Text

301 Final Simulator Scenario 3
	ML13071A144
Person / Time
Site:	05523694
Issue date:	03/12/2013
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	;
References
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	Download: ML13071A144 (75)
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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

Voatle Scenario No.:

3 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power, MOL, steady state operations.

(Base IC # 14, snapped to IC # 183 for HL17 NRC Exam)

Eguiment OOS: Safety Injection Pump A is tagged out for motor repair.

Turnover: Maintain 100% power. Containment mini-purge is in service for a Containment entry on the next shift.

Preloaded Malfunctions:

TU1OB Main Turbine EHC Pump B Auto Start Failure Overrides HS-3009 OPEN (Panel Map B-Left, HS-3009 LP-1 MS SPLY to AFW TD PMP-1 to OPEN)

Event Maif.

Event Event No.

No.

Type*

Description Ti SGO2D I-UO SG # 4 NR LT fails high (LT-554).

@ 100%

I-SS TS-SS LCO 3.3.1 Condition A LCO 3.3.1 Condition A, FU 13 Condition E LCO 3.3.2 Condition A LCO 3.3.2 Condition A, FU 5c Condition I LCO 3.3.2 FU 6b Condition D T2 CVO8 C-OATC CVCS Letdown Leak ORG (Aux. Building Isolable).

@ 25%

C-SS TS-SS 3

NI A N-OATC Places Excess Letdown in service.

N-SS T4 PRO2A l-OATC Controlling PRZR Pressure channel PT-455 fails high.

@ 100%.

I-SS TS-SS LCO 3.3.1 Condition A, FU 6 Condition E, LCO 3.3.1 FU 8a Condition M, LCO 3.3.1 FU 8b Condition E, LCO 3.3.2 Condition A, FU id Condition D, LCO 3.3.2 FU 8b Condition L (One hour action),

LCO 3.4.1.a Condition A T5 TU1 1 C-UO Main Turbine EHC Pump A trips with failure of standby EHC pump to C-SS automatically start.

1

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event MaIf.

Event Event No.

No.

Type*

Description T6 SGO1A R-OATC Steam Generator # 1 10 gpm SGTL requiring a rapid down power.

@3%

N-UO R-SS TS-SS LCO 3.4.13 Condition A T7 SG01A M-ALL DBA SGTR on SG # 1 (-.450 gpm)

@45%

Ramp 180 seconds 8

Preload C-UO TDAFW steam supply valve from SG # 1 will not manually close Critical C-SS requiring closure of TDAFW Trip and Throttle valve to isolate SG # 1.

T9 PRO7 C-OATC PRZR spray valve loop 4 fails 80% open after maximum rate

@ 80%

C-SS depressurization of RCS when OATC attempts to shut the valve.

Critical (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 1:

SG # 4 NR LT controlling channel fails high causing MFRV loop # 4 to throttle closed.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Performs IOA and takes manual control of SG # 4 FW control valves to restore NR level between 60-70%.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation Condition A LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation FU 13 Condition E LCO 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation Condition A LCO 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation EU 5c Condition I

LCO 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESEAS) Instrumentation EU 6b Condition D Event 2:

CVCS Letdown line breaks in the Auxiliary Building that will be isolated lifting letdown relief to the PRT.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Manipulates penetration room temperature switches at QPCP to determine a leak exists.

OATC Closes Letdown Orifices HV-8149A, B, C and Letdown Isolations LV-459 and LV-460 to isolate an RCS leak to the PRT.

OATC Adjusts HC-182 and FIC-121 to establish 8 to 13 gpm seal injection flow with charging flow approximately 10 gpm greater than total seal injection flow.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.4.13 RCS Operational Leakage Condition A (Note: Leakage is isolated after OATC closes the Letdown Orifices and Isolations)

Event 3:

Excess Letdown will be placed in service to the seal return header to control PRZR level.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Sets 1 HC-1 23 to closed. (0% demand).

OATC Opens Excess Letdown Isolation valves 1-H V-81 53 / 1-HV-81 54.

OATC Adjusts 1 HC-123 to establish maximum allowable Excess Letdown flow (30 gpm).

OATC Adjusts 1 FIC-1 21 and 1 HC-1 82 to control charging and seal injection flows.

3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 4:

Controlling PRZR Pressure channel PT-455 fails high resulting in PORV 455A opening and both PRZR sprays fully open, RCS pressure will be lowering rapidly.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Perform lOAs of 18001-C by closing PRZR sprays, closing PORV 455A, and operating heaters as necessary to control PRZR pressure.

OATC Manually closes PORV Block Valve 1 HV-8000A to stop LOCA to PRT.

OATC Controls PRZR heaters and sprays to control PRZR pressure.

OATC Sets PRZR Master Controller to 25% demand.

OATC Selects channel 457 I 456 on PRZR Pressure control switch PS-455F.

OATC Places PRZR heaters and PORV 455A in AUTO and ensures proper operation.

OATC Places PRZR Pressure Master Controller in AUTO and verifies proper operation.

OATC Selects channel PT-457 as controlling channel on pressure recorder PS-455G.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation Condition A LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation EU 6, Condition E LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation EU 8a, Condition M LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation FU 8b, Condition E LCO 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Condition A LCO 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) EU id, Condition D LCO 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) FU 8b Condition L (one hour)

LCO 3.4.1.a RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB)

Limits 4

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 5:

Main Turbine EHC Pump A trips with failure of the standby pump to automatically start.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Starts EHC pump B prior to Main Turbine / Reactor trip on low EHC pressure of 1100 psig.

This will prevent an unnecessary Turbine I Reactor trip and transient on the plant.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 6:

A 10 gpm SGTL will occur on SG # 1 requiring a rapid down power per 18013-C, this is to preclude the tube leak from propagating into a SGTR per the EPRI Guidelines.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Borates as necessary for rapid down power to maintain Tavg Tref matched.

UO Reduces Turbine load at < 5% per minute to maintain Tavg Tref matched.

Event 7, 8:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 1 requiring a plant trip and safety injection.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Manually trips the reactor using either QMCB hand switch, manually actuates safety injection, and adjusts seal injection to RCPs between 8 to 13 gpm after the SI.

UO Places SGBD hand switches in hard closed to prevent water hammer to SGBD system.

UO Throttles AFW flow to maintain SG levels 10 65%.The UD may perform an early operator action and isolate AFW flow to SG # 1 once SG # 1 level is> 10% NR with SS permission.

UO Isolates ruptured SG # 1 by performing the following.

Adjusts SG # 1 ARV potentiometer set point to 7.73 (to control at 1160 psig).

Trips the TDAFW pump by closing PV-15129 (Trip and Throttle Valve)

Closes SG # 1 MSIV and Bypass valves.

Isolates FW flow to SG # 1 (MFIV, MFRV, BFIV, BFRV, TDAFW, MDAFW valves all shut)

UO Blocks Low Steam line Pressure SI and SLI when RCS pressure <2000 psig (P-il) and then places the steam dumps in Steam Pressure Mode and opens the 3 cool down steam dumps for a maximum rate Cooldown.

UO Closes the steam dumps after selected CETC is reached and controls CETC below this temperature (usually this is 51 8°F or 506°F depending on ruptured SG pressure).

OATC Depressurizes RCS with maximum PRZR spray flow to refill the pressurizer.

5

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 9:

OATC Trips RCP # 4 when a PRZR spray valve will not shut, trips RCP # 1 if necessary.

The scenario may be stopped after this point with chief examiner approval.

CRITICAL TASKS:

1) Isolates SG # ito limit secondary contamination and potential release environment by performing the following actions no later than the 19030-C procedure steps. These are steps 6 through ii of 19030-C.

Adjusts SG # 1 ARV potentiometer set point to 7.73 (to control at 1160 psig).

Trips the TDAFW pump by closing PV-i 5129 (Trip and Throttle Valve)

Closes SG # 1 MSIV and Bypass valves.

Isolates FW flow to SG #1 (MFIV, MFRV, BFIV, BFRV, TDAFW, MDAFW, and SGBD and Sample valves all shut)

2) Depressurizes PRZR to refill the PRZR with ECCS injection and to limit break flow using normal PRZR spray to meet conditions of step 37 of 19030-C.

3) Stops RCP # 4 when PRZR spray valve will not fully close. (Stops RCP # 1 if necessary)

This prevents a loss of RCS pressure control requiring a transition to the SGTR ECA series of EOPs. Also, an uncontrolled backfill of the SG from the secondary side may occur resulting in possible loss of shutdown margin and contaminants being introduced into the primary side. This action is performed per step 38a RNO of 19030-C.

6

i NUCLEAR SAFETY FOCUS zJ TARGET ZERO d*j.

Protected Train:

EOOS:

Green Alpha LI Yellow LI Bravo LI Orange LiRed Plant 100 % power MOL.

