ML070610369
| ML070610369 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 02/26/2007 |
| From: | Bowman C South Texas |
| To: | Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR/ADRO |
| References | |
| NOC-AE-07002104, STI: 32105401 | |
| Download: ML070610369 (110) | |
Text
Nuclear Operating Company South Teaas Prm/ed Electric Generating Station P.. Box 289 Wadsworth. Teas 77483 February 26, 2007 NOC-AE-07002104 10CFR50.90 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 South Texas Project Units I and 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50499 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information on Proposed Change to Technical Specification 3.3.3.6, "Accident Monitoring Instrumentation"
References:
- 1. Letter from T. J. Jordan, STPNOC, to NRC Document Control Desk dated October 2, 2006, "Revision to Proposed Change to Technical Specification 3.3.3.6, 'Accident Monitoring Instrumentation"' (TAC Nos. MD0934 and MD0935, ML062830032, NOC-AE-06002060)
- 2.
Informal NRC Request for Additional Information, E-mail from Mohan Thadani, NRC, to A. Harrison and S. Head, STPNOC, dated October 23, 2006 (ML062980024)
In Reference 1, STP Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) submitted a proposed amendment to South Texas Project Operating Licenses NPF-76 and NPF-80 to revise Technical Specification 3.3.3.6, "Accident Monitoring Instrumentation" with respect to the required action for inoperable Wide Range Reactor Coolant Temperature, Wide Range Steam Generator Level, and Auxiliary Feedwater Flow.
In Reference 2, the NRC staff requested additional information on with regard to the STPNOC application. The attachment to this letter responds to the NRC questions.
There are no commitments in this letter.
STI: 32105401
./\\ Ot
Attachment I NOC-AE-07002104 Page 2 If there are any questions regarding the proposed amendment or the responses, please contact Mr. A. W.
Harrison at (361) 972-7298 or me at (361) 972-7454.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on Vc/ 0' c5I7 Date Charles T. Bowman General Manager, Oversight Attachments:
- 1. Response to NRC Request for Additional Information
- 2. Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (OPOP05-EO-EOOO)
- 3.
Reactor Trip Response (OPOP05-EO-ESO1)
NOC-AE-07002104 Page 3 cc:
(paper copy)
(electronic copy)
Regional Administrator, Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, Texas 76011-8064 Senior Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. 0. Box 289, Mail Code: MN116 Wadsworth, TX 77483 C. M. Canady City of Austin Electric Utility Department 721 Barton Springs Road Austin, TX 78704 Richard A. Ratliff Bureau of Radiation Control Texas Department of State Health Services 1100 West 49th Street Austin, TX 78756-3189 A. H. Gutterman, Esquire Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP Mohan C. Thadani U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
,Steve Winn Christine Jacobs Eddy Daniels Marty Ryan NRG South Texas LP Ed Alarcon J. J. Nesrsta R. K. Temple Kevin Pollo City Public Service Jon C. Wood Cox Smith Matthews C. Kirksey City of Austin
Attachment NOC-AE-07002104 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information NOC-AE-07002104 Page 1 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT REQUEST FOR AMENDMENTS PROPOSED CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION TAC NOS. MD0934 AND MD0935 AFW FLOW INSTRUMENT CONCERNS Question #1:
How does an INOPERABLE AFW flow instrument channel affect the OPERABILITY and function of its associated AFW train? Per the South Texas license amendment request, it appears that an INOPERABLE AFW flow instrument channel may prevent the associated AFW train from automatically delivering a pre-set range of feed flow to its associated S/G, since the AFW regulator valve is controlled by QPDS using AFW flow. Is this correct?
Response
That is correct. If the inoperable AFW flow affects the control function, then application of the definition of OPERABILITY would require an operability evaluation for the associated train of AFW, which is governed by TS 3.7.1.2. Note that the accident analyses do not credit automatic AFW flow control; however, the associated AFW train would be inoperable if the condition prevented AFW actuation or flow. In any case, the proposed Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) actions apply only for inoperable indication of AFW flow.
For all questions, consider a range of malfunctions which would cause an AFW flow instrument to be considered INOPERABLE, to include: instrument failed high, instrument failed low, instrument failed at an intermediate AFW flow, and no signal from the AFW flow instrument to QPDS.
Question #1.a:
Response
Question #1.b:
Does an INOPERABLE AFW flow instrument channel cause the associated AFW train to be INOPERABLE?
If the condition prevents AFW actuation or flow or the ability to regulate the flow between 550 gpm and 675 gpm, the associated train of AFW would be inoperable per TS 3.7.1.2.
Isn't it a part of the current design basis for an AFW train to AUTOMATICALLY deliver a pre-set range of feed flow given a valid AFW actuation signal? (e.g., SI signal, LOOP with S/G low-low water level). How does an INOPERABLE AFW flow instrument channel affect this design basis?
Response
Yes. See response to l.a above.
Question #1.c:
For accidents where AFW actuation occurs (i.e., many events from the South Texas FSAR chapter 15 accident analysis), a value of AFW flow had to be assumed. Per the proposed new TS action statements, one AFW flow channel instrument could be INOPERABLE indefinitely. How does an INOPERABLE AFW flow instrument affect the AFW flow(s) assumed in the chapter 15 accident analysis?
NOC-AE-07002104 Page 2 Example: Consider a steam generator tube rupture accident on say S/G A, as described in STP's FSAR. Add in a failed low AFW flow instrument for S/G A, which would be allowed indefinitely per the proposed TS change. Without operator action, will the AFW flow regulator valve to S/G A be open too far (due to the failed low AFW flow instrument) and perhaps lead to overfill on S/G A?
Response
An inoperable AFW flow indication channel does not affect the Chapter 15 analyses. Only the indication function is affected by the proposed TS change.
If only indication is affected, the AFW train will function as designed. If the condition affects the ability of the AFW train to start or for the regulating valve to control flow between 550 gpm and 675 gpm, then TS 3.7.1.2 applies.
With AFW flow indication available in the other loops or alternate indication of SG level, then adequate level can be maintained in the SG for decay heat removal and cool down.
A failed low AFW flow transmitter will cause the regulating valve to open to its 675 gpm upper limit. The analysis assumes full flow for 10 minutes before the steam generator is isolated in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP). The EOP directs the operators to isolate AFW flow to the faulted steam generator.
Question #2:
When an AFW flow instrument channel becomes INOPERABLE, it appears that operators can take manual action to control the associated AFW regulator valve. Is this correct?
Response
Yes. The Operator can take manual control of the regulator valve from the Control Room after AFW actuation by resetting the actuation signal. The EOPs direct the operators to monitor narrow range steam generator level and manually control AFW flow to maintain the level to greater than 14% narrow range. The wording below is typical for management of steam generator level. Note that the AFW flow rates are called out in the "Response Not Obtained" column. However, even if the AFW flow rate indication is not available, AFW operation will be indicated by the control board indication for the AFW pump and regulator valve position. Flow can be confirmed by observing the steam generator level indication.
STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 14 MONITOR Intact SG Levels:
- a. NR levels - GREATER THAN 14%[34%]
- a. PERFORM the following:
- 1) MAINTAIN total AFW flow GREATER THAN 576 GPM to restore NR level GREATER THAN 14% [34%] in at least one SG.
- 2) any AFW pump fails to start. THEN:
a) RESET all SG LO-LO level AFW actuations.
b) CLOSE applicable AFW regulating valve.
c) OPEN applicable AFW cross connects.
d) CONTROL AFW flow to LESS THAN 675 GPM per AFW pump
Attachment I NOC-AE-07002104 Page 3 Question #2.a: Is this what operators do when an AFW flow channel instrument becomes INOPERABLE? If so, answer these associated questions:
No. Manual control is taken after AFW actuation by resetting the actuation signal, then taking manual control of the valve at the control board. There is not a manual/auto selector for the regulator valve.
Question #2.a.l:
How do operators know that an AFW flow channel instrument has become inoperable with AFW not running? Consider an AFW flow instrument failed high, failed low, instrument failed at an intermediate AFW flow, and no signal from the AFW flow instrument to QPDS. How would operators be alerted to these conditions? Alarms? Flow meter indications?
Response
PAMS TS surveillance requirements include a monthly channel check and 18 month channel calibration for AFW Flow. Flow is observed in the TS surveillance for the AFW pumps that is performed once per 31 days on a staggered test basis.
Question #2.b.l:
Response
Question #2.b.2:
Is taking manual control required by plant procedures? If so, please explain the procedure(s) entered (alarm procedure(s),
operating/abnormal procedure(s)) and provide the procedures to the NRC.
See the response to Question 2 above.
If taking manual control is an action required by procedures, in what amount of time after an AFW flow instrument is determined to be INOPERABLE will this action be taken?
Response
See the response to Question 2 above. Taking manual control of AFW is a response to steam generator level indication, not a response to a loss of AFW flow indication.
Question #2.b.3:
Does taking manual control of the AFW regulator valve restore that AFW train to OPERABLE?
Response
No. With the AFW flow input to the regulator valve inoperable, the associated train of AFW would be inoperable because it would not be able to meet its surveillance requirements. However, this question does not relate to the proposed TS change for PAMS, but pertains to the application of TS 3.7.1.2 for the AFW system.
Question #2.c:
Does taking manual control of the AFW regulator valve allow that train of AFW to return to being able to perform its design function of delivering a pre-set range of feed flow given a valid AFW actuation signal?
NOC-AE-07002104 Page 4
Response
As described above, the Operator can only take manual control of AFW flow by resetting the AFW actuation signal after an AFW actuation. The Operators can control AFW Flow to perform its design function to maintain SG level based on SG level indication. AFW will actuate after being reset if it receives an actuation signal.
Question #2.d:
Consider an INOPERABLE AFW flow channel instrument, with the associated AFW regulator valve in manual. What would be the response of that AFW train to a LOOP (and associated loss of normal feedwater)? Compare this to the FSAR analysis, where that train's AFW pump will start on the LOOP, but go into recirculation until a valid S/G low-low level signal is received. Please justify any differences in AFW response.
Response
This question relates to the actuation and flow control function for AFW which is governed by TS 3.7.1.2, not by the PAMS TS that STPNOC is seeking to change.
However, the response of the AFW system would not be significantly affected.
As previously described, the regulator valves are normally open and control flow
- between the limits of 550 gpm and 675 gpm when in automatic mode. With the valves in manual, upon receipt of an AFW actuation signal and a LOOP, the pump would start as required and initial flow to the SG would occur at a rate established by the AFW regulator valve position at the time of actuation (normally full-open). As discussed in the responses to Questions 2 and 5, the operators will manually manage AFW flow using SG level indication.
OTHER CONCERNS Question #3:
Please provide a listing for how the plant uses/where the output signal goes for each of the instruments considered in the proposed TS change:
RCS Loop Thot wide range RCS Loop Tcold wide range S/G water level wide range AFW flow Use plant drawings as necessary, and include any alarms, feeds to other instruments, interlocks, and displays where the outputs of the instruments are utilized. (The NRC would like to verify that Thot, Tcold, S/G level are primarily for indication ONLY, and that only AFW flow serves another purpose (regulator valve control).
Response
The STPNOC application identifies the other functions provided by the PAMS instrumentation.
The wide range reactor coolant inlet and outlet temperatures are input to the cold overpressure mitigation system (COMS). However, the TS for the COMS
Attachment I NOC-AE-07002104 Page 5 function is not applicable in MODE 1, 2 & 3 where the Accident Monitoring Instrumentation TS applies.
Steam Generator Level WR provides no control or protective function.
" AFW flow functions were described in the application and are the subject of other questions in this RAI. As discussed in the STPNOC responses, where the control functions are affected, the actions of TS 3.7.1.2 for the associated AFW train would apply.
Question #4:
Although in the LAR for STP it was stated how these instruments are used during an accident (e.g., EOP implementation, emergency action level classification), the NRC would like to conduct an independently verification. Would it be possible for STP to provide their entire EOP network to the NRC on a CD-rom? By entire EOP network, the NRC means:
- 1. The "baseline" EOPs (e.g., E-0, E-1, E-2, E-3).
- 2. Critical safety function status trees.
- 3. Functional restoration procedures.
- 4. Emergency contingency procedures (i.e., loss of all AC power, loss of ECCS recirculation, uncontrolled depressurization of all steam generators, LOCA outside containment, steam generator tube rupture without pressurizer pressure control, etc.)
- 4. Event specific procedures (i.e., reactor trip response, re-diagnosis, natural circulation cooldown, SI termination, post LOCA cooldown and depressurization, transfer to cold leg recirculation, etc.).
- 5. Emergency action level classification procedure which includes what plant data are used and how to classify events.
Response
As discussed with the NRC staff in teleconference on November 8, 2006, STPNOC resolved this request by agreeing to provide pertinent excerpts from the procedures in the responses to these questions.
Specifically, STPNOC agreed to provide the procedural guidance and references to respond to a loss of off-site power with a reactor trip and loss of normal feedwater, assuming a failure of Train A and Train D actuation. The relevant procedural requirements are the procedure for Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (OPOP05-EO-EOOO) and Reactor Trip Response (OPOP05-EO-ESOI). These procedures are provided in and Attachment 3, respectively. The operator action to manage AFW flow is highlighted. STPNOC considers this event successfully mitigated when the plant is stable in MODE 3, which is the licensing basis safe shutdown condition for STP.
Success criteria includes keeping the pressurizer from going water-solid.
STP EOPs also contain certain conditions where AFW flow value is specified. For an ATWS, AFW flow of greater than 1080 gpm is required due to the heat load. For uncontrolled depressurization of all steam generators, AFW flow of 100 gpm per SG is required to maintain the SGs in a wetted condition and to minimize the cooldown.
However, with AFW flow indication to two SGs still available in the control room, STP has adequate information to cooldown to RHR conditions.
Attachment I NOC-AE-07002104 Page 6 OTHER EVENT-SPECIFIC CONCERNS Question #5:
For a Loss of Normal Feedwater flow event, as described in section 15.2.7 of the licensee's UFSAR, a LOOP is assumed with a failure of ESFAS train A to actuate.
This results in only the B and C motor-driven AFW pumps running, with operator action required within 15 minutes to manually start either the A motor-driven AFW pump or the D steam-driven AFW pump. Explain how the operator action to manually start these AFW pumps would be affected assuming that the associated AFW flow indicator was INOPERABLE. Specifically:
Question #5.a:
Do you believe operators can successfully manually start an AFW pump without flow indication?
Response
Yes. Not having AFW flow indication does not affect the ability of the operator to manually start the AFW pumps. Indication of AFW flow will be evidenced by control board indication of the running AFW pumps, regulator valve position, and by observing increasing steam generator water level.
