ML17228A145

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 122 to License DPR-67

ML17228A145
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	05/03/1993
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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ML17228A144	List: ML17228A145
References
NUDOCS 9305060300
Download: ML17228A145 (5)

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 122 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67 FLORIDA POWER

& LIGHT COMPANY S

LUCI PLANT UNIT NO.

1. 0 INTRODUCTION DOCKET NO. 50-335 By letter dated March 4, 1993, Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) proposed to modify St.

Lucie Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.1.1.a.l, Containment Integrity Surveillance Requirements, by excluding penetrations inside containment from the integrity verification that is required at least once per 31 days.

In Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, TS 4.6.l.l.a requires, in part, that Containment Vessel Integrity shall be demonstrated at least once per 31 days by verifying that:

"l. All containment vessel penetrations not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind

flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except as provided in Table 3.6-2 of Specification 3.6.3.1."

Some of these components inside containment are inaccessible or are in areas of high radiation fields.

A TS change is necessary to avoid radiation dose to those employees who would be required to check these components inside containment.

Accordingly, the proposed amendment will exclude valves, blind

flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside containment and are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in their. closed positions from the 31-day surveillance of containment penetrations.

2.0 DISCUSSION The licensee committed that the corrective actions for Unit 1 delineated in FPL's revised response (FPL letter L-93-046) to a Notice of Violation (Inspection Report 92-21) will be completed by the end of the 1993 spring Refueling Outage.

These actions include installation of locking devices and other measures, as appropriate, on penetration components inside containment to satisfy the condition of being secured in their proper positions.

FPL also committed that during plant startup from cold shutdown, all containment vessel penetrations not capable of being closed by operable containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during 9305060300 930503 PDR ADQCK 05000335

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accident conditions will be verified closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves which are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in their proper positions prior to entry into Hode 4 where containment integrity is required.

These conditions will be verified using approved system valve lineup procedures, local leak rate post-test valve lineups, and containment integrity surveillance valve lineups.

FPL stated that containment access during reactor operation is restricted physically by locked hatches which are annunciated in the control room when any containment hatch is opened.

Administrative controls restrict entries into Unit I containment to anomaly inspections, typically 2 per month, that inspect the accessible areas of containment for any unusual conditions.

Work that may require containment access during unplanned, short notice outages is normally limited in scope.

Since configuration control on all plant systems is achieved through approved plant procedures, the equipment clearance order procedure, and/or the locked valve deviation log, the anomaly inspections or the outage activities will not reduce the effectiveness of containment integrity.

Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.6.l.l.a.l involves only verification, through a system walkdown, that applicable components are secured in their correct positions.

Since access to the containment is typically restricted during Hodes I, 2, 3, and 4 for ALARA reasons, FPL considers that the probability of misalignment of these components, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small.

The staff agrees.

For valves and blind flanges inside containment, FPL considers the proposed verification appropriate frequency of "during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days" since these valves and flanges are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.

The staff also agrees.

The proposed amendment is identical to the provision that excludes verification of penetrations inside containment from the corresponding 31-day SR in the approved TS for St. Lucie Unit 2.

This provision was found acceptable for Unit 2 as part of the licensing basis for that plant.

The administrative controls and other factors contributing to the acceptability of the exclusion provision for Unit 2 are equally applicable to St. Lucie Unit l.

3.0 TECHNICAL FINDING Based on the above discussions, the staff considers that the probability of misalignment of penetration components located inside containment, once they have been verified to be properly aligned, is small.

Horeover, the proposed amendment and associated bases are consistent with NUREG-1432, Rev.

0 (09/28/92),

"Standard Technical Specifications for Combustion Engineering Plants."

Therefore, the staff concludes that operation of St. Lucie Unit I in accordance with the proposed amendment is acceptable.

4.0'TATE CONSULTATION Based upon the written notice of the proposed amendment, the Florida State official had no comments.

5. 0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements.

The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released

offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

The Commission has previously issued a

proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (58 FR 16859).

Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibilitycriteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

6. 0 CONCLUSION The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed

above, that:

(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed

manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor:

Jan Norris Date:

Hay 3, 1993

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