Conditions:

Major Activities:

Maintain power operations per UOP 1 2004-C section 4.3 for power operation.

Active LCOs:

LI LCO 3.5.2 Condition A is in effect due to SIP A tagged out.

OOS/ Degraded LI None CR Instruments:

Narrative LI Containment mini-purge is in service for a planned Status:

Containment Entry on next shift.

LI SIP A is tagged out for motor repair, expected return to service time is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months with 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months left on a shutdown LCO of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

LI The remnants of Hurricane Maya are passing through, severe weather and thunderstorms will be in the area for the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . The Severe Weather Checklist is in effect.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 2-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

1 Event

Description:

SG # 4 controlling level channel LT-554 fails HIGH requiring UO to take manual control of SG # 4 MFRV to control SG levels, selects an unaffected level channel, and returns SG # 4 MFRV to Auto.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnose the failure of SG # 4 controlling level channel LT-554.

Symptoms I alarms:

ALB13-D06 STM GEN 4 HI / LO LVL DEVIATION ALB14-D01 STM GEN 4 HI-HI LEVEL ALERT.

Indications:

MFRV # 4 throttling shut Feed flow < steam flow on SG # 4 IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS SS / UO El.

Check Steam and feed flows MATCHED ON ALL SGS.

RNO El.

Take manual control of affected SG feed flow valves to restore NR level between 60% and 70%.

[ SG 4 MFRV l-FIC-540 placed in manual and depresses UP arrow to raise FW flow]

SS Enters AOP-1800l-C, Section E for Failure of SG Level Instrumentation.

SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS SS / UO E2.

Selects unaffected SG level channel for control. (Selects 1 LT-549, Ch II on 1 LS-549C)

UO E3.

Return SG feed flow valves control to automatic.

[ SG # 4 MFRV 1 -FIC-540 returned to auto]

Cue to Simbooth: IF asked, the Shift Manager has given permission to place the MFRV in auto.

1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

1 Event

Description:

SG # 4 controlling level channel LT-554 fails HIGH requiring UO to take manual control of SG # 4 MFRV to control SG levels, selects an unaffected level channel, and returns SG # 4 MFRV to Auto.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC / UO E4.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

UO

E5.

Check SG level control maintains NR level AT 65%.

SS E6 Notify I & C to initiate repairs.

Contacts SSS to perform the following:

Notify I&C to initiate repairs Write a Condition Report Notify OPS Duty Manager of AOP entry SS E7.

Bypass the affected channel per 13509-C, Bypass Test Instrumentation (BTI) Panel Operation.

NOTE: It is not expected the SS will desire to bypass the channeL 55 E8.

Trip affected channel bistable and place associated MASTER TEST switch in TEST position per TABLE El within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . (TS 3.3.1 & 3.3.2)

NOTE: It is not expected the SS will trip bistables at this time.

SS E9.

Initiate the applicable actions of:

TS3.3.1 TS 3.3.2 LCO 3.3.1 FU 13 CONDITION E SG LO-LO LEVEL RX TRIP CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Enter the Condition referenced in Immediately Functions with Table 3.3.1-1 for the channel(s).

one or more channels inoperable.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 2-301 Event No.:

1 Scenario No.: 3 Event

Description:

SG # 4 controlling level channel LT-554 fails HIGH requiring UO to take manual control of SG # 4 MFRV to control SG levels, selects an unaffected level channel, and returns SG # 4 MFRV to Auto.

E9. cont.

LCO 3.3.2 FU 6b CONDITION D SG LO-LO LEVEL AEW ACTUATION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. One channel D.1 Place channel in trip.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable OR D.2.1 Be in MODE 3 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months AND D2.2 Be in MODE 4 84 hours9.722222e-4 days 0.0233 hours 1.388889e-4 weeks 3.1962e-5 months LCO 3.3.2 EU 5c CONDITION I P-14, FWI E. One channel inoperable E.1 Place channel in trip.

OR E.2 Be in MODE 3.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 78 hours CONDITION I. One channel inoperable REQUIRED ACTION 1.1 Place channel in trip.

OR SS 1.2 Be in MODE 3 COMPLETION TIME 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months RNO

Elo Check repairs and surveillances COMPLETE.

78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months

El 0 Perform the following:

a.

WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete THEN perform Step El 1.

b.

Return to procedure and step in effect.

END OF EVENT 1 3

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

CVCS Letdown line break ORC that auto isolates the HELBA valves but requires OATC actions to isolate a Letdown leak to the PRT via relief.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnose Letdown line break CRC and CVCS relief lifting to PAT:

UO Symptoms / alarms:

ALB63-EOl CVCS PIPE BREAK RM PACT ACTUATION ALB61 -C06 LVL A LEAK DETECTED (short time delay)

ALBO7-C05 LP LTDN HX HI TEMP (short time delay)

ALBO6-F01 CSFST TROUBLE (short time delay)

Indications:

Both temperature indicators for room RA09 reading high.

Letdown flow lowering toO in 1LI-132C and iLl-i 32A.

Enters AOP 1 8007-C, Section A, TOTAL LOSS OF LETDOWN FLOW.

OATC Al. Isolate letdown relief flowpath by performing the following:

a. Close letdown orifice isolation valves:

HV-8149A HV-8149B HV-81 49C

b. Close letdown isolation valves:

LV-459 LV-460 4

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

CVCS Letdown line break ORC that auto isolates the HELBA valves but requires OATC actions to isolate a Letdown leak to the PRT via relief.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 1

OATC A2. Adjust HC-182 and FIC-121 as necessary to establish the following:

Seal injection flow to all RCP5 8 to 13 GPM.

-AND Charging flow - APPROXMATELY 10 GPM GREATER THAN TOTAL SEAL INJECTION FLOW.

OATC A3. Check pipe break protection valves OPEN.

. HV-15214(NO)

. HV-8160(NO)

RNO A3. Perform the following:

UO

a. Check affected unit room temperatures.

UNIT 1

. R-A07

. R-A08

. R-A09 (high room temperature for both trains) b.

IF affected room temperatures are greater than 135°F, THEN investigate reason for high temperature in rooms before opening affected valves and restoring letdown.

5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

CVCS Letdown line break ORC that auto isolates the HELBA valves but requires OATC actions to isolate a Letdown leak to the PRT via relief.

[_Time Position_[

Applicants Action or Behavior OATC NOTE to Simbooth: IF, personnel dispatched to check out RAO9, report back the following:

Room appears to be full of steam and the submarine door at the entrance is very hot to the touch. HP will not allow us to attempt to enter the room.

OATC A4. Check instrument air to containment ESTABLISHED. (YES)

OATC A5. Check CVCS letdown to BTRS flowpath.

a. Check TV-0381 B BTRS Demin Inlet Temperature Control

OPEN. (HS-10351 DILUTE or OFF lights lit.) (OFF LIT)

b. Check HV-81 15 LETDOWN DIVERT TO BTRS - OPEN.

(YES)

OATC A6. Identify and correct cause for loss of letdown.

a. Check for letdown path valve failures or mispositions. (NO)

b. Check instrumentation:

Pl-131A TI-130 c.

Check PIC-131.

d. Check HV-8152.

e. Check for other causes.

6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

CVCS Letdown line break ORC that auto isolates the HELBA valves but requires OATC actions to isolate a Letdown leak to the PRT via relief.

Time_]_Position_[

Applicants Action or Behavior OATC A7. Check normal letdown AVAILABLE. (NO)

RNO A7. Perform the following:

a.

Establish Excess Letdown by initiating 13008, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM EXCESS LETDOWN.

Note to examiner: SS should wait here for Excess Letdown to be placed in service prior to proceeding to step A9.

Note to examiner: Excess Letdown steps are on page # 10.

GO TO EVENT 3 for placing Excess Letdown in service steps, then return to step A9 once Excess Letdown has been placed in service.

b. GotoStepA9.

7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

CVCS Letdown line break ORC that auto isolates the HELBA valves but requires OATC actions to isolate a Letdown leak to the PRT via relief.

Time Position_[

Applicants Action or Behavior OATC A9. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

uO OATC AlO. Verify PRZR level - TRENDING TO PROGRAM. (YES)

Note to examiner: The OATC should be able to turn PRZR level to a down trend with Excess Letdown in service.

8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

CVCS Letdown line break ORC that auto isolates the HELBA valves but requires OATC actions to isolate a Letdown leak to the PRT via relief.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS All. Check normal letdown flow ESTABLISHED. (NO)

RNO Al 1. Perform the following:

a. WHEN normal letdown capability is restored, THEN restore normal letdown by initiating 13006, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM.

b.

Evaluate the impact of continued power operation with normal letdown out of service.

c.

WHEN Normal Letdown restored remove Excess Letdown by initiating 13008, CHEMICAL VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM EXCESS LETDOWN.