In discussion with the staff, STPNOC agreed that the Bases for the PAMS AFW flow indication would be improved by identifying the alternate indications of AFW flow. The alternate flow indications on the control board (AFW pump running, regulator valve position, and steam generator water level), are STPNOC's pre-planned alternate indication of AFW flow should one channel of AFW flow be expected to be inoperable for longer than 30 days or if more than one channel of AFW flow is inoperable. Operators will be briefed on the use of the alternate indications if their use is required.
The STPNOC license amendment request dated October 2, 2006 included the Bases changes excerpted below. STPNOC will enhance these Bases with the highlighted additions.
For channels ofAFWflow instrumentation, ACTION 35 applies only for loss of t**ihdicationflinction. If the control function of an A FWflow channel is
,inoperable, TS 3.7.1.2 is applicable.,
ACTION 35.b requires entry into the 7-day shutdown action if two or more of the four required SG wide range level instruments or two or more of the four required AFW flow instruments are inoperable. The Completion Time of 7 days is based on the relatively low probability of an event requiring PAM instrument operation and the availability of alternate means to obtain the required information. There is safety margin in this requirement in the availability of the functionally diverse indications and that unavailability of the level indication or the AFW flow indication does not make the associated steam generator unavailable as a heat sink if it is receiving flow. In the absence of direct AFW flow indication, AFW flow is evidenced by control board indication of the running AFWpumps, the regulator valve position, and by observation of inc.reasing steam generator water level.' With respect to the LONF event, the 7-day action is conservative because control board indication of running AFW pumps and steam generator level can still be used to confirm AFW flow to the
Attachment I NOC-AE-07002104 Page 7 steam generator in the absence of direct AFW flow indication in the unlikely event of an accident with two of the AFW flow channels inoperable. The alternate flow indications on the control board (AFW pump running, regulator valve position, and steam generator water level), are STPNOC's pre-planned alternate indication of AFWflow should one channel of AFWflow be expected to be inoperable for longer than 30 days or if more than one channel of AFW flow is inoperable. Operators will be briefed on the use of the alternate indications if their use is required.
With respect to the post-accident decay heat removal and determination of the need to initiate feed and bleed, the 7-day action is conservative because it can reasonably be expected that A FWflow and indication and steam generator level indication will be available for at least one generator in the unlikely event of an accident with two or more channels of either function inoperable. Continuous operation with two or more required channels inoperable in a function is not acceptable because the alternate indications may not fully meet all performance qualification requirements applied to the PAM instrumentation. Therefore, requiring restoration of at least three operable channels of thefunction limits the risk that the PAM function will be in a degraded condition should an accident occur.
Question #5.b:
Response
Question #5.c:
How will operators verify that they have successfully started an AFW pump without flow indication?
See response to #5.a Is there adequate guidance in plant procedures to ensure that operators can manually start an AFW pump without flow indication?
Yes. See Addendum 7 of attached procedure OPOP05-EO-ESOI as an example.
Are operators adequately trained such that they will be able to manually start an AFW pump without flow indication?
Response
Question #5.d:
Response
Question #5.e:
Yes. Operators understand that AFW flow can be determined by observing steam generator level and pump running indication.
Will operators be able to meet the 15-minute required action time, assuming one INOPERABLE AFW flow indicator (i.e., AFW flow indicator A is INOPERABLE, and operators choose to start the A AFW pump)
Yes. Inoperable AFW flow indication has no effect on operator response time.
Response
Question #5.f:
Response
NOC-AE-07002104 Page 8 Will operators be able to meet the 15-minute required action time, assuming two INOPERABLE AFW flow indicators (AFW flow indicators A and D INOPERABLE).
Yes. Inoperable AFW flow indication has no effect on operator response time.
Question #6:
Consider again a steam generator tube rupture accident, assuming the ruptured tube occurs on S/G A. Also assume that the AFW flow indicator for train A is failed high and INOPERABLE, such that the AFW regulator valve for train A will be more closed due to the failed instrument. Under these circumstances, AFW flow to the A S/G will be less than the AFW flow to the B, C, and D S/Gs. Could this lower AFW flow to the A S/G perhaps mask the A S/G level increasing from the tube rupture, when compared to the B, C, and D S/Gs which have higher AFW flow?
Response
This question is relevant to the flow regulating function governed by TS 3.7.1.2 rather than the flow indication function governed by the PAMS TS that STPNOC is seeking to change. However, in addition to rising steam generator level, the operators will use the steam line radiation monitors, the N-16 monitors, and the steam generator blowdown radiation monitors to identify the ruptured steam generator. Consequently, any difference in AFW flow would not be expected to affect the proper identification of the ruptured steam generator.
NOC-AE-07002104 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (OPOP05-EO-EOOO)
Adobe Acrobat 7.0 Document
The AFW Flow references are highlighted on the following pages:
Step 8 on p. 9 of 23 Step 22 on p.
Addendum 5, Conditional Inf Note that man Isolation of AF indication.
18of 23 08/09/05 Step 5 on p. 3of 8 DATE EFFECTIVE ormation Pages (last two pages of the procedure) agement of SG level is the success criteria for AFW flow.
W on the Conditional Information Pages does not require flow
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0 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION OPOPO5-EO-EOOO Rev.
19 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION DEPARTMENT PROCEDURE SAFETY RELATED (Q)
USAGE CONTROL:
In Hand Controlling Station LIST OF ATTACHMENTS:
0 0
0 0
0 0
Addendum 1, Addendum 2, Addendum 3, Addendum 4.
Addendum 5, Conditional Phase A Isolation Verification Establishing Alternate Charging Flow Control Emergency Electrical Loading Requirements Sequencer Loading Verification - Mode III Verification of SI Equipment Operation Information Page This procedure is applicable in Modes 1, 2. and 3 with RCS pressure GREATER THAN 1000 PSIG.
REV.
19 OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 1 OF 23 PURPOSE This procedure provides actions to verify proper response of the automatic protection systems following manual or automatic actuation of a Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to assess plant conditions, and identify the appropriate recovery procedure.
SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS
- 1) The following are symptoms that require a REACTOR TRIP, if one has not occurred:
o SR High Flux. 1/2 channels GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 105 CPS o
IR High Flux, 1/2 channels current GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 25% power o
PR (Low Setpoint). 2/4 channels GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 25% power o
PR (High Setpoint),
2/4 channels GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 109% Power o
PR High Rate, 2/4 channels rise GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 5% in LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 2 SECONDS o
OTDT, 2/4 channels GREATER THAN setpoint o
OPDT, 2/4 channels GREATER THAN setpoint o
Pressurizer Low Pressure, 2/4 channels LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 1870 PSIG o
Pressurizer High Pressure, 2/4 channels GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 2380 PSIG o
Pressurizer High Level, 2/4 channels GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 92%
o Single Loop Low Flow. 2/3 channels on 1/4 loops LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 91.8%
flow when power is GREATER THAN P-8 o
Two Loop Low Flow. 2/3 channels on 2/4 loops LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 91.8%
flow when power is GREATER THAN P-7 o
RCP Undervoltage. 2/4 sensors LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 10,014 V o
RCP Underfrequency. 2/4 LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 57.2 HZ o
SG LO-LO Level, 2/4 channels on 1/4 SG(s) LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 20% of NR o
Turbine Trip. 2/3 channels auto stop oil pressure LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 1245.8 psig OR 2/4 turbine throttle valves shut o
Safety Injection. 1/2 trains o
SSPS Urgent Failure. 2/2 logic train General Warning alarms
REV.
19 OPOPO5-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 2 OF 23
- 2)
The following are symptoms of a REACTOR TRIP:
o Any reactor trip annunciator lit o
Rapid lowering in neutron level o
All shutdown and control banks fully inserted with rod bottom lights lit
- 3)
The following are symptoms that require a REACTOR TRIP AND SAFETY INJECTION, if one has not occurred:
o Pressurizer Low Pressure. 2/4 channels LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 1857 PSIG and NOT BLOCKED o
Containment High Pressure. 2/3 channels GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 3 PSIG o
Low Compensated SG Pressure, 2/3 channels LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 735 PSIG on any SG and NOT BLOCKED
- 4)
The following are symptoms of a REACTOR TRIP AND SAFETY INJECTION:
o Any SI annunciator lit o
SI pumps running o
Phase A isolation o
STBY DGs running
- 5)
The following are entry conditions for OPOP05-EO-EOOO.
REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION:
o A Reactor Trip resulting from the Manual actuation of 1/2 Reactor Trip handswitches.
o A Safety Injection resulting from the Manual actuation of 1/2 Safety Injection handswitches.
o An automatic Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS IF any of the following conditions are met.
THEN USE adverse containment values:
o Containment pressure GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 5 PSIG.
o Containment radiation levels GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 105 R/HR.
o Containment integrated radiation dose GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 106 RADS.
REV.
19 OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 3 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE o
Steps 1 through 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION steps.
o Foldout CIP page should be open.
I VERIFY Reactor Trip:
o Rod bottom lights - LIT o Reactor trip and bypass breakers -
OPEN o Neutron flux -
LOWERING PERFORM the following:
- a. Manually TRIP reactor using both reactor trip switches.
- b.
IF reactor will NOT trip. THEN:
- 1) OPEN 480V LC 1K1(2K1) and ILI(2L) feeder breakers.
- 2) IF reactor will NOT trip. THEN GO TO OPOP05-EO-FRS1.
RESPONSE
TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION -
- ATWS, Step 1 AND MONITOR Critical Safety Functions.
- 3) IF reactor trip and bypass breakers DO NOT open. THEN DISPATCH an operator to open reactor trip and bypass breakers.
(60 ft EAB RM 323)
"REACTOR TRIP BREAKER R*
"REACTOR TRIP BREAKER 5" "BYPASS BREAKER R" "BYPASS BREAKER S"
- 4) WHEN the reactor is verified tripped, THEN CLOSE 480V LC IK1(2KI) and ILI(2L1) feeder breakers.
REV.
19 OPOPO5-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 4 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
-2 VERIFY Turbine Trip:
- a.
VERIFY all turbine throttle valves - CLOSED
__b.
Main generator output breaker OPEN
_c.
Main steam to deaerator valves -
CLOSED
- a.
PERFORM the following:
- 1) Manually TRIP turbine.
- 2) IF turbine will NOT trip. THEN:
a) PLACE EH pumps in PULL TO LOCK.
b) Manually RUNBACK turbine.
c) IF turbine throttle valves can NOT be closed, THEN CLOSE MSIVs and MSIBs.
- b. Manually OPEN breaker.
- c. Manually CLOSE valves.
REV.
19 OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 5 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
-3 VERIFY Power To AC ESF Busses:
__a.
AC ESF busses - AT ENERGIZED o 4.16KV ESF bus o 480V ESF LCs o 480V ESF MCCs LEAST ONE
- a.
PERFORM the following:
- 3) ENSURE "SPLY" and "OUTP" breakers for "4.16KV/480V XFMR"(s)
CLOSED.
- 4) IF power can NOT be restored to at least one AC ESF bus, THEN GO TO OPOP05-EO-ECOO, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER, Step 1 AND MONITOR Critical Safety Functions
_b.
AC ESF busses - ALL ENERGIZED o 4.16KV ESF busses o 480V ESF LCs o 480V ESF MCCs
- b.
TRY to restore power to deenergized AC ESF busses.
o Emergency START STBY DG.
o WHEN STBY DG is running. THEN ENSURE STBY DG Output Breaker CLOSED.
o ENSURE "SPLY" and "OUTP" breakers for "4.I6KV/480V XFMR"(s)
CLOSED.
REV.
19 OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 6 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 4
CHECK SI Status:
_a.
CHECK if SI is actuated o SI reactor trip first out annunciator
- LIT o ESF status monitoring red SI status lights - LIT
- a.
PERFORM the following:
- 1) CHECK if SI is required:
o Pressurizer pressure-LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 1857 PSIG AND NOT BLOCKED.
OR o Containment pressure -
GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 3 PSIG.
OR o Any SG pressure OR EQUAL TO 735 BLOCKED.
LESS THAN PSIG AND NOT OR o As directed by US/SS.
- 2) IF SI is required. THEN manually ACTUATE.
- 3) IF SI is NOT required.
THEN GO TO OPOPO5-EO-ES01.
REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE. Step 1 AND MONITOR Critical Safety Functions.
- b.
VERIFY all trains of SI -
ACTUATED
- b. Manually ACTUATE SI.
o Train A ESF status monitoring red SI status lights - LIT o Train B ESF status monitoring red SI status lights - LIT o Train C ESF status monitoring red SI status lights -
LIT
REV.
19 OPOPOS-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 7 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE ADDENDUM 5. VERIFICATION OF SI EQUIPMENT OPERATION is required to be completed before Functional Restoration Procedures are implemented.
Addendum 5 ensures that the ESF systems are functional.
5 VERIFY Proper SI Equipment Operation Per ADDENDUM 5. VERIFICATION OF SI EQUIPMENT OPERATION
REV.
19 OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 8 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 6
MONITOR If Containment Spray Is Required:
__a. Containment pressure - GREATER THAN 9.5 PSIG (QDPS)
- a. PERFORM the following:
- 1) CHECK Containment pressure -
HAS EXCEEDED 9.5 PSIG (CP-O18) o "PRESS PR-0934" OR o "EXTD RNG PRESS PR-9759"
- 2) I__ containment pressure HAS EXCEEDED 9.5 PSIG. THEN GO TO Step 6.b.
- 3) IF containment pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 9.5 PSIG.
THEN GO TO Step 7.
- b. Manually INITIATE containment spray.
__b.
VERIFY containment spray -
INITIATED
__c.
VERIFY containment isolation Phase B valves CLOSED
- c. Manually CLOSE valve(s).
__o "INL OCIV MOV-0318" o "INL OCIV MOV-0291"
-o "OUTL ICIV MOV-0542"
-o "OUTL ICIV MOV-0403" o "OUTL OCIV MOV-0404"
- d.
STOP ALL RCPs
REV.
19 OPOPO5-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 9 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 7
CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:
_a.
Seal injection flow - NORMAL
- a.
PERFORM the following:
o MAINTAIN seal injection flow
between 6 and 13 gpm
THEN:
a) TRIP the RCP(s).
b)
ENSURE one charging pump running and supplying seal injection.
c)
MAINTAIN seal injection flow between 6 and 13 gpm NOTE WHEN RCS temperature is controlled by the SG PORVs in AUTO.
