B17143, Proposed Tech Specs 3.5.5 Re ECCS Trisodium Phosphate
| ML20216J545 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1998 |
| From: | NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216J521 | List: |
| References | |
| B17143, NUDOCS 9804210411 | |
| Download: ML20216J545 (18) | |
Text
.
i Docket No. 50-336 817143 I
l i
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications j
Trisodium Phosphate (TSP) j Marked Up Pages l
April 1998 i
l J
9004210411 900413 PDR ADOCK 05000336 p
)
\\
febrrua r y a,
, y y 2 --
INDEX
\\
llHTTING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE RE001REMENTS i
SECTION PAGE 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES..................................
3/4 4-2 3.4.4.3 RELIEF VALVES..................................
3/4 4-3 3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER....................................
3/4 4-4 3/4.4.5 STEAH GENERATORS...............................
3/4 4-5 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAXAGE.................
3/4 4-8 Leakage Detection Systems......................
3/4 4 8 Reactor Cool ant System Leakage.................
3/4 4-9 3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY......................................
3/4 4-10
{
374.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY..............................
3/4 4 13 3/4.4.9 TRESSURE/ TEMPERATURE LIMITS....................
3/4 4-17 t
Reactor Coolant System.........................
3/4 4-17 I
Pressurizer....................................
3/4 4-21 Overpressure Protection Systems................
3/4 4-21a 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY...........................
3/4 4-22 3//. 4.11 P.EACTOR COOLANT SYSTEH VERTS...................
3/4 4-23 1
3/4.5 EMEPGENCY COD.E COOL!NG SYSTEpS IECCSb 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS.........................
3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSY'IEMS - T avg > 300*F.................
3/4 5-3 EC'S SUBSYSTEMS - Tavg < 300*F................. 3/4 5-7 3/4.5.3 C
3/4 5.4 REFUELING WATEP. STORAGE TANK...................
3/4 5-8
.3/V 5.S TRISoOzu m Gdowm97E (Ts?)......
3/Y S- ?
('
{.gSTONE-UNIT 2 Vi Amendmerit No. 50, 77. 7p
/U
~
1 c bruary 15,1005-c INDEX BASES
(
l SECTION EA_qE A
3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION.........
B 3/4 4-1 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES B 3/4 4-1 3/4.4.3 RELIEF VALVES.................
B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER B 3/4 4-2a 3/4.4.5 STEAM bc.NERATORS B 3/4 4-2a 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE............
B 3/4 4-3 3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY B 3/4 4-4
{
3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY...................
B 3/4 4-4 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS..............
B 3/4 4-5 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY B 3/4 4-7 l
f 3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS B 3/4 4-8 J
l 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3/4.5.1 SAFETY. INJECTION TANKS B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST)
B 3/4 5-2 3/y. S. S Msoozum Plosmu cro) 8 W S.2
~
3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT..................
B 3/4 6-1 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS B 3/4 6-3 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES B 3/4 6-3 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL................
B 3/4 6-4 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT.................
'B 3/4 6-5 l
l MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 XII AmendmentNo.77,J7,77.Jpf,J77[M 0120
au,,pm EMERGENCY CORE COOL 1HG SYSTEMS SURVEfttANCE RE00lREMENTS (Continued)
Verifying that the following valves are in the indicated 10.
position with power to the valve operator removed:
Valve Number y,alve Function Valve Position,
2-51-306 Shutdown Cooling Open Flow Control 2-S1-659 SRAS Rec. ire.
Open*
2-51-660 SRAS Recirc.
Open*
2-CH-434 Thermal Bypass Closed **
By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, b.
etc.) is present in the containment which could be trash, clothing,he containment sump and cause restriction of the transported to t This visual inspection shall pump suctions during LOCA conditions.
be perfomed:
For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing 1.
CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of 2.
containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is 1
established.
At least once per 18 nonths by:
c.
Verifying automatic interlock action of the shutdown cooling 1.
system from the reactor coolant system by ensuring that with a j
simulated reactor coolant systett pressure signal greater than f
or equal to 300 psia the int,erlock prevents the shutdown cooling system suction valves from being opened.
A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that 2.
the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.
t 110 edic f et'of triso m
IVeriffngthata imum total 3.
pho(phate dodec ydrate (TSP s contained hin the Moragebask s.
DELETED
/
4.
Verifyin that when a r esentative sam e of 0.35 1 0.
lbs of TSP rom a TSP stor e basket is su rged, withou agit ion, in 50 i gallons of 180 10*F borated ter from t
RWST, the pH o the mixed solu on is raised 2 6 within
)
hours.
- To be closed prior to recirculation following LOCA.
