ML17342B026
| ML17342B026 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/04/1987 |
| From: | Brewer D, Macdonald J, Mcelhinney T, Wilson B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17342B024 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-87-43, 50-251-87-43, NUDOCS 8711190285 | |
| Download: ML17342B026 (25) | |
See also: IR 05000250/1987043
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-250/87-43
and 50-251/87-43
Licensee:
Florida Power
and Light Company
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami, FL
33102
'ocket
Nos.:
50-250
and 50-251
Facility Name: Turkey Point
3 and
4
License Nos.:
and
Inspection
Conducted:
September
21 - October
19,
1987
Inspectors:
.
R.
rewer,
Senior
Residen
nspector
B. Macdonal
, Resident
Insp
tor
d
,
F.
Mc
hinney,
Resident
Inspec
~ "--."
ruce Wilson, Section Chief
Division of Reactor Projects
/~ V.S'7
Da
e Signed
II 9 f3
Date Signed
ii 4/I'9
Date Signed
zt F77
Date Signed
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine,
unannounced
inspection entailed direct inspection at the
site,
including backshift
inspection,
in the
areas
of annual
and
monthly
surveillance,
maintenance
observations
and reviews,
engineered
safety features,
operational
safety,
and plant events.
Results:
One violation and
one unresolved
item were identified.
87iii90285 87iii2
ADOCN 05000250
G
0
II ~
REPORT
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
C.
A'
D.
D.
T.
J.
D.
4'J
R.
0.
J.
R.
E.
AG
"R.
O'D
AJ
R.
J.
"R.
W.
p.
AG
4'J
D.
S.
A.
4'B
"R.
S.
Odom, Vice President
J.
Baker, Plant Manager-Nuclear
H. Southworth,
Maintenance
Superintendent
A. Chancy, Site Engineering
Manager
(SEM)
0. Grandage,
Operations
Superintendent
A. Finn, Training Supervisor
D. Webb, Operations - Maintenance
Coordinator
H. Taylor, Operations
System
Enhancement
Coordinator
W. Kappes,
Performance
Enhancement
Coordinator
A. Longtemps,
Mechanical
Maintenance
Department Supervisor
Tomasewski,
Instrument
and Control
( I&C) Department
Supervisor
C. Strong, Electrical
Department Supervisor
W. Bladow, Quality Assurance
(QA) Superintendent
E.
Lee, Quality Control Inspector
F. Hayes, Quality Control
(QC) Supervisor
A. Warriner,
QC Operations
Supervisor
J. Earl,
QC Supervisor
W. Haase,
SEG Chairman
A. Labarraque,
Technical
Department
Supervisor
G. Mende, Operations
Supervisor
Arias, Regulation
and Compliance
Supervisor
D. Hart, Regulation
and Compliance
Engineer
C. Miller, Senior Technical Advisor
A. Kaminskas,
Reactor
Engineering
Supervisor
W. Hughes,
Health Physics
Supervisor
Solomon,
Regulation
and Compliance
Engineer
Donis, .Engineering
Department
Supervisor
E. Meils, .Chemistry Supervisor
W. Jones,
Procedure
Upgrade
Program Supervisor
D. Ferrell, Licensing Engineer
G. Abbott, Startup Administrative Coordinator
D. Kelly, Mainteance
and Specialized
Traaining Supervisor
Blaschke,
QA/QC Coordinator,
Stores
Sontag,
INPO Coordinator
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
'construction
craftsmen,
engineers,
technicians,
operators,
mechanics,
and electricians.
"Attended exit interview on October
19,
1987.
2.
Exit Interview
The
inspection
scope
and
findings
were
summarized
during
management
interviews
held throughout
the reporting period with the Plant Manager
Nuclear
and selected
members of his staff.
An exit meeting
was conducted
on
October
19,
1987.
The
areas
requiring
management
attention
were
reviewed.
The licensee
acknowledged
the findings without exception.
No
proprietary
information
was
provided
to
the
inspectors
during
the
reporting period.
One violation was identified:
Three
examples
of failure
to
meet
the
requirements
of
Technical Specification (TS) 6.8. 1, in that off normal operating
procedures
were not
properly
implemented
when
a nuclear
instrument
was
removed
from service
and
troubleshooting
was
performed
on
a critical
heat
tracing circuit
thermostat
and
an administrative
procedure
was
not properly implemented,
in that
a
val.ve
was
not properly controlled
locked
open
(paragraph
9)
(250, 251/87-43"01) .
Unresolved
Items (URI)
Unresolved
items
are matters
about which more information is required to
determine
whether
they
are
acceptable
or
may,
involve violations
of
requirements
or deviations
from commitments.
One
unresolved
item is
identified in this report.
Review the
health
physics,
maintenance
and
operational
procedures
for
regulatory
compliance
with
regard
to
the
September
30,
1987
Process
Radiation
Monitor
System
(PRMS) R-ll
alarm
and
resultant
automatic
containment
and control
room ventilation isolation
(paragraph
8)
(250,
251/87"43-02).
Followup on Items of Noncompliance
(92702)
A review
was
conducted
of the following noncompliances
to assure
that
corrective actions
were adequately
implemented
and resulted
in conformance
with regulatory
requirements.