OATC A12. Return to procedure and step in effect.

END OF EVENT 2, proceed to EVENT 4.

9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 2-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

The OATC places Excess letdown in service per direction of the SS to maintain PRZR level after letdown is isolated to stop the RCS leak. The OATC will use SOP 13008-1, to place excess letdown in service.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Section 4.1 of 13008-1 is selected.

OATC NOTE: Independent Verifications performed within Section 4.1 are documented on Checklist 1.

4.1.1 Verify Reactor power is maintained < 3622.6 MWT while Excess Letdown is in service and LEFM is in service. IF LEFM is NOT in service, maintain power 3562 MWT per guidance of 12004-C.

OATC 4.1.2 Verify that a CVCS Charging Pump is running.

OATC 4.1.3 Verity CLOSED RX HEAD VENT TO EXCESS LETDOWN ISOLATION 1 -HV-8098.

OATC 4.1.4 Verify flow controller EXCESS LETDOWN, 1 HO-i 23 is set to closed (0% demand).

OATC 4.1.5 Verity OPEN RCPs Seal Leakoff Isolation valves:

1 -HV-81 00 RCPS SEAL LEAKOFF ORC ISOLATION 1-HV-81 12 RCPS SEAL LEAKOFF IRC ISOLATION 10

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 2-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

The OATC places Excess letdown in service per direction of the SS to maintain PRZR level after letdown is isolated to stop the RCS leak. The OATC will use SOP 13008-1, to place excess letdown in service.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.1.6 Verity EXCESS LETDOWN TO VCT, 1HS-8143 is in the OPEN VCT position.

OATC 4.1.7 Verity Reactor power is maintained 3622.6 MWT while Excess Letdown is in service and LEFM is in service. IF LEFM is NOT in service, maintain power 3562 MWT per guidance of 12004-C.

OATC 4.1.8 Open EXCESS LETDOWN LINE Isolation Valves:

1-HV-81 53 EXCESS LETDOWN LINE ISO VLV 1-HV-8154 EXCESS LETDOWN LINE ISO VLV OATC 4.1.9 Record the following:

Pressure on indicator EXCESS LETDOWN HX OUTLET, lPl-124.

Temperature on indicator EXCESS LETDOWN HX OUTLET, 1TI-122.

Note to examiner: ALB63-A06 FILTERS BACKFLUSH PNL ALARM will illuminate shortly after placing Excess Letdown in service.

11

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

The OATC places Excess letdown in service per direction of the SS to maintain PRZR level after letdown is isolated to stop the RCS leak. The OATC will use SOP 13008-1, to place excess letdown in service.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.1.10 WHILE establishing excess letdown, perform the following:

Monitor pressure rise on pressure indicator EXCESS LETDOWN HX OUTLET, 1PI-124 and verify it remains less than 50 pounds above pressure recorded in Step 4.1.8.

Monitor temperature rise on temperature indicator EXCESS LETDOWN HX OUTLET, 1TI-122 and verify it remains less than 165 degrees.

OATC 4.1.11 Slowly adjust output flow controller EXCESS LETDOWN 1HC-123 to establish maximum allowable flow (estimated to be approximately 30 gpm).

OATC 4.1.12 Perform the following as required to maintain desired pressurizer level:

Adjust charging using CHARGING LINE CONTROL, 1 FIC-121.

Adjust seal injection using SEAL FLOW CONTROL, 1 HC-1 82.

12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

The OATC places Excess letdown in service per direction of the SS to maintain PRZR level after letdown is isolated to stop the RCS leak. The OATC will use SOP 13008-1, to place excess letdown in service.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.1.13 IF normal letdown is isolated, align the outlet of the Seal Water Heat Exchanger to the Volume Control Tank spray nozzle as follows: (IV REQUIRED) (N/A if previously performed) a.

Unlock and open CVCS SEALS SEAL WATER HX OUTLET TO VCT, 1-1208-U6-104. (KEY 10P2-281)

(RA-26) b.

Close CVCS SEALS SEAL WATER HX OUTLET TO NCP SUCTION, 1-1 208-U6-1 06. (RA-26)

OATC 4.1.14 IF directed by SS to transfer excess letdown to the RCDT, perform the following:

a.

Verity RCDT system is aligned to accept Excess Letdown flow per 13002-1 Reactor Drain Tank Operation.

b.

Place EXCESS LETDOWN TO VCT, 1 HS-81 43 to the OPEN RCDT position.

c.

Monitor temperature rise on EXCESS LETDOWN HX OUTLET 1TI-122 and verity it remains less than 165 degrees.

d.

Slowly raise output on flow controller EXCESS LETDOWN, 1HC-123 to establish maximum allowable flow.

e.

swap to RCDT is being performed for Chemistry control or level control Step 4.2.7.

f.

Perform the following as required to maintain desired pressurizer level:

Adjust charging using CHARGING LINE CONTROL, 1 FIC-121.

Adjust seal injection using SEAL FLOW CONTROL, 1HC-182.

13

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 2-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

The OATC places Excess letdown in service per direction of the SS to maintain PRZR level after letdown is isolated to stop the RCS leak. The OATC will use SOP 13008-1, to place excess letdown in service.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.1.15 H the Seal Water Heat Exchanger Outlet was aligned to the Volume Control Tank, restore normal alignment as follows:

(IV REQUIRED) a.

Open CVCS SEALS SEAL WATER HX OUTLET TO NCP SUCTION, 1-1208-U6-106. (RA-26) b.

Close and lock CVCS SEALS SEAL WATER HX OUTLET TO VCT, 1-1 208-U6-1 04 (KEY 1 OP2-281).

(RA-26)

END OF EVENT 3, Return to EVENT 2 on page # 7, step A9.

14

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

PRZR Pressure channel PT-455 fails high resulting in PRZR PORV 455A and both PRZR Sprays fully opening. The OATC will have to take manual action to prevent a Reactor trip and SI.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnose the high failure of PRZR Pressure channel PT-455.

Symptoms / alarms:

ALB11-B03 PRZR HI PRESS ALB1 1 -COl PRZR CONTROL HI LEVEL DEV AND HEATERS ON ALB11-C03 PRZR HI PRESS CHANNEL ALERT ALB12-D03 PRZR PRESS LO PORV BLOCK ALB12-E04 PV-0455A OPEN SIGNAL ALBO6-F06 CSFST TROUBLE Indications:

PRZR Pressure channel PT-455 off scale high.

PRZR Pressure channels PT-456, 457, and 458 rapidly lowering.

Both PRZR Sprays full open.

OATC AOP 18001-C, Section C IMMEDIATE ACTIONS Cl.

Check RCS pressure

- STABLE OR RISING. (NO)

RNO:

Cl.

Perform the following:

Close spray valves.

Close affected PRZR PORV.

Operate PRZR heaters as necessary.

SS Enters AOP 18001 -C, Section C and verifies immediate operator actions properly completed.

15

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

PRZR Pressure channel PT-455 fails high resulting in PRZR PORV 455A and both PRZR Sprays fully opening. The OATC will have to take manual action to prevent a Reactor trip and SI.

[ime } Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC C2.

Check controlling channel OPERATING PROPERLY. (NO)

RNO:

C2.

Perform the following:

a. Place HS-455A in close.

b. Place PRZR spray valve controllers in manual.

OATC C3.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

UO OATC C4.

Control PRZR pressure using heaters sprays

BETWEEN 2220 AND 2250 PSIG.

OATC C5.

Check PIC-455A Pressurizer Master Pressure ControllerIN AUTO WITH OUTPUT SIGNAL APPROXIMATELY 25%.

(NO)

RNO:

C5.

Place PIC-455A in manual and adjust controller output to approximately 25%.

OATC C6.

Check affected channel selected on PS-455F PRZR PRESS CNTL SELECT. (YES) 16

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

PRZR Pressure channel PT-455 fails high resulting in PRZR PORV 455A and both PRZR Sprays fully opening. The OATC will have to take manual action to prevent a Reactor trip and SI.

Time [ Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC C7.

Select unaffected channels on PS455F:

Failed Channel Select P455 CH4571456 P456 CH455/458 P457 CH455/456 P458 CH455/456 OATC C8.

Perform the following:

a. Check PRZR pressure STABLE AT APPROXIMATELY 2235 PSIG.

b. Place PRZR heaters in AUTO.

c.

Place PRZR spray valve controllers in AUTO.

RNO:

a. Adjust PRZR pressure to approximately 2235 psig using PRZR heaters and sprays.

Cue to Simbooth: IF asked, the Shift Manager has given permission to place the PRZR pressure control system in auto.

OATC C9.

Place PORVs in AUTO and verify proper operation.

OATC ClO.

Return PRZR pressure Master Controller to AUTO.

