ML17292A622

Requests Addl Info Re Bulletin 96-02, Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel,Fuel in Reactor Core,Or Safety-Related Equipment

ML17292A622
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	12/05/1996
From:	Colburn T NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	Parrish J WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
References
IEB-96-002, IEB-96-2, NUDOCS 9612160024
Download: ML17292A622 (7)

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 December 5,

1996 Hr. J.

V. Parrish Chief Executive Officer Washington Public Power Supply System P.O.

Box 968, (Hail Drop 1023)

Richland, Washington 99352

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO BULLETIN 96-02, "MOVEMENT OF HEAVY LOADS OVER SPENT FUEL, FUEL IN THE REACTOR

CORE, OR SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT"

Dear Hr. Parrish:

The NRC staff has evaluated the responses to Bulletin 96-02, "Movement of Heavy Loads over Spent Fuel, Fuel in the Reactor Core, or Safety-Related Equipment,"

and found that some licensees without single-failure-proof cranes have analyzed or are planning to analyze postulated spent fuel storage cask and transportation cask drop accidents to establish design basis accidents for their facilities.

Typical cask drop analyses for in-plant cask movement have addressed the effects of a drop on plant equipment and/or cask integrity.

Those analyses have assumed that the cask was in its final condition with its structural lids bolted or welded in place and that the fuel remained in the cask at all times, though the integrity of the cask might be breached during the cask drop.

However, since most cask lids are not secured until after the casks are removed from the pool, it is conceivable that a cask could drop in a tipped-over orientation.

The cask could be also dropped back into the spent fuel pool or adjacent

area, possibly dislodging the cask lid or dislodging the cask lid and ejecting some or all the spent fuel elements onto the top of the spent fuel racks, the floor of the pool, or adjacent areas.

This accident scenario involves the potential for dropping the cask during movement from the spent fuel pool to the area within the plant building where activities such as drying, inerting, and final securing of'he cask lid are completed.

Offsite dose effects are not expected from a cask drop and tip-over event in which there is a loss of both the cask lid and fuel confinement.

However, the effect of such an event on the operation of the facility needs to be assessed.

For example, evaluations may need to determine if any vital plant areas are rendered inaccessible and if operations or maintenance activities would be significantly hampered.

Such evaluations would involve, but are not limited to, the cask and crane designs, the load paths, and the extent to which the licensee can demonstrate its capability of performing actions necessary for safe shutdown with resulting plant damage and in the presence of radiological source term.

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Mr. J. V. Parrish To support further NRC staff evaluation of this potential cask drop scenario while the reactor is at power (in all modes other than cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled),

please provide the following:

l.

An evaluation of your crane design, load path, and cask loading and unloading processes that supports a determination that the scenario described above is not credible at your facility, or

2. If you determine that the event is credible, please provide the following:

(a)

An analysis of a possible drop of a spent fuel storage or transportation cask involving a drop that results in the tipping over of the spent fuel cask, loss of the cask lid, or loss of the cask lid and ejection of the spent fuel from the cask into the spent fuel pool or areas adjacent to the pool.

This load drop/consequence analysis should include a dose analysis to personnel involved in the cask movement for the time immediately following the accident.

Also, the analysis should address personnel exposure resulting from required entry into plant areas affected by the event and the impact of elevated dose fields on the ability to reach, safe shutdown or continue normal plant operation.

(b)

An evaluation addressing the potential for criticality resulting from the postulated cask drop accident scenario described above.

(c)

An evaluation that addresses possible means of recovering from the postulated cask drop accident scenario described above.

(d)

An evaluation that addresses whether the potential impact of the scenario described above on other parts of the facility (e.g.,

the spent fuel pool) is bounded by previous load drop analyses.

Please provide your response within 60 days of your receipt of this request for information. If you need clarification of the staff's request, please contact me at (301) 415-1341.

This letter contains information collections that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.

3501 et seq.).

These information collections were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0012, which expires June 30, 1997.

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is covered by the original estimate of 600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> per response for responding to Bulletin 96-02.

Hr. J.

V. Parrish December 5,

1996 The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OHB control number.

Sincerely, cc:

See next page ORIGINAL SI GEND BY Timothy G. Colburn, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate IV-2 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation DISTRIBUTION:

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Hr. J.

V. Parrish The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OHB control number.

Sincerely, cc:

See next page Timothy G. Colburn, Senior Project Hanager Project Directorate IV-2 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Mr. J.

V. Parrish CC:

Hr. Greg 0. Smith (Mail Drop 927M)

WNP-2 Plant General Manager Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.

Box 968

Richland, Washington 99352-0968 Mr. Al E. Mouncer (Mail Drop 396)

Chief Counsel Washington Public Power Supply System P.O.

Box 968

Richland, Washington 99352-0968 Hr. Frederick S. Adair, Chairman Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council P. 0.

Box 43172 Olympia, Washington 98504-3172 Hr. David A. Swank (Hail Drop PE20)

Manager, Regulatory Affairs Washington Public Power Supply System P.O.

Box 968

Richland, Washington 99352-0968 Mr. Paul R.

Bemis (Mail Drop PE20)

Vice President, Nuclear Operations Washington Public Power Supply System P.O.

Box 968

Richland, Washington 99352 Regional Administrator, Region IV U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Harris Tower 5 Pavilion 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, Texas 76011-8064 Chairman Benton County Board of Commissioners P.O.

Box 69

Prosser, Washington 99350-0190 Mr. R.

C. Barr, Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O.

Box 69

Richland, Washington 99352-0968 H. H. Philips, Jr.,

Esq.

Winston 8 Strawn 1400 L Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005-3502 Hr. Rodney L. Webring (Hail Drop PE08)

Vice President, Operations Support/PIO Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.

Box 968

Richland, Washington 99352 Ms. Lourdes C. Fernandez (Mail Drop PE20)

Manager, Licensing Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.

Box 968

Richland, Washington 99352

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