Verification of corrective
action
was
achieved
through record reviews,
observation
and discussions
with licensee
personnel.
Licensee
correspondence
was
evaluated
to
ensure
that
the
responses
were timely and that corrective actions
were"'Tmplemen'ted within
the time periods specified in the reply.
(Closed) Violation 251/79-12-01.
Failure to declare
the pressurizer
level
channels
when
their
indication
was
out
of
tolerance.
OP-0204.2,
Periodic Tests,
Checks
and Operating
Evolutions,
require
the
Reactor
Operator
perform the periodic
checks
on pressurizer
level
every
shift.
Additionally,
the
procedure
requires
that
a test
should
be
repeated
for verification of the condition
and
a Plant work order written
if a periodic test,
check or evolution does
not meet acceptance
criteria.
Violation 251/79-12-01 is closed.
(Cl osed)
Yiol ati on
250,
251/85-13-06.
Fai 1 ur e
to
imp 1 ement
the
requirements
of
10 CFR 50.55a.(g),
Inservice
Inspection
requirements
for
Intake Cooling Water(ICW)
system.
Plant Change/Modification
(PC/M) 85-38
wa's performed to inspect,
clean
and repair the above
ground
ICW piping and
PC/M 85-151
was
performed
on sections
of internal
ICW piping.
Procedure
OP-0206.6,
ASME Section
XI Pressure
Tests
for Quality
Group A,
B
and
C
systems/components,
was
revised
to
insure
detailed
review of pressure
boundaries,
complete
walkdowns
and verification of test
boundaries
are
performed.
Violation 250, 251/85-13-06 is closed.
(Closed)
Violation 251/84-36-03.
Failure to maintain facility operating
records
as
required
by TS.
On October
31,
1984,
during
performance
of
'P
1009. 1,
Estimated
Critical Conditions
(ECC)
the
licensee
failed to
maintain
a copy zf
a
completed
work sheet.
OP 1009.1,
revision
dated
October
11,
1984,
Section 7.1
specified
that completed
ECC work sheets
were quality records
and therefore
must
be retained.
OP 1009. 1, revision
dated
March ll, 1987, Sections
7. 1 and 7. 1.1 more specifically states
the
requirement
to retain
and maintain
ECC work sheets
in accordance
with QA
records
requirements.
Violation 251/84-36-03 is closed.
(Closed) Violation 250,
251/85-13-05.
Failure
to verify the operability
of opposite train safety related
equipment prior to elective
removal of an
Emergency
Diesel
Generator
(EDG)
from service.
On April 25,
1985
the
A EDG was
removed
from service for preventive
maintenance
when
the
3B
safety
injection
pump
was
unavailable.
AP 0103.4,
In-Plant
Equipment
Clearance
Orders,
was revised August 28,
1985, to ensure that prior to the
removal
of an
EDG from service that the opposite train Engineered
Safety
Feature
(ESF)
equipment
and its
emergency
power
is verified to
be
available.
Labels
were affixed to the
EDG control
panels
re-enforcing
this requirement.
Violation 250, 251/85-13-05 is closed.
(Closed) Violation 251/85-30-05.
Inadequate
Temporary
System
Alteration
(TSA)
procedure
al lowed
loss
of
containment
integrity.
A non-Plant
Nuclear Safety
Committee
(PNSC)
approved
and
an
inadequate
TSA procedure
caused
Unit 4
containment
integrity to
be
lost
between
June
26
and
August 8,
1985,
in that the
4C
SG blowdown isolation valve CV-4-6275C was
not operable.
An inappropriate
TSA resulted
in the inability of the valve
to close
on
a phase
A containment isolation signal.
Procedure
O-ADM-503,
Control
and
Use of Temporary
System Alterations,
was revised
and approved
by the
PNSC
on
January
14,
1986.
Training Brief
106
was
issued
with
letter
PTN-TRNG-86-033 to explain the
procedure
changes
and to reenforce
the
need
to adhere
to the instruction to ensure
regulatory
compliance.
Violation 251/85-30-05 is closed.
Followup
on
Unresolved
Items
(URIs),
Inspector
Followup
Items (IFIs),
Inspection
and Enforcement
Information Notices (IENs),
IE Bulletins (IEBs)
(information only), IE Circulars (IECs),
and
NRC Requests
(92701)
(Closed)
URI 251/78-12-04.
Inadequacy
of procedures
to include
a method
for obtaining
permission
from operations
to
work
on
safety-related
equipment.
Administrative
Procedure
0190. 19,
Control of Maintenance
on
Safety Related
and Quality Related
Systems,
revision dated August 4,
1987,
contains
the
requirements
and
methods
for
obtaining
permission
from
operations.
URI 251/78-12-04 is closed.
(Closed)
URI 250,251/85-13-08,
testing of Auxiliary Feed Water
(AFW) check
valves.
Secti on XI
code,
par agraph
IWV-35226,
Normally
Closed
Valves,
states
in part:
valves
that
are
normally closed
during plant
operation
and
whose
function
is
to
open
on
reversal
of
pressure
differential shall
be tested
by proving that the disk moves promptly from
the
seat
when
the closing differential pressure
is
removed
and flow is
initiated.