THEN RCS temperature will be maintained at approximately 571OF at the SG PORV setpoint.
8
'w fMNITOR RCS Temperatures:-
PERFORM Substep a.
OR Substep b.
based on RCS temperature:
o WITH ANY RCP RUNNING, RCS TAVG STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 567 0 F
- a. JF temperature LESS THAN 567°F AND lowering. THEN:
OR MAINTAIN total AW flow-o WITHOUT ANY RCP RUNNING.
RCS TCOLD
,GREATER THAN 576 GPM unt il NR STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 567°F level is GREATER THAN 14%!°-.
[34%] in at least one SG.ý Step 8 continued on next page.
REV.
19 OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 10 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Step 8 continued from previous page.
- 2) ISOLATE steam loads as follows:
o ISOLATE steam dump drains.
o ISOLATE steam chest drains.
o ISOLATE steam to MSR and steam line drains to MSRs.
o TRIP all SGFPTs.
o STOP dumping steam.
o ISOLATE SGBD.
- 3) IF cooldown continues. THEN CLOSE MSIVs and MSIBs.
- b. IF temperature GREATER THAN 567*F AND rising THEN:
- 1) IF condenser is available, THEN DUMP steam to condenser.
a) VERIFY SG PORV setpoints at 1225 psig.
b) IF SG PORVs are NOT controlling temperature in AUTO.
THEN:
- 2) CONTROL temperature STABLE AT 5670 F.
REV.
19 OPOPO5-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 11 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 9
CHECK Pressurizer Status:
-a. PORVs - CLOSED
- a. WHEN pressurizer pressure LESS THAN 2335 PSIG. THEN:
- 1) Manually CLOSE PORVs.
- 2) IF any PORV can NOT be closed.
THEN manually CLOSE its isolation valve.
- 3)
IF isolation valve can NOT be closed, THEN PERFORM the following:
o GO TO OPOPO5-EO-EO10, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.
Step 1.
o MONITOR Critical Safety Functions.
o WHEN Addendum 5 of this procedure is complete. THEN Functional Restoration Procedures may be IMPLEMENTED.
_ b. Normal pressurizer spray valves -
CLOSED
- b. WHEN pressurizer pressure LESS THAN 2260 PSIG. THEN:
- 1) Manually CLOSE normal spray valve(s).
- 2) IF spray valve(s) can NOT be closed, THEN PERFORM the following:
a) STOP RCP lA(2A).
b) STOP RCP WD(2D).
c)
IF RCS pressure continues to lower. THEN STOP all but one RCP.
Step 9 continued on next page.
REV.
19 OPOPO5-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 12 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Step 9 continued from previous page.
_c.
Auxiliary spray valve -
CLOSED
__d. Excess letdown isolation valves -
CLOSED 10 MONITOR If RCPs Should Be Stopped:
__a. HHSI pump - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING
- b.
RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1430 PSIG
- c. Manually CLOSE auxiliary spray valve.
- d. Manually CLOSE excess letdown isolation valves.
- a.
GO TO Step 11.
- b. GO TO Step 11.
- c.
STOP all RCPs
REV.
19 OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 13 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 11 VERIFY The Following Containment Isolation Valves CLOSED
- a. Seal return isolation valves
- a. IF neither seal return isolation valve CAN be verified closed.
THEN DISPATCH operator to ensure seal return OCIV closed (29 ft MAB RM 108C)
"I1(2)-CV-MOV-0079" "RCP SEAL WATER RETURN ORC" "CONTAINMENT ISOLATION MOV" "OPERATOR"
__b.
Containment atmosphere radiation monitor isolation valves
- b.
IF neither valve in the supply line OR neither valve in the return line CAN be verified closed, THEN DISPATCH operator to ensure OCIVs closed.
(41 ft MAB RM 216 Mezz.)
"1(2)-RA-MOV-0004" "RCB EXHAUST RT-8011 SUPPLY" "ORC ISOLATION MOV OPERATOR" "1(2)-RA-MOV-0006" "RCB EXHAUST RT-8011 RETURN" "ORC ISLOATION MOV OPERATOR"
REV.
19 OPOPO5-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 14 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 12 CHECK If SG Secondary Pressure Boundary Intact:
_a.
CHECK pressures in all SGs o CONTROLLED OR RISING o GREATER THAN CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 13 CHECK If SG Tubes Are Intact:
o Main steamline radiation - NORMAL o IF SG blowdown in service, THEN SG blowdown radiation NORMAL o CARS pump radiation NORMAL o NO SG level rising in an uncontrolled manner 14 CHECK If RCS Is Intact:
o Containment radiation - NORMAL o Containment pressure -
NORMAL o Containment wide range water level NORMAL
- a. IF any faulted SG is NO1 isolated, AND is NOT needed for RCS cooldown, THEN PERFORM the following:
o GO TO OPOPO5-EO-EO20.
FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION.
Step 1.
o MONITOR Critical Safety Functions.
o WHEN Addendum 5 of this procedure is complete. THEN Functional Restoration Procedures may be IMPLEMENTED.
GO TO OPOP05-EO-EO30.
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1.
o MONITOR Critical Safety Functions.
o WHEN Addendum 5 of this procedure is complete. THEN Functional Restoration Procedures may be IMPLEMENTED.
GO TO OPOP05-EO-EO1O.
LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.
Step 1.
o MONITOR Critical Safety Functions.
o WHEN Addendum 5 of this procedure is complete.
THEN Functional Restoration Procedures may be IMPLEMENTED.
REV.
19 OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 15 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 15 MONITOR If SI Flow Should Be Terminated:
-a. RCS subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 351F
_b.
Secondary heat sink criteria -
SATISFIED o Total AFW flow to SGs - GREATER THAN 576 GPM
- a.
GO TO Step 16.
- b.
GO TO Step 16.
OR o NR level in at least one SG -
GREATER THAN 14%
_c.
RCS pressure criteria
- SATISFIED o Pressure -
GREATER THAN 1745 PSIG o Pressure - STABLE OR RISING
- d. Pressurizer level -
GREATER THAN 8%
- c.
GO TO Step 16.
- d.
PERFORM the following:
- 1) USE normal pressurizer spray to stabilize RCS pressure.
- 2) IF normal spray NOT available.
THEN:
a) ENSURE normal spray valves are closed.
b) USE auxiliary spray if available.
- 3) GO TO Step 16.
Step 15 continued on next page.
REV.
19 OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 16 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Step 15 continued from previous page.
__e.
GO TO OPOPO5-EO-ES11.
SI TERMINATION.
Step 1
-1) Addendum 5 of this procedure complete
- 1) PERFORM the following:
a) MONITOR Critical Safety Functions.
b) WHEN Addendum 5 of this procedure is complete, THEN Functional Restoration Procedures may be IMPLEMENTED.
-2) MONITOR Critical Safety Functions AND IMPLEMENT Functional Restoration Procedures as required 16 INITIATE MONITORING of Critical Safety Functions
_a.
Addendum 5 of this procedure complete
- a.
PERFORM the following:
- 1) MONITOR Critical Safety Functions.
- 2) WHEN Addendum 5 of this procedure is complete. THEN Functional Restoration Procedures may be IMPLEMENTED.
- 3)
GO TO Step 17.
_b.
MONITOR Critical Safety Functions.
AND IMPLEMENT Functional Restoration Procedures as required 17 RESET SI 18 RESET ESF Load Sequencers
- 19 RESET Containment Isolation Phase A
REV.
19 OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 17 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 20 RESET Containment Isolation Phase B UIII I I CAUTION IIF a pressurizer spray valve has been determined to be stuck open AND more than one RCP is operating.
HEN IA to containment should NOT be established to avoid -the initiation of an uncontrolled RCS depressurization.
I 21 ESTABLISH IA To Containment:
-a. IA pressure - GREATER THAN 95 PSIG
- a. DISPATCH an operator to start an IA compressor.
- b.
IF IA OCIV can NOT be opened from the control room, THEN DISPATCH operator to perform the following:
(10 ft MAB PENT space)
- 1) UNLOCK and CLOSE:
"1(2)-IA-1515" "RCB INSTRUMENT "FV-8565 MANUAL "VALVE" AIR HEADER" OVERRIDE"
- 2)
UNLOCK and OPEN:
"1(2)-IA-1516" "RCB INSTRUMENT "FV-8565 MANUAL "VALVE" AIR HEADER" OVERRIDE"
REV.
19 OPOPO5-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 18 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 2~2~
MONITOR SC Leve1s~D iZa. NR,_I ev eýýsj a CG R-THAR. 14%-
,a. PERFORM the following:
il)M MAINTAIN total AFW flow, (GREATER THAN 576 GPM to*,*
(restore NR level GREATER THAq)
(14%'
in,at Žlact one SG.
?)ii~&anAFW.Jpump-fails ~to (a)_RESET all SG LO-LO'Leve1 iAFW actuations.1
'b)_ CLoSE applic abl e AFWi
-(re~gullating_ valve_._
OciPEN applicable AFW cross";
ýconnects.-
id)
(CNRL FWfow to LESS'
,THAN 675 Gp4 per AE'_ pump.)
- b.
IF NR level in any SG continues to rise in an uncontrolled
- manner, THEN GO TO OPOP05-EO-EO30, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE.
Step 1.
AND MONITOR Critical Safety Functions
- c.
GO TO OPOP05-EO-E030.
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE.
Step 1 AND MONITOR Critical Safety Functions.
Cb CONTROL AFW flow to maintain NR (levels BETWEEN 22% and 50%
- c. CHECK for a tube rupture -
NO UNEXPLAINED SG LEVEL TREND WHERE LEVEL IS CONSTANT OR RISING WITH LOW AFW FLOW
REV.
19 OPOPO5-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 19 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 23 CHECK Secondary Radiation:
_a.
PERFORM the following:
.. 1) RESET SG LO-LO level AFW actuations
.. 2) RESET SG blowdown and sample isolations
- 3)
NOTIFY Chemistry to sample all SGs for activity
_b.
VERIFY SG sample activity - NORMAL 24 CHECK NAB Radiation -
NORMAL 25 CHECK FHB Conditions:
o FHB area radiation monitors -
NORMAL o FHB ECCS pump sump levels - NORMAL 26 CHECK PRT Conditions - NORMAL
- b.
IF SG sample activity is verified abnormal.
THEN GO TO OPOP05-EO-E030, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE.
Step I AND MONITOR Critical Safety Functions.
JE the cause of the abnormal condition is a loss of RCS inventory outside containment. THEN GO TO OPOP05-EO-EC12, LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT.
Step I AND MONITOR Critical Safety Functions.
IF the cause of the abnormal condition is a loss of RCS inventory outside containment. THEN GO TO OPOP05-EO-ECl2.
LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT, Step 1 AND MONITOR Critical Safety Functions.
EVALUATE cause of abnormal condition.
REV.
19 OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 20 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 27 MONITOR If LHSI Pumps Should Be Stopped:
_ a. CHECK RCS pressure:
- 1) Pressure - GREATER THAN 415 PSIG
-2) Pressure -
STABLE OR RISING
_ b.
STOP LUSI pumps and PLACE in AUTO 28 ESTABLISH Charging Flow:
- 1) GO TO OPOPO5-EO-EOIO, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.
Step 1 AND MONITOR Critical Safety Functions.
- 2)
GO TO Step 28.
- a. CCPs - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING
- a.
PERFORM the following:
- 1) CLOSE seal injection isolation valves.
o "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033A" o "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033B" o "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033C" o "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033D"
- 2)
CLOSE the CCP discharge valve for the CCP to be started.
- 3)
CLOSE the charging flow control valve.
- 4) IF charging flow control valve will NOT close. THEN ESTABLISH charging flow to maintain pressurizer level GREATER THAN 8% per ADDENDUM 2.
ESTABLISHING ALTERNATE CHARGING FLOW CONTROL AND GO TO Step 29.
- 5) OPEN the recirculation valve for the CCP to be started.
- 6)
START one CCP.
Step 28 continued on next page.
REV.
19 OPOPO5-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 21 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Step 28 continued from previous page.
- 7) OPEN the CCP discharge valve for the pump that was started.
_b.
Charging flow - ESTABLISHED
- b.
PERFORM the following:
- 1) ENSURE Containment Isolation Phase A RESET.
- 2)
ENSURE charging flow control valve CLOSED.
- 3) IF charging flow control valve will NOT close. THEN ESTABLISH charging flow to maintain pressurizer level GREATER THAN 8% per ADDENDUM 2.
ESTABLISHING ALTERNATE CHARGING FLOW CONTROL AND GO TO Step 29.
- 4) ENSURE CCP discharge valves open.
- 5) ENSURE normal or alternate charging isolation valve open.
- 6) ENSURE charging OCIV open.
- 7) IF charging OCIV will NOT open. THEN DISPATCH operator to open charging OCIV:
(29 ft MAB RM 108C)
"1(2)-CV-MOV-0025" "CVCS CHARGING" "ORC CONTAINMENT ISOLATION" "MOV OPERATOR" Step 28 continued on next page.
REV.
19 OPOPO5-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 22 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Step 28 continued from previous page.
- c.
CONTROL charging flow to maintain pressurizer level GREATER THAN 8%
- c.
IF charging flow control valve will NOT control charging flow, THEN MAINTAIN pressurizer level GREATER THAN 8% per ADDENDUM 2, ESTABLISHING ALTERNATE CHARGING FLOW CONTROL.
29 MONITOR If STBY DGs Should Be Stopped:
_a.
VERIFY AC ESF busses - ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER o 4.16KVCESF bus o 480V ESF LCs o 480V ESF MCCs
- a. TRY to restore offsite power:
I) REFER TO OPOPO4-AE-0001.
FIRST RESPONSE TO LOSS OF ANY OR ALL 13.8 OR 4.16 BUS.
- 2) IF offsite power can NOT be restored. THEN manually LOAD desired equipment on the AC ESF busses. REFER TO ADDENDUM
- 3. EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL LOADING REQUIREMENTS.
- 3)
WHEN offsite power is restored, THEN PERFORM Steps 29.b. 29.c and 29.d.
__b.
RESET any unloaded DG(s) non-emergency trips
- c.
RELEASE any unloaded DG(s) from EMERGENCY mode
__d. STOP any unloaded DG(s)
REV.
19 OPOPO5-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 23 OF 23 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 30 ENSURE SFPC In Service Within 2.5 HOURS Of Loss Of SFPC:
_ a. CHECK CCW pumps -
AT LEAST TWO RUNNING
__b. ALIGN CCW flow to SFPC heat
.exchanger(s)
- a.
