ML060590423
| ML060590423 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/2003 |
| From: | O'Connor T Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Waldinger L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Public Service Enterprise Group |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2005-0194, VPNO 2003-010 | |
| Download: ML060590423 (2) | |
Text
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VPNO 2003-010 TO:
Lon Waldinger l
I Director - Nuclear Operations
/ <I FROM:
Tim O'Connor Vice President - Nuclear Operations
SUBJECT:
OPERATIONS
/
DATE:
January 28, 2003 I am writing this letter to point out my dissatisfaction in your oversight for achieving Business Plan results from this last weekend's Hope Creek Downpower. The total performance outcome is you cost the company needless plant challenges, potential human performance errors, and lost revenue to accomplish nothing, plus put the site one step further away in achieving the INPO Index, Capacity Factor and 0/kw objectives for 2003.
We were not planned with sufficient understanding, preparations, and accountability to achieve results. The condenser tube leak plan was inadequate from a depth of understanding of the configuration and our test methodology. The reactivity Plan was not well understood around the withdrawal of the 9D rods for the next run period. We are now faced with two more downpowers not to mention stress to our RR pump seal and SRV, all because we were not thinking.
Beyond just last weekend's Hope Creek Operations I see two issues surfacing when reviewing the most recent Salem Unit 1 unplanned downpower. First, we don't fully understand the plans and their depth to the plant. Second, we have in less than 7 days returned two units to power without any defense in depth rigor; thus, leading us to reactive chaotic management after the fact to keep the units at 100% power.
The point of contact flawless execution in Operations is poor. I connect the dots and find we have a gaping whole around the process for returning a plant to full Reactor
Lon'Waldinger 1/28/03 Power. It seems our only structure/rigor is if the plant SCRAMS or if the plant is returning from a refueling outage. It is not possible for us to return a plant to 100%
power from a transient or from a planned load drop and not know if the proper reviews were completed before authorizing the change. I cannot and will not accept that our process is an okay by the Operations Manager or the Operations Director.
I expect an immediate procedure be generated which provides structure for comprehensive understanding of the information in a documented fashion before authorizing a plant to return to rated power. This is our way of providing independent thought and thoroughness in a routine fashion as one of our defense barriers. I simply cannot have one person be our process.
Addiltionally, I expect a review to be rnade on why our work management process that your team participates in yields poor readiness before the plant is moved. Is it missing something in structure or is it missing just accountability?
I believe this must be one of the key elements your shift managers engage in as part of their leadership development plans to improve operations. These ought to be the discussions in the combined operations meetings.
A notification needs to be written and documented by you in our Corrective Action Program to fully understand these issues stated above and our actions to fix them.
C N. Bergh H. Keiser G. Stanley