ML17219A611
| ML17219A611 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 05/29/1987 |
| From: | Bibb H, Crlenjak R, Wilson B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17219A610 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-87-10, 50-389-87-09, 50-389-87-9, NUDOCS 8706100141 | |
| Download: ML17219A611 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000335/1987010
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-335/87-10
and 50-389/87-09
Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami,
FL
33102
Docket Nos.:
50-335
and 50-389
License Nos.:
and NPF-16
Facility Name:
St. Lucie
1 and
2
Inspection
Conducted:
April 5 - May 2,
1987
Inspectors:R.'
Cr enga
,
S nior Resident
Inspec or
j
H. B. Bibb, Resident
Inspector
~/<2 Cr
ate
igne
ate
igne
Approved by:
ct
- ~
c
B.
i son, Section
C ie
Division of Reactor
Projects
ate
igne
SUMMARY
Scope:
This inspection
involved on site activities in the areas
of Technical
Specification
compliance,
operator
performance,
overall
operations,
quality
assurance
practices,
station
and corporate
management
practices,
corrective
and
preventive
maintenance
activities, site security procedures,
radiation control
activities,
and surveillance activities.
Results:
Of the areas
inspected,
two violations were identified (paragraph
9).
One unresolved
item was identified (paragraph
9).
8706100141
870601
ADOCK 05000335
8
REPORT
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
- K. Harris, St. Lucie Vice President
- G. J. Boissy, Plant Manager
- R. Sipos,
Services
Manager
- J. H. Barrow, Operations
Superintendent
T. A. Dillard, Maintenance
Superintendent
- J. B. Harper,
gA Superintendent
L. W. Pearce,
Operations
Supervisor
- R. J. Frechette,
Chemistry Supervisor
- C. F. Leppla, I 5
C Supervisor
- C. A. Pell, Technical Staff Supervisor
E. J. Wunderlich, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
H. F. Buchanan,
Health Physics
Supervisor
G. Longhouser,
Security Supervisor
- C. l,. Burton, Reliability and Support Supervisor
J. Barrow, Fire Prevention Coordinator
R. E. Dawson, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- Electrical
C. Wilson, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- Mechanical
N.
G. Roos, guality Control Supervisor
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
technicians,
operators,
mechanics,
security force members,
and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
Exit Interview
The inspection
scope
and findings were
summarized
on May 11,
1987, with
those
persons
indicated in paragraph
1 above.
The licensee
did not identify as proprietary
any of the materials
provided
to or reviewed
by the inspectors
during this inspection.
Licensee Action on Previous
Enforcement Matters
(Closed
- Units
1
and
2)
UNR 335,
389/85-28-02,
Uncertainties
In Time
Performance
of 24 Hour Surveillance:
Ambiguities in recording the time of
performance
on
several
copies
of OP-2-3200020
(Primary
System
Manual
Calorimetric),
performed
in October,
1985
were previously reported
( IE
Report
335,
389/85-28).
The inspector
reviewed
80 'copies
of similarly
completed
procedures
for Units
1
and
2.
No discrepancies
were noted.
This item is considered
closed.
Unresolved
Items
(UNR)
An UNR is
a matter which more information is required to determine
whether
it is acceptable
or may involve
a violation or deviation.
One
UNR is
addressed
in paragraph
9
(UNR 389/87-09-01).
Plant Tours (Units
1 and 2)
The inspectors
conducted
plant tours periodically during the inspection
interval to verify that monitoring equipment
was recording
as required,
equipment
was properly tagged,
operations
personnel
were
aware of plant
conditions,
and plant housekeeping
efforts were adequate.
The inspectors
also
determined
that
appropriate
radiation
controls
were
properly
established,
critical clean
areas
were being controlled in accordance
with
procedures,
excess
equipment
or material
was
stored
properly
and
combustible materials
and debris
were disposed
of expeditiously.
During
tours,
the inspectors
looked for the
existence
of unusual fluid leaks,
piping
vibrations,
pipe
hanger
and
seismic restraint settings,
various
valve
and breaker positions,
equipment
caution
and danger tags,
component
positions,
adequacy of fire fighting equipment,
and instrument calibration
dates.
Some tours were conducted
on backshifts.
The inspectors
routinely conducted
partial
walkdowns of emergency
core
cooling
systems
(ECCS).
Valve,
breaker/switch
lineups
and
equipment
conditions
were
randomly verified both locally and in the control
room.