PERFORM the following:
- 2) IF SFPC can NOT be placed in
- service, THEN GO TO Step 31.
- b. IF CCW flow can NOT be aligned from the main control board. THEN DISPATCH operator to open the following valves:
(29 ft MAB RM 106A SW corner) o "1(2)-CC-MOV-0447" "SPENT FUEL POOL HXS" "CCW SUPPLY HEADER" "FIRST ISOLATION MOV OPERATOR" o "1(2)-CC-MOV-0032" "SPENT FUEL POOL HXS" "CCW'SUPPLY HEADER" "SECOND ISOLATION MOV OPERATOR"
- c.
START SFPC pump(s).
REFER TO OPOP02-FC-0001.
SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING'AND CLEANUP SYSTEM.
__c. CHECK SFPC pump -
RUNNING 31 RETURN TO Step 8
-END-
REV.
19 OPOPO5-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE I OF 4 ADDENDQU/l PHASE A ISOLATION VERIFICATION DEVICE POSITION CHECK Fire Water to Containment
- FIRE WTR OCIV FV-0756" CLOSED Instrument Air to Containment "IA OCIV FV-8565" CLOSED Containment H2 Monitoring "VPI FV-4101" CLOSED "VPI FV-4127" CLOSED "VPI FV-4104" CLOSED "VPI FV-4133" CLOSED "H2 SAMPLE INL ICIV FV-4135" CLOSED "H2 SAMPLE DISCH ICIV FV-4128" CLOSED "H2 SAMPLE INL ICIV FV-4136" CLOSED "H2 SAMPLE DISCH ICIV FV-4134" CLOSED Primary Sampling System "RHR SAMPLE ICIV FV-4823" CLOSED "RHR SAMPLE OCIV FV-4461" CLOSED "SI ACC SAMPLE ICIV FV-4824" CLOSED "SI ACC SAMPLE OCIV FV-4466" CLOSED "RCS LOOP 1A(2A) Th SAMPLE ICIV" "FV-4454" CLOSED
REV.
19 OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 2 OF 4 ADDENDUM I PHASE A ISOLATION VERIFICATION DEVICE POSITION CHECK Primary Sampling System (con't)
"RCS LOOP IC(2C) Th SAMPLE ICIV" "FV-4455" CLOSED "RCS SAMPLE OCIV FV-4456" CLOSED "PRZR LIQ SAMPLE OCIV FV-4451B" CLOSED "PRZR LIQ SAMPLE ICIV FV-4451" CLOSED "PRZR VAPOR SAMPLE OCIV FV-4452" CLOSED "PRZR VAPOR SAMPLE ICIV FV-4450" CLOSED Post Accident Sample System "CNTMT SUMP SAMPLE OCIV FV-2453" CLOSED "RHR SAMPLE OCIV FV-2454" CLOSED "RCS SAMPLE OCIV FV-2455/2455A" CLOSED "CNTMT AIR SAMPLE OCIV FV-2456" CLOSED "RETURN TO PRT OCIV FV-2458" CLOSED "CNTMT AIR RETURN OCIV FV-2457" CLOSED SI Accumulators "TEST LN ICIV FV-3970" CLOSED "TEST LN OCIV FV-3971" CLOSED "N2 SPLY OCIV FV-3983" CLOSED
REV.
19 OPOPO5-EO-EOoo REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 3 OF 4 ADDENDUM 1 PHASE A ISOLATION VERIFICATION DEVICE Pressurizer Relief Tank "OCIV FV-3652" "ICIV FV-3653" "OCIV FV-3651" Reactor Coolant Drain Tank "OCIV FV-4913" "ICIV MOV-0312" "OCIV FV-4919" "ICIV FV-4920" Containment Normal Sump
".DISCH ICIV MOV-0064" "DISCH OCIV FV-7800" CVCS Letdown "OCIV MOV-0024" "ICIV MOV-0023" "LTDN ORIF IlDR ISOL FV-0011" CVCS Seal Return "SEAL RTN ICIV MOV-0077" "SEAL RTN OCIV MOV-0079" POSITION CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED
'CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CHECK
REV.
19 OPOPO5-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 4 OF 4 ADDENDUM 1 PHASE A ISOLATION VERIFICATION DEVICE CVCS Charging "OCIV MOV-0025" POSITION CHECK CLOSED Personnel Airlock Seal OCIVs "INNER SEAL FV-1025" "INNER SEAL FV-1028" "OUTER SEAL FV-1026" "OUTER SEAL FV-1027" CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED
REV.
19 OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 1 OF 5 ADDENDUM 2 ESTABLISHING ALTERNATE CHARGING FLOW CONTROL STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION IF RCP Seal Cooling has been lost and Seal Inlet Temperature has exceeded 2300F, THEN Seal Injection SHALL NOT be established to affected RCPs per this Addendum.
I DISPATCH operator to perform the following:
- a.
THROTTLE charging flow control manual bypass two turns open (19 ft MAB RM 79)
"1(2)-CV-0255" "CVCS CHARGING DISCHARGE" "FCV-0205 BYPASS VALVE"
- b.
CLOSE charging flow control manual inlet isolation valve (19 ft MAB RM 79)
"1(2)-CV-0254A" "CVCS CHARGING DISCHARGE" "FCV-0205 INLET VALVE" 2
CHECK normal or alternate charging loop isolation valve -
OPEN OPEN normal or alternate charging loop isolation valve.
REV.
19 OPOPO5-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 2 OF 5 ADDENDUM 2 ESTABLISHING ALTERNATE CHARGING FLOW CONTROL STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 3
CHECK charging OCIV -
OPEN PERFORM the following:
- a.
OPEN charging OCIV.
- b.
IF charging OCIV will NOT open.
THEN DISPATCH operator to open charging OCIV.
(29 FT MAB RM 108C)
"1(2)-CV-MOV-0025" "CVCS CHARGING ORC" "CONTAINMENT ISOLATION" "MOV OPERATOR" CLOSE affected seal injection OCIV's:
o "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033A" o "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033B" o "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033C" o "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033D" 4
VERIFY RCP seal inlet temperatures have remained - LESS THAN 230°F 5
ESTABLISH charging flow:
- a.
CHECK CCP suction aligned to RWST
- a. PERFORM the following:
- b.
CHECK CCP(s)
RUNNING
- b.
PERFORM the following:
- 1) OPEN the recirculation valve(s) for the CCP(s) to be started.
- 2) START the CCP(s)
- c. IF running CCP(s) discharge valve can Efl be OPENED.
THEN GO TO Step 6 of this Addendum.
OBSERVE the CAUTION prior to Step 6.
- c.
ENSURE running CCP(s) discharge valve -
OPEN Step 5 continued next page
REV.
19 OPOPO5-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 3 OF 5 ADDENDUM 2 ESTABLISHING ALTERNATE CHARGING FLOW CONTROL STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Step 5 continued continued from previous page
- d.
DISPATCH operator to adjust charging flow control manual bypass to achieve desired flowrate (19 ft MAB RM 79)
"1(2)-CV-0255" "CVCS CHARGING DISCHARGE" "FCV-0205 BYPASS VALVE"
- e.
CLOSE the running CCP(s) recirculation valve
- f.
CHECK RCP seal injection flow -
BETWEEN 6 and 13 GPM
- f.
IF RCP Seal Inlet temperatures have remained - LESS THAN 230'F.
THEN PERFORM the following:
- 1) ENSURE seal injection OCIV(s)
OPEN.
o "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033A" o "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033B" o "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033C" o "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033D"
- 2) ADJUST 1(2)-CV-HCV-0218 to establish between 6 and 13 gpm RCP seal injection flow.
- g. RETURN TO procedure step in effect
REV.
19 OPOPO5-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 4 OF 5 ADDENDUM 2 ESTABLISHING ALTERNATE CHARGING FLOW CONTROL STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CANT1IN IF RCP seals have NOT been previously isolated. THEN maximum seal injection flow will result when CCP 1B(2B) Alt Discharge to RCP Seal Isolation CV-0236B OR CCP 1A(2A) Bypass Isol MOV-8348 is opened.
6 DISPATCH operator to perform the following:
- a.
OPEN alternate discharge to RCP seals:
(19 ft MAB RM 79)
"1(2)-CV-0236B" "CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP IB(2B)"
ENSURE CCP 1B(2B) discharge isolation MOV-8377B - CLOSED 8
CHECK CCP 1A(2A)
RUNNING
- a.
OPEN CCP 1A(2A) Bypass Isol MOV-8348
- b.
ENSURE CCP 1A(2A) discharge isolation MOV-8377A - CLOSED GO TO Step 9 of this Addendum.
REV.
19 OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 5 OF 5 ADDENDUM 2 ESTABLISHING ALTERNATE CHARGING FLOW CONTROL STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 9
ESTABLISH desired charging flow:
- a.
DISPATCH operator to open:
(19 ft MAB RM 79)
"1(2)-CV-0255" "CVCS CHARGING DISCHARGE" "FCV-0205 BYPASS VALVE"
- b.
THROTTLE HCV-0206 to establish desired charging flow
- c.
CLOSE the running CCP(s) recirculation valve 10 VERIFY RCP seal injection temperature has remained - LESS THAN 230'F RETURN TO procedure step in effect.
- a. ENSURE seal injection OCIV(s)
OPEN 0
0 0
0 "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033A" "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033B" "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033C" "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033D" 11 DISPATCH operator to THROTTLE Alternate Source to Seal Injection Isolation valve to establish between 6 and 13 gpm RCP seal flow (19 ft MAB RM 79)
"1(2) -CV-0246" "CVCS CHARGING PUMPS" "ALT RCP SEAL SUPPLY ISOL VALVE" 12 RETURN TO procedure step in effect
REV.
19 OPOPO5-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 1 OF I ADDENDUM 3 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL LOADING REQUIREMENTS Components Train A (KW)
Train B (KW)
Train C (KW)
Pressurizer Heaters lA/lB (2A/2B) 431.0 N/A 431.0 Hydrogen Recombiners N/A 75.0 75.0 RHR Pumps 222.2 222.2 222.2 RMW Pumps N/A 41.0 41.0 SFPC Pumps N/A 140.4 140.4 SFP Air Handling Unit N/A 0.5 0.5 Centrifugal Charging Pumps 450.0 N/A 450.0 BA Transfer Pump Room Fans 0.4 N/A 0.4 BAT Pumps 27.0 N/A 27.0 RMW Pumps Air Handling Unit N/A 1.9 1.9 480V MCCs IA5/IBS/iC5 (2A5/2B5/2C5) 171.5 72.5 92.2
/1
REV.
19 OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 1 OF 2 ADDENDUM 4 SEQUENCER LOADING VERIFICATION - MODE III STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED I
CAUTION o Equipment should NOT be manually loaded on an ESF Bus until the respective ESF Load Sequencer has completed its automatic sequence OR it has been determined that the respective ESF Load Sequencer has failed to operate.
o IF a LOOP or SI occurs, AND a train of Essential Chilled Water fails, THEN the corresponding EAB HVAC fans should be stopped within 30 minutes to prevent heat buildup in the Auxiliary Shutdown/QDPS rooms.
I I
VERIFY the following equipment -
LOADED ON ESF BUS Manually LOAD equipment NOT previously secured by the Emergency Operating Procedures.
COMPONENT TRAIN "A" TRAIN "B" TRAIN "C" 480V LC Feeder Breakers ECW Pumps HHSI Pumps LHSI Pumps CNTMT Spray Pumps (If Requiredmax. of 2)
RCFCs CCW Pumps AFW Pumps Essential Chill Water Pumps EAB Supply and Return HVAC Fans CRE Supply. Return, C/U and M/U HVAC Fans FHB Main Exhaust HVAC Fans Essential Chillers
REV.
19 OPOPO5-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 2 OF 2 ADDENDUM 4 SEQUENCER LOADING VERIFICATION -
MODE III STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 2
RESET ESF load sequencers 3
RESET Pressurizer Backup Heaters 1A(2A) and lB(2B)
- a. Place Control Room Handswitches in OFF
- b.
RETURN Control Room Handswitches to the position required for current plant conditions 4
STOP any equipment previously secured by any Emergency Operating Procedure 5
CHECK ALL Essential Chilled Water Trains IN SERVICE SECURE the corresponding EAB HVAC for any Essential Chilled Water Train that is NOT operating.
6 RETURN TO procedure step in effect
REV.
19 OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE I OF 8 ADDENDUM 5 VERIFICATION OF SI EQUIPMENT OPERATION STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION Functional Restoration Procedures (FRPs)
SHOULD NOT be IMPLEMENTED until this Addendum is complete.
See OPOP01-ZA-0018 "EOP User's Guide" for exceptions.
1 VERIFY FW isolation:
- a.
SGFPTs TRIPPED
- b.
SU SGFP TRIPPED
- c.
VERIFY the following valves
- CLOSED o FWIVs o FWIBs o FW preheater bypass valves o FW regulating valves o Low power FW regulating valves o SG blowdown isolation valves o
o SG sample isolation valves
- a.
Manually TRIP SGFPTs.
- b.
Manually TRIP SU SGFP.
- c. Manually CLOSE valves.
REV.
19 OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 2 OF 8 ADDENDUM 5 VERIFICATION OF SI EQUIPMENT OPERATION STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 2
CHECK if main steamline should be isolated:
- a.
CHECK for any of the following conditions:
o Containment pressure - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 3 PSIG OR o SG pressure (without low steamline pressure SI blocked)
- LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 735 PSIG OR o SG pressure (with low steamline pressure SI blocked)
- LOWERING AT A RATE GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 100 PSI/SEC.BY OBSERVANCE OF THE STEAMLINE PRESSURE RATE BISTABLES
- b. VERIFY main steamline isolation:
o MSIVs CLOSED
- a.
GO TO Step 3 of this Addendum.
- b. Manually CLOSE valves.
o MSIBs CLOSED
REV.
19 OPOPO5-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 3 OF 8 ADDENDUM 5 VERIFICATION OF SI EQUIPMENT OPERATION STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED I
CAUTION Equipment should NOT be manually loaded on an ESF Bus until the respective ESF Load Sequencer has completed its automatic sequence OR it has been determined that the respective ESF Load Sequencer has failed to operate.
I 3
VERIFY AFW system status:
- a. Motor-driven pump -
RUNNING
- b. Turbine-driven pump -
RUNNING 4
VERIFY AFW valve alignment -
PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT 5):---*
- ERIFY total AFW Flow-)GREATER-hA 576 G~
- a.
