05000483/LER-2009-001, Regarding Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Loss of Power Supply
| ML091070620 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 04/17/2009 |
| From: | AmerenUE, Union Electric Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML091070621 | List: |
| References | |
| ULNRC-05612 LER 09-001-00 | |
| Download: ML091070620 (10) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 4832009001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9-2007)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)
APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2010
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 1. FACILITY NAME Callaway Plant Unit 1
- 2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000483
- 3. PAGE 1 OF 6
- 4. TITLE Technical Specification Required Shutdown due to Loss of Power Supply
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 02 19 2009 2009
- - 001 - 00 04 17 2009 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER
- 9. OPERATING MODE 1
- 10. POWER LEVEL 100
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in SUMMARY OF THE EVENT, INCLUDING DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES At 0228 on 2/19/2009, multiple annunciators actuated in the control room in response to receipt of a containment purge isolation [EIIS system: JE] signal (CPIS), control room ventilation isolation [EIIS system: JE] signal (CRVIS), fuel building isolation [EIIS system: JE] signal (FBIS), steam generator blowdown and sample isolation [EIIS system: WI] signal (SGBSIS), as well as signals indicative of an auxiliary feedwater pump [EIIS system: BA, component: P] suction transfer to the essential service water (ESW) [EIIS system: BI] and a motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump start. Proper actuations were verified for the CRVIS, CPIS, and FBIS per plant operating procedure OTO-SA-00001, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Verification and Restoration, which was entered at 0231. Both trains of CRVIS, CPIS, and FBIS actuated per design.
Investigation revealed that the lights on power supplies PS-1, PS-3, and PS-4 [EIIS system: JE, component: RJX] were extinguished on cabinet SA036D [EIIS system: JE, component: CAB],
Balance of Plant (BOP) Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) channel 1 logic cabinet (located in the back of the control room). Although the annunciator actuations were indicative of these three power supply failures, PS-1 directly feeds the other two downstream power supplies, PS-3 and PS-4, such that there was actually only one power supply failure, i.e., PS-1.
The BOP ESFAS system functions to provide certain ESFAS actuation signals including a CPIS, CRVIS, FBIS, SGBSIS, and Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal (AFAS). In this instance, both trains of CPIS, CRVIS, and FBIS logic actuated (such that the affected dampers [EIIS system: JM, component: DMP] repositioned, etc.).
The system isolation/actuations were invalid because they were not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, nor were they initiated due to parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the
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