ML17250B076

LER 89-014-00:on 891023,containment Ventilation Isolation Occurred Due to Containment Gas Radiation Monitor R-12 Reaching Alarm Setpoint.Caused by Flow/Pressure Fluctuations.Isolation Signal reset.W/891121 Ltr

ML17250B076
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	11/21/1989
From:	Backus W, Mecredy R ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-014, LER-89-14, NUDOCS 8911300082
Download: ML17250B076 (11)

Text

ACCELERATED TIUBUTION DEMON~TION SYSHM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8911300082 DOC.DATE: 89/11/21 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET g FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna,'Nuclear P3.ant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BACKUS,W.H. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

MECREDY,R.C. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 89-014-00:on 891023,containment gas radiation monitor spikes,due to flow imbalance, causes containment VI.

W/8 DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

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TITLE: 50.73 50.9 Licensee Event Re P ort ( LER ), Incident R P t etc.

NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72). 05000244 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PDl-3. LA 1 1 PD1-3 PD 1 1 JOHNSON,A 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 ACRS WYLIE AEOD/DS P/TPAB 1.,1 1'

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PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTEl CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEEDl FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED'TTR 37 ENCL 37

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////l/ "I;;i//Iter /r,'"i ////",l'," / 55*55 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ~ 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649-0001 tC'~045 AREA COG~5 ill'46 2700 November,21, 1989 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

LER 89-014, Containment Gas Radiation Monitor Spikes, Due To Flow Imbalance, Causes Containment Ventilation Isolation R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires a report of, "any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) including the Reactor Pro-tection System (RPS)", the attached Licensee Event Report. LER 89-014 is hereby submitted.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Very ly yours,

',<.~Ca Robert C. Mec edy General Manager Nuclear Production xco U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna USNRC Senior Resident Inspector 8>11300082 SP1121 w(g.2.

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SVSSLCMENTAL 1CSOAT CXStCTCD 114) MONTH CAY YCA1 CXSCCTtD LUIM I OATS IIION 11 ~I YCS /I/SN, Saa(SHH CXSSCTCD SVIMIIIIDJVDATC/ HO AIITAAOT/Laall ce laoo MacH, I A, aaanls~Hls /0(aaa valH~ca ssaaeerNHa aaad II~ I On October 23, 1989 at 1758 EDST, with the reactor at approximately 994 full power, a containment ventilation isolation occurred due to containment gas radiation monitor R-12 reaching its alarm setpoint.

All containment ventilati'on isolation valves that were open, closed as designed.

Immediate operator action was to perform the applicable alarm response procedures actions. This included verifying automatic actions, determining the cause of the containment. ventilation isolation, and making appropriate notifications.

The underlying cause of the event was determined to be flow/pres-sure fluctuations in the R-12 RMS monitor sensing lines that increased the R-12 RMS monitor readings to the alarm setpoint.

Corrective action was to return the containment ventilation isolation system to service followed by a troubleshooting effort by the Instrument and Control Department.

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NRC FANII 844A UA. NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMMISSION 1944 I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT IL'ERI'TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OM8 NO. 8150&184 EXPIRES.'ISI/84 FACILITY NAME lll OOCKET NUMEER.IEI LER NUMbER l4l PACE ISI YEAR '.gled SEOUENTIAL '~qv IIEVISIQN NUM EN SN X NIIM 4 R R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant o s o o o~ 44 014 0 0 0 20'- 8 TEXT IIF IItrt tPAtt N INRttNL vW eeWO'Ona'VilC fcttn SCCA'tl I ITl PRE-EV1WT PLANT CONDITIONS The plant was at approximately 99% steady state full power with no ma)or activities in progress.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT.

A. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES FOR MAJOR OCCURRENCES:

o October 23, '1989; 1758,EDST: Event. date and time.

0 October 23, 1989, 1758 EDST: Event discovery date and time.

o October 23, 1989, 1759 EDST: Control Room operators verified all containment, ventilation isolation functions took place.

o October 23, 1989, 2013 EDST: Control Room operators reset containment ventilation isolation and restored system to normal.