17

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

PRZR Pressure channel PT-455 fails high resulting in PRZR PORV 455A and both PRZR Sprays fully opening. The OATC will have to take manual action to prevent a Reactor trip and SI.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

]

OATC Cii.

Select same channel on PS-455G PRZR PRESS REC SEL as selected on PS-455F.

457 OATC Ci2.

Check P-i i status light on BPLB indicates correctly for plant condition within one hour.

OFF OATC C13.

Notify l&C to initiate repairs.

SS will call typically call the SSS to perform the following:

Notify Operations Duty Manager of the AOP entry Write a Condition Report Notify l&C OATC C14.

Bypass the affected instrument channel using 13509 C, BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI) PANEL OPERATION, if desired.

NOTE: SS is NOT expected to bypass failed channel.

18

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

PRZR Pressure channel PT-455 fails high resulting in PRZR PORV 455A and both PRZR Sprays fully opening. The OATC will have to take manual action to prevent a Reactor trip and SI.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 015.

Trip the affected channel bistables and place the associated MASTER TEST switches in TEST position per TABLE Cl within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . (TS 3.3.1 & 3.3.2)

NOTE: SS expected to leave bistables untripped during allowed out of service time to facilitate troubleshooting by I&C.

SS C16.

Initiate the applicable actions of:

TS3.3.1 ReactorTrip Function Condition LCO3.3.1 A

6OTzXT E

8a Low PRZR pressure M

8b High PRZR pressure E

TS3.3.2ESFAS Function Condition LCO3.3.2 A

id SI low PRZR pressure D

8b P-i 1 Interlock L (one hour action)

TS 3.4.1.a DNB RCS pressure < 2199 psig B (Momentary) 19

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

PRZR Pressure channel PT-455 fails high resulting in PRZR PORV 455A and both PRZR Sprays fully opening. The OATC will have to take manual action to prevent a Reactor trip and SI.

Time Position_[

Applicants Action or Behavior SS C17.

Check repairs and surveillances

- COMPLETE.

RNO:

C17.

Perform the following:

a.

WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete, THEN perform step C18.

b.

Return to procedure and step in effect.

END OF EVENT 4, proceed to EVENT 5.

20

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Main Turbine EHC pump 1 trips and the standby pump fails to automatically start on low pressure. The UO will refer to ARP-17033-1 for corrective actions. The standby pump will be manually started to prevent a turbine trip on low EHC pressure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnoses trip of EHC pump:

Alarms:

ALB33-B07 480V SWGR 1 NB02 TROUBLE ALB2O-D05 HYD FLUID LO PRESS (after several minutes)

Indications:

EHC pump 1 (HS-6539):

RedOFF Amber-ON GreenON EHC pressure (P1-6338) <1600 psig and lowering.

EHC Pump 1 amps (11-40073) drop to 0 amps.

UO Refers to ARP 17033-1 for Window B07.

(480V SWGR 1 NBO2 TROUBLE) 21

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Main Turbine EHC pump 1 trips and the standby pump fails to automatically start on low pressure. The UO will refer to ARP-17033-1 for corrective actions. The standby pump will be manually started to prevent a turbine trip on low EHC pressure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO ARP 17033-1 WINDOW B07 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE

1. One of the breakers on Switchgear 1 NBO2 tripped due to a fault.

2.

Bus ground fault.

3.

Potential transformer/fuse failure.

4.

Loss of bus voltage from Switchgear 1 NAO4.

5. Transformer 1 NBO2X winding high temperature.

6. Loss of 1 25V DC control power from Panel 1 ND21.

7.

Loss of power to transformer temperature monitor.

2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NONE 22

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Main Turbine EHC pump 1 trips and the standby pump fails to automatically start on low pressure. The UO will refer to ARP-17033-1 for corrective actions. The standby pump will be manually started to prevent a turbine trip on low EHC pressure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO NOTE: Loss of 125V DC control power results in loss of breaker remote/local remote operating capabilities and associated control circuit trip features.

3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. Check for associated alarms and indications.

2.

Dispatch an operator to Switchgear 1 NBO2 to check for:

a.

Ground fault indications.

b.

Other abnormal conditions.

3.

IF alarm is due to a breaker tripping on fault or undervoltage:

a. Determine affected loads.

b. Start redundant loads, if applicable.

4.

IF alarm is due to a loss of 125V DC control power, dispatch an operator to the switchgear to manually operate breakers, under the direction of the Control Room.

5.

IF a bus ground fault is indicated, selectively shift to redundant loads and de-energize components to locate the ground.

23

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Main Turbine EHC pump 1 trips and the standby pump fails to automatically start on low pressure. The UO will refer to ARP-17033-1 for corrective actions. The standby pump will be manually started to prevent a turbine trip on low EHC pressure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior uO 40 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued) 6.

Initiate maintenance as required to correct cause of the alarm.

5.0 COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS 1.

Initiate maintenance to correct problem (i.e., restore alarm).

2.

IF after three days the alarm has NOT been restored, initiate a Temporary Modification per 00307-C, Temporary Modifications to clear the bad input(s).

Record this action required on Figure 5 of 10018-C, Annunciator Control.

24

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Main Turbine EHC pump 1 trips and the standby pump fails to automatically start on low pressure. The UO will refer to ARP-17033-1 for corrective actions. The standby pump will be manually started to prevent a turbine trip on low EHC pressure.

Time Position]

Applicants Action or Behavior ARP 17020-1 WINDOW D05 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE 1.

Failure of Electrohydraulic Control (EHC) Fluid Pumps.

2.

Clogged strainers and filters in pump suction or discharge.

3.

EHC Fluid System leak.

2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 1.

If pressure drops below 1400 psig, the standby EHC Fluid Pump will start.

2.

If pressure continues to drop to 1100 psig, the Turbine will trip.

3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS 1.

IF a reactor trip occurs, Go To 19000 C, E 0 Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection.

2.

Verify standby EHC Fluid Pump is on, if needed.

4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS CAUTION EHC fluid is a fire resistant fluid that may be harmful to personnel. Observe proper safety precautions when in contact with this fluid.

1.

Dispatch an operator to the Hydraulic Power Unit to check for system leaks or pump failure.

2.

IF equipment failure is indicated, initiate maintenance as required.

25

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Main Turbine EHC pump 1 trips and the standby pump fails to automatically start on low pressure. The UO will refer to ARP-17033-1 for corrective actions. The standby pump will be manually started to prevent a turbine trip on low EHC pressure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO NOTE: Student notices green and amber lights for EHC pump 1 and then starts EHC pump 2 with SS permission.

NOTE: After starting EHC pump 2 EHC pressure returns to 1600 psig.

UO Will call SSS to:

SS Write condition report Notify Maintenance END OF EVENT 5, proceed to EVENT 6.

26

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 2-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

6 Event

Description:

SG 1 develops a 15 GPM tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL> 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required. This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose SG Tube Leakage:

ALARMS:

ALBO5-B03 INTMD RADIATION ALARM ALBO5-C03 HIGH RADIATION RE-0724 Primary to secondary leakage monitor (IPC)

RE-0810 SJAE low range monitor (IPC)

RE-12839C SJAE monitor (IPC)

INDICATIONS:

Charging flow increases if in auto. (expect manual control)

PRZR level slowly lowers.

SS Enters AOP 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak and directs actions of OATC / UO listed in the following steps. (Crew Update)

OATC / UO 1.

Initiate continuous actions page.

OATC 2.

Maintains PRZR level by:

a. Adjusting charging flow.

b. Check PRZR level stable or rising.

RNOb.1) Isolating letdown (only necessary if at 120 GPM.

letdown)

RNOb.2) Start additional charging pump. (will not be necessary)

RNOb.3) IE PRZR level can NQI be maintained greater than 9%,

THEN perform the following:

a. Trip the Reactor.

b. WHEN Reactor trip verified, THEN actuate SI.

c. Go to 19000 C, E 0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

27

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

6 Event

Description:

SG 1 develops a 15 GPM tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL> 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required. This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 3.

Try to identify affected SG:

SS

a. Direct Chemistry attempt to identify the leaking SG by initiating 31 120-C.

UO

b. Check SG level indications stable or rising with relatively lower feed flow rate. (will not be able to see this)

OATC 4.

Verifies VCT level maintained with automatic makeup control OATC / SS 5.

Check leak rate < 5 GPM as determined by CVCS flow balance.

[charging (letdown + seal leak off)]

(Leak rate will be -15 GPM)

RNO a. Initiate 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction.

RNO b. Be in mode 3 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

RNOc. Go to step 11.

SS Initiates a unit shutdown per AOP-18013-C, Rapid Down Power.

