ML17215A876
| ML17215A876 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 04/25/1985 |
| From: | John Miller Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Williams J FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| GL-83-10, NUDOCS 8505100501 | |
| Download: ML17215A876 (6) | |
Text
Docket No. 50-335 Mr. J.
W. Williams, Jr.
Vice President Nuclear Energy Department Florida Power
& Light Company P. 0.
Box 14000 Juno Beach, Florida 33408
Dear Mr. Williams:
April 25,'985 DISTRIBUTION:
EIIKTTKE.
NRC PDR L PDR ORB¹3 Rdg HThompson OELD EJordan BGrimes JPartlow DESells PMKreutzer ACRS +10 Gray File 0
SUBJECT'EACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP The staff has completed its review of the Combustion Engineering Owners Group (CEOG) report CEN-268, "Justification of Trip Two/Leave Two Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Strategy During Transients."
We have determined that the CEOG response concerning service water availability is inadequate and precludes completion of the review on this issue.
Enclosed is a request for additional information that is required in order to complete our review.
You are requested to provide this information no later than June 1, 1985.
If you have any questions, contact the project manager, D. Sells (301) 492-9735.
This request for additional information affects fewer than ten respondents;,
therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L.96-511.
Sincerely, Or4kflifeed bt:
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/enclosure See next page James R. Miller, Chief Operating Reactors Branch ¹3 Division of Licensing 8505100501 850485 PDR ADOCK 05000335 P
PDR ORB¹P:DL PPpfqytzer 4/q /85 0
3:DL DESells:dd 4/gS7S5 4/
h H
'1 HI H
HH IH fI p
H r
H'
RE UEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP In response to Generic Letter 83-10, CEN-268, "Justification of Trip Two/Leave Two Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Strategy During Transients,"
was provided by the CE Owners Group.
The following paragraph is taken from CEN-268:
6.5 SERVICE WATER AVAILABILITY I
RCP cooling water will be isolated at some plants upon a containment isolation actuation signal (CIAS).
Continuous RCP operation under this condition may lead to potential RCP damage.
Low RCP cooling flow alarms are available in the control
- room, and timely operator action could be employed to restore essential water service.
Each utility should review the RCP cooling water service system requirements on a plant specific basis and make changes as necessary.
(page 6-5)
This information was provided in response to a specific issue in Generic Letter 83-10, I.l(e):
"Transients and accidents which produce the same initial symptoms as a
W LOCA (i.e., depressurization of the reactor and actuation of engineered safety features) and result in containment isolation may result in the termination of systems essential for continued operation of the reactor
coolant pumps (i.e.,component cooling water and/or seal injection water).
It was the intent of TMI Action Plan Item II.E.4.2 to have licensees reevaluate essential and non-essential systems with respect to containment isolation.
In particular, if a facility design terminates water services essential for RCP operation, then it should be assured that these water services can be restored in a timely manner once a non-LOCA situation is I
confirmed, and prevent seal damage or failure.
It should be confirmed that containment isolation with continued RCP operation will not lead to seal or pump damage or failure."
l.
Does any containment isolation signal result in the termination of systems essential for continued operation of the reactor coolant pumps? If so, identify the signals and systems effected.
2.
If essential water services are terminated, provide a description of the operator guidelines,
- training, and procedures in place (or to be implementedj which assure that these services are restored in a timely manner to prevent seal damage or failure, once a
non-LOCA situation has been confirmed.
3.
Provide confirmation, included the technical
- basis, that containment isolation with continued RCP operation will not lead to seal or pump damage or failure.
4.
Since RCP trip will be required for LOCA events, assurance must be provided that RCP trip, when required, will occur.
To address this concern, provide the following information:
(a)
Identify the components required to trip the RCPs.
Include relays, power supp 1 ies and breakers.
Address re 1 iabi 1 ity and al ternate trip methods.
(b) If necessary, as a result of the location of any critical component, include the effects of adverse containment conditions on RCP trip reliability.
Describe the basis for the adverse containment parameters selected.
St. Lucie 152 Mr. Jack Shreve Office of the Public Counsel Room 4, Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Resident Inspector c/o U.S.
NRC Senior Resident Inspector 7585 S.
Hwy A1A Jensen Beach, Florida 33457 State Planning 5 Development Clearinghouse Office of Planning 5 Budget Executive Office of the Governor The Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold F. Reis, Esquire Newman 8
Holtzinger'615 L Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036 Norman A. Coll, Esquire McCarthy, Steel, Hector and Davis 14th Floor, First National Bank Building Miami, Fl orida 33131 Administrator, Depart. of Environ.
Reg.
Power Plant Siting Section State of Florida 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Weldon B. Lewis, County Administrator St. Lucie County 2300 Virginia Avenue, Room 104 Fort Pierce, Florida 33450 Mr. Charles B. Brinkman, Manager 7910 Woodmont Avenue
- Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Regional Administrator USNRC, Region II Executive Director for Operations 101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. Allan Schubert, Manager Public Health Physicist Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd.
Tallahassee, Florida 32301