B. EVENT:

On October 23, 1989 at 1758 EDST, with the reactor at approximately 99% full power, the following control board alarms were received: E-16 (RMS Process Monitor High Activity) and A-25 (Containment Ventilation Isolation). The Control Room operators, responding

,to the above alarms, observed that Containment Gas Radiation Monitor R-12 was on alarm. Subsequently (approximately one minute), after 'he above alarms were received, control board alarm E-20 (CNMT or Plant Vent Rad MON Pump Trip) was received. This alarm was due to the containment ventilation isolation which trips the containment radiation monitor pump and isolates the containment valves to and from this pump ~

NRC FOIIM 944A (944 I

NRC Pens 444A U$ . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NQI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMS NOS(50&IO4 EXPIRES; 4/SII45 PACILITY NAME (1( DOCKET NVMSER IXI LER NVMEER (4) PACE (SI Xny,'EOUENTIAL (~p REVISION

<SM NUM ES NUM Es R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant o" s o o o 24 489 0'1 '4 0 0 0 30F 08 TEXT /It more Nrece lt eqrreerS, uee o es(regret h'RC Form SE((A'SI (171 Control Room operators verified that all contain-r The ment ventilation isolation valves that were open, closed as designed.

Subsequently, the Control Room operators determined that the apparent cause of containment gas radiation monitor R-12 alarming was due to a Health Physics Technician drawing a local containment sample which interrupted flow to the R-12 monitor causing R-12 reading to increase to the alarm setpoint.

The R-12 monitor was observed by the Control Room operators to be cycling between 18,000 cpm and 24,000 cpm during the time the Health Physics Technician was drawing a local containment sample. Shortly there-after, the R-12 monitor finally alarmed at 25,000 cpm causing containment ventilation isolation., The Control Room operators notified the Health Physics Technician to terminate local sampling of containment and removed the R-12 monitor from service.

The Instrument and Control (I&C) Department was called to troubleshoot the R-12 monitor. The I&C Department, after troubleshooting the R-12 monitor, determined that. the potential cause of the problem was flow/pressure fluctuations at the R-12 monitor skid. The I&C Department also determined at this time that if no local sampling was being done at the R-12 monitor skid then the R-12 monitor would operate correctly.

After the above troubleshooting was concluded, the containment ventilation isolation was reset and the system was restored to normal.

C. INOPERABLE STRUCTURES t COMPONENTS s OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT:

None.

NRC SORM 444A (4451

NRC Forrrr 358A U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION I84I3 I

<<UCENSEE EVENT REPORT tLER) TEXT CONTINUATION AffROVED DMS 'NO. 3IEOWID5 EXPIRES 8/3I/8$

fACILITYNAME Ill DOCKET NUMSER IEI LER NUMSER ISI FADE I3)

YEAR 5EQUENTIAL EVI5ION NUM 5/I NUM55/I R.E. Ginna Nuclear Pawer Plant TEXT //F more g>>ce /I eoq/irerF, ow o55/O'o>>/ F//IC Form 385A Si IITI o s o o o 2 448 9 1 4 p p p 40Fp 8 D. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:

-With the containment ventilation isolation, the following major components were isolated:

o R-10A, Containment Iodine RMS Monitor.

o R-ll, Containment Particulate RMS Monitor.

o "R-'12,'Containment Gas RMS 'Monitor.

E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY:

The event was immediately apparent due to control hoard annunciator alarms and containment ventilation isolation valve position indication in the Control Room.

F. OPERATOR ACTION:

Control Room operators responded to ..the .event by performing the applicable actions of alarm response procedures Z-16, A-25, and E-20. This included the following:

o '"Veri'fying that all containment ventilation isolation valves that were open, closed as designed.

o Determining the apparent cause of the R-12 monitor alarm.

o Resetting the containment ventilation .isolation signal and restarting R-10A, R-ll, and R-12 sample pump and veri'fyizg sample 'f1m was re-estahlished.

o Verifying .that R-10A, R-ll, .and R-12 RES monitor readings returned to normal.

o Xotify'ivy the HRC wnl H9+er Supervisim ef -the ESF actuation.

NIIC FO/IM 355A (943 I

NRC For~ 344A U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION 1943)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI'-TEXT CONTINUATION APPRovEooMSNo.sls0&I04 EXPIRES: SISI/45 PACILITY NAME IlI COCKET NUMSER Ill LER NUMSER (SI ~ AOE ISI YEAR ':u'EauENTiAL rr~~9 PEVISION NUM44II NUM SR R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant o s o o o 244 89 014 0 0 05 oF8 TEXT It/ Issss spscs is nqw'a1, Pss oddtxsssi HRC %%dnn SRLS'si I I TI ZZZ. CAUSE Op ZVZNT A. ZMMEDZATE CAUSE:

The containment ventilation isolation was caused by R-12 RMS monitor reaching its alarm setpoint.