Entry Condition Target Approx. Time

@ 3-5%/rn in 1701 5-D05 MFPT High Vibrations

<70% RTP 5-8 minutes 1 7015-E01 1701 9-B04 Condenser Low Vacuum >22.42 18025-C Vacuum Hg and STABLE or orCirc Water Pump Trip RISING or Loss of utility Water 18009-C SG Tube Leak (75 gpd

<50% RTP within 1 10-17 minutes with an ROC 30 hour3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months gpd/hr) 18009-C SG Tube Leak (5 20% RTP within 1 16-27 gpm) hour & trip minutes reactor 1 8039-C Confirmed Loose Part 20% RTP quickly 16-27 minutes SS determination based As determined by on theSS plant conditions 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

6 Event

Description:

SG 1 develops a 15 GPM tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL> 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required. This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 1.

Performs SHUTDOWN BRIEFING METHOD Auto rod control should be used.

Reduce Turbine Load at approximately 3% RTP per minute (approx 36 MWe) up to 5% RTP (approx 60 MWe).

Borate considering the calculations from the reactivity briefing sheet and BEACON.

Maintain AFD within the doghouse.

SS (or SRO designee)

- Maintain supervisory oversight.

AU rod withdrawals will be approved by the SS.

Approval for each reactivity manipulation is not necessary as long as manipulations are made within the boundaries established in this briefing (i.e. turbine load adjustment up to 60 MWe, etc.).

A crew update should be performed at approximately every 100 MWe power change.

If manpower is available, peer checks should be used for all reactivity changes.

OPERATIONAL LIMITS Maintain TAVG within +/-6°F of TREE. If TAVG/TREF mismatch

>6°F and not trending toward a matched condition if TAVG 551°F, then trip the reactor.

If load reduction due to a loss of vacuum, every effort should be made to maintain the steam dumps closed. (Permissive C-9

> 24.92° Hg).

INDUSTRY OE Shift supervision must maintain effective oversight and exercise conservative decision making.

Correction of significant RCS TAVO deviations should only be via secondary plant control manipulations and primary plant control manipulations. (i.e., do not withdraw control rods or dilute).

29

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

6 Event

Description:

SG 1 develops a 15 GPM tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL>5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required. This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 2.

Verify rods in AUTO.

UO 3.

Reduce Turbine Load at the desired rate up to 5%/rn in (60 MWE/rnin).

OATC 4.

Borate as necessary by initiating 13009, CVCS REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEM.

Note to examiner: Boration steps from 13009 start on page # 32.

IF, crew Emergency Borates, steps from 13009 start on page # 38.

OATC / UO 5.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

OATC / UO 6.

Check desired ramp rate

- LESS THAN Q EQUAL TO 5%/MI N.

OATC 7.

Maintain Tavg within 6°F of Tref:

a. Monitor Tavg/Tref deviation (UT-0495).

b. Verify rods inserting as required.

c. Energize Pressurizer back-up heaters as necessary.

OATC / UO 8.

Maintain reactor power and turbine power MATCHED.

a. Balance reactor power with secondary power reduction using boration and control rods.

b. Check rate of reactor power reduction ADEQUATE FOR PLANT CONDITIONS.

c. Check RCS Tavg GREATER THAN 551 °F (TS 3.4.2).

d. Check RCS Tavg

- WITHIN 6°F OF TREF.

30

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

6 Event

Description:

SG 1 develops a 15 GPM tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL> 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required. This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 9.

Maintain PRZR Pressure AT 2235 PSIG.

OATC 10.

Maintain PRZR Level AT PROGRAM.

UO 11.

Maintain SG Level BETWEEN 60% AND 70%.

SS 12.

Notify the System Operator that a load reduction is in progress.

SS 13.

Notify SM to make the following notifications as appropriate:

Plant Management Notifications using 10000-C, CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS.

91001-C, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS.

00152, FEDERAL AND STATE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

Chemistry Technical Specification sampling for load reductions greater than 15% using 35110 C, CHEMISTRY CONTROL OF THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.

QC to perform a NOPT inspection using 84008, RPV ALLOY 600 MATERIAL INSPECTIONS AND REPORTS for reactor shutdowns.

NOTE Event will continue until adequate power maneuver completed as determined by the NRC Chief Examiner, at that point, the SGTR will occur and the crew will trip the plant lAW 18009-C, step 3.b RNO.

END OF EVENT 6, proceed to EVENT 7.

31

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

6 Rapid Power Reduction boration steps Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction boration steps from 13009.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.2 BORATION 4.2.1 Determine the existing RCS boron concentration from Boron Meter 1-Al-40134 OR by sample analysis.

4.2.2 To determine the number of gallons of boric acid required to borate the RCS, perform the following.

IF borating to required boron for a xenon free cool down, obtain the maximum boron concentration for the cool down range from the PTDB Tab 1.3.4-Ti and T2.

OR IF borating to a desired boron concentration, determine the desired change in boron concentration by subtracting the existing concentration from the desired concentration.

THEN Determine the amount of boric acid necessary to accomplish the desired change in boron concentration using PTDB Tab 2.3 and correct the obtained value using PTDB Tab 2.1.

Note to examiner: The OATC may also use a Beacon Book calculation to obtain a boron addition target for the Rapid Power Reduction. For a power reduction to 70%, this will be a boron addition of 230 gallons at 30 gpm.

OATC 4.2.3 Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1 -HS-40001 B in STOP.

OATC 4.2.4 Place VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT i-HS-40001A in BOR.

32

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

6 Rapid Power Reduction boration steps Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction boration steps from 13009.

((, Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE If necessary, boric acid flow may be adjusted using 1 -FIC-Ol 10 with SS concurrence. Changes to pot setting should be logged in the Control Room Log and restored at completion of activity.

OATC 4.2.5 Adjust potentiometer on Boric Acid Blender Flow Controller 1 -FIC-Ol 10 as desired and verify in AUTO.

CAUTION Digital counter setting on BORIC ACID TO BLENDER integrator 1-FQI-01 10 reads in tenth-gallon increments.

OATC 4.2.6 Set BORIC ACID TO BLENDER integrator 1 -FQI-01 10 to the desired amount of Boric Acid.

33

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

6 Rapid Power Reduction boration steps Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction boration steps from 13009.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.2.7 Verify the following:

BA TO BLENDER 1 -HS-O1 1 OA is in AUTO.

. BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT 1 -HS-01 1 OB is in AUTO.

. One Boric Acid Transfer Pump in AUTO or START.

RX MU WTR TO BA BLENDER 1 -FV-01 11 A is closed with 1HS-O111A in AUTO.

. BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT 1 -FV-01 11 B is closed with 1HS-O111B in AUTO.

NOTES Boration can be manually stopped at any time by placing 1-HS-40001B in STOP.

VCT pressure, 1 -P1-115 should be maintained between 20 and 45 psig.

OATC 4.2.8 Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1 -HS-40001 B in START and perform the following:

Verify Boric Acid Transfer Pump is running.

Verify 1 -FV-O1 1 OB is open.

Verify 1 -FV01 1 OA throttles open to provide desired flow on 1-Fl-O11OA.

Monitor BORIC ACID TO BLENDER integrator 1 -FQI-01 10.

34

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

6 Rapid Power Reduction boration steps Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction boration steps from 13009.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.2.9 WHEN 1 -FQI-01 10 BORIC ACID TO BLENDER integrator reaches its setpoint, verify boration stops and the following valves close.

1 -FV-01 1 OA, BA TO BLENDER 1-FV-01 lOB, BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT OATC 4.2.10 Flush approximately 15 gallons of Reactor Makeup Water through 1 -FV-01 1 OB by performing the flowing:

a. Place VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT 1-HS-40001A to ALT DIL.

b. Set TOTAL MAKEUP integrator 1 -FQI-01 1 1 for 13 to 15 gallons.

c.

Place BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT 1 -HS-01 11 B in CLOSE.

d. Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1 -HS-40001 B in START.

e. Verify flow is indicated on 1 -FI-Ol 1 OB.

f.

WHEN TOTAL MAKEUP integrator 1 -FQI reaches the desired setpoint, verify the following valves close:

1-FV-O111A, RX MU WTRTO BA BLENDER 1-FV-01 lOB, BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT 35

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

6 Rapid Power Reduction boration steps Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction boration steps from 13009.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.2.11 Verify 1-FIC-OllO potentiometer is set to setting recorded prior to boration (or as directed by SS).

OATC 4.2.12 Align Reactor Makeup Control system for automatic operation as follows:

COMPONENT NAME POSITION a.

1 HS-1 1 OB BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT AUTO b.

IHS-40001A VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT AUTO c.

1 -I-IS-40001 B VCT MAKEUP CONTROL START OATC 4.2.13 IF BA TRANSFER PUMP was placed in START at Step 4.2.7, return to AUTO oras directed bySS.

OATC 4.2.14 Monitor RCS Tavg, source range count rate, and Reactor Power as applicable.