This is verified by visual
or electrical
observation.
check
valves
140,240,
340,
AFP0-9,
AFPD-ll and
AFPO-13
are
tested
in
accordance
with ASME Section II requirements.
Additionally the
AFW pump casings
and discharge
lines
are
inspected
by
touch
every shift to detect
back
leakage.
250,
251/85-13-08
is
closed.
(Cl osed)
251/86-35-01.
Missed
TS
survei
1 1 ances.
Violation
250,
251/86-39-02
was "issued
as
a result of the
programmatic
weakness
in the
identification and scheduling
of TS required
surveillance,
as
documented
in URI 251/86-35-01.
Corrective actions
were
reviewed
and the violation
was
closed
in inspection
report
250,
251/87-10.
URI 251/86-35-01
is
closed.
II
(Closed)
IFI 251/84-18-01.
Steam
dumps to condenser
did not
arm
due
to
wiring error.
The cause of the wiring error
was
covered
in Inter-office
Correspondence
dated
June
13,
1984,
and
appears
to
be
due to confusion
with the
arrangement
at its terminal
block. "IFI 251/84-18-01
is
closed.
(Closed)
IFI 251/84-29-04,
concerning
the Safety
Engineering
Group
(SEG)
review of
emergency
containment
cooler
(ECC)
control
valve
actuator
relocation.
The
licensee
concluded
in
correspondence
SEG 87-12,
dated
February
17,
1987, that the
ECC control valve actuators
as installed
by
PC/M 83-123/124
are seismically supported.
The actuators
were modified by
PC/M 85-137/138 to allow manual
operation
to comply with Appendix
R safe
shutdown analysis.
The requests
to relocate
the actuators,
REA 85-33,
was
cancelled.
IFI 251/84-29-04 is closed.
Onsite
Followup
and
In-Office Review of Written
Reports
Of Nonroutine
Events
(92700/92712)
The
Licensee
Event
Reports
(LERs)
discussed
below were
reviewed
and
closed.
The Inspectors verified that reporting requirements
had
been met,
root
cause
analysis
was
performed,
corrective
actions
appeared
appropriate,
and generic applicability had
been considered.
Additionally,
the
Inspectors
verified that
the
licensee
had
reviewed
each
event,
corrective actions
were implemented,
responsibility for corrective actions
not fully completed
was
clearly
assigned,
safety
questions
had
been
evaluated
and resolved,
and violations of regulations
or TS conditions
had
been identified.
(Closed)
A
Boric
Acid
Storage
Tank
(BAST)
Concentration
Exceeded
Technical
Specification
(TS)
Limits.
On
September ll,
1985,
with Unit 3
operating
at
100
power,
the
concentration
in the
A BAST, which was aligned to Unit 3,
was 22,800 parts
per million (ppm).
TS 3.6.c.3 requires
boron concentration
to
be
between
20,000
and
22,500
ppm.
The licensees'orrective
actions
were
reviewed
and
found acceptable.
The revision to
TS 3.6.c.3
to include
an
action
statement
which would provide
a reasonable
amount of time to correct the
boron concentration
was not
made at this time.
The licensee
is in the
process of revising all of the
TS to the'Standard
TS format.
The upgraded
Turkey Point
TS will include
an action:statement
with
a specified
time
allowance prior to exceeding
TS requirements.
LER 250/85-26 is closed.
(Closed)
Reactor Trip and Safety Injection Actuation
Due
to Personnel
Error.
On June
27,
1986, with Unit 3 at
100% power
a reactor
trip and safety injection actuation
occurred.
The cause of the event
was
due to Instrumentation
and Control (IKC) personnel
performing sections
of
Operating
Procedure
(OP)
14004. 1,
Protection
Channels
Periodic Test",
on Channel III, without verifying that Channel III was not
the
controlling
channel.
As
a
result
of this
incident,
violation
250/86-33-01
was issued
on September
3,
1986.
Corrective actions for this
LER will be
tracked
by followup of the violation.
is
closed.
(Closed)
Excessive
leakage
during leak rate test of the
Personnel
Hatch.
A local
leak rate
performed
March 10,
1987,
on
the
Unit 4 Personnel
Hatch.
The
leakage
rate
measured,
150,000 cc/min,
was
greater
than
the
9.6
La
acceptance
criteria of 45,000 cc/min.
A unit
shutdown
was
commenced.
The
excessive
leakage
rate
was
caused
by
a
malfunctioning
linkage
mechanism
in the
equalizing
valve
on
the inner
door.
The
valve
and
linkage
were
replaced
and
the
personnel
hatch
was retested satisfactorily.
LER 251/87-07 is closed.
(Closed)
Performed
Without Containment
Integrity.
On April 9,
1987,
maintenance
initiated the lift of the Unit 4
upper
internals
without prior notification to
the control
room.
The
containment
purge
valves
had
been
jumpered
open
defeating
their
containment
isolation
function.
Violation 251/87-14-02
was
issued
as
a
result,
and was eventually included in Enforcement Action':"
EA 87-97.
The
corrective
actions
to
this
event will
be
tracked
via
violation
251/87" 14-02.
LER 251/87-08 is closed.
(Closed)
EDG Automatic Start
due
to personnel
error.