B. ZNTERMEDZATE CAUSE:

The cause of the R-12 RMS monitor reaching its alarm setpoint was apparently due to flow/pressure fluctu-ations at the R-12 RMS monitor skid during local containment sampling.

C. ROOT CAUSE:

The underlying cause of the flow/pressure fluctuations during local containment, sampling was determined to be as follows:

0 When local containment sample was drawn from the R-12 RMS skid, it changed the flow/pressure characteristics at the R-12 RMS monitor.

The R-12 RMS monitor has a pressure compensation input to the R-12 electronics that amplifies the gain of the R-12 RMS monitor, depending on pressure sensed at the detector. As pressure decreases gain increases causing higher indica-tion.

0 When a local containment sample was drawn at the R-12 RMS monitor skid, the pressure at the detector decreased and the pressure compensation signal to the R-12 electronics increased, thus increasing the R-12 RMS monitor output readings.

0 The amplifying effect was higher, causing isolation, during these manual sampling operations because the detector readings were higher than normal.

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').Or NUM SA ..i'rr'. NUM EA R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TEXT /// mors Aoocr /s PRr/rorL o>> odckrwl ///IC form 88LI8/ IITI 0500024489 014 00 06 OF 0 8 ANALYS1S OP EVENT This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report system, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires reporting of, "any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)". The containment ventilation isolation due to the R-12 RMS monitor alarm was an automatic actuation of an ESF sub-system.

An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions:

There were no operational or safety consequences or implications attributed to the containment ventilation isolation because:

o The containment ventilation isolation system operated as designed.

o The components affected were capable of withstanding the isolation.

o The containment ventilation isolation was in the conservative direction.

Based on the above, it health and safety was assured at all times."

can be concluded that the public's NRC SORM 388A 19831

NRC Sons 39SA U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION 194Lll LICENSEE EVENT REPORT'(LER)'TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMS NO. 3150-OIOO EXPIRES: 8/SlrSS FACILITY NAME Ill OOCXET NUMSER (1I LER NUMSER IS) ~ AOE I1)

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V. CORRECTIVE ACTION A. ACTION TAKEN TO 'ETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS:

o The Control Room operators, after determining the apparent cause of the containment ventilation isolation, had the Health Physics Technician terminate the local containment sample. Sub-secpxently the Control Room operators removed R-12 RMS monitor from service for troubleshooting.

After the I&C department completed their trouble-shooting with inconclusive results, the Control Room operators reset the containment ventilation isolation signal and restored the system to pre-event status.

B. ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

After extensive troubleshooting by the I&C and Health Physics Departments, the following conclusions have been reached and the following actions are planned or taken:

o The R-12 RMS monitor pressure compensation does affect the output of the R-12 RMS monitor. At lower pressure, higher than actual cpm are indicated.

0 The local containment sample does affect the flow/pressure in the R-12-RMS monitor by lowering the pressure, thus increasing the monitor output cpm.

II 0 The power supply on R-12 RMS monitor has been changed, which stabilized the counts per minute to normal values.

o The procedure for local containment sampling will be reviewed to see if any enhancements may prevent the R-12 RMS monitor .from reaching its alarm setpoint.

N R C P 0 R M SOS A 19411 r

NAC Form 388A ISA l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)."TEXT CONTINUATION U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPAOVEO OMS NO. 3I SOM104

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LER NUMSER ISI ~ AOE ISI

'/r'/8 SEQUENTIAL rIEVrSION YEAR NIIM ER +P

. /.'NIrM Esl R.E. Ginna Power Plant o 5 o o o 24 4 89 01 4 0 0 80F 0 8 TfxT Iilmoro sposo II PAAiirorE uso PArorionolHiIC %%drrrr ORLE'si IITI o The local containment sampling procedure may need to be changed to indicate that during sampling a containment ventilation isolation could'ccur due to the upset of the R-12 RMS monitors flow/pressure characteristics. This change will be evaluated if enhancements to the procedure are not effective in preventing R-12 from reaching the alarm setpoint.

o R-12 alarm setpoints will be evaluated for the possibility of raising the R-12 RMS monitor setpoint during sampling to a point at which the monitor would not,reach, due to the flow/pressure oscillations.

VI. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

A. FAILED COMPONENTS:

None identified.

B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:

A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results:

o LER 89-013 had the same root cause.

o LER 87-005, LER 88-007, and LER 89-011 were similar events 'with undetermined or different root causes.

C. SPECIAL COMMENTS:

None.

NIIC POIIM 3EEA (843 I