OATC 4.2.15 Operate the Pressurizer Back-up Heaters as necessary to equalize boron concentration between the RCS and the Pressurizer.

36

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

6 Rapid Power Reduction boration steps Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction boration steps from 13009.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.2.16 Verify desired boration through sample analysis or from Boron Concentration Meter 1-1 208-T6-006. (1 -Al-401 34)

Return to EVENT 6, Rapid Power Reduction, page # 30, step 4.

37

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 38 of 3 Event No.:

6, Steps for Emergency Boration if crew opts to perform.

Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction Emergency Boration steps.

Time Position J Applicants Action or Behavior 1

NOTE: Table 1 provides a convenient tool for checking Emergency Boration flow path alternatives.

OATC 4.9.1 Emergency Boration Through 1-HV-8104 OATC 4.9.1.1 Start one (1) Boric Acid Transfer Pump.

OATC 4.9.1.2 Verify a Charging Pump is running.

OATC 4.9.1.3 Open EMERGENCY BORATE valve 1-HV-8104.

NOTE: The following step assumes that with 12 gpm of seal return, 30 gpm will be supplied to the RCS.

OATC 4.9.1.4 Place 1-FIC-0121 in MANUAL.

OATC 4.9.1.5 Adjust 1-FIC-0121 to maintain flow greater than 42 gpm.

NOTES:

IPC computer point for Boric Acid flow Rate is F0183 (GPM).

Computer point for Boric Acid Totalized Flow is UFO1 83 (Gallons)

OATC 4.9.1.6 Verify Emergency Boration flow 1-Fl-0183 greater than 30 gpm.

38

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 39 of 3 Event No.:

6, Steps for Emergency Boration if crew opts to perform.

Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction Emergency Boration steps.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.9.1.7 If flow is less than 30 gpm, start the second Boric Acid Transfer Pump.

OATC 4.9.1.8 Operate the Pressurizer Backup Heaters as necessary to equalize boron concentration between the RCS and the Pressurizer.

OATC 4.9.1.9 Check plant conditions are consistent with the boration of the RCS:

RCS Tavg may be dropping.

NIS may be dropping.

OATC 4.9.1.10 Determine the amount of boric acid required to allow termination of Emergency Boration.

NOTE: Monitor Boric Acid Flow Rate computer point F0183. After flow has started the totalized flow should be reset by selecting Reset Boric Acid Flow Totalizer from the IPC System Menu.

OATC 4.9.1.11 When the determined amount of boric acid has been added to the RCS, close 1-HV-8104.

OATC 4.9.1.12 Return the Boric Acid Transfer Pumps to the desired system configuration.

OATC 4.9.1.13 Restore 1-FIC-0121 to the AUTO position.

39

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 2-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 40 of 3 Event No.:

6, Steps for Emergency Boration if crew opts to perform.

Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction Emergency Boration steps.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.9.1.14 Direct Chemistry to sample and report the RCS boron concentration, or monitor the Boron Meter 1 -Al-401 34 if available.

Return to EVENT 6, Rapid Power Reduction, page # 30, step 4.

40

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 2-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 1 with complications. The TDAFW steam supply from SG # 1 will not close requiring the crew to trip the TDAFW pump using the Trip and Throttle Valve. In addition, after depressurizing the RCS with PRZR spray to refill the PRZR and lower break flow, a PRZR spray will not close requiring the crew to stop RCP #4.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Performs Immediate Operator Actions per 1 9000-C, E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

SS Makes a page announcement of Reactor Trip.

OATC

1. Check Reactor Trip: (YES)

Rod Bottom Lights LIT Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers OPEN Neutron Flux LOWERING UO

2. Check Turbine Trip: (YES)

All Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED UO

3. Check Power to AC Emergency Buses. (YES) a.

AC Emergency Busses AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED.

4l6OAClEBusses b.

AC Emergency Busses ALL ENERGIZED.

. 4l6OVAClEBusses

480V AC 1 E Busses OATC

4. Check if SI is actuated. (YES)

Any SI annunciators LIT

. SI ACTUATED BPLP window LIT SS Go to Step 6.

41

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 1 with complications. The TDAFW steam supply from SG # 1 will not close requiring the crew to trip the TDAFW pump using the Trip and Throttle Valve. In addition, after depressurizing the RCS with PRZR spray to refill the PRZR and lower break flow, a PRZR spray will not close requiring the crew to stop RCP # 4.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS

6. Initiate the Foldout Page.

CREW SS

7. Perform the following:

OATC OATC Initial Actions Page (Note to examiner, start page 43)

UO UO Initial Actions Page (Note to examiner, start page 46)

NOTE: SS initiates step 8 after OATC/UO Initial Actions completed.

42

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 1 with complications. The TDAFW steam supply from SG # 1 will not close requiring the crew to trip the TDAFW pump using the Trip and Throttle Valve. In addition, after depressurizing the RCS with PRZR spray to refill the PRZR and lower break flow, a PRZR spray will not close requiring the crew to stop RCP #4.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS

1. Check both trains of ECCS equipment ALIGNING FOR INJECTION PHASE: (YES)

MLB indication OATC

2. Check Containment Isolation Phase A ACTUATED. (YES)

CIA MLB indication OATC

3. Check ECCS Pumps and NCP status:

a.

CCPs RUNNING. (YES) b.

SI Pumps RUNNING. (YES) c.

RHR pumps RUNNING. (YES) d.

NCP TRIPPED. (YES)

OATC

4. Verify CCW Pumps ONLY TWO RUNNING TRAIN B. (YES) 43

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 2-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 1 with complications. The TDAFW steam supply from SG # 1 will not close requiring the crew to trip the TDAFW pump using the Trip and Throttle Valve. In addition, after depressurizing the RCS with PRZR spray to refill the PRZR and lower break flow, a PRZR spray will not close requiring the crew to stop RCP #4.

[

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 1

OATC PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS

5. Verify proper NSCW system operation: (YES) a.

NSCW Pumps - ONLY TWO RUNNING PER TRAIN.

b.

NSCW TOWER RTN HDR BYPASS BASIN hand switches IN AUTO:

. HS-1669A

. HS-1668A OATC

6. Verify Containment Cooling Units: (YES) a.

ALL RUNNING IN LOW SPEED. (YES)

. MLB indication b.

NSCW Cooler isolation valves OPEN. (YES)

MLB indication OATC

7. Check Containment Ventilation Isolation.

a.

Dampers and Valves CLOSED. (YES) 44

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 1 with complications. The TDAFW steam supply from SG # 1 will not close requiring the crew to trip the TDAFW pump using the Trip and Throttle Valve. In addition, after depressurizing the RCS with PRZR spray to refill the PRZR and lower break flow, a PRZR spray will not close requiring the crew to stop RCP #4.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS

8. Check Containment pressure REMAINED LESS THAN 21 PSIG.

(YES)

OATC

9. Check ECCS flows:

a.

BIT flow (YES) b.

RCS pressure LESS THAN 1625 PSIG. (YES) c.

SI Pump flow. (YES) d.

RCS pressure LESS THAN 300 PSIG. (NO)

RNO d.

GotoSteplO.

OATC

10. Check ECCS Valve alignment PROPER INJECTION LINEUP INDICATED ON MLBs. (YES)

OATC

11. Check ACCW pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING. (YES)

OATC

12. Adjust Seal Injection flow to all RCPs 8 to 13 GPM.

OATC

13. Dispatch Operator to ensure one train of SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING in service per 13719, SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM.

END OF OATC INITIAL ACTIONS - RETURNS TO MAIN BODY OF 19000-C CONTINUING AT STEP 8, page # 49.

45

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 2-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 1 with complications. The TDAFW steam supply from SG # 1 will not close requiring the crew to trip the TDAFW pump using the Trip and Throttle Valve. In addition, after depressurizing the RCS with PRZR spray to refill the PRZR and lower break flow, a PRZR spray will not close requiring the crew to stop RCP #4.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS

1. Check AFW Pumps RUNNING. (YES)

MDAFW Pumps TDAFW Pump, if required.

UO

2. Check NR level in at least one SG GREATER THAN 10%.

(32% ADVERSE). (YES)

UO

3. Check if main steamlines should be isolated: (NO) a.

Check for one of more of the following conditions:

Any steam line pressure LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 585 PSIG.

Containment pressure GREATER THAN 14.5 PSIG.

Low Steam Pressure SI/SLI BLOCKED AND High Steam Pressure Rate ON TWO OR MORE CHANNELS OF ANY STEAMLINE.

RNO a.

GotoStep4.

46

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 2-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 1 with complications. The TDAFW steam supply from SG # 1 will not close requiring the crew to trip the TDAFW pump using the Trip and Throttle Valve. In addition, after depressurizing the RCS with PRZR spray to refill the PRZR and lower break flow, a PRZR spray will not close requiring the crew to stop RCP #4.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS

4. Verify FW Isolation Valves closed: (YES)

MFIVs BFIVs MFRVs BFRVs UO

5. Verify SG Blowdown isolated: (YES)

Place SG Blowdown Isolation Valve handswitches HS-7603A, B, C, and D in the CLOSE position.