On
May 22,
1987,
the
B
EDG experienced
an auto-start
when
an electrician
failed to properly follow procedures
when performing testing
on the
4160
Volt bus
protection circuit.
Violation 251/87-22-01
was
issued
as
a result.
Corrective actions
to this event will be tracked via
violation 251/87-22-01.
LER 251/87-10 is closed.
(Closed)
Automatic Start of the
4B Component
Cooling Water
(CCW)
pump during
safeguards
testing
on Unit 3.
On July 5,
1987,
the
Unit 3
ESF Integrated test,
3-0SP-203,
was performed.
The
D Motor Control
Center
(MCC)
was
de-energized
by procedure.
The
D MCC
powers
the
4A
J
0,
emergency
containment
cooler
and
fan
and
associated
CCW valves.
The
valves
are
designed
to fail open.
When the valves
opened
CCW flow was
increased
and
pressure
decreased.
The
decreased
pressure
was
sufficient to cause
an auto-start
of the
4B
CCW pump,
also
as
designed.
The
LER
was
submited
because,
although
all
equipment
functioned-
as
designed,
procedure
3"OSP-203 did not anticipate
or recognize
that
a
pump would auto-start.
LER 251/87-12 is closed.
(Closed)
AFW train inoperable
due to
steam
supply piping
leak.
On July 14,
1987,
a small through wall steam line leak was observed
on the Unit 4 train I AFW steam
supply.
The condition went unevaluated
through July 17,
1987,
when it was
brought
to the attention
of upper
licensee
management.
Violation 251/87-33-02
was
issued
for failure to
promptly identify and correct conditions
adverse
to safety.
Corrective
actions
to this
event will be tracked via violation 251/87-33-02.
LER 251/87-14 is closed.
(Closed)
backup
system
due to
personnel
error.
On July 15,
1987,
a Turbine Operator
(TO) improperly and
contrary to procedure
re-aligned
the
backup
system for both
trains
on Unit 4,
such that
the
system
was inoperable.
The condition
existed
for approximately
17
hours
until
another
TO
recognized
the
misalignment
and properly restored it.
Violatiion 251/87-33-01
was issued
as
a result
and was included in EA:87-85.
The corrective actions to this
event
wi 1 l
be
tracked
vi a violation
251/87-33-01.
i s
closed.
(Closed)
Operation
in excess
of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> with greater
than
a
2% Quadrant
Power Tilt Ratio
(QPTR).
On July 9-10,
1987,
Unit 4
nuclear
instrument
N-41 indicated
a
QPTR greater
than
2% power for in
excess
of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> without any
TS action statement
requirements
being met.
Violation 251/87-33-03
was issued
as
a result.
The corrective actions to
this event will be tracked
via violation 251/87-33-03.
closed.
Monthly and Annual Surveillance Observation
(61726/61700)
The
inspectors
observed
TS required
surveillance
testing
and verified:
that
the test
procedure
conformed to the requirements
of the
TS, that
testing
was
performed
in" accordance
with adequate
procedures,
that test
instrumentation
was calibrated,
that limiting conditions
for operation
(LCO) were met, that test results
met acceptance
criteria requirements
and
were
reviewed
by personnel
other
than the individual directing the test,
that deficiencies
were identified,
as
appropriate,
and
were
properly
reviewed
and resolved
by management
personnel
and that system restoration
was adequate.
For completed tests,
the inspectors
verified that testing
frequencies
were met and tests
were performed
by qualified individuals.
The
inspectors
witnessed/reviewed
portions
of
the
following test
activities:
3/4-0SP-041.1,
(RCS)
Leak Rate Calculation
3/4-0SP-019.2,
ICW System
Flowpath Verification
3-0SP-046.3,
CVCS-Boration
Systems
Flowpath Verification
3/4-OSP-075. 1,
AFW Train
1 Operability Verification
3/4-OSP-0?5.2,
AFW Train
2 Operability Verification
3/4-0SP-075.3,
LowPressure
Alarm Setpoint
And Leakrate Verification
4-0SP-089,
Main Turbine Valves Operability Test
No violations or deviations
were identified within the areas
inspected.
8.
Maintenance
Observations
(62703/62700)
Station
maintenance
activities of safety related
systems
and
components
were
observed
and
reviewed
to ascertain
that
they
were
conducted
in
accordance
with approved
procedures,
regulatory guides,
industry codes
and
standards
and in conformance with TS.
The following items
were considered
during this review,
as appropriate:
that approvals
were. obtained prior to initiating work; that activities
were
accomplished
using
approved
procedures
and
were
inspected
as
applicable;
that procedures
used
were
adequate
to control
the activity;
that
troubleshooting
activities
were
controlled
and
repair
records
accurately
reflected
the maintenance
performed;
that
functional
testing
and/or
calibrations
were
performed
prior to
returning
components
or
systems
to service; that
(}C records
were maintained; that activities were
accomplished
by qualified personnel;
that parts
and materials
used
were
properly certified; that radiological controls were properly
implemented;
that
gC hold points
were established
and
observed
where required;
that
fire prevention controls
were
implemented;
that outside
contractor
force
activities were controlled in accordance
with the approved
gA program;
and
that housekeeping
was actively pursued.
a.
Pump
(RCP)
3B High Vibration Troubleshooting.