- 2-CH-434, a manual valve, shall be locked closed.
)
AmendmentNo.7,#,M,M/
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-5 seas
i i
INSERT A - New Paae 3/4 5-9 i
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS TRISODIUM PHOSPHATE (TSP)
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i
l 3.5.5 The TSP baskets shall contain 1282 ft' of active TSP.
APPLICABILITY MODES 1,2, and 3 ACTION:
With the quantity of TSP less than required, restore the TSP quantity within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, or be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
i 4.5.5.1 Verify that the TSP baskets contain 2 282 ft' of granular trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate at least once per 18 months.
4.5.5.2 Verify that a sample from the TSP baskets provides adequate pH j
adjustment of borated water at least once per 18 months.
j 3/4 5-9
h5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) g BASES 3 /4. 5'.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS The OPERABILITY of each of the RCS safety injection tanks ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of tha safety injection tanks. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.
The limits on safety injection tank volume, boron concentration cnd prassure ensure that the assumptions used for safety injection tank injection in the accident analysis are met.
The limit of one hour for operation with an inoperable safety injection tank minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional safety injection tank which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.
3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS
)
The OPERABILITY of two separate and independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capabiity will be available in the event of
)
a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideratun.
Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the safety i
injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.
The tri dium phosph e dodecahydrat (TSP) stored in issolving b kets locate in the conta ment basement i provided to minimi the possib ity of corr ion crackin of certain met components during peration of the ECCS fo owing a LOC. The. TSP provi s this protection dissolving n the sump
{
ter and cau ng its final p to be raised to 7.0.
This etermination' assumes th RCS, the SI nks, and the RW is at maximum bor rt concentra on of 2400 ppm The requirement o dissolve a represent ve sample TSP in a sample f RWST water provi s assuranc hat the sto d TSP will ssolve in borate water at the post ated-nost A temperatu
- s. /'Tiie Ecc5 leak rate surveillance requirements assure that the leakage rates assu*
for the system outside containment during the recirculation phase will not ue exceeded.
The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that-at a minimum, the assumptions used in the accident analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. The purpose of the HPSI and.
LPSI pumps differential pressure test on recirculation ensures that the pump (s) have not degraded to a point where the accident analysis would be adversely impacted.
The actual inputs into the safety analysis for HPSI and LPSI pumps differential pressure (discharge-suction) when running on recirculation are 1209 and 150 psi, respectively. The acceptance criteria in
.)
the Technical Specifications were adjusted upward to account for instrument uncertainties and drift.
gSTONE-UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-I AmendmentNo.h,h,[/[
1 J-etwus.y 15, i095 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM 1
{
BASES I
The purpose of the ECCS throttle valve surveillance requirements is to provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.
Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:
(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECC3 LOCA analyses.
Only one HPSI pu ;: may be OPERABLE in R JE 4 with RCS temperatures less than or equal to 275'F due to the restrictea relief capacity with Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection System.
To reduce shutdown risk by having additional pumping capacity readily available, a HPSI pump may be made inoperable but available at short notice by shutting its discharge valve with the key lock on the control panel.
3/4.5.4 REFUEL'M WfTER STORAGE TANK (RLSI).
The OPERABILITY of the RWST as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of
(
a LOCA. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that
- 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to tre core, and 2) the reactor will remaia subcritical in the cold condition fcilowing mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inse ted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are coasistent with the LOCA analyses.
W-I NSE.fr 2 MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 5-2 AmendeintNo.JJ,JJJ.[/T osis
/
INSERT B - Paae B 3/4 5-2 3/4.5.5 TRISODIUM PHOSPHATE (TSP)
The trisodium phosphate (TSP) dodecahydrate stored in dissolving baskets located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibility of corrosion cracking of certain metal components during operation of the ECCS following a LOCA. The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised 2 7.0. This determination assumes the RCS, the Si tanks, and the RWST are at a maximum boron concentration of 2400 ppm and the BASTS are at a maximum boron concentration of 3.5 weight percent.
The requirement to dissolve a repretantative sample of TSP in a sample of borated water provides assurance the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at postulated post-LOCA temperatures.
This test is performed by submerging a representative sample of 0.6662 t 0.0266 grams of TSP from one of the baskets in containment in 250 i 10 milliliters of water at a boron concentration of 2482 i 20 ppm, and a temperature of 77 i 5 F. Without agitation, the solution is allowed to stand for four hours. The liquid is then decanted, mixed, and the pH measured. The pH must be 2 7.0. The representative TSP sample weight is based on the minimum required TSP mass of 12,042 pounds, which at the manufactured density corresponds to the minimum volume of 223 ft' (The minimum Technical Specification requirement of 282 ft' is based on 223 ft' of TSP for boric acid neutralization and 59 ft of TSP for neutralization of hydrochloric and nitric acids.), and the maximum sump water volume (at 77 F) following a LOCA of 2,046,4M liters, normalized to buffer a 250 i 10 milliliter sample.
