Information Notice 1997-74, Inadequate Oversight of Contractors During Sealant Injection Activities

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Inadequate Oversight of Contractors During Sealant Injection Activities
ML031050083
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Crane  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 09/24/1997
From: Roe J
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-97-074, NUDOCS 9709180079
Download: ML031050083 (8)


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UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

September 24, 1997

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 97-74: INADEQUATE OVERSIGHT OF CONTRACTORS

DURING SEALANT INJECTION ACTIVITIES

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors except those who have

permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed

from the reactor vessel.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert

addressees to the consequences of inadequate oversight of contractors during sealant

injection activities. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to

their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. Suggestions

contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or

written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

Beaver Valley

The head vent system (HVS) at Beaver Valley Unit 2 removes noncondensable gases from

the reactor vessel head and is designed to mitigate the consequences of inadequate core

cooling or impaired natural circulation resulting from the accumulation of noncondensable

gases in the reactor coolant system (RCS).

In November 1996, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 (cold shutdown) near the end of an extended

refueling outage, operators noted a leak at a blind flange downstream of a normally shut

1-inch flow-gauge isolation valve located in a dead-leg portion of the HVS. The leak

measured approximately 15 drops per minute. On December 2, 1996, sealant was injected

into an upstream valve to temporarily stop the leakage. Following the sealant injection, the

reactor was restarted on December 3, 1996. Subsequently, as a result of concerns raised by

the NRC regarding the leaktightness of several valves upstream of the valve where sealant

was injected, Unit 2 was shut down and the valves were tested for leaks. During this post- maintenance testing, it was discovered that some sealant had migrated to other portions of

the HVS, clogging two HVS flow control valves and causing one of these valves to become

bound and unable to fully stroke.

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IN 97-74 September 24, 1997 As a result of this event, the plant manager issued a stop-work order and also ordered (1) a

review of the leak repair process at the plant, (2) a check of all existing leak repairs, and (3)

a review of vendor oversight practices.

Several factors contributed to the event at Beaver Valley Unit 2:

(1)

Licensee engineering provided improper information to the vendor performing the

repair. Engineering specified normal RCS operating pressure and temperature

conditions (610°F and 2235 psia) to the vendor instead of the actual conditions under

which the repair would be made (close to ambient). As a result, the wrong sealant

material was used.

(2)

The licensee did not review vendor procedures adequately and did not exercise

sufficient monitoring and control of vendor activities. Specifically, there was no

monitoring of the quantity of sealant injected, the injection pressure of the sealant, or

the location of the injection port.

(3)

Significant weaknesses were found in work instructions, quality assurance and quality

control involvement, sealant material selection, injection port location, and direct

vendor oversight. Work instructions, prebriefings, and overall vendor oversight were

inadequate.

As a result of inadequate licensee control of the injection of sealant material into the HVS at

Unit 2, twice as much sealant was injected into the valve as was specified in the

maintenance work package. The sealant failed to harden properly, migrated to unintended

portions of the HVS, and degraded the HVS flow control valves when it accumulated on the

valve seats. One of the valves became bound and was unable to fully stroke. Because the

valves were inoperable, the HVS would. not have been able to perform its gas-removal

function".

LaSalle

On June 19, 1996, with both units operating at 100 percent power, nonessential service water

(SW) system discharge pressures began to decrease because of the high differential pres- sures across the in-line strainers. The operators backwashed the strainers, restoring

the normal discharge pressures. On June 24, 1996, the problem recurred, causing high

temperature in a diesel fire pump during routine surveillance testing.

The licensee's root cause determination following the initial event focused on material

generated from sandblasting performed on the exterior of the lake screenhouse. The

licensee initially believed that some of the sandblasting material had become entrained in the

IN 97-74 September 24, 1997 SW, fouling the strainers. After the June 24 event, the licensee determined that both events

had been caused by the injectable sealant that had been used to repair cracks in the floor of

the service water building, which is also the roof of the SW intake tunnel. The tunnel

provides a common water source for both the SW and emergency service water (ESW)

systems of Unit 1 and Unit 2. As a result of the crack repair activities, a large amount of

sealant entered the tunnel and a portion of it was drawn into the SW strainers.

Following the June 19 and June 24 events, the licensee erroneously concluded that the

material that fouled the SW system strainers could not affect the ESW systems. On June 28,

1996, during operations to clean the SW intake tunnel, divers found sealant in the tunnel in a

place that could compromise the operability of the ESW systems. Subsequently, the licensee

declared the ESW system inoperable and shut down both reactors.

An Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) was sent to the site to investigate the sealant injection

event. It concluded that the root cause of the strainer fouling was poor control of work on a

safety-related structure. The licensee staff responsible for assigning and controlling this work

did not know enough about the facility to appreciate the potential consequences of this work.

Therefore, a contractor, who was permitted to seal cracks in the safety-related SW intake

tunnel structure, had no knowledge of the potential impact of the work, no approved

procedures, and inadequate licensee oversight. The AIT also concluded that an inadequate

assessment of the root cause of the June 19 and June 24 events, as well as the failure to

develop an initial inspection and recovery plan that was comprehensive and thorough, permitted repeated challenges to key safety systems and threatened the availability of the

ultimate heat sink (UHS). Loss of the function of these safety systems, and the resultant loss

of the UHS, would have significantly affected the licensee's ability to respond to analyzed

accidents. Had the root cause for the initial event been thoroughly evaluated, the event of

June 24 could have been avoided, reducing the time that the ESW system for both units was

threatened.

Conclusion

These events illustrate the consequences and the possible safety impact of inadequate

oversight of contractors during sealant injection activities. Such activities can adversely

impact on the ability of safety-related systems to perform their intended safety function if

called upon.

Related Generic Communications

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Information Notice (IN) 82-06, "Failure of Steam

Generator Primary Side Manway Closure Studs," dated March 12, 1982.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, IN 85-90, "Use of Sealing Compounds in an Operating

System," dated November 19, 1985.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, IN 93-90, "Unisolatable Reactor Coolant System Leak

Following Repeated Applications of Leak Sealant," dated December 1, 1993.

IN 97-74 September 24, 1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts

listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Hi Jack W.

,Acting Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts:

William F. Burton, NRR

301-415-2853 E-mail: wfb@nrc.gov

T. Jerrell Carter, Jr.

301-415-1153 E-mail: tjc@nrc.gov

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

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Attachment

IN 97-74

September 24, 1997 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information

Date of

Notice No.

Subject

Issuance

Issued to

97-73

97-72

Fire Hazard in the Use

of a Leak Sealant

Potential for Failure

of the Omega Series

Sprinkler Heads

Inappropriate Use of

10 CFR 50.59 Regarding

Reduced Seismic Criteria

for Temporary Conditions

Potential Problems with

Fire Barrier Penetration

Seals

09/23/97

09/22/97

09/22/97

09/19/97

97-71

97-70

All holders of OLs for

nuclear power reactors

except those who have

permanently ceased

operations and have

certified that fuel

has been permanently

removed from the

reactor vessel

All holders of OLs or

CPs for nuclear power

reactors and fuel

cycle facilities

All holders of OLs for

nuclear power reactors

except those who have

permanently ceased

operations and have

certified that fuel

has been permanently

removed from the

reactor vessel

All holders of OLs for

nuclear power reactors

except those who have

permanently ceased

operations and have

certified that fuel has

been permanently removed

from the reactor vessel

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 97-74 September 24, 1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts

listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

original signed by D.B. Matthews for

Jack W. Roe, Acting Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts:

William F. Burton, NRR

301-415-2853 E-mail: wfb@nrc.gov

T. Jerrell Carter, Jr.

301-415-1153 E-mail: tjc@nrc.gov

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred on 913/97 DOCUMENT NAME: 97-74.IN *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: "C" a Copy without enclosures wEb - Copy with enclosures "N" - No copy

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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

IN 97-xx

September xx, 1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the infornation in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts

listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Jack W. Roe, Acting Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts:

William F. Burton, NRR

301-415-2853 E-mail: wfb@nrc.gov

T. Jerrell Carter, Jr.

301-415-1153 E-mail: tjcenrc.gov

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\WFBXBVSEAL.IN

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: SC" = Copy without enclosures "E! - Copy with enclosures "N" - No copy

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August xx, 1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts

listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Jack W. Roe, Acting Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts:

William F. Burton, NRR

301-415-2853 E-mail: wfb@nrc.gov

T. Jerrell Carter, Jr.

301-415-1153 E-mail: tjc@nrc.gov

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\WFB\\BVSEAL.IN

To receive a copy of this docwnent. Indicate In the box: "C" = Copy without enclosures

"EF - Copy with enclosures "N" a No copy

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