During the Unit 3 refueling outage
in January
1984, vibration
problems
were noted
on the
3B
and traced
to
a
bowed
pump shaft
below the
pump
and
motor coupling.
To compensate
for the
damaged
shaft,
a tapered
shim was installed between
the coupling halves'he
3B
RCP was scheduled
to be replaced during the
1987 Unit 3 refueling
outage but was not because
vendor support could not be provided.
The
motor
had
been
uncoupled
in anticipation of replacement.
The motor
and
pump were recoupled without equipment
changeout.
High vibrations
were
experienced
again
on
the
3B
during
unit restart.
On
September
25,
1987
the
licensee
decided
to bring Unit 3 to
Cold
Shutdown,
due to high vibrations
on the
3B RCP,
a leaking pressurizer
spray
valve,
and
seal
table
leaks.
Upon
investigation
of the
possible
cause
of high vibration,
maintenance
personnel
found that
the
tapered
used
to
compensate
for
the
bowed
shaft
was
improperly installed.
The
shim is divided into
two
wedge
shaped
halves,
each
with
a
taper
from
0.061 inches
to
0.050 inches.
Apparently
as the maintenance
personnel
were recoupling the
pump to
the motor,
one half of the
shim was inadvertently reversed
such that
the effect of the
wedge
was
negated.
Each half of the
has
a
locating
notch
in it.
One half has
a single notch
while the other
half has
a double
notch.
The licensee
attributed
the
cause
of the
improperly placed
shim to personnel
error.
The maintenance
personnel
used
a micrometer to verify shim thickness
before installation
but failed to verify proper: orientation after
installation
by notch location.
The licensee
indicated that this is
the first time this type of incident
has
occurred
with the
shim.
Because
The
3B
RCP motor
was scheduled
to have
been
replaced
and
usage
is
unique
to
the
3B RCP,
the
licensee
did
not write
an
instruction
or
procedure
for
shim reinstallation
prior to this
incident.
Although the licensee
does
not plan to uncouple
the motor
and
pump prior to motor replacement
during the next refueling outage,
procedure
CMM-41. 1, Reactor Coolant
Pump Uncoupling and Coupling, is
currently
under
revision
to include
special
instructions
for the
3B
This item will be closely monitored by the
resident
inspectors
during future inspections.
ESF Actuation Caused
By An Ongoing Maintenance Activity.
On September
30,
1987,
PRMS Channel
R-11 alarmed initiating a Unit 3
containment
and control
room ventilation isolation.
The isolation
occurred
when
R-11
detected
increased
activity in the auxiliary
building
caused
when
mechanical
maintenance
transported
a
highly
contaminated,
unshielded
pump
seal
water injection
filter from the
Unit
3 charging
pump
room through
the auxiliary
building to the rad waste building.
The 3F220B seal
water injection
filter had just, been replaced
by mechanical
maintenance.
Maintenance
procedure
0-PMM-047. 10,
CVCS [chemical
and volume control
system]
and
Letdown
Systems
Fluid
Filters
Replacement,
revision
dated
December
23,
1986 provided instruction.
The work was performed
under
plant work order
(PWO) //2277/63.
The health physics
requirements
for
the
replacement
and
transportation
of the filter were detailed
in
RWPs 87-2314-A
and
2318 respectively.
The filter was
replaced
in
accordance
with the procedure,
but the control
room was not notified
prior to maintenance
personnel
transporting
the fi,lter from the work
area
as
required
in
Section
6.2
of
0-PMM-047. 10.
Further
correspondence
dated
June
17,
1985, to the health physics
operations
supervision
from the
Health
Physics
Operations
Supervisor,
stated
that all liquid processing filters such
as
the
seal
water injection
filters that
are
greater
than
25
roentgen
per
hour
(R/Hr),
on
contact,
shall
be transported
via the
shielded transfer cart.
The
seal
water injection filter transported,
unshielded,
on September
30,
1987
was
40R/Hr
on contact.
It is
recognized
that
an
approved
procedure
and
a supervisory directive were not followed.
Due to the
time required
to review all pertinent
maintenance,
operational
and
health
physics
procedures
and regulations
for applicability to this
event, it will be identified as
URI 250, 251/87-43-02.
The
licensee
has
taken
corrective
actions.
Health
Physics
instruction
HPI-8,
Removal
and
Transportation
of
Used
CVCS Fluid
Filters,
revi sion
dated
October 8,
1987,
directs
that
the
Operations
Supervisor
or his assistant
must
be notified prior to
activating
the
RWP,
the
shielded cart will be
used
in all filter
replacements
and will be carried
by
a fork lift, if available,
and
the normal travel path or an alternate
path will be verified prior to
the start of the evolution.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
9.
Operational
Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors
observed control
room operations,
reviewed applicable
logs,
conducted
discussions
with
control
room
operators,
observed
shift
turnovers
and confirmed operability of instrumentation.
The
inspectors
verified the operabil.ity of selected
emergency
systems,
verified that
maintenance
work orders
had been
submitted
as
required
and that followup
and prioritization of work was
accomplished.
The
inspectors
reviewed
tagout records, verified compliance with TS
LCOs
and verified the return
to service of affected
components.
By observation
and direct
interviews,
verification
was
made
that
the
physical security plan was being
implemented.
