregoing guidance, in its ongoing NEPA reviews, i.e., for any proceeding at a licensing stage where a Final Envi ro11TJenta l Impact Statement has not yet been issued.
11
( 45 Fed. ~-
at 40103.)
j
- parties. Those proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law not adopted herein by the Licensing Board are rejected.
With respect to the mattters in controversy, the Licensing Board makes the following conclusions of law:
(1)
The issuance of the license amendment requested in this proceeding is not a major C001T1ission action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and, therefore, it does not require the preparation of an environmental impact state-ment under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321, et~-, and Part 51 of the C01T1Tiission 1s reg*-
ulations, 10 C.F.R. Part 51.
(2)
Because the Board has found that the proposed action is not a major Federal action which would significantly affect the quality of the human environment, the Board concludes that it is not required as a matter of law to satisfy NEPA to consider the alterna-tives of storage of spent fuel at another reactor site, storage at an independent spent fuel storage installation, or storage of spent fuel outside of the United States as raised in Intervenor Township of Lower Alloways Creek's Contention 1. Portland General Electric Co., (Trojan Nuclear Plant) ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 266 (1979).
Nevertheless, the Board has considered Intervenor's con-tention 1 and as stated in our Findings of Fact above we conclude
(l e that no alternative was identified which results in environmental impacts of lesser magnitude than the proposed action. Accordingly, the appropriate course of action from this standpoint is the issuance of the proposed license amendment.
(3)
There is reasonable assurance that the activities authorized by the requested operating license amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public.
(4)
The activities authorized by the requested operating license amendment will be conducted in canpliance with the Commission's regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I.
(5)
The issuance of the requested operating license amendment will not be inimicable to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
IV.
ORDER Wherefore, it is ORDERED, in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act, as amended and the regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and based on the findings and conclusions set forth herein, that the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation is authorized to make appropri-ate findings in accordance with the Commission's regulations and to issue the appropriate license amendment authorizing the requested replacement of spent fuel storage racks at Salem Station Unit 1.
- r: It is further ORDERED in accordance with 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.760, 2.762, 2.764, 2.785, and 2.786, that this Initial Decision shall be effective immediately and shall constitute the final action of the Cooimission forty-five days after the issuance thereof, subject to any review pursuant to the above-cited Rules of Practice.
Dated at Bethesda, Maryland THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Gary L. Milhollin, Esq.,
Mr. Frederick J. Shon, Member Dr. James C. Lamb, III, Member this day of
, 1980.
Respectfully subm{tted C--CULLJ02 0_
Janice E. Moore Counsel for NRC Staff
~[ZJJ__drQ_ e, _rrT!rffD__
Jr1-=.William D. Paton
~ -
Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 23rd day of June, 1980.
Appendix A - List of Exhibits
APPENDIX A List of Exhibits in Salem Spent Fuel Pool Proceeding l:.xhi bits 1-A 1-B 1-C 1-D 1-E 1-F 1-G 1-H 1-I 1-J 1-K 2
3 4
5 6-A 6-B 6-C 7
8 9
10 Id.
Ltr, Librizzi to Lear, 11/18/77 358 Ltr, Librizzi to Lear, 12/13/77 358 Ltr, Librizzi to Lear, 2/14/78 w/revised application 358 Ltr, Librizzi to Lear, 5/17/78 358 Ltr, Librizzi to Schwencer, 7/31/78 358 Ltr, Librizzi to Schwencer, 8/22/78 358 Ltr, Librizzi to Schwencer, 10/13/78 358 Ltr, Librizzi to Schwencer, 10/31/78 358 Ltr, Librizzi to Schwencer, 11/20/78 358 Ltr, Librizzi to Schwencer, 12/22/78 358 Ltr, Librizzi to Schwencer, 1/4/79 358 Affidavit of Edwin A. Liden, L/21/79 358 Exxon Nuclear XN-NS-TP-009 359 Request for protection of proprietary information &
360 affidavit in support thereof by Exxon Nuclear Exxon Nuclear XN-NS-TP-009/NP 360 Ltr, Schwencer to Librizzi, 1/15/79 364 Safety Evaluation Keport 364 Environmental Impact Appraisal 364 Report of John R. Weeks, 7/77, Corrosion of Materials in Spent Fuel Storage Pools 365 Report of John R. Weeks, 1/79, Corrosion 367 Considerations in the Use of Boral in Spent Fuel Storage Pool Racks Ltr, Cunningham to Smith, 12/20/77 Ltr, Crockett to Beckjord, 1/19/78 398 399 Evd.
368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 413 414 414 369 369 369 652 652
I
. I,
~
Exhibits 11 12 Eckhart Affidavit (Applicant)
Package of view plans for Salem plant (Staff)
Id.
940 1338 Evid.
941 1338 13 (Reserved) Monticello Inspection Report No.
11 NRC at 339 50-263/79-02 14 Licensee 1s response to Licensing Board Question 5 regarding 11Gross Loss of Water 11 1652 (unnumbered)
Statement of Estimated Dose from Moving and Storing Spent Fuel from Salem Unit No. 1 in the Unit No. 2 Spent Fuel Pool and Statement of Fuel Elements Shipped from Salem Unit No. 1 to Unit No. 2 (Attachments to Affidavit of Robert P. Doublas)
Submitted with Licensee 1s Response to Motion for Reconsideration of Colemans 1 Contention No. Thirteen
- \\ *. ~ p....
e UNITED S"i"l-iTES OF.!:.'.*'.ERICA -
NUCLEAR F;LGULhTORY COMMISSION BEFlJRE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Mat~er bf PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC &
GAS COMPANY (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1)
)
)
Docket No. 50-272
)
Proposed Issuance of Amendment
)
to Facility Operating License
)
No. DPR-70
)
).
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of NRC STAFF PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE FORM OF AN INITIAL DECISION, in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class,- or, as indicated by an asterisk, through deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system, this 23rd day of June, 1980.
Gary L. Milhollin, Esq., Chairman*
1815 Jefferson Street Madison, Wisconsin 53711
- Mr. Frederick J. Shon Atomic Safety a,1d Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. James C. Lamb, III 313 Woodhaven Road Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 Richard Fryling, Jr., Esq.
Assistant General Solicitor Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101 Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esq.
Conner & Moore 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Suite 1050 Washington, D.C.
20006 c,rf Va lore., Jr., Esq.
535 Tilton Road Northfield, N. J. 08225 Lower Alloways Creek Township c/o Mary 0. Henderson Municipal Building Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038
I
,..i fl \\JI J_.. -
Mr. Alfred C. Coleman, Jr.
Mrs. Eleanor G. Coleman 35 "K" Drive Pennsville, New Jersey 08070
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
- Atorni c Safety and Licensing
- Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
- Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Mr. Dale Bridenbaugh M.H.B. Technical Associates 1723 Hamilton Avenue Suite K San Jose, California 95125 Sandra T. Ayres, Esq.
Assistant Deputy Public Advocate Divisjon of Public Interest Advocacy P. 0. Box 141 520 East State Street Trenton, ~ew Jersey 08625 Richard M. Hluchan, Esq.
Rebecca Fielcs, Esq.
Deputy Attorney General State of New Jersey 36 West State Street Trenton, New Jersey 08625 kayi,,011d E. f'idKUl, £.sq.
Assi s.tant [JefJuty Public Advucate Division of Rate Counsel 10 Commerce Court Newark, New Jersey U7102 June D. MacArtor, Esq.
Deputy Attorney General Tatnall Building P.O. Box 1401 Dover, Delaware 19901 u~~-~
Janice E. Moore Counsel for NRC Staff