The boron concentratier of the test water is representative of the maximum possible concentration in the suw following a LOCA. Agitation of the test solution is prohibited during TSP dissolution since an adequate standard for the agitation intensity cannot be specified.
The dissolution time of four hours is necessary to allow time for the dissolved TSP to naturally diffuse through the sample solution. In the containment sump following a LOCA, rapid mixing will occur, significantly decreasing the actual amount of time before the required pH is achieved. The solution is decanted after the four hour period to remove any undissolved TSP prior to mixing and pH measurement.
Mixing is necessary for proper operation of the pH instrument.
i 2
Docket No. 50-336
)
B17143 i
)
I Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Trisodium Phosphate (TSP)
Retyped Pages i
l i
l April 1998
IhDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l
SECTION EaG1 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES.....................
3/4 4-2 3/4.4.3 RELIEF VALVES.....................
3/4 4-3 3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER,
3/4 4-4 3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS 3/4 4-5 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE 3/4 4-8 Leakage Detection Systems 3/4 4-8 Reactor Coolant System Leakage 3/4 4-9 3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY.......................
3/4 4-10 3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY...................
3/4 4-13 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS 3/4 4-17 Reactor Coolant System................
3/4 4-17 Pressurizer 3/4 4-21 Overpressure Protection Systems............
3/4 4-21a 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY.................
3/4 4-22 l
3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS.............
3/4 4-23 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS................
3/4 5-1 j
3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T, 1 300*F 3/4 5-3 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T,< 300*F 3/4 5-7 3/4 5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK.............
3/4 5-8 3/4 5.5 TRISODIUM PHOSPHATE (TSP)...............
3/4 5-9 l
l I
l MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 VI Amendment No. pp, 77, Jpp, JJJ, 0365
(
o 4
INDEX BASES SECTION 1101 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSIEM 3/4.4.1 COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION.........
B 3/4 4-1 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES B 3/4 4-1 3/4.4.3 RELIEF VALVES.....................
B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER B 3/4 4-2a 3/4.4.S STEAM GENERATORS B 3/4 4-2a 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE B 3/4 4-3 3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY B 3/4 4-4 3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY...................
B 3/4 4-4 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS..............
B 3/4 4-5 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY B 3/4 4-7 3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS B 3/4 4-8 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST)
B 3/4 5-2 3/4.5.5 TRIS 0DIUM PHOSPHATE (TSP)...............
B 3/4 5-2 l
j 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS.
3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT..................
B 3/4 6-1 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS B 3/4 6-3 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES B 3/4 6-3 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL................
B 3/4 6-4 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT.................
B 3/4 6-5 MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 XII Amendment No. JJ, JJ, 77, J9p, JJ7, om
- JFF,
ENERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSJIM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
- 10. Verifying that the following valves are in the indicated position with power to the valve operator removed:
Valve Number Valve Function Valve Position 2-SI-306 Shutdown Cooling Open Flow Control 2-SI-659 SRAS Recire.
Open*
2-SI-660 SRAS Recirc.
Open*
2-CH-434 Thermal Bypass Closed **
b.
By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:
1.
For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CGNTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and 2.
Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.
i c.
At least once per 18 months by:
1.
Verifying automatic interlock action of the shutdown cooling system from the reactor coolant system by ensuring that with a simulated reactor coolant system pressure signal greater than or equal to 300 psia the interlock prevents the shutdown cooling system suction valves from being opened.
2.
A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.
3.
DELETED l
4.
DELETED l
- To be closed prior to recirculation following LOCA.
- 2-CH-434, a manual valve, shall be locked closed.
MILLSTONE - UNIf 2 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 7, p), pg, Jpf, 0367
/ff,
. s ENERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTENS IBJSODIUN PHOSPHATE fTSP)
LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.5 The TSP baskets shall contain 1282 ft* of active TSP.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 ACTION:
i With the quantity of TSP less than required, restore the TSP quantity within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, or be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within the following 6 hcurs.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.5.5.1 Verify that the TSP baskets contain 2282 ft* of granular trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate at least once per 18 months.
4.5.5.2 Verify that a sample from the TSP baskets provides adequate pH adjustment of borated water at least once per 18 months.
I 4
NILLSTONE - UKIT Z
?/4 5-9 Amendment No.
0300
3/4.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)
BASES 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS The OPERABILITY of each of the RCS safety injection tanks ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the safety injection tanks. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.