Plant
housekeeping/cleanliness
conditions
and
implementation
of
radiological controls were observed.
Tour s of the intake structure
and diesel, auxiliary, control
and turbine
buildings were conducted
to observe
plant
equipment
conditions
including
potential fire hazards,
fluid leaks
and excessive
vibrations.
The
inspectors
walked
down accessible
portions of the following safety
related
systems
to verify operability and proper valve/switch alignment:
A and
Control
Room Vertical Panels
and Safeguards
Racks
Intake Cooling Water Structure
4160 Volt Buses
and
480 Volt Load and Motor Control Centers
Component
Cooling Water
Main Steam Isolation Valve Control
Unit 4 Feedwater
Boric Acid Storage
Tanks
'a
~
Heat Tracing Circuitry Troubleshooting
On September
28,
1987 with Unit 4 in Mode I at
100~o power,
the Heat
Tracing
Trouble
alarm
annunciated..
The
Unit 4
Reactor
Control
Operator
(RCO)
referred
to
Off
Normal
Operating
Procedure
(ONOP)
O-ONOP-048,
Off-Normal
Critical
Heat
Tracing
System
A
0
10
Temperature,
revision dated
June
26,
1985.
A Nuclear Operator
(NO)
was
dispatched
to
determine
which
heat
tracing circuit
had
an
off-normal temperature.
Critical heat tracing circuit number
8 was
found to be reading
191F,
which is above the alarm setpoint of 190F.
The
NO reported
that the
heat tracing thermostat
for circuit 8 was
set at 200F.
Under the direct'upervision of the Unit 4
RCO, the
NO
set
the
thermostat
to
190F without
the
use
of the'equired
electrical
maintenance
procedure
2507. 1,
Maintenance
Heat
Tracing
Circuits.
The
Unit 4
RCO
then
recirculated
the
tank to
cool
the line
in order
to clear
the
alarmed
Although these
actions
were sufficient to clear
the
O-ONOP-048,
step 3.2.5 directs
the
RCO to submit
a
PWO
to have Electrical
Mai.ntenance
check the heat tracing
thermostat if
no degraded
insulation or abnormal
system
operation
is discovered.
Failure to follow the instruction of 0-ONOP-048 is
example
one of
violation 251/87-43-01.
Discussions
with Electrical Maintenance
personnel
indicate that this
heat tracing circuit is of the Chemelex self-regulating
type.
As the
temperature
increases
along the length of the circuit, the resistance
also increases
which will limit the current flow, thus
reducing
the
heat
up rate.
The thermostats
are
used
as
a backup with this type of
circuitry.
Electrical
Maintenance
has
a
detailed
procedure,
Maintenance
Procedure
2507. 1,
Maintenance
Heat
Tracing
Circuits,
which outlines the steps for troubleshooting this type of circuit.
b.
Nuclear Instrument Declared
Out Of Service
On October 2,
1987 with Unit 4 in Mode
1 at
100% power, nuclear
power
range
instrument
N-44
had
a
Rod
Drop
alarm
which
appeared
to
be
spurious.
Operations
personnel
declared
N-44 out of
service
in
accordance
with 4-0NOP-059.3.
The Unit 4
RCO completed
the procedure
and
continued
with other duties.
An
NRC inspector
reviewing
the
event discovered that step 5.3. l.a(4), which directs the operator to
transfer
the Comparator
Channel
Defeat switch to the failed channel,
had
not
been
performed,
The transfer
of the
Comparator
Channel
Defeat
switch allows
the operator-'to
'cl'ear
the
channel
deviation
alarm
and
be able to receive
the
alarm for a flux deviation
on the
remaining three
power
range
channels.
The Plant Supervisor
Nuclear
(PSN)
was
immediately notified of the discrepancy
and
the
step
was
successfully
performed
by the
RCO.
Failure to follow the instruction
of 4-0NOP-059.3 is example
two of violation 250, 251/87-43-01.
c.
Valve Lock Found Incorrectly Attached
On
October 3,
1987,
during
a routine
plant tour,
the
inspectors
noticed that the
A BAST recirculation
isolation valve,
344,
was not
locked
as required
by procedure
O-ADM-205, Administrative Control of
Valves,
Locks,
and
Switches,
revision
dated
August ll,
1987.
The
valve
was open,
as required,
and the lock was engaged.
However, the
lock wire
was
not properly
threaded
through
the
valve
handwheel
and-valve
around
the process
pipe.
Consequently,
the valve could be
closed
while
the
lock
remained
engaged.
The
licensee
promptly
corrected
the discrepancy.
Failure to implement the instruction of 0-ADN-205 is example three of
violation (250, 251/87-43-01).
Operation
Of The
Waste
Gas
System
In An Alignment Not Addressed
In
The
Numerous auxiliary building evacuations
have
occurred
from 1978 to
1986,
during
VCT gas
space
purge evolutions.
In 1986 there
were
53
auxiliary building evacuations,
42 of which occurred
during
purges.
In
1978 the
gas
strippers
appear
to have
been
taken out of
service.
Their associated
power
panel
was also de-energized
which
left the waste
gas vent header
to the gas strippers isolation valves,
CV-4A and CV-4B, open in their failure
mode position.