During the inspection
period the inspectors
conducted
a complete walkdown
of the accessible
areas
of the Units
1
and
2 emergency
diesel
generators
to verify that the lineups
were in accordance
with licensee
requirements
for operability and that equipment material conditions were satisfactory.
Additionally, flowpath verifications
were
performed
on the following
systems:
Units
1
and
2 high and low pressure
safety injection, chemistry
and volume control,
and auxiliary feedwater.
Plant Operations
Review (Units
1 and 2)
The inspectors,
periodically during
the, inspection
interval,
reviewed
shift logs
and
operations
records,
including
data
sheets,
instrument
,traces,
and
records 'of equipment
malfunctions.
This review included
control
room logs
and auxiliary logs, operating
orders,
standing
orders,
jumper
logs
and
equipment
tagout
records.
The
inspectors
routinely
observed
operator
alertness
and
demeanor
during plant tours.
During
routine
operations,
operator
performance
and
response
actions
were
observed
and
evaluated.
The
inspectors
conducted
random
off-hours
inspections
during the reporting interval to assure
that operations
and
security
remained
at
an acceptable
level.
Shift turnovers
were observed
to verify that they were
conducted
in accordance
with approved
licensee
procedures.
The inspectors
performed
an in-depth review of the following
safety-related
tagouts
(clearances):
1-4-217
1A Boric Acid Makeup
(BAM) Pump - reset impeller
1-4-215
1B Charging
Pump - planned maintenance
(PM)
1-4-212
1A BAM Pump - inservice test
1-3-181
1A
BAM Pump - install
pump
Technical Specification
(TS) Compliance
(Units
1 and 2)
During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance
with
limiting conditions
for operations
(LCO's)
and
results
of selected
surveillance
tests.
These verifications
were
accomplished
by direct
observation
of monitoring
instrumentation,
valve
positions,
switch
positions,
and
review of completed
logs
and
records.
The licensee's
compliance
with
LCO
action
statements
were
reviewed
on
selected
occurrences
as they happened.
Maintenance
Observation
Station
maintenance
activities of selected
safety-related
systems
and
components
were observed/reviewed
to ascertain
that they were conducted
in
accordance
with requirements.
The following items were considered
during
this review;
LCO's were met, activites
were accomplished
using
approved
procedures,
functional tests
and/or calibrations
were performed prior to
returning
components
or systems
to service; quality control records
were
maintained; activities were accomplished
by qualified personnel;
parts
and
materials
used
were properly certified;
and radiological controls
were
implemented
as required.
Work requests
were reviewed to determine
status
of outstanding
jobs
and
to
assure
the priority was
assigned
to
safety-related
equipment.
The inspectors
observed/reviewed
portions of
the following maintenance activities:
PW0
4624
5053
62-299
62-2008
62-2036
Semi-Annual Calibration of Fluke Digital Voltmeter
Unit
1 "A" CVCS [Chemical
and Volume Control System]
Heat
Tracing Cabinet - Loss of Cabinet
Power
Repair
Leak on Unit 2 Instrument Air Dryer Heater
2C Changing
Pump
-PM
Pump -
Review of Nonroutine Events
Reported
by the Licensee
(Units
1 and 2)
The following Licensee
Event Reports
(LER's) were reviewed for potential
generic
impact,
to detect
trends,
and to determine
whether corrective
actions
appeared
appropriate.
Events which were reported
immediately were
also reviewed
as they occurred to determine that technical
specifications
were
being
met
and that the public health
and safety
were of upmost
consideration.
The following LER's are considered
closed:
335/87-09 - Technical Specification
(TS) Radiation Monitors Inoperable
On April 12,
1987,
the
1A emergency
core cooling system
(ECCS)
emergency
exhaust
fan radiation monitor was discovered
to have failed.
Efforts to
effect repairs
were
unsuccessful
during the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
The
licensee
decided
that the
ECCS area
was
a more critical area to monitor
than
was the fuel handling building
(FHB) area.
On April 15, to satisfy
the requirements
of Unit
1
TS 3.3.3.1.b,
the licensee installed temporary
ducting to allow the
FHB exhaust
radiation monitor to sample
the
area,
leaving
the
FHB
area
exhaust
unmonitored.
The
FHB
exhaust
'entilation fan
was
on at this time
and
remained
on for the next five
days.
The
FHB exhaust
should
have
been
secured
or periodically sampled
in
accordance
with Unit 1
TS 3.3.3.10.b.
On April 20,
1987,
a chemistry
technician
noted
that
the
FHB ventilation
fans
were still running.