WHEN the respective ESF Load Sequencer has completed its automatic sequence OR it is determined that the respective ESF Load Sequencer has failed, THEN manually START pump(s).
- b. Manually OPEN steam supply valves.
Manually ALIGN valves.
(EFRM the following:)
G M a nu alliy -STAR~t'
_pupm ps A ND LIGN~j
'valves to feed SGs.,
(b-.CONT ROL AFWflow to maintainNR-)
(level BETWEEN 14% (.[34_]%)(and 50%.)
REV.
19 OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 4 OF 8 ADDENDUM 5 VERIFICATION OF SI EQUIPMENT OPERATION STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 6
VERIFY containment isolation phase A:
- a. Phase A -
ACTUATED
- b.
Phase A valves - CLOSED, REFER TO ADDENDUM 1, PHASE A ISOLATION VERIFICATION 7
VERIFY ECW status:
.o ECW pumps -
RUNNING o ECW pump discharge isolation valves -
OPEN
- a. Manually ACTUATE phase A.
b...anua.ly..OSE.val........
- b.
Manually CLOSE valves.
WHEN the respective ESF Load Sequencer has completed its automatic sequence OR it is determined that the respective ESF Load Sequencer has failed. THEN PERFORM the following:
- a. Manually START pump(s).
- b. Manually OPEN discharge isolation valve(s).
- c.
IF any ECW pump can NOT be started OR its discharge isolation valve can NOT be opened.
THEN:
- 1) TRIP associated STBY DG.
AND PLACE in PULL-TO-STOP.
- 2) TRIP associated Essential Chiller(s).
WHEN the respective ESF Load Sequencer has completed its automatic sequence OR it is determined that the respective ESF Load Sequencer has failed. THEN manually START pump(s).
8 VERIFY CCW pumps -
RUNNING
REV.
19 OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 5 OF 8 ADDENDUM 5 VERIFICATION OF SI EQUIPMENT OPERATION STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 9
VERIFY RCFC status:
- a.
RCFCs -
RUNNING
- b. Cooling water TRANSFERRED TO CCW
- a. WHEN the respective ESF Load Sequencer has completed its automatic sequence OR it is determined that the respective ESF Load Sequencer has failed, THEN manually START RCFC(s).
- b.
PERFORM the following:
- 1) IF RCFC inlet temperatures are LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 1160 F, THEN Manually TRANSFER cooling to CCW.
- 2)
IF RCFC inlet temperatures are GREATER THAN 1160°FTHEN CONTACT the TSC prior to transferring cooling.
WHEN the respective ESF Load Sequencer has completed its automatic sequence OR it is determined that the respective ESF Load Sequencer has failed, THEN manually START pump(s).
10 VERIFY SI pump status:
o HHSI pumps -
RUNNING o LHSI pumps -
RUNNING
-11 VERIFY SI valve alignment - PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT Manually ALIGN valves.
REV.
19 OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 6 OF 8 ADDENDUM 5 VERIFICATION OF SI EQUIPMENT OPERATION STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 12 VERIFY SI flow:
- a.
RCS pressure -
1745 PSIG LESS THAN
- b.
HHSI pump flow - INDICATED
- c. RCS pressure -
415 PSIG LESS THAN
- d.
LHSI pump flow - INDICATED 13 VERIFY containment ventilation isolation:
- a.
Containment atmosphere radiation monitor isolation valves -
CLOSED
- b.
Normal purge supply and exhaust fans - STOPPED
- c.
Supplemental purge supply and exhaust fans -
STOPPED
- a.
GO TO Step 13 of this Addendum.
- b. Manually START pumps AND ALIGN valves.
- c.
GO TO Step 13 of this Addendum.
- d. Manually START pumps AND ALIGN valves.
- a. Manually CLOSE valves.
- b. Manually STOP fans.
- c. Manually STOP fans.
d-------------------..M.nully.COSE.dmpe
- d. Manually CLOSE dampers.
- d. Purge Dampers -
CLOSED
REV.
19 OPOPO5-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 7 OF 8 ADDENDUM 5 VERIFICATION OF SI EQUIPMENT OPERATION STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 14 VERIFY ventilation actuation:
- a. Control room HVAC - OPERATING IN EMERGENCY RECIRC
- b.
EAB HVAC -
OPERATING IN EMERGENCY RECIRC
- c.
FHB HVAC - OPERATING IN EMERGENCY MODE
- d.
FEB Exhaust Fans - ONLY TWO TRAINS OPERATING o
Exhaust booster fans o
Main exhaust fans
- a. Manually PLACE control room HVAC in EMERGENCY RECIRC.
- b. Manually PLACE EAB HVAC in EMERGENCY RECIRC.
- c.
Manually PLACE FHB HVAC in EMERGENCY MODE.
- d.
PERFORM the following:
- 1) IF three trains FHB exhaust fans running, THEN PLACE one train FEB exhaust fans in PULL TO LOCK.
- 2) IF LESS THAN two trains FHB exhaust fans running. THEN manually START train(s).
o Exhaust booster fans o
Main exhaust fans
- e.
SECURE one FEB filter train by PERFORMING the following:
o PLACE the outlet damper Controller in manual o
Manually close the outlet damper o
VERIFY proper operation of filter train in service
- f. Essential chilled water pumps
- RUNNING
- f.
PERFORM the following:
- 1) Manually START essential chilled water pumps.
- 2) IF an Essential Chilled Water Train fails to start, THEN SECURE the corresponding train of EAB HVAC.
Step 14 continued next page.
REV.
19 OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION PAGE 8 OF 8 ADDENDUM 5 VERIFICATION OF SI EQUIPMENT OPERATION STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Step 14 continued from previous page.
- g. Essential chillers - RUNNING
- g.
PERFORM the following:
- 1) WHEN the respective ESF Load Sequencer has completed its automatic sequence OR it is determined that the respective ESF Load Sequencer has failed.
THEN manually START essential chiller(s).
- 2) IF an Essential Chiller fails to start, THEN SECURE the corresponding train of EAB HVAC.
- h. Manually START ECCS pump room fan coolers.
- h.
ECCS pump room fan coolers
- RUNNING
- i.
AFW pump cubicle fans -
RUNNING J.
FHB truck bay doors -
CLOSED 15 NOTIFY Unit Supervisor that Addendum 5 is COMPLETE 16 IMPLEMENT Functional Restoration Procedures as required 17 RETURN TO procedure step in effect.
- i.
Manually START AFW pump cubicle fans.
- j.
CONTACT designated personnel to close the FHB truck bay doors.
OPOPO5-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev.
19 CONDITIONAL INFORMATION PAGE Page 1 of 2 RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF BOTH conditions listed below occur. THEN TRIP ALL RCPs:
- a.
HHSI pumps
- AT LEAST ONE RUNNING
- b.
RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1430 PSIG FAULTED SG ISOLATION IF a faulted SG(s) is NOT required to maintain at least two SGs available for RCS cooldown.
THEN the US or SS may direct actions be taken to isolate the faulted SG(s).
KSIV AND MSIB CLOSURE CRITERIA IF a loss of secondary support systems occurs that impairs the ability of secondary systems to provide a heat sink for the Steam Generators. THEN CLOSE MSIVs and MSIBs.
(for example loss of Condenser Availability. C-9)
LHSI PUMP RESTART CRITERIA
.F RCS pressure lowers in an uncontrolled manner to LESS THAN 415 PSIG. THEN START the LHSI pumps to supply water to the RCS.
SEQUENCER LOADING VERIFICATION IF a LOOP occurs, after the performance of Step 4.
THEN PERFORM Addendum 4: Sequencer Loading Verification - Mode III.
MAf W FLOW CRITERIA floAF mW bereducedtoTlim.t.R.SuoooodowT...
IM THROTTLE AFW flow as necessaryj (while maintaining total AFW flow GREATER THAN 576 GPM until NR level in at-least one;*
(SG.
THAN I...
[34.%1 AFWST MAKEUP CRITERIA IF AFWST level lowers to LESS THAN 138.000 GALLONS (26%).
THEN INITIATE makeup to the AFWST per OPOPO2-AF-0001.
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER. to prevent inventory problems during cooldown.
PHASE B ACTUATION IF a Containment Spray / Phase B actuation occurs. THEN STOP all RCPs.
OPOP05-EO-EOOO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev. 19 CONDITIONAL INFORMATION PAGE*
Page 2 of 2 R
_Cal bulleted substeps below are part of this CIP action)
IF a ruptured SG(s) is NOT required to maintain at least one SG available for RCS cooldown. THEN the US or SS SHALL direct actions be taken to isolate the ruptured SG(s) as follows:
o SG ID(2D) ISOLATION WHEN at least one motor driven AFW pump is available, THEN ISOLATE main steam to AFW pump 14(24):
- 1) RESET SI
- 3) TRIP turbine-driven AFW pump
- 4)
CLOSE turbine-driven AFW pump steam inlet valve (AF-MOV-0143)
- 5)
DISPATCH operator to OPEN breaker for AF-MOV-0143.
ElDl1(E2Dll)/5C
- 6)
ENSURE turbine-driven AFW pump trip/throttle valve closed (AF-MOV-0514)
- 7)
CROSS-CONNECT AFW to 1D(2D)
SG until SG NR level is GREATER THAN 14%[34%]
"oAFW ISOLATION CRTEIA Of the folowingcenons eowtare satisfied. THEN_ SOLATE AFW flow' (to the ruptured SG(s):ý At pturep SGi s) NR level is GREATERHN1[3%
Befoýre RCSan-d r'up-tu r~ed -SC-(-s) 'p-re-s~sur'es hav~e -b~een 'equ~aliz~ed o SG PORV ISOLATION CRITERIA IF the affected SG(s) PORV(s) is open with SG pressure LESS THAN setpoint-TBEN manually CLOSE the SG PORV OR dispatch an operator to isolate the SG PORV locally.
o MSIV AND MSIB CLOSURE CRITERIA IF a loss of secondary support systems occurs that impairs the ability of secondary systems to provide a heat sink for the Steam Generators. THEN CLOSE MSIVs and MSIBs.(for example loss of Condenser Availability. C-9)
RWST CONSERVATION CRITERIA IF all three CS pumps are injecting. THEN secure one containment spray pump.
NOC-AE-07002104 Reactor Trip Response (OPOP05-EO-ESO1) sq 0 ý Adobe Acrobat 7.0 Document
The steps relevant to AFW flow are identified below.
Step 1 on p.2 of -22 Step-.oni p. 4 of 22 P>
Step 8 on p. 15 of 22 Addendum 6 Step 11 on p. 3 of 3 Addendum 7 in general Note that mainagement of SG level is the success criteriafor' AFW Flow.
10-21-05 DATE EFFECTIVE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION OPOPO5-EO-ESOI Rev.
23 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE DEPARTMENT PROCEDURE SAFETY RELATED (Q)
USAGE CONTROL: In Hand Controlling Station LIST OF ATTACHMENTS:
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
Addendum 1.
Addendum 2.
Addendum 3.
Addendum 4.
Addendum 5, Addendum 6 Addendum 7.
Addendum 8, Addendum 9.
Conditional Establishing Normal Letdown Establishing Excess Letdown Emergency Electrical Loading Requirements Saturation Curve Sequencer Loading Verification - Mode II Placing Main Feedwater in Service Placing AFW in Service Failing Air to MSIVs and MSIBs Establishing Alternate Charging Flow Control Information Page This procedure is applicable in Modes 1, 2. and 3.
REV.
23 OPOP05-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 1 OF 22 PURPOSE This procedure provides the necessary instructions to stabilize and control the plant following a Reactor Trip without a Safety Injection.
SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS This procedure is entered from OPOP05-EO-EOOO.
REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Step 4.
when SI is neither actuated nor required.
REV.
23 OPOP05-EO-ESO1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 2 OF 22 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED o
Foldout CIP page should be open.
o MM RCS temperature is controlled by the SC PORVs in AUTO.
T3EN RCS temperature will be maintained at approximately 5710F at the SG PORV setpoint.
1 o WITH ANY RCP RUNNING, RCS TAVG STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 5670F o WITHOUT ANY RCP RUNNING, RCS TCOLD STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 567 0 F PERFORM Substep a.
OR Substep b.
based on RCS temperature:
ia.
IF temperature LESS THAN 567"F and lowering., I~d; U1)Lithe AEW system is in)-
'service. THEN THROTTLE AFW:
flow such that total AFW flow, is GREATER THAN 57i6 GPM untill iNR level is GREATER TAN1 (in at least one SG._
- 2)
ISOLATE steam loads as follows:
o ISOLATE steam dump drains.
o ISOLATE steam chest drains.
o ISOLATE steam to MSR and steam line drains to MSRs.
o TRIP all SGFPTs.
o STOP dumping steam.
o ISOLATE SGBD.
- 3)
IF cooldown continues, THEN CLOSE MSIVs and MSIBs.
o IF MSIV(s) and MSIB(s) can NOT be closed, THEN DISPATCH operator to close MSIV(s) and MSIB(s) per ADDENDUM 8, FAILING AIR TO MSIVS AND MSIBS.
Step 1 continued on next page.
REV.
23 OPOP05-EO-ESOI REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 3 OF 22 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Step 1 continued from previous page.
- 4) IF temperature LESS THAN 550°F AND lowering, THEN:
a) INITIATE emergency boration b) WHEN RCS temperature rises to GREATER THAN 5500F OR RCS Cb GREATER THAN 2800 ppm. THEN SECURE emergency boration.
- b.
IF temperature GREATER THAN 567°F AND rising. THEN:
- 1) IF condenser available. THEN DUMP steam to condenser.
a) VERIFY SG PORV setpoints at 1225 psig.
b) IF SG PORV(s) are NOT controlling temperature in AUTO.
THEN:
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ESOI REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 4 OF 22 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 2
CHECK FW Status:
__a.
CHECK RCS TAVG - LESS THAN 5740F
- a.
PERFORM the following:
- 1) WHEN RCS TAVG is LESS THAN 574-F.
THEN PERFORM Steps 2.b and 2.c.
- 2)
GO TO Step 3
__b. VERIFY FW isolation:
- b. Manually CLOSE valves.
o FWIVs CLOSED o FWIBs CLOSED o FW preheater bypass valves -
CLOSED o FW regulating valves -CLOSED o Low Power FW regulating valves
-CLOSED
- c. TRIP all SGFPTs 3n "VERIVY~ Feedwater-Fowý ~E9ta1 Riqhed T
~GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO t1hre (3) o Main Feedwater flow -
REFER TO ADDENDUM 6. PLACING MAIN FEEDWATER IN SERVICE OR ko AFW flow,)ý->REFER TO ADDENDUM 7.