Initially it
was
believed
that
the
gas
strippers
were
gas tight,
making
the
position of CV-4A and
CV-4B irrelevent.
During ensuing
VCT purges
many auxiliary building evacuations
occurred
due to high airborne
contamination.
The licensee
believed the high airborne contamination
levels were
due to high backpressure
in the existing waste
gas
system
flowpath causing
leakage
from various
system
components
.
OP-2132. 1
(now OP-047. 1),
VCT Gas
Space
Concentration
Control,
was revised to
allow the vent header
to discharge directly to the
CVCS holdup tanks
by opening
normally closed
valve
4627,
the vent header to cover gas
cross-connect'isolation
valve.
This reduced
system
backpressure
and
helped
reduce
airborne
contamination'f
the
auxiliary building.
However, this specific
VCT purge alignment
was not addressed
by the
FSAR.
Plant
Quality
Assurance
(QA)
observed
this
condition
and
generated
a
Corrective
Action
Request
(CAR),
via
correspondence
QAO-PTN-87-598,
dated
October
3,
1986.
A series
of
QA prompted
responses
and
requests
for additional
clarifications,
ultimately
'eading
to
an
Engineering
Safety
Evaluation,
followed
and
are
documented
below.
October 20,
1986,
October
24,
1986,
November 7,
1986,
January
21,
1987,
July 9,
1987,
July 31,
1987,
Gas Releases
PTN-PMN-86-430,
Response
to
QAO-PTN-86-660,
Response
to
CAR; Additional
Information Requested
PTN-Tech-86-854,
Response
to
Nemo
QAO-PTN-86-660
JPE-PTP0-87-108,
Turkey
Point
Unit 3
Operability
and
Substantial
Safety
Hazards
Evaluation
for the
Radwaste
Gas
System;
REA-TPN-86-140,
File:
TPN-86-140,
Oue
June
26,
1987
QAO-PTN-87-588,
Overdue
Commitment
Operability
Review
and
Substantial
Safety
Hazards
Evaluation
for
the
Radwaste
Gas
System
JPE-PTP0-87-1632,
Request
for
extension
until
October 2,
1987
to
complete;
REA TPN-86-140, File:
TPN-86-140-2
12
July 31,
1987,
October 8,
1987,
October
14,
1987,
October
14,
1987,
JQA-87-133,
Extension
Granted
QAO-PTN-87-857,
CAR-QA0-86-598,
Overdue
Committment
QAO-PTN-87-868,
Request
for Extension
JPE-PTP0-87-2097,
Turkey Point Units
3
8
4
Maste
Gas
System Evaluation,
REA TPN-86-140,
File:
TPN 86-140-2
The evaluation,
JPE-PTP0-87-2097,
concluded that
a substantial
safety
hazard
as
defined
in
10 CFR 21 did not exist.
However, it
was
determined
that the
performance
of
a
VCT purge with valve 4627 open
such that the flowpath would be directly to
the
holdup
tanks,
as
opposed
to
the
waste
decay
tanks,
is outside
the
design
basis
flowpath
as described
in the
FSAR.
OP-047. 1
was
revised April 9,
1987,
to
ensure
that
valve
4627 is controlled
closed
during
purges
which meets
the
FSAR design
basis.
The auxiliary building
airborne
contaminator
problem
was
resolved
by maintaining
the
gas
stripper isolation valves,
CY-4A and CV-4B, closed.
10.
Engineered
Safety
Features
Mal kdown (71710)
The inspectors
performed
an inspection designed
to verify the operability
of the
Emergency
Oiesel
Generators
and Auxiliary Equipment
by performing
a
complete
walkdown of al 1
accessible
equipment.
The
following criteria
were used,
as appropriate,
during the walkdown:
I
a.
System
lineup
procedures
matched
plant
drawings
and
the as-built
configuration.
b.
Equipment conditions
were satisfactory
and
items that might degrade
performance
were identified and evaluated
(e.g.
hangers
and supports
were operable,
housekeeping
was adequate).
c.
Instrumentation
was
properly
valved
in
and
functioning
and that
calibration dates
were not exceeded.
d.
Valves 'were in proper position, breaker alignment'was
correct,
power
was available,
and valves were locked/lockwired as required.
4f.
Local
and
remote
position
indication
was
compared
and
remote
instrumentation
was functional.
Breakers
and
instrumentation
cabinets
were
inspected
to verify that
they were free of damage
and interference.
The
Inspectors
reviewed
procedure
O-OSP-023.6,
Oiesel
Generator
System
Flowpath
Verification,
revision
dated
June
2,
. 1987,
and
drawings
5610-T-E4536,
sheets
1 and
2 revision
11.
Conditions that were noted
and brought to the attention of licensee
include:
13
A EDG
A minor fuel oil leak at the skid tank drain valve 041A connection.
The leak
has existed
since th A EDG overhaul
and skid tank cleaning
performed during the
1987 Unit 3 refueling outage.
A drip pan
is
placed
under
the
connection.
Approximately
one to two gallons of
fuel oil appears
to have collected.
Plant Work Order
(PWO) ¹316006,
dated October 23,
1987,
was issued.
This is considered
a rework
PWO,
in that the connection
had
been
previously
tightened
to stop'he
leakage.