Additionally, he
knew that
TS required
samples
were not being taken
on the
FHB exhaust
and
immediately
informed operations.
Operations
personnel
secured
all
FHB fans at 8:00 a.m.,
on April 20,
1987.
Repairs
were
completed
and
the
lA ECCS
emergency
exhaust
fan radiation monitor was
returned to service at 4:00 p.m.,
on April 20,
1987.
With regards
to the
above
events
the following plant
procedures
were
reviewed
by the inspector:
a
~
Administrative Procedure
(AP) 0010432,
Nuclear Plant
Work Orders,
which
states:
"All modifications,
preventive
and
corrective
maintenance
performed
by
Power
and
Light maintenance
personnel
and maintenance
directed work by contractors
and vendors at
St.
Lucie Plant shall
be authorized
through the Nuclear Plant
Work
Order."
A work order
was not issued
to perform the shifting of the
FHB
radiation
monitor suction
to the
emergency
radiation
monitor suction.
b.
Administrative Procedure
(AP) 0010124,
Control
and
Use of Jumpers
and
Disconnected
which states:
"To ensure
control of all jumpers,
disconnected
and temporary piping in safety related circuits
and systems,
one of the following methods
shall
be used:.
( 1)
Control
by procedure - The documentation
in a procedure shall
be
used
when the procedure specifies
the alteration
and restoration
of a circuit or system.
(2)
Control
by the
Jumper/Lifted
Request
Log -
When
an
alteration
is not .controlled
by
an
approved
procedure (i.e.,
troubleshooting
electronic
equipment
to permit interim operation)
and is unattended
(not hand held),
it shall
be
recorded
in the Jumper/Lifted
Log
and
a
Temporary
Circuit Alteration
Tag
attached.
This shall
be
accomplished
as outlined in Section 8.0 of this procedure.
(3)
Hand Held - As long as continuous
h sical contact is maintained
with the disconnected
lead or gumper
and Reed
the controls in
steps
1 and
2 above
are not required."
These
procedures
were not implemented
and
as
a result, the temporary
alteration/jumper
was not properly documented
and controlled.
N
l
c ~
Operating
Procedure
(OP)
0010129
-
Equipment
Out of Service-
Class
1, Which states:
"Figure
1 shall
be filled out at any time
a
Class
1
piece of equipment
is
removed
from service."
Inspector's
note:
Figure
1 referred to above, is the log sheet
portion of the
Equipment
Out of Service
Log.
And, "the Assistant
Nuclear Plant
Supervisor
is
responsible
for maintaining
the
Equipment
Out of
Service Log."
This
procedure
was
not properly
implemented
in that the out of
service
equipment
was not logged.
The
above
described
items a., b.,
and
c.
are
examples
of failure to
follow/implement procedures
and together
are considered
to be
a violation
(335/87-10-01).
Additionally, the inspector
reviewed the following Unit 1 TS:
TS 3.3.3.10,
Table
3.3-13
Action
3 states
that effluent releases
can
continue for up to 30 days with the
FHB exhaust radiation monitor out of
service if grab samples
are taken
once
per eight hours
and analyzed within
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The
TS was not followed in that grab samples
were not taken
on
a shiftly bases
during the five days that the
FHB exhaust ventilation fan
was operating
unmonitored.
This is
a violation (335/87-10-2).
The following events
were
reported
immediately
by the
licensee
and
reviewed
by the inspector;
On April 22,
1987,
at 1:35 p.m. Unit 2 tripped from 100K power due to
a
turbine trip caused
by personnel
error while performing routine electrical
maintenance.
Electrical
maintenance
personnel
were
performing routine
circulation
water
pump
(CWP)
ammeter
calibrations.
The
ammeter
calibrations
consisted
of shorting
out the
to the appropriate
ammeter
by utilizing a jumper across
the associated
terminals in reactor
turbine gauge
board
(RTGB), section
202.
The meters
are
them removed from
the
RTGB for calibration.
The electricians
had jumpered the
2A2
CWP meter
at terminal block (TB) No. 5, points
57 and
58 in RTGB, section
202.
They
then
jumpered
the
282
CWP meter at
TB No. 5, points
82
and
83 in RTGB,
section
202.
For the
281
CWP meter,
the drawing indicated that they
should
jumper
TB No.
29 points
92
and 93,
RTGB, section
202.
At this
point
the electricians
jumpered
across
TB No.29,
however,
they
had
unknowingly crossed
into
RTGB, section
201.