The limits on safety injection tank volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for safety injection tank injection in the accident analysis are met.
The limit of one hour for operation with an inoperable safety injection tank minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional safety injection tank which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.
3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two separate and independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.
Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the safety injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.
The ECCS leak rate surveillance requirements assure that the leakage rates assumed for the system outside containment during the recirculation phase will not be exceeded.
The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the accident analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. The purpose of the HPSI and LPSI pumps differential pressure test on recirculation ensures that the pump (s) have not degraded to a point where the accident analysis would be adversely impacted. The actual inputs into the safety analysis for HPSI and LPSI pumps differential pressure (dis:harge-suction) when running on recirculation are 1209 and 150 psi, respectively. The acceptance criteria in the Technical Specifications were adjusted upward to account for instrument uncertainties and drift.
i l
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. JJ 77. JJJ.
0368
o 4
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES l
The purpose of the ECCS throttle valve surveillance requirements is to provide
)
assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.
{
Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system 1
to each injection point is necessary to:
(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and j
(3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.
Only one HPSI pump may be OPERABLE in MODE 4 with RCS temperatures less than or equal to 275'F due to the restricted relief capacity with Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection System.
To reduce shutdown risk by having additional I
pumping capacity readily available, a HPSI pump may be made inoperable but available at short notice by shutting its discharge valve with the key lock on the control panel.
3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST)
The OPERABILITY of the RWST as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of bor v.ed water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. Tha smits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that
- 1) sufficien water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all cor, trol rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.
3/4.5.5 TRISODIUM PH0SPHATE (TSP)
The trisodium phosphate (TSP) dodecahydrate ::tored in dissolving baskets located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibility of corrosion cracking of certain-metal components during operation of the ECCS following a LOCA.
The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised 1 7.0.
This determination assumes the RCS, the t ' tanks, and the RWST are at a maximum boron concentration of 2400 ppe and the BASTS are at a maximum boron concentration of 3.5 weight percent.
The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of borated water provides assurance the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at postulated post-LOCA temperatures.
This test is performed by submerging a representativo sample of 0.6662 0.0266 grams of TSP from one of the baskets in containment in 250 10 milliliters of water at a boron concentration of l
2482 1 20 ppe, and a temperature of 77 1 5'F.
Without agitation, the solution is allowed to stand for four hours.
The liquid is then decanted, mixed, and
(
the pH measured.
The pH must be 2 7.0.
The representative TSP sample weight is based on the minimum required TSP mass of 12,042 pounds, which at the l
l MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. pp, J77 J Q,
0388 s
. ~.
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SY6TEMS BASES 3/4.5.5 TRISODIUM PHOSPHATE (TSP) (continued) manufactured density corresponds to the minimum volume of 223 ft* JThe minimum Technical Specification requirement of 282 ft* is based on 223 ft of TSP for boric acid neutralization and 59 ft* of TSP for neutralization of hydrochloric and nitric acids.), and the maximum sump water volume (at 77'F) following a LOCA of 2,046,441 liters, nore1 1 zed to buffer a 250 1 10 milliliter sample.
1 The boron concentration of the test water is representative of the maximum possible concentration in the sump following a LOCA.
Agitation of the test solution is prohibited during TSP dissolution since an adequate standard for the agitation intensity cannot be specified.
The dissolution time of four hours is necessary to allow time for the dissolved TSP to naturally diffuse through the sample solution.
In the containment sump following a LOCA, rapid mixing will occur, significantly decreasing the actual amount of time before the required pH is achieved.
The solution is decanted after the four hour period to remove any undissolved TSP prior to mixing and pH measurement.
Mixing is r.ecessary for proper operation of the pH instrument.
4 MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-3 Amendment No.
0300
O 4 D,
Docket No. 50-336 817143 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Trisodium Phosphate (TSP)
NNECO Commitments i
i i
l April 1998
4 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B17143/ Attachment 5/Page 1 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications 1
Trisodium Phosphate (TSP)
List of Regulatory Commitments The following table identifies those actions committed to by NNECO in Please notify the Manager - Regulatory Compliance at Millstone Unit N ocument.
questions regarding this document or any associated regulatory commitme of any Commitment Committed Date or Outage NONE N/A
4 *..
U. S. Nuclear R:gulatory Commission B17143/Att chm:nt 5/Paga 1 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Trisodium Phosphate (TSP)
List of Regulatory Commitments The following table identifies those actions committed to by NNECO in this document.
Please notify the Manager - Regulatory Compliance at Millstone Unit No. 2 of any questions regarding this document or any associated regulatory commitments.
Commitment Committed Date or Outage NONE N/A I