(PLACIýNG,_F IN SERVICE' ESTABLISH feedwater flow to GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO three (3)
SGs using:
o Main Feedwater flow - REFER TO ADDENDUM 6, PLACING MAIN FEEDWATER IN SERVICE OR o AFW flow - REFER TO ADDENDUM 7.
PLACING AFW IN SERVICE.
-flow on SG LO-LO level AEW
ýactuation)
REV.
23 OPOP05-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 5 OF 22 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 4
VERIFY Control Rods Fully Inserted o All rod bottom lights - LIT PERFORM the following:
- a. IF two OR more control rod bottom lights NOT lit, THEN:
- 1) Emergency BORATE 940 GALLONS of boric acid (60 ppm) for each control rod 18 steps OR LESS.
X 940 gals = __
gals
- of rods
- 2) Emergency BORATE 3600 GALLONS of boric acid (228 ppm) for each control rod GREATER THAN 18 steps.
X 3600 gals gale
- of rods OR
- 3) Emergency BORATE until RCS Cb GREATER THAN 2800 ppm.
- b.
IF DRPI has failed. THEN:
- 1) INITIATE emergency boration.
THEN SECURE emergency boration.
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ESOI REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 6 OF 22 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
-5 CHECK STBY DG Status:
__a. STBY DG -
RUNNING
- b. VERIFY ECW to STBY DG
- a.
GO TO Step 6.
- b.
PERFORM the following:
- 1) Manually START applicable ECW pump.
- 2) Manually OPEN discharge isolation valve.
- 3) IF ECW can NOT be established to a running STBY DG.
THEN TRIP the affected STBY DG.
- 4) IF ECW can NOT be established to Essential Chillers, THEN TRIP the associated Essential Chillers.
REV.
23 OPOP05-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 7 OF 22 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED I
CAUTION The Charging Pump should NOT be manually loaded on an ESF bus until the respective Load Sequencer has completed its automatic sequence OR it has been determined that the respective Load Sequencer has failed to operate.
I 6
CHECK Pressurizer Level Control:
-a. Pressurizer level - GREATER THAN 17%
- a. PERFORM the following:
- 1) ENSURE normal letdown isolation.
- 2) ENSURE excess letdown isolation.
- 3) ENSURE pressurizer heaters off.
- 4)
CONTROL charging to restore pressurizer level GREATER THAN 17%.
- 5) WHEN pressurizer level is GREATER THAN 17%.
THEN:
a) ENSURE ESF load sequencers reset.
b) TURN ON pressurizer heaters as necessary.
c) ESTABLISH normal letdown per ADDENDUM 1, ESTABLISHING NORMAL LETDOWN.
d) IF normal letdown can NOT be established, THEN ESTABLISH excess letdown per ADDENDUM 2, ESTABLISHING EXCESS LETDOWN.
Step 6 continued on next page.
REV.
23 OPOP05-EO-ESO1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 8 OF 22 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Step 6 continued from previous page.
_b.
VERIFY charging - IN SERVICE
- b. ESTABLISH charging flow:
- 1) IF a charging pump is NOT available, THEN GO TO step 6.c.3 (RNO) of this procedure.
- 2) IF a charging pump is NOT running. THEN:
a) CLOSE all seal injection isolation valves.
b) CLOSE the charging pump discharge isolation valve for the pump to be started.
c)
CLOSE charging flow control valve.
d)
IF charging flow control valve will NOT close. THEN ESTABLISH charging flow per ADDENDUM 9. ESTABLISHING ALTERNATE CHARGING FLOW CONTROL and GO TO Step 6) of this RNO.
e) OPEN recirculation valve for the charging pump to be started.
f) RESET the ESF load sequencers.
g) START a charging pump.
- 3) OPEN charging pump discharge isolation valve.
- 4)
OPEN normal or alternate charging isolation valves.
- 5)
OPEN charging OCIV.
- 6) CONTROL charging flow as necessary.
Step 6 continued on next page.
REV.
23 OPOP05-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 9 OF 22 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Step 6 continued from previous page.
- 7) CLOSE the recirculation valve for the running charging pump.
_c.
CHECK RCP seal injection flow -
- c. PERFORM the following:
NORMAL
- 1) IF seal injection flow is established. THEN ADJUST "FLOW CONT" HCV-0218 to return RCP seal injection flow to BETWEEN 6 AND 13 GPM.
- 2) IF seal injection flow is NOT established, THEN:
a) PERFORM the following:
- 1) CHECK seal water inlet and lower seal water bearing temperatures LESS THAN 230*F for each RCP.
(Plant computer RC-O10)
THEN DO NOT establish seal injection to that RCP.
GO TO Step 6.d.
b)
CLOSE 'FLOW CONT" HCV-0218.
c) ENSURE seal injection isolation valves open for applicable RCPs.
d)
MONITOR seal water inlet and lower seal water bearing temperatures.
(Plant computer RC-010)
Step 6 continued on next page.
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ESOI REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 10 OF 22 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Step 6 continued from previous page.
e) Slowly OPEN "FLOW CONT" HCV-0218 to establish a 1°F per minute cooldown rate on seal water inlet and lower seal water bearing temperatures.
f) ESTABLISH normal seal injection flow of between 6 and 13 gpm.
- 3) IF a charging pump is not running, THEN:
a) PERFORM the following:
- 1) CHECK seal water inlet and lower seal water bearing temperatures LESS THAN 230'F for each RCP.
(Plant computer RC-010)
- 2) IF seal water inlet OR lower seal water bearing temperatures GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 2300 F, THEN DO NOT establish seal injection to that RCP.
GO TO Step 6.d.
b) ENSURE seal injection isolation valves open for applicable RCPs.
c) ENSURE PDP recirculation valve is 100% open.
d) START the PDP.
e) MONITOR seal water inlet and lower seal water bearing temperatures.
(Plant computer display RC-010)
Step 6 continued on next page.
REV.
23 OPOP05-EO-ESOI REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 11 OF 22 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Step 6 continued from previous page.
f) Slowly CLOSE the PDP recirculation valve to establish a lOF/min.
cooldown rate on seal water inlet and lower seal water bearing temperatures.
g) ESTABLISH normal seal injection flow of between 6 and 13 gpm.
__d. VERIFY letdown IN SERVICE
- d.
PERFORM the following:
- 1) ESTABLISH letdown:
a) ESTABLISH normal letdown per ADDENDUM 1.
ESTABLISHING NORMAL LETDOWN.
b) IF normal letdown can NOT be established. THEN ESTABLISH excess letdown per ADDENDUM 2.
ESTABLISHING EXCESS LETDOWN.
- 2)
IF letdown established. THEN GO TO Step 6.e.
- 3) IF letdown NOT established AND emergency boration NOT in progress, THEN PERFORM the following:
a) ISOLATE charging.
b)
REDUCE seal injection flow to approximately 6 gpm.
c)
GO TO Step 7.
Step 6 continued on next page.,
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 12 OF 22 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Step 6 continued from previous page:
- e. Pressurizer level trending to 25%
7 MONITOR Pressurizer Pressure Control:
_ a. Pressure - GREATER THAN 1857 PSIG
.. b. Pressure STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG
- e.
CONTROL charging and letdown to maintain level at 25%.
- a. PERFORM the following:
- 1) ENSURE SI actuated.
- 2)
GO TO OPOP05-EO-EOOO.
REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
Step 1.
- b.
PERFORM the following:
- 1) IF pressure LESS THAN 2235 PSIG AND lowering, THEN:
a) ENSURE pressurizer PORVs closed.
b) IF any PORV can NOT be closed.
THEN manually CLOSE its isolation valve AND REFER TO TECH SPECS 3.4.4.
c) ENSURE pressurizer spray valves closed.
Step 7 continued on next page.
REV.
23 OPOPO5-ED-ESOI REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 13 OF 22 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Step 7 continued from previous page.
d) IF pressurizer spray valve(s) can NOT be closed.
THEN PERFORM the following:
- 1) STOP RCP 1A(2A).
- 2) STOP RCP lD(2D).
- 4) IF RCS pressure still continues to lower. TIEN PERFORM the following:
o ISOLATE IA to containment.
o PLACE Excess Letdown in service per ADDENDUM 2.
ESTABLISHING EXCESS LETDOWN.
e) ENSURE ESF load sequencers reset.
f) ENSURE pressurizer heaters on.
Step 7 continued on next page.
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 14 OF 22 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Step 7 continued from previous page.
- 2) IF pressure GREATER THAN 2235 PSIG AND rising. THEN:
a) ENSURE pressurizer heaters off.
b) CONTROL pressure using normal pressurizer spray.
c) IF normal spray NOT available, T=EN
- 1) ENSURE normal spray valves are closed.
- 2)
USE auxiliary spray.
d) JZ auxiliary spray MOT available. THEN USE one pressurizer PORV.
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 15 OF 22 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 8 -aONITOR S
j Levels:
I
- a. PERFORM the following:
1)IF NR -level na1SýOb LES'S)
..HAN 14%.
THEN MAINTAINj-tota (AFW7 low10wREATER THAN 57-6 GPM.
42)4,IiR) lli -evel in at least one)
SG i1s ",GREATER THAN 14%,,THEN)
ICONTROL AFWj low to maintain 1NR)IevelI;LBETWEEN)422% and) 5 0%)
3)' IF an ;4ýwuppump fails to)
(sta rio
,HN
) RESETS,allSG LO-LO.'level:
?AFW actuations.)
4b6) SSE- " applicable "AEW) re~gu~lating valve.
~)j J)(pp~cabe 'AFW lcroqss fI4 ) - -CONTROL -AFJ14 ýfl OwwtLES
,THAN 6775 GP~
jFW 'pump)
G(4) O-)Spe-8-.c,ý
- b.
CHECK AFW system - IN SERVICE
- b.
GO TO Step 9.
o AFW pump(s)
RUNNING
.ic.
CONTROL AFW'flow to mitiNj levels'BiETWEEN,,22% andl'5W%
Ic
-iF NRlevel in any),SG>5continues)
- to rise. ',THEN "STOP AFW)low to!
t*h~at__) SGi..
__d. IF Main Feedwater is available.
THEN PLACE Main Feedwater in service per ADDENDUM 6. PLACING MAIN FEEDWATER IN SERVICE
REV.
23 0POP05-EO-ESOI REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 16 OF 22 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 9
VERIFY All 13.8KV And 4.16KV AC Busses - ENERGIZED BY OFFSITH POWER 10 ENSURE All Dilution Paths Are Isolated:
__a. BTRS - BYPASSED
__b.
Letdown Demineralizer - BYPASSED
-c. RMW pumps -
PULL TO LOCK
_d.
RMW nonessential header isolation valvev - CLOSED PERFORM the following:
- a. TRY to restore offsite power per OPOPO4-AE-O001.
FIRST RESPONSE TO LOSS OF ANY OR ALL 13.8KV OR 4.16KV BUS.
- b.
IF offsite power can NOT be restored. THEN manually LOAD desired equipment on the AC ESE busses. REFER TO ADDENDUM 3.
EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL LOADING REQUIREMENTS.
- a. BYPASS BTRS.
- b.
BYPASS letdown demineralizer.
- c.
PLACE RMW pumps in PULL TO LOCK.
- d.
CLOSE at least one RMW nonessential header isolation valve.
REV.
23 OPOP05-EO-ES01' REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 17 OF 22 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE Approximately three (3) turns open on each Deaerator High Level Dump Bypass Valve is a good starting point to maintain Deaerator level.
11 IMAINTAIN Deaerator Level:
__a. DISPATCH Operator To Throttle Open Deaerator High Level Dump Bypass Valves To Maintain Deaerator Level (29 ft TGB S of CNDSR #13/23) o "1(2)-FW-0486" "DEAERATOR STORAGE TANK #2" "HIGH LEVEL DUMP BYPASS VALVE" o "l(2)-FW-0487" "DEAERATOR STORAGE TANK #1" "HIGH LEVEL DUMP BYPASS VALVE"
__b. VERIFY Deaerator Level Control Valve -
MAINTAINING LEVEL
- b. Manually CONTROL Deaerator Level Control Valve to maintain Deaerator Level.
REV.
23 OPOP05-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 18 OF 22 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 12 CHECK NSIV Status:
__a. Condenser AVAILABLE
- a. PERFORM the following:
- 1) ENSURE MSIVs and MSIBs -
CLOSED.
o IF MSIV(s) and MSIB(s) can NOT be closed. THEN DISPATCH operator to close MSIV(s) and MSIB(s) per ADDENDUM 8.
FAILING AIR TO MSIVS AND MSIBS.
o WITHOUT ANY RCP running. RCS TCOLD -
STABLE.
o WITH ANY RCP running. RCS TAVG -
STABLE.
- 3)
GO TO Step 14.
OBSERVE note prior to Step 14.
-b. MSIVs OPEN
- 1) ENSURE MSIV and MSIB handswitches in CLOSED position.
- 2) ENSURE Main Steam Isolation reset.
- 3) Slowly OPEN MSIBs to K ressurize the main steam eader.
- 5)
IF RCS TAVG lowers in an uncontrolled manner, THEN CLOSE the MSIVs and MSIBs.
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ESO1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 19 OF 22 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE The steam dump pressure controller setting to maintain 1185 psig is approximately 8.46 turns.
13 TRANSFER Condenser Steam Dump To Pressure Control Mode:
-a.
PLACE the steam dump controller in MANUAL and at minimum demand
_b.
TRANSFER steam dump to pressure control mode
- c.
ENSURE Steam dump pressure
- c.
ADJUST steam dump controller.
controller -
SET TO MAINTAIN 1185 PSIG
- d.
PLACE the steam dump controller in AUTO
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ESO1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 20 OF 22 STEP
.ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE The RCP preferred running order to provide normal pressurizer spray is as follows:
o First LOOP D o Second -
LOOP A o Third
- LOOPs B OR C 14 CHECK RCP Status -
AT LEAST ONE RUNNING PERFORM the following:
- a. START one RCP per OPOP02-RC-0004, OPERATION OF REACTOR COOLANT PUMP.
- b. IF an RCP can NOT be started, THEN VERIFY natural circulation.
o RCS subcooling based on core exit T/Cs -
GREATER THAN 35*F o SG pressures -
STABLE OR LOWERING.
o RCS hot leg temperatures STABLE OR LOWERING.
o Core exit T/Cs -
STABLE OR LOWERING.
o RCS cold leg temperatures - AT SATURATION TEMPERATURE FOR SG PRESSURE.