SG Sample Isolation Valves CLOSED.

UO

6. Verify Diesel Generators RUNNING. (YES)

UO

7. Throttle total AFW flow as necessary to maintain SG NR levels between 10% (32% ADVERSE) and 65%.

UO

8. Verify both MFPs TRIPPED. (YES) 47

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 1 with complications. The TDAFW steam supply from SG # 1 will not close requiring the crew to trip the TDAFW pump using the Trip and Throttle Valve. In addition, after depressurizing the RCS with PRZR spray to refill the PRZR and lower break flow, a PRZR spray will not close requiring the crew to stop RCP #4.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO

9. Check Main Generator Output Breakers OPEN. (YES)

OATC BACK TO 19000-C PROCEDURE MAIN BODY, page # 49.

uO 48

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 1 with complications. The TDAFW steam supply from SG # 1 will not close requiring the crew to trip the TDAFW pump using the Trip and Throttle Valve. In addition, after depressurizing the RCS with PRZR spray to refill the PRZR and lower break flow, a PRZR spray will not close requiring the crew to stop RCP # 4.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW

8. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

OATC

9. Check RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F.

-OR-Without RCP(s) running RCS WR COLD LEG TEMPERATURES.

RNO (IF needed)

9. IF temperature is less than 557°F and lowering, THEN perform the following as necessary:

a.

Stop dumping steam.

b.

Perform the following as appropriate:

IF at least one SG NR level greater than 10%

(32% ADVERSE), THEN lower total feed flow.

-OR IF all SG NR levels less than 10% (32% ADVERSE), THEN lower total feed flow to NOT less than 570 gpm.

c.

If cooldown continues, THEN close MSIVs and BSIVs.

d.

If temperature greater than 557°F and rising, THEN dump steam.

49

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 1 with complications. The TDAFW steam supply from SG # 1 will not close requiring the crew to trip the TDAFW pump using the Trip and Throttle Valve. In addition, after depressurizing the RCS with PRZR spray to refill the PRZR and lower break flow, a PRZR spray will not close requiring the crew to stop RCP #4.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC CAUTION: A PRZR PORV Block Valve which was closed to isolate an excessively leaking or open PRZR PORV should not be opened unless used to prevent challenging the PRZR Safeties.

10. Check PRZR PORVs, Block Valves, and Spray Valves:

a.

PRZR PORVs - CLOSED AND IN AUTO. (YES) b.

Normal PRZR Spray Valves CLOSED. (YES) c.

Power to at least one Block Valve AVAILABLE. (YES) d.

PRZR PORV Block Valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (NO)

RNO

d. Verify open at least one PRZR PORV Block Valve when PRZR pressure is greater than 2185 psig.

OATC

11. Check if RCPs should be stopped:

a.

ECCS Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING: (YES)

CCPorSI Pump b.

RCS pressure LESS THAN 1375 PSIG. (NO)

RNO b.

GotoStepl2.

Note to examiner: It is expected RCP pressure will be above 1375 psig at this time.

50

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 2-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 1 with complications. The TDAFW steam supply from SG # 1 will not close requiring the crew to trip the TDAFW pump using the Trip and Throttle Valve. In addition, after depressurizing the RCS with PRZR spray to refill the PRZR and lower break flow, a PRZR spray will not close requiring the crew to stop RCP#4.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO

12. Check SGs secondary pressure boundaries:

a.

SG Pressures:

Any lowering in an uncontrolled manner. (NO)

-OR Any completely depressurized. (NO)

RNO a.

GotoStepl3.

51

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 2-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 1 with complications. The TDAFW steam supply from SG # 1 will not close requiring the crew to trip the TDAFW pump using the Trip and Throttle Valve. In addition, after depressurizing the RCS with PRZR spray to refill the PRZR and lower break flow, a PRZR spray will not close requiring the crew to stop RCP # 4.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO

13. Check SG Tubes intact:

a.

Direct Chemistry to take periodic activity samples of all SGs one at a time.

b.

Secondary Radiation NORMAL. (NO)

MAIN STEAM LINE MONITORS RE-13120(SG1)

RE-13121 (SG2)

RE-13122 (SG3)

RE-13119(SG4)

CNDSR AIR EJCTR/STM RAD MONITORS:

RE-12839 RE-12839D (if on scale)

RE-12839E (if on scale)

STM GEN LIQ PROCESS RAD:

RE-0019 (Sample)

RE-0021 (Blowdown)

SG sample radiation:

RNO b.

Go to 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE.

Note to examiner: 19030-C, E-3 SGTR actions are on following attachment.

52

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior FEW

1. Initiate the following:

Continuous Actions and Foldout Page.

Critical Safety Function Status Trees per 1 9200-C, F-OCRfl1CAL SAFEPI FIJNCflON STA11JSTF.

2. Initiate NMP-EP-1 10, Ei1VIcLAlFcATION DETSRMINATION AND lNrnALCTlON.

OAIC

3. Maintain Seal Injection flow to all FCF8 to 13GPM.

QA1O

4. Check if RDF should be stopped:

a.

EtSPumps-ATLEASTOF\\ERUNNING: (YES) ccP or Sip Pump

b. FtS pressure LTHAN 1375 FSIG. (NO)

FD b.

IFFtSpressure lowers to less than 1375 psig prior to initiation of RScooldown in Step 17.

11-EN stop all RDFand return to Step in effect.

Go to Step 5.

53

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO

5. Identify ruptured SG(s) by any of the following conditions.

Unexpected rise in any SG NR level.

High radiation from any 93 sample.

High radiation from any 93 steamline.

High radiation from any 93 blowdown line.

Note to examiner: 93 # 1 level will be rising with AFW flow throttled.

However, this is a hard call for the candidate until the TDARV steam supply is isolated in later steps since steam is being supplied to the TDAFW pump causing the level rise to NOT be as pronounced.

CAUTION: At least one 93 should be maintained available for FtS cooldown.

UO

6. Isolate ruptured SO(s):

Critical

a. Adjust ruptured SG ARV(s) controller setpoint to 1160 psig (pot setting 7.73)

b. check ruptured SGARV(s) CLCD.

PV-3000 (SG 1)

PV-301 0 (SO 2)

PV-3020 (SO 3)

PV-3030 (SO 4) 54

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time ] Position [

Applicants Action or Behavior CAUTION: If TDAFVV Pump is the only available AFW pump, maintain at least one steam supply 0P6J.

UO

7. Close affected TDAFW Pump Steam supply valve(s):

HV-3009 (SG 1) LP-1 MS SIYTO AUX FW TD PMP-1.

HV-301 9 (SG 2) LP-2 MS YTO AUX FW TD PMP-1.

Note to examiner: HV-3009 will NOT close.

AND Critical

7. IF at least one MDAFW Pump running, THEN trip the TDAFW Pump by closing PV-1 51 29 using HS-15111.

UO

8. Verify SG Blowdown Isolation Valves CLOSED WITH Critical HANDSWITCHES IN CLOSE POSTION.

Note to examiner: HV-7603A.

OAIC

9. Isolate flow from the ruptured SG(s) by closing its Main Critical Steamline isolation and Bypass Valves.

Note to examiner: HV-3006A I B, HV-1 3006A I B.

55

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position {

Applicants Action or Behavior CAUTIONS:

This procedure should be performed in a timely manner to assure that break flow in the ruptured SG(s) is terminated before water enters the SGs main steam piping.

Any ruptured SG that is also faulted, should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for FCScooldown or 33 activity sample.

UO

10. Check ruptured SG(s) level:

a.

33 NR level GFEATBR11-IAN 1CY%(32%ADV6. (YES) b.

Step feed flow to ruptured 33(s).

Close the TDAFW and MDAFW valves to SG # 1.

Critical (Note to examiner: 1 HS-51 22A and 1 HS-51 39A)

UO

11. Check ruptured SG(s) pressure GFEATBTl-lAN 290 FSIG.

(YES)

NOTE: When the low steamline pressure Sl,SLI is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur is the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

56

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

12. Check if low steamline pressure SI/SLI should be blocked:

UO a.

Steam dumps - AVAILAftE (YES)

QAIC b.

PFØpressure L11-IAN 2000 FlG. (YES)

UC c.

High steam pressure rate alarms CLEAR. (YES) d.

Block low steam line pressure SI/SLI using the following:

H4O068

[-40069 UC

13. Align steam Dumps for FCScooldown:

a.

lFSteam Dumps are inTAVG mode, (YES) 11-EN UO 1)

Match demand on SG Header Pressure Controller PIC-507 and ED demand meter U 1-500.