This action resulted
in
shorting
the control
switch for the feeder
breaker to the
480 volt 2A1
load center
(LC) and at 1:35 p.m. the station service transformer
2Al 4160
KV breaker
tripped.
This resulted
in the
loss of
a large
number of
non-safety
related
equipment in the plant,
however, this should not have
resulted
in
a turbine trip/reactor trip.
A turbine/reactor trip was
experienced.
Subsequent
investigation
revealed
that the loss of LC 2A1 resulted in the
deenergization
of
two control
element
drive
mechanism
(CEDN)
bus
(UV) relays.
This made up, contrary to design,
the turbine
trip on reactor trip logic, causing
a turbine trip,
The cause of the
bus
UV relay deenergization
was
a set of rolled/reversed
leads in
cabinet
2.
The original
plant. design
had
the
in the rolled
configuration,
howe'ver
this
had
caused
two earlier
Consequently
a plant change/modification
(PC/M) was implemented in 1983 to
change
the leads.
They were functionally tested to the
new confirguration
in 1984.
A review, by the licensee,
of associated
work documents
revealed
that
no
changes
were authorized
subsequent
to the
PC/M referred
above.
The licensee
is currently investigating this event to determine
how the
were rolled.
Until the investigation is completed
and reviewed
by
the inspector this item is unresolved
(UNR, 389/87-09-01).
On April 9, 1987, with Unit 2 at .100 percent
power, Instrument
and Control
( I&C) personnel
were
performing
the monthly surveillance
test of the
engineered
safety features
actuation
system.
During the testing, it was
noted that
one annunciator
did not illuminate.
After completion of the
test,
IKC personnel
commenced
trouble shooting to determine
the cause of
the annunciator failure.
A jumper was placed
on the wrong terminal, main
steam isolation signal
actuation
pushbutton,
causing
the closure of the
and feedwater isolation valves.
This resulted in an automatic reactor trip due to low steam generator level.
With regards
to plant
response
two pieces
of plant equipment
did not
respond
as
expected
during
the
event.
The
steam
driven auxiliary
pump
(AFW) tripped
on overspeed
and
(MSSV) remained partially open for approximately eight minutes.
The two
electric driven
AFW pumps
functioned properly
and the
steam
driven
pump
was restarted
without problem.
The licensee
investigated
the
cause
of the
pump trip and could not determine
the cause.
The
pump trip was
determined
to
be
an isolated
event.
In reference
to the partially open
MSSV, operations
personnel
reduced
pressure
to allow the
valve to reclose.
This was also
an isolated event,
however, the licensee
is continuing to determine
the cause for the valve sticking.
The trip described
above is
one of several
which have occurred
over the
past
few months
which involve personnel
error
and is possibly indicative
of
a trend in this area.
The licensee
is pursing
these
problems
and is
taking corrective actions
in an attempt to reverse
the negative
trend.
The inspectors
are monitoring these actions.
Physical
Protection (Units
1 and 2)
The inspectors verified by observation
and interviews during the reporting
interval that measures
taken
the assure
the physical
protection of the
facility met
current
requirements.
Areas
inspected
included
the
organization
of the security force, the establishment
and maintenance
of
gates,
doors
and isolation
zones
in the proper conditions,
that
access
control
and badging
was proper,
and procedures
were followed.
W
ll.
Survei 1 l ance Observati ons
During the
inspection
period,
the
inspectors
verified operations
in
compliance
with selected
technical
specifications
(TS)
requirements.
Typical of these
were confirmation of compliance with the
TS for reactor
coolant
chemistry,
refueling
water
tank
(level,
temperature
and
chemistry),
containment
pressure,
control
room ventilation
and
AC and
electrical
sources.
The inspectors verified that testing
was performed in
accordance
with adequate
procedures,
test instrumentation
was calibrated,
limiting conditions for operations
were met,
removal
and restoration of
the affected
components
were accomplished,
test results
met requirements
and
were
reviewed
by personnel
other
than the individual directing the
test,
and
that
any deficiencies
identified during
the testing
were
properly reviewed
and resolved
by appropriate
management
personnel.
The
inspectors
observed
portions of the following surveillance(s):
INC 1-1220050
R.13
- Linear Power
Range Safety
Channel quarterly
Calibration
AP 1-00110125
- Schedule of Periodic Tests,
Checks
and Calibrations
- Check Sheets
1,2,3,4,5,
and 6,Data
Sheets
3,4,5,21,22,
and
26
lI