REFER TO ADDENDUM 4.
SATURATION CURVE.
- c.
IF natural circulation can NOT be verified, THEN RAISE steam dumping rate.
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ESOI REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 21 OF 22 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 15 CHECK If SR Detectors Should Be Energized:
__a.
CHECK IR flux - LESS THAN 10-10 AMPS
_b.
VERIFY SR detectors - ENERGIZED
__c.
TRANSFER NR-45:
o Highest SR channel o Highest IR channel 16 SECURE Unnecessary Plant Equipment, REFER TO OPOP04-ZO-0003.
SECONDARY PLANT STABILIZATION 17 PERFORM OPSP1O-ZG-0003.
SHUTDOWN MARGIN VERIFICATION MODES 3.
- 4.
AND 5 18 MAINTAIN Stable Plant Conditions:
o Pressurizer pressure -
BETWEEN 2220 PSIG AND 2250 PSIG o Pressurizer level -
BETWEEN 23% AND 33%
o SG NR levels BETWEEN 22% and 50%
o RCS Temperature o WITH ANY RCP RUNNING, RCS TAVG BETWEEN 565 0 F AND 569 0 F OR o WITHOUT ANY RCP RUNNING, RCS TCOLD BETWEEN 565°F AND 569 0 F
- a.
PERFORM the following:
- 1) WHEN IR flux LESS THAN 10-10 AMPS, THEN PERFORM Steps 15.b and 15.c.
- 2)
GO TO Step 16.
- b. Manually ENERGIZE SR detectors.
REV.
23 OPOP05-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 22 OF 22 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 19 DETERMINE If Natural Circulation Cooldown Is Required:
__a. CHECK RCPs - ALL OFF
- b.
Letdown - AVAILABLE
- a.
GO TO Step 20.
- b.
GO TO OPOP05-EO-ESO5.
NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN WITHOUT LETDOWN.
Step 1.
__c. GO TO OPOPO5-EO-ES02, NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN, Step 1 20 PERFORM OPOP01-ZQ-0022.
PLANT OPERATIONS SHIFT ROUTINES, SAFETY FUNCTION CHECKLIST. For The Applicable Mode 21 VERIFY Compliance With Technical Specifications Limiting Conditions For Operation PERFORM The following:
- a.
CONTINUE monitoring of Critical Safety Function Status Trees.
- b.
CONTINUE monitoring the Conditional Information Page.
- c.
ATTEMPT to restore plant conditions to comply with Technical Specifications.
- d.
CONSULT Plant Management.
- e.
DO NOT exit this procedure until directed by Plant Management OR compliance with Technical Specification Limiting Conditions For Operation are achieved.
22 GO TO Appropriate Plant Procedure, As Determined By Unit Or Shift Supervisor
-END-
REV.
23 OPOP05-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 1 OF 7 ADDENDUM 1 ESTABLISHING NORMAL LETDOWN STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1
VERIFY charging - IN SERVICE 2
VERIFY at least one train of CCW ALIGNED TO THE LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER RETURN TO procedure step in effect.
PERFORM the following:
- a. START CCW pump(s) and ALIGN valves to establish COW flow to letdown heat exchanger.
- b. IF CCW flow can NOT be established to letdown heat exchanger, THEN RETURN TO procedure step in effect.
RETURN TO procedure step in effect.
3 CLOSE RCS letdown orifice isolation valves
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 2 OF 7 ADDENDUM 1 ESTABLISHING NORMAL LETDOWN STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 4
VERIFY letdown pressure - WITHIN 100 psi OF RCS PRESSURE (35 ft EAB Relay Room North Wall.
Panel ZLC505)
"1(2)-CV-PI-0469" "EXCESS/NORMAL LETDN PRESSURE" PERFORM the following:
- a. ENSURE CCW is in service and aligned to supply cooling to the excess letdown heat exchanger.
- b.
OPEN excess letdown loop isolation valves.
- c.
OPEN regenerative heat exchanger excess letdown heat exchanger crosstie valve.
(35 ft EAB Relay Room North Wall.
panel ZLC5O5)
"1(2)-CV-HS-0469 EXCESS/NORMAL" "LETDN CROSS CONNECTION"
- d.
VERIFY pressure on "CV-PI-0469 EXCESS/NORMAL LETDN PRESSURE" WITHIN 100 PSI of RCS pressure.
- e. IF letdown pressure is NOT WITHIN 100 psi of RCS pressure. THEN PERFORM the following:
- 1) CLOSE regenerative heat exchanger excess letdown heat exchanger crosstie valve.
(35 ft EAB Relay Room North Wall. panel ZLC505 "1(2)-CV-HS-0469 EXCESS/NORMAL' "LETDN CROSS CONNECTION"
- 2) CLOSE excess letdown loop isolation valves.
- 3) RETURN TO procedure step in effect.
REV.
23 OPOP05-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 3 OF 7 ADDENDUM 1 ESTABLISHING NORMAL LETDOWN STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 5
PLACE letdown pressure controller in MANUAL 6
THROTTLE letdown pressure control valve 1(2)-PCV-0135 to 50%
7 OPEN letdown line containment isolation valves o
OCIV MOV-0024 o
ICIV MOV-0023 8
OPEN letdown line loop isolation valves o LETDN ISOL LCV-0465 o LETDN ISOL LCV-0468 PERFORM the following:
- a. CLOSE regenerative heat exchanger excess letdown heat exchanger crosstie valve.
(35 ft EAB Relay Room North Wall.
panel ZLC505)
"1(2)-CV-HS-0469 EXCESS/NORMAL" "LETDN CROSS CONNECTION"
- b. RETURN TO procedure step in effect.
PERFORM the following:
- a. CLOSE letdown line containment isolation valves.
- b. CLOSE regenerative heat exchanger excess letdown heat exchanger crosstie valve.
(35 ft EAB Relay Room North Wall.
panel ZLC505)
"1(2)-CV-HS-0469 EXCESS/NORMAL" "LETDN CROSS CONNECTION"
- c.
RETURN TO procedure step in effect.
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ESO1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 4 OF 7 ADDENDUM 1 ESTABLISHING NORMAL LETDOWN STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 9
OPEN letdown orifice header isolation valve o
LTDN ORIF HDR ISOL FV-OO1 PERFORM the following:
- a.
CLOSE letdown line loop isolation valves.
- b.
CLOSE letdown line containment isolation valves.
- c. CLOSE regenerative heat exchanger excess letdown heat exchanger crosstie valve.
(35 ft EAB Relay Room North Wall.
panel ZLC505)
"1(2)-CV-HS-0469 EXCESS/NORMAL" "LETDN CROSS CONNECTION"
- d.
RETURN TO procedure step in effect.
REV.
23 OPOP05-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 5 OF 7 ADDENDUM I ESTABLISHING NORMAL LETDOWN STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED I
CAUTION Failure to perform Steps 10 and 11 in rapid sequence may cause excessive letdown line fluid flashing or lifting of letdown relief to PRT.
I 10 OPEN desired letdown line orifice isolation valve:
o FV-0012 OR o FV-0013 OR o MOV-0014 PERFORM the following:
- a.
CLOSE letdown orifice header isolation valve.
- b.
CLOSE letdown line loop isolation valves.
- c.
CLOSE letdown line containment isolation valves.
- d.
CLOSE regenerative heat exchanger excess letdown heat exchanger crosstie valve.
(35 ft EAB Relay Room North Wall.
panel ZLC505)
"1(2)-CV-HS-0469 EXCESS/NORMAL" "LETDN CROSS CONNECTION"
- e.
RETURN TO procedure step in effect.
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ESO1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 6 OF 7 ADDENDUM 1 ESTABLISHING NORMAL LETDOWN STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 11 THROTTLE letdown pressure controller to maintain 375 to 385 psig PERFORM the following:
- a. CLOSE applicable letdown line orifice isolation valve(s):
o FV-0012 o FV-0013 o MOV-0014
- b. CLOSE letdown orifice header isolation valve.
- c.
CLOSE letdown line loop isolation valves.
- d.
CLOSE letdown line containment isolation valves.
- e. CLOSE regenerative heat exchanger excess letdown heat exchanger crosstie valve.
(35 ft EAB Relay Room North Wall.
panel ZLC505)
"l(2)-CV-HS-0469 EXCESS/NORMAL" "LETDN CROSS CONNECTION*
- f.
RETURN TO procedure step in effect.
12 OPEN additional letdown orifice isolation valves as desired 13 PLACE letdown pressure controller to AUTO CONTROL letdown pressure in MANUAL.
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ESO1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 7 OF 7 ADDENDUM.
ESTABLISHING NORMAL LETDOWN STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 14 IF regenerative heat exchanger excess letdown heat exchanger crosstie valve 1(2)-CV-HV-0469 was opened, THEN CLOSE:
(35 ft EAB Relay Room North Wall, Panel ZLC505)
"1(2)-CV-HS-0469 EXCESS/NORMAL" "LETDN CROSS CONNECTION" 15 VERIFY excess letdown loop isolation valves - CLOSED 16 RETURN TO procedure step in effect Manually CLOSE excess letdown loop isolation valves.
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ESO1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE I OF 3 ADDENDUM 2 ESTABLISHING EXCESS LETDOWN STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1
OPEN CCW isolation valves for excess letdown heat exchanger 2
CHECK seal return containment isolation valves -
OPEN RETURN TO procedure step in effect.
PERFORM the following:
- a. OPEN seal return containment isolation valves.
- b. IF seal return containment isolation valves can NOT be opened. THEN:
- 1) PLACE excess letdown divert valve to RCDT position.
- 2) START RCDT pump.
- 3) ENSURE LV-4911 RCDT level control valve in AUTO.
- 4) OPEN RCDT discharge containment isolation valves.
- 5)
DISPATCH operator to open RCDT HX discharge flow orifice bypass.
(Valve located 29 ft MAB Rm 108C.
operated via reach rod 41 ft MAB.
Penetration Area)
"1(2)-WL-0019" "RCDT HEAT EXCHANGER" "FE-4914 BYPASS VALVE'
- 6)
ENSURE adequate capacity in the RHT to receive the discharged coolant.
- 7) OPEN excess letdown loop isolation valves.
- 8)
GO TO Step 5 of this Addendum and OBSERVE caution prior to Step 5 of this Addendum.
REV. 23 OPOPO5-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 2 OF 3 ADDENDUM 2 ESTABLISHING EXCESS LETDOWN STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 3
OPEN excess letdown loop isolation valves 4
PLACE excess letdown divert valve to VCT position RETURN TO procedure step in effect.
ESTABLISH excess letdown flow to RCDT
- a.
PLACE excess letdown divert valve to RCDT position.
- b.
START RCDT pump.
- c.
ENSURE LV-4911 RCDT valve in AUTO.
- d.
OPEN RCDT discharge isolation valves.
level control containment
(Valve located 29 ft MAB Rm 108C, operated via reach rod 41 ft MAB.
Penetration Area)
"I(2)-WL-0019" "RCDT HEAT EXCHANGER" "FE-4914 BYPASS VALVE"
- f.
ENSURE adequate capacity in the RHT to receive the discharged coolant.
REV.
23 OPOP05-EO-ESO1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 3 OF 3 ADDENDUM 2 ESTABLISHING EXCESS LETDOWN STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION IF excess letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature rises to GREATER THAN 1750 OR pressure rises to GREATER THAN 150 PSIG, THEN damage to excess letdown piping and components may occur.
5 INITIATE excess letdown flow by throttling excess letdown temperature control valve PERFORM the following:
- a.
CLOSE excess letdown loop, isolation valves.
- b.
IF 1(2)-WL-0019 was operated.
THEN DISPATCH operator to CLOSE RCDT HX discharge flow orifice bypass valve.
(Valve located 29 ft MAB Rm 108C, operated via reach rod 41 ft MAB.
Penetration Area)
"1(2) -WL-0019" "RCDT HEAT EXCHANGER" "FE-4914 BYPASS VALVE"
- c. RETURN TO procedure step in effect.
6 RETURN TO procedure step in effect
REV.
23 OPOP05-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE I OF 1 ADDENDUM 3 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL LOADING REQUIREMENTS Components Train A (KW)
Train B (KW) Train C (KW)
Pressurizer Heaters lA/IB (2A/2B) 431.0 N/A 431.0 Hydrogen Recombiners N/A 75.0 75.0 RHR Pumps 222.2 222.2 222.2 RMW Pumps N/A 41.0 41.0 SFPC Pumps N/A 140.4 140.4 SFP Air Handling Unit N/A 0.5 0.51 Centrifugal Charging Pumps 450.0 N/A 450.0, BA Transfer Pump Room Fans 0.4 N/A 0.4.
BAT Pumps 27.0 N/A 27.0 RMW Pumps Air Handling Unit N/A 1.9 1.9 480V MCCs 1A5/1B5/1C5 (2A5/2B5/2C5) 171.5 72.5 92.2
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ESO1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 1 OF 1 ADDENDUM 4 SATURATION CURVE STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Saturation Curve Pressure (psig) 2600 2400 2200 2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0
ACCEPTABLE REGION OF OF NACCEPTABLE
-T-L_ýE G 10 N
- 090000, 0ae!
200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 Temperature (F)
REV.
23 OPOP05-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 1 OF 2 ADDENDUM 5 SEQUENCER LOADING VERIFICATION - MODE II STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED I
CAUTION o Equipment should NOT be manually loaded on an ESF Bus until the respective ESF Load Sequencer has completed its automatic sequence OR it has been determined that the respective ESF Load Sequencer has failed to operate.
o IF a LOOP or SI occurs, AND a train of Essential Chilled Water fails. THEN the corresponding EAB IVAC fans should be stopped within 30 minutes to prevent heat buildup in the Auxiliary Shutdown/QDPS rooms.
I 1
VERIFY the following equipment -
LOADED ON ESF BUS Manually LOAD equipment NOT previously secured by theKEmergency Operating Procedures.
COMPONENT-TRAIN *A" TRAIN "B" TRAIN "C" 480V LC Feeder Breakers ECW Pumps RCFCs CCW Pumps AFW Pumps Essential Chill Water Pumps EAB Supply and Return HVAC Fans CRE Supply. Return and C/U HVAC Fans FHB Main Exhaust HVAC Fans Essential Chillers
REV.
