L-84-003, 2001 Summary of Revised Regulatory Commitments
| ML021550486 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 05/14/2002 |
| From: | Garchow D Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| BL-84-003, GL-88-005, LRN-02-0182 | |
| Download: ML021550486 (3) | |
Text
PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 MAY 14 2002 0 PSEG Nuclear LLC LRN-02-0182 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-001 Attn: Document Control Desk 2001
SUMMARY
OF REVISED REGULATORY COMMITMENTS SALEM GENERATING STATION SALEM UNIT NOS. I AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 Gentlemen:
This correspondence is being transmitted in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) process for managing NRC commitments. It provides a summary of changes to NRC commitments that have been made but not reported by other means.
The following information is provided regarding each of the changed commitments and their source documents.
NRC I.E.Bulletin 84-03, "Refueling Water Cavity Seal" This bulletin addressed the potential for failure of refueling water cavity seals in industry. In a supplemental information response to this bulletin, PSEG transmitted a safety evaluation that committed to station a dedicated operator to the transfer tube isolation valve whenever the valve is in the open position.
PSEG recently evaluated a new replacement Refueling Water Cavity seal design. This new seal consists of elastomer segments held in place and compressed by steel plates with J bolts and cam arrangement. The previous seal used an inflatable seal. The gross failure analysis for the inflatable seal provides a bounding analysis for the new "segmented" seal. Since PSEGs evaluation showed that gross failure for the new passive seal is very unlikely, we have rescinded the commitment to station a dedicated operator (which was captured in Section 2.3.1 of Salem procedures S1/2.OP-SO.SF 0009, Refueling Operations) at the transfer tube isolation valve whenever the valve is open. The commitment to monitor and procedurally recover from a loss of refueling cavity or Spent Fuel Pool level will continue.
95-2168 REV. 7/99
Document Control Desk LRN-02-0182 2
MAY 14 2002 NRC Generic Letter 88-05, "Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR Plants" This Generic Letter (GL) addressed the growing concern the NRC had for boric acid corrosion and its impact on Carbon Steel Reactor pressure boundary components. The GL requested that the utilities provide details of their in-place program to ensure that boric acid corrosion did not lead to degradation of the assurance that the reactor coolant pressure boundary would not have an extremely low probability of abnormal leakage, rapidly propagating failure or gross rupture.
PSEG Nuclear responded to the GL indicating that doors had been installed on the Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) ventilation shroud to allow reactor head penetrations to be visually inspected as Unit was in MODE 3. PSEG Nuclear also mentioned the installation of an experimental leakage detection system, i.e., Main Coolant System Leakage Air Particulate Monitor (MCSLAPM) in Unit 1. This system was subsequently installed in Unit 2.
The experimental MCSLAPM leakage detection system, as currently designed, has not performed as expected. The purpose of MCSLAPM was to detect small Reactor Coolant (RC) leakage, less than the Technical Specification limit (1 gpm) from the reactor head area. To capture detectable amounts of leakage "particles" (e.g., Rb-88 particles) on the MCSLAPM filter, the sampling flow-rate, the time allowed for radioactive particle build-up, filter paper advancing speed and radiation detector sensitivity must be carefully coordinated. Also a sophisticated signal processing method is required to distinguish the low level useful signal from the background and electronic noise. The existing MCSLAPM design has turned out to be lacking in all these areas and system improvements would not be cost effective.
The numerous, existing RC system leakage detection systems (such as R1i1A, Containment Atmosphere Air Particulate radiation monitor, R12A and Containment Atmosphere Gaseous radiation monitor) along with the increased trending frequencies of R11A, provide adequate assurance of detecting RC system leakages smaller than required by Technical Specifications. Subsequently, the MCSLAPM system is being removed. All other commitments associated with the original GL 88-05 response will continue.
Document Control Desk LRN-02-0182 3
MAY 14 2002 Should there be any questions please contact us.
- Sincleel, D. Garcho'v Vice Presi ent - Operations
/hgb C
Mr. H. J. Miller Regional Administrator USNRC, Region 1 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19046 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. Robert Fretz, Licensing Project Manager - Salem Mail Stop 08B2 Washington DC 20555-001 Mr. Ray Lorson - Salem (X24)
USNRC Senior Resident Inspector Mr. K. Tosch, Manager, IV Bureau of Nuclear Engineering PO Box 415 Trenton, NJ 08625