UC

2) Tinsfer Steam Dumps toSTM P1 mode using HS-500C.

b.

FtS temperature GFEATBTfHAN 550°F.

UO c.

AsFtScooldown is initiated, hold HS-0500A and l-S05008 in the BYPA INTBiD( position until FCS temperature is less than 550°F.

UC

14. Raise intact SG levels prior to maximum rate cooldown.

57

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC

15. Check at least one R:FRUNNING. (YES)

SS

16. Determine required core exit temperature for cooldown.

Lowest Ruptured SG Core Exit Pressure (psig)

Temperature (°F) 1200 and greater 530 llOOto 1199 518 1000 to 1099 506 900 to 999 493 800 to 899 479 700 to 799 463 600 to 699 445 500 to 599 424 400 to 499 399 300 to 399 366 290 to 299 350 Note to examiner: Expect to pick either 518 or 506.

58

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UC

17. Initiate FtScooldown:

a.

Dump steam to Condenser from intact SG(s) at maximum rate using Steam Dumps by slowly raising demand on PC-507.

OA1C

18. Check if RScooldown should be stopped:

a.

Core Exit ICs - LS11-iAN FE)UIFEDTEMP611JFE.

(NOT AT THIS TIME)

FO a.

SM-EN core exits are less than required, Ti-EN perform steps 18.b and 18.c.

Note to examiner: This will take several minutes to reach GETtarget temperate of either 518 or 506.

UC b.

Stop FtScooldown.

c.

Maintain Core Exit TCs-LThANUITBv1PS1UE Note to examiner: The UC will use steam dumps to maintain.

59

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO

19. Check intactSG levels:

a.

NR level - ATLEASrOI\\EGFEATBRTHAN 10%. (32%ADV)

(YES) b.

Maintain NR levels between jQD/ (32/oADV) and 65%.

c.

NR level AFW RlNG IN AN UNOONTRDLLED MANN8R. (NO)

AND

c. Go to Step 20.

DAlE

20. Check PFØFOFWsand Block Valves:

a.

Power to Pt F(JWBIock ValvesAVAILABLE. (YES)

b. R-iFcR/s-GLcD. (YES)

C.

[-RI-I RDFW Block Valves - AT LEASTO1.E OFEN. (NO)

AND c.

IFBlockValve NDT closed to isolate an excessively leaking or open Fi-ZH RDRJ, AND WFB\\J Fi-11-I pressure is greater than 2185 psig, TI-EN verify open at least one FORJ Block Valve.

60

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position {

Applicants Action or Behavior CAUTIONS:

If offsite power is lost after SI reset, action is required to restart the following Fequipment if plant conditions require their operation.

FHRPumps

. SiPumps

. Post-LOCACavity Purge Units

. Containment Coolers in low speed (Started in high speed on a UV signal)

. Chilled Water Pumps (If CR1 is reset)

OAIC

21. ResetSl.

CAUTION:

Repositioning Phase A Isolation Valves may cause radiation problems throughout the plant.

OAIC

22. Reset Containment Isolation Phase A.

61

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO

23. Establish Instrument Air to Containment.

a.

Instrument Air pressure GFEATTHAN 100 PG. (YES) b.

Open INSTRAIRCNMT ISO VLV HV-9378. (YES) c.

Verify PFØSpray Valves operating as required. (YES)

OATC

24. Check if R1-F( Pumps should be stopped:

a.

FfR Pumps - ANY RUNNING Wfll-1 SUDTION ALIGNED TO RAT.

(YES) b.

FCS pressure - GFEA1THAN 300 FSK3. (YES) c.

Stop RI-FPumps.

OAIC

25. IFFtSpressure lowers in an uncontrolled manner to less than 300 psig.

ThEN restart RI-F Pumps.

62

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 1 9030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE

[me Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC

26. Check if FtScooldown should be stopped.

a.

Core Exit its - LESS11-IAN FEDIJIFED TEMPBAilJFE. (YES, depending on how fast crew is, if NO, the crew will wait until < 518 or 506 and stop the cooldown per the RNO of this step) b.

Stop FtScooldown.

c.

Maintain Core Exit its-LESSTHAN lDUlFEDTB1PBA1UE CAUTION:

Ruptured SG pressure and ADS subcooling should begin to rise as ADS pressure recoveis after the cooldown is stopped.

UO

27. Check ruptured SG(s)pressureSTABLECRRSING.(YES)

OATC

28. Check ASSubcooling - GFEATBRTHAN 44°F.

(58°F ADVS) (YES)

OATC

29. Check all of the following:

ADS pressure - GFEATBTfl-IAN RUP1UED3(s)

FfJE (YES)

FHa-1 level - Li1-IAN 75% (52% ADVB). (YES)

30. Check Normal PIRrayAVAlLABLE. (YES) 63

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position [

Applicants Action or Behavior OATC

31. Depressurize RDS using Normal PFSpray to refill PFR.

Critical

a. Spray PRZR with maximum available spray.

Note to examiner: OA1ID must fully open BOTH spray valves to satisfy the critical step.

b.

Normal PFØRSpray - EFFBJflVE AT FEDLJCING ADSPFLFE (YES) c.

Go to Step 37.

OATC

37. Check if AF\\IY of the following conditions are satisfied.

BOTH of the following:

Critical

1) RCS pressure LESS THAN RUPTURED SO(s)

PRESSURE.

Critical

2) PRZR level GREATER THAN 9%. (37% ADVERSE)

-OR FcsSubcooling LTHAN 24oF (38°FAD)

-OR-Critical PRZR level GREATER THAN 75% (52% ADVERSE)

Note to examiner: Due to the nature ofaDBAS3TlRat Vogtle, it will be very close on whether it is BOTH FCP pressure & Fi-iH level as highlighted above OR PFØ level > 75% only. The OATC will close the spray valves based on the 1 st parameter obtained.

64

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time [ Position_J Applicants Action or Behavior QAIC

38. Terminate RSdepressurization:

a.

Verify Normal PFRSpray valve(s)

OLcD. (NO)

FD Critical a.

IF a Normal Spray valve can NOT be closed, THEN stop RCP 4.

IF PRZR pressure continues lowering uncontrollably, THEN stop RCP 1.

Note to examiner: It isexpected that RSpressure will be rising after stopping RDP#4. If NOT, then stopping RDP# 1 will also be a critical step.

b.

Verify PF1 FCPsJ(s) CLCD. (YES) c.

Block COFS.

d.

GheckAuxiliary Spray lNMGE(NO)

FD

d. Go to step 39.

OAIC

39. Check FtS pressure - RISING. (YES)

CAUTION BXSR.cWSHQIJLD BETBRMINATED when termination criteria are satisfied to prevent overfilling of the ruptured S.

65

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC

40. Check if ECCS flow should be terminated.

a.

RCS Subcooling GREATER THAN 24°F (38°F ADVERSE)

(YES)

b. Secondary Heat Sink:

UO Total feed flow to SGs GREATER THAN 570 GPM AVAILABLE (YES)

-OR NR level in at least one intact SG GREATER THAN 10%

(32% ADVERSE) (YES)

OATC c.

RCS pressure STABLE OR RISING. (YES) d.

PRZR level - GREATER THAN 9% (37% ADVERSE) (YES).

OATC

41. Stop ECCS Pumps and place in standby.

SI Pumps All but one CCP OATC

42. Establish charging flow:

a. Check Instrument Air AVAILABLE.

b. Open CCP normal miniflow isolation valves.

HV-81 1 1A CCP-A MINIFLOW HV-81 11 B CCP-B MINIFLOW HV-81 10 - CCP A & B COMMON MINIFLOW 66

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE j Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC

42. continued c.

Close CCP alternate miniflow valves:

HV-8508A - CC P-A RV TO RWST ISOLATION HV-8508B CCP-B RV TO RWST ISOLATION

d. Verify white Pressure Control Mode light NOT LIT:

HV-8508A - CCP-A RV TO RWST ISOLATION HV-8508B - CCP-B PC TO RWST ISOLATION

e. Close BIT DISCH ISOLATION VALVES:

HV-8801A HV-8801 B f.

Set SEAL FLOW CONTROL HC-182 to maximum seal flow (HC-0182 closed).

g. Open CHARGING TO RCS ISOLATION valves:

HV-8105 HV-8106 OATC

43. Control charging flow to maintain PRZR level and Seal injection flow to all RCPs8to 13GPM.

67

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE

[ Time Position [

Applicants Action or Behavior OATC

44. Check ECCS flow not required:

a.

RCS Subcooling GREATER THAN 24°F (38°F ADVERSE)

(YES) b.

PRZR level

- GREATER THAN 9% (37% ADVERSE) (YES)

END OF EVENT 7, END OF SCENARIO #3.

68

ML13071A144

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