23 OPOP05-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 2 OF 2 ADDENDUM 5 SEQUENCER LOADING VERIFICATION MODE II STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 2
RESET ESF load sequencers 3
RESET Pressurizer Backup Heaters 1A(2A) and 1B(2B)
- a. Place Control Room Handswitches in OFF
- b. RETURN Control Room Handswitches to the position required for current plant conditions 4
STOP any equipment previously secured by any Emergency Operating Procedure 5
CHECK ALL Essential Chilled Water Trains IN SERVICE SECURE the corresponding EAB HVAC for. any Essential Chilled Water Train that is NOT operating.
6 RETURN TO procedure step in effect
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 1 OF 3 ADDENDUM 6 PLACING MAIN FEEDWATER IN SERVICE STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1
VERIFY S/U SGFP - RUNNING 2
VERIFY S/U SGFP discharge valve -
OPEN PERFORM the following:
- a.
CLOSE S/U SGFP discharge valve.
- b. Manually START S/U SGFP.
- c.
OPEN the S/U SGFP discharge valve.
- d.
IF S/U SGFP can NOT be started THEN ENSURE AFW in service per ADDENDUM 7. PLACING AFW IN SERVICE.
Manually OPEN S/U SGFP discharge valve.
3 PLACE FW regulating and low power FW regulating valves in manual and minimum demand 4
PLACE the handswitches for the following valves in the CLOSED position:
o FWIVs o
FWIBs o
Preheater Bypass Valves o
SGBD Isolation Valves 5
REV.
23 OPOP05-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 2 OF 3 ADDENDUM 6 PLACING MAIN FEEDWATER IN SERVICE STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED The status lights located on' the feedwater isolation panel for the "FW CONT/BYP VALVES" may remain lit after the feedwater isolation has been reset.
6 RESET "FW CONT/BYP VALVES" feedwater isolation NOTE To reset a Feedwater Isolation signal following an actual SG HI-HI (P-14) condtion.
the SI/SG HI-HI pushbuttons must be depressed with the reactor trip breakers closed and the SG HI-HI condition clear.
7 RESET SI/SG HI-HI level feedwater isolation 8
RESET all feedwater isolation safety-grade solenoids by momentarily placing handswitches for each train in the OPEN postion CAUTION IF any SG levels begin to rise in an uncontrolled manner when the respective preheater bypass valve is opened. THEN it may be necessary to manually isolate the main feedwater regulating valve for that SG(s).
I 9
OPEN the preheater bypass valves 10 ESTABLISH SG main feedwater flow with the low power FW regulating valves IF SG main FW flow can NOT be established to ALL SGs.
THEN USE AFW to maintain level in affected SGs per ADDENDUM 7. PLACING AFW IN SERVICE.
REV.
23 OPOP05-EO-ESO1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 3 OF 3 ADDENDUM 6 PLACING MAIN FEEDWATER IN SERVICE STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED I
VE*-F SG NR level in at least onee 4SGj(3)(GREATER THAN 14%)
- PXERF0FR tihe__ -oillowing:
~(a. (AINTAIN total AEW flow)
'GREATER TIANJ,ý J~GPM.*
(j.WHEN SG NR lievel mnat least one SG is GREATER ITHAN i4%:,THEN TPERFOR Step, 12 of this addendum.;
- c.
RETURN TO procedure step in affect.
(1112 (IN- 'S C
NTO ANY: Sr, 13 SECURE AFW to SG(s) being supplied by main FW
- a.
RESET all SG LO-LO level AFW actuations
- b.
- c.
SECURE applicable AFW pump(s):
o Motor-driven AFW pumps -
STOP PUMP AND PLACE IN AUTO o
Steam-driven AFW pump
- TRIP TURBINE AND CLOSE TRIP/THROTTLE VALVE
- d.
OPEN applicable AFW flow control valves 14 CONTROL feedwater flow to maintain SG NR levels BETWEEN 22% and 50%
15 RETURN TO procedure step in effect GO TO Step 14 of this addendum.
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ESO1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 1 OF 3 ATDDENDPUM 7 PLACI(NG AEW IN SERVICE STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Components are located on CPO06 unless otherwise noted.
VERIFY AFW to SG isolation valves -
CLOSED o
"OCIV MOV-0048" o
AFW to SG 1B(2B) "OCIV MOV-0065" o
"OCIV MOV-0085" o
"OCIV MOV-0019" 2
CLOSE AFW to SG regulating valves(s) o AFW to SG 1A(2A)
IF cross train flow is desired. THEN OPEN the desired AFW Pump cross connect valve(s) o AFW Pump 11(21)
"XCONN FV-7517" o
AFW Pump 12(22)
"XCONN FV-7516" o
AFW Pump 13(23)
"XCONN FV-7515" o
AFW Pump 14(24)
"XCONN FV-7518" CLOSE valves.
DISPATCH an operator to close valve(s).
(25 ft IVC)
DISPATCH an operator to open the desired valve(s).
(25 ft IVC)
REV.
23 OPOP05-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 2 OF 3 ADDENDUM 7 PLACING AFW IN SERVICE STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED I
CAUTIO)
AFW Pump flowrate SHALL NOT I
exceed 675 GPM per pump.
4 START the selected motor-driven AFW pump(s) o "AFW Pump 11(21)"
o "AFW Pump 12(22)"
o "AFW Pump 13(23)"
5 OPEN AFW to SG isolation valves o
"OCIV MOV-0048" o
"OCIV MOV-0065" o
"OCIV MOV-0085" o
"OCIV MOV-0019" IF a motor-driven AFW pump can NOT be started, THEN START the turbine-driven AFW pump as follows:
- a.
ENSURE "MN STM ISOL MOV-0143 -
OPEN.
- b.
ENSURE "T & T UNIT TRIP" annunciator (06M4 B-7)
EXTINGUISHED.
C.
ENSURE "T & T MECH OVERSP TRIP" annunciator (06M4 C-8)
EXTINGUISHED.
- d.
OPEN "TURB TRIP/THROT MOV-0514 DISPATCH an operator to open the valve(s).
(25 ft IVC)
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 3 OF 3 ADDENDUM 7 PLACING AFW IN SERVICE STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 6
THROTTLE the AFW to SG regulating valves to maintain SG NR levels -
BETWEEN 22% and 50%
"AFW REG FV-7526" DISPATCH an operator to throttle valve(s).
(25 ft IVC)
__ 7 RETURN TO procedure step in effect
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ESO1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 1 OF I ADDENDUM 8 FAILING AIR TO MSIVS AND MSIBS STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE The following steps will vent air to both the MSIV and MSIB.
1 CLOSE IA isolation to MSIV and MSIB:
(58 ft IVC, on wall by MSIV)
A - "1(2)-IA-0555" "INSTRUMENT AIR B - "I(2)-IA-0551" "INSTRUMENT AIR C - "I(2)-IA-0547" "INSTRUMENT AIR D - "I(2)-IA-0559" "INSTRUMENT AIR SUBHEADER ISOLATION VALVE" SUBHEADER ISOLATION VALVE" SUBHEADER ISOLATION VALVE" SUBHEADER ISOLATION VALVE" 2
VENT IA line to atmosphere by opening petcock on air regulator to MSIB:(58 ft IVC on wall by MSIB)
A -
"1(2)-IA-PCV-7037" or "1(2)-IA-PCV-7038" for "1(2)-MS-FV-7412" "STEAM GENERATOR 1A(2A) MAIN STEAM" "FSV-7414 BYPASS VALVE (ORC)"
B -
"1(2)-IA-PCV-7050' or "1(2)-IA-PCV-7051" for "1(2)-MS-FV-7422" "STEAM GENERATOR 1B(2B) MAIN STEAM" "FSV-7424 BYPASS VALVE (ORC)"
C - "1(2)-IA-PCV-7063" or "1(2)-IA-PCV-706 " for "1(2)-MS-FV-7432" "STEAM GENERATOR 1C(2C) MAIN STEAM" "FSV-7434 BYPASS VALVE (ORC)"
D - "1(2)-IA-PCV-7025" or "1(2)-IA-PCV-7023" for "1(2)-MS-FV-7442" "STEAM GENERATOR 1D(2D) MAIN STEAM" "FSV-7444 BYPASS VALVE (ORC)"
3 RETURN TO procedure step in effect
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ESO REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 1 OF 5 ADDENDUM 9 ESTABLISHING ALTERNATE CHARGING FLOW CONTROL STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED I
CATIION IF RCP Seal Cooling has been lost and Seal Inlet Temperature has exceeded 230 0 F. THEN Seal Injection SHALL NOT be established to affected RCPs per this Addendum.
I I DISPATCH operator to perform the following:
- a. THROTTLE charging flow control manual bypass two turns open (19 ft MAB RM 79)
"1(2)-CV-0255" "CVCS CHARGING DISCHARGE" "FCV-0205 BYPASS VALVE"
- b.
CLOSE charging flow control manual inlet isolation valve (19 ft MAB RM 79)
"1(2)-CV-0254A" "CVCS CHARGING DISCHARGE" "FCV-0205 INLET VALVE" 2
CHECK normal or alternate charging loop isolation valve OPEN OPEN normal or alternate charging loop isolation valve.
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 2 OF 5 ADDENDUM 9 ESTABLISHING ALTERNATE CHARGING FLOW CONTROL STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 3
CHECK charging OCIV - OPEN PERFORM the following:
- a. OPEN charging OCIV.
- b.
IF charging OCIV will NOT open.
THEN DISPATCH operator to open charging OCIV.
(29 FT MAB RM 108C)
'1(2)-CV-MOV-0025" "CVCS CHARGING ORC" "CONTAINMENT ISOLATION" "MOV OPERATOR" CLOSE affected seal injection OCIV's:
4 VERIFY RCP seal inlet temperatures have remained - LESS THAN 230'F o "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033A" o "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033B" o "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033C" o "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033D" 5
ESTABLISH charging flow:
- a.
CHECK CCP suction aligned to RWST
- a.
PERFORM the following:
- b. OPEN the recirculation valve(s) for the CCP(s) to be started.
- b.
CHECK CCP(s)
- RUNNING
- c.
ENSURE a CCP running
- d.
ENSURE running CCP(s) discharged.
valve -
OPEN
- d. IF running CCP(s) discharge valve can NOT be OPENED.
THEN GO TO Step 6 of this Addendum.
OBSERVE the CAUTION prior to Step 6.
Step 5 continued next page
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ESO1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 3 OF 5 ADDENDUM 9 ESTABLISHING ALTERNATE CHARGING FLOW CONTROL STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Step 5 continued continued from previous page
- e.
DISPATCH operator to adjust charging flow control manual bypass to achieve desired flowrate (19 ft MAB RM 79)
"1(2)-CV-0255" "CVCS CHARGING DISCHARGE" "FCV-0205 BYPASS VALVE"
-- f.
CLOSE the running CCP(s) recirculation valve
- g. CHECK RCP seal injection flow -
BETWEEN 6 and 13 GPM
- g. IF RCP Seal Inlet temperatures have remained - LESS THAN 2300 F.
THEN PERFORM the following:
- 1) ENSURE seal injection OCIV(s)
OPEN.
o "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033A" o "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033B" o "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033C" o "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033D"
- 2) ADJUST 1(2)-CV-HCV-0218 to establish between 6 and 13 gpm RCP seal injection flow.
- h. RETURN TO procedure step in effect
REV.
23 OPOPO5-EO-ESO1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 4 OF 5 ADDENDUM 9 ESTABLISHING ALTERNATE CHARGING FLOW CONTROL STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED I
CAUTION IF RCP seals have NOT been previously isolated. THEN maximum seal injection flow will result when CCP 1B(2B) Alt Discharge to RCP Seal Isolation CV-0236B OR CCP 1A(2A) Bypass Isol MOV-8348 is opened.
I 6
DISPATCH operator to perform the following:
- a.
OPEN alternate discharge to RCP seals:
(19 ft MAB RM 79)
"1(2)-CV-0236B" "CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP LB(2B)"
ENSURE CCP 1B(2B) discharge isolation MOV-8377B - CLOSED 8
CHECK CCP 1A(2A)
RUNNING
- a.
OPEN CCP IA(2A) Bypass Isol MOV-8348
- b.
ENSURE CCP 1A(2A) discharge isolation MOV-8377A -
CLOSED GO TO Step 9 of this Addendum.
REV. 23 0POP05-EO-ESOI REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE PAGE 5 OF 5 ADDENDUM 9 ESTABLISHING ALTERNATE CHARGING FLOW CONTROL STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 9
ESTABLISH desired charging flow:
- a.
DISPATCH operator to open:
(19 ft MAB RM 79)
"1(2)-CV-0255" "CVCS CHARGING DISCHARGE" "FCV-0205 BYPASS VALVE'
- b. THROTTLE HCV-0206 to establish desired charging flow
- c.
CLOSE the running CCP(s) recirculation valve 10 VERIFY RCP seal injection temperature has remained - LESS THAN 2300F RETURN TO procedure step in effect.
- a. ENSURE seal injection OCIV(s)
OPEN 0
0 0
0 "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033A" "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033B" "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033C" "SEAL INJ ISOL MOV-0033D" 11 DISPATCH operator to THROTTLE Alternate Source to Seal Injection Isolation valve to establish between 6 and 13 gpm RCP seal flow (19 ft MAB RM 79)
-_ 12 RETURN TO procedure step in effect
OPOP05-EO-ES01 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE Rev.
23 CONDITIONAL INFORMATION PAGE SI ACTUATION CRITERIA IF EITHER condition listed below occurs, THEN ACTUATE SI and GO TO OPOP05-EO-EOOO, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. Step 1.
o RCS subcooling based on core exit T/Cs - LESS THAN 350F.
o Pressurizer level - LESS THAN 8%.
AFWST MAKEUP CRITERIA IF AFWST level lowers to LESS THAN 138.000 GALLONS (26%).
THEN INITIATE makeup to the AFWST per OPOP02-AF-0001.
to prevent inventory problems during cooldown.
EOOO TRANSITION CRITERIA IF an SI actuation occurs during this procedure. THEN GO TO OPOPO5-EO-EOO0.
REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Step 1.
RCFC COOLING CRITERIA RESTORE CCW to RCFCs within 30 minutes after a LOOP signal.
SEQUENCER LOADING VERIFICATION IF a LOOP has occurred.
THEN PERFORM Addendum 5. Sequencer Loading Verification -
Mode II.
NSIV AND NSIB CLOSURE CRITERIA IF a loss of secondary support systems occurs that impairs the ability of secondary systems to provide a heat sink for the Steam Generators. THEN CLOSE MSIVs and MSIBs.
(For example: loss of Condenser Availability. C-9.)