PWO ¹307541,
no
date,
remained
hung
for day
tank to skid tank
solenoid
valve
SV-3522.
This
PWO was
worked
and the condition
was
repaired
on August 19,
1987.
The
PWO has
since
been
removed.
B
Instrument
Air
valve
CV-4-2046
had
a
slight
packing
leak.
PWO ¹316005,
dated October
23,
1987,
was issued.
A slight fuel oil leak,
between
the
fuel
metering
valve
and the
return
to
the
skid tank.
PWO ¹WA871421325,
dated April 22,
1987,
identified the leak.
Red
and
orange
marks
(as described
by
an information tag) to aid
operators
in identifying kilowatt (KW) limits were missing from the
local
KW meter.
Common
The
pressure
on
the air receivers
for both
are
non
qualified.
The
on the
D receivers
(PI 3668A and 36688) were
removed
and replaced
by plugs via TSA 3-87-23-8-2,
dated
February
12,
1987.
The
on
the
A receivers
(PI 3667A
and
3667B)
are
controlled closed,
except
to take
log readings,
by clearance
order
0-87-2-15,
dated
February
12,
1987.
The
inspectors
observed
the
valves to be closed
as required.
11.
Summary of International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Activities
In fulfillment of the
Safeguards
Agreement
between
the United States
and
the
IAEA, the
IAEA selected,
on July 19,
1985,
Turkey Point Unit 4 for
participation in its international
safeguards
inspection
program.
A major
portion of this
program requires
the continuous surveillance of the fuel
inventory
through
camera
monitoring
and
seal
wire
placement.
The
surveillance
program
ensures
that
the
fuel
inventory
does
not
change
between
physical
audits.
On April 10,
1987,
the
Commission
issued
Amendment
117 to the Facility Operating
Licence
No.
DPR-41 for 'the Turkey
Point Plant,
Unit 4.
The
amendment
adds
License
Condition 3.J
regarding
implementation of the
IAEA Safeguards
program for Unit 4.
14
The
NRC inspectors verified, during routine tours of the Unit 4 Spent
Fuel
Pool
(SFP)
and the accessible
portions of the containment
building, that
seal
wires were in place
and intact
and that surveillance
cameras
were
Seal
wires are
placed
by
IAEA inspectors
on the
containment
, equipment
access
hatch
and the reactor
vessel
head
seismic restraints, if
accessible.
Only the
seal
wires
on the
equipment
hatch can'e
observed
from outside
the
containment
building.
The containment
building is not
normally entered
during
power operation.
Two surveillance
cameras
are
installed
in the Unit 4
SFP.
The
area
is always
accessible
through
locked
and alarmed doors.
The
GAEA is scheduled
to perform
a fuel inventory in the Unit 4
on
November 22,
1987.
12.
Plant Events
(93702)
The following plant events
were reviewed to determine facility status
and
the
need for further followup
actions
'lant
parameters
were
evaluated
during transient
response.
The significance
of the event
was evaluated
along with the
performance
of the
appropriate
safety
systems
and
the
actions
taken
by the
licensee.
The
inspectors
verified that
required
notifications were
made to the
NRC.
Evaluations
were
performed relative
to the
need for additional
NRC response
to the event.
Additionally, the
following issues
were
examined,
as
appropriate:
details
regarding
the
cause
of the event;
event chronology;
safety
system performance;
licensee
compliance with approved
procedures;
radiological
consequences,
if any;
and proposed corrective actions.
The licensee
plans to issue
LERs on each
event within 30 days following the date of occurrence.
On
September
30,
1987, with'nit.-3 in Mode 5, Unit 3
PRMS channels R-ll,
R17A and
B and
R-19 and Unit 4
PRMS channel
178 alarmed
causing
a Unit 3
containment
and control
room ventilation isolation.
The
PRMS
channels
alarmed
when mechanical
maintenance
was transporting
an unshielded highly
contaminated
reactor
coolant
pump
seal
injection filter through
the
auxiliary building.
This event is discussed
further in paragraph
8,
On October
12,
1987,
a hurricane warning was issued for Dade County.
The
licensee
declared
an
unusual
event
and
made
the required notifications.
Unit 4
commenced
a
normal
shutdown
from 100:o'ower.
Hurricane
Floyd
passed
by Turkey Point at approximately 8:00 p.
m.
The highest sustained
wind speeds
were
less
than
40
MPH and the highest
wind gusts'ere
less
than
60 MPH.
No injuries or damages
were reported.
On October
12,
1987, with Unit 4 in Mode 3,
an automatic
containment
and
control
room ventilation isolation
occurred.
PRMS Channel
R-11
spiked
high initiating the
actuation.
The
cause
of the
event
was
that
the
sampling
paper
had
reached
the
end of its
spool
causing
one
section of
paper
to
be held stationary
at the
sample point, allowing particulate to
accumulate.
When
the
sampling
paper
was
rewound
R-11
detected
the
15
. accumulation
of particles
and
alarmed.
The containment
atmosphere
was
sampled
and
an
RCS leakage
rate calculation
was performed.
On October
15,
1987 the licensee
made
a significant event notification as
a result of operating
the
common waste
gas
system
in a configuration not
analysed
in the
FSAR.
This event is discussed
further in paragraph
9.