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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Station P1-137 l
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Attention: Document Control Desk y
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Gentlemen:
. SUBJECT:
Grand Gulf Nuclear ~ Station; j
Unit 1 Docket No. 50-416 i
License No. NPF-29.
Loss of Shutdwn Cooling Due to Inadequate Procedure LER 90-022 AECM-90/0205-Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER)90-022 which is a final l
report.
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cc: Mr. D. C. Hintz (w/a)
Mr.R.B.McGehee(w/a))-
Mr. N. S. Reynolds-(w/a L
Mr. H. L. Thomas (w/o)(w/a)
Mr. H.- 0. Christensen Mr. Stewart D. Ebneter.(w/a) l Regional Administrator-1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission-i Region II
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101 Marietta St., N.W., Suite 2900 i
3 Atlanta,-Georgia-30323 l
Mr. L. L. Kintner, Project Manager.(w/a) i Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissioni Mail Stop 11021 Washington, D.C. _20555 i
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Crnnd Gulf Nucienr Station - Unit 1 0 l s l 0 l o l 014 11 ~ l 6 1loFl014 11144 ter Loss of Shutdown Cooling Due to Inadequate Procedure IVINT DATS 467 kg R NUM6(R ($;
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On October 26, 1990, breaker 52-153109 which supplies pewer to common suction line isolatien valve E12-F008 was closed. As a result, valve E12-F008 stroked closed from a trip signal that was being sent as aart of an Instrumentation ano Control (I&C) surveillance in progress at t1e time, thereby tripping the Residual Heat Removal (EIIS code: B0) pump _"B" and isolating the Shutdown Cooling System. 'he E12-F008 valve was subsequently reopened and shutdown cooling restored within 15 minutes.
Valve E12-F008 was closed due to inadeqtate procedural guidance on the use of information tags to control in progress test activities.
The lack of verbal communications between the operators involved and the test directors was also a contributing factor.
The Operations Superintendent conducted briefings with the responsible test directors and issued Standing Orders to implement interim guidance on the use of tags on valves, breakers, etc., that are placed out of their normal i
position for testing purposes. An evaluation of current testing l
methodologies will be performed by plant management.
Upon completion, a program will be developed to implement a uniform component tagging system l
to indicate specific testing conditions. This program will'be completed by March 31, 1991, i roonn99 neuon o gRg,.... -
Attachment to AECM-90/0205 ac au LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION aa,aovto oue ao mo-oio.
EXPIRES l'31/M
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A.
Reportable Occurrence On October 26, 1990, during performance of two refueling surveillances, a single failure caused two independent channels of the Residual Heat Removal System to become inoperable.
This condition is
. reported pursuant to 50.73(a)(2)(vii).
B.
Initial Condition The plant was operating in Mode 5, Refueling, at the time of this incident.
C.
Description of Occurrence l
On October 26, 1990, Instrument and Control (I&C) technicians were in the process of performing /RHR Shutdown Cooling Isolation) which Surveillance 06-IC-B21-R-0001, Reactor l
Vessel High Pressure (RPS requiredthebreakar(52-153109) for valve E12-F008 to be open. Valve E12-F008 remained open to supply suction for the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System"B"'(EIIS' Code:B0).
Concurrently with this activity, Operations personnel were in the process of restoring equipment to conclude Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)' testing on the Division I Diesel Generator and associated Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) equipment when they noticed that the power su? ply breaker-(52-153109) to valve E12-F008 was open.
They assumed brea<er 52-153109 had been opened per their surveillance (06-0P-1P75-R-0003, Standby Diesel Generator 11: 18' Month Functional Test) and requested that it be closed. When breaker 52-153109 was closed, valve E12-F008 stroked closed from a trip signal that was being sent as part of the I&C surveillance in progress at the time, thereby' tripping the RHR pump "B" and isolating the Shutdown Cooling System.
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The E12-F008 valve was subsequently reopened and~ Shutdown Cooling restored within 15 minutes.
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Apparent Cause Shutdown Cooling Isolation Valve E12-F008 inadvertently closed due to inadeluate procedural guidance on the use of information tags to contr(1 in progress test activities. Although existing tagging prograns are in place, no written guidance on their use during testing activities was implemented.
Since the handswitch was not tagged to alert operators of the specific test: activity, they mistakenly concluded that breaker 52-153109 was opened for LOCA testing.
The lack of verbal communications between the operators involved-in this incident and the test directors.in charge was also a contributing.
factor. Operators discussed, among themselves, the fact that the breaker for valve E12-F008 was open, but failed to contact the test-director to verify that-breaker. 52-153109 was not connected to a i
surveillance test in progress.
i E.
Supplemental Actions The Operations Superintendent briefed the test director. responsible for the overall implementation of the surveillance tests.in progress at the time of the shutdown cooling isolation. The purpose of this briefing was to stress the-importance of maintaining complete control-over tests from beginning to restoration of the system.
As an interim measure, Standing Orders were' issued to im)1ement en nce on the use of tags on valves, breakers, etc., t1at are placed ou
,f their normal position for testing purposes. ~ This process will, in part, require placing a tag (e.g., Red Tag,-Work Incomplete Tag, Information Tag, etc.) on the handswitch of the valve affected by the test to denote testing _is in progress.
These guidelines will be incorporated, as appropriate, into a new tagging program for components under test.
An evaluation of current testing methodologies will-be performed by plant management. Upon completion, a program will be developed to implement a uniform-tagging system to indicate specific testing conditions. This program will be completed by March 31, 1991.
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Safets Assessment The Shutdown Cooling System in service was out of operation for 15 tinutes.
Reactor coolant temperature remained at approximately 90 degrees Fahrenheit.
Reactor coolant temperature was not significantly:
affected by the isolation since the reactor cavity was flooded, providing an increased coolant. inventory.
Further, the isolation occurred 26 days after shutdown; therefore, decay heat was minimum, i
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80Au ases LER90022/SCMPFLR
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| 05000416/LER-1990-001, :on 900112,determined That Tech Spec Reactor Coolant Cooldown Rate Limit of 100 Degrees F Exceeded in Reactor Bottom Head Drain Pipe.Caused by Programmatic Deficiencies.Incident Rept Form Improved |
- on 900112,determined That Tech Spec Reactor Coolant Cooldown Rate Limit of 100 Degrees F Exceeded in Reactor Bottom Head Drain Pipe.Caused by Programmatic Deficiencies.Incident Rept Form Improved
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000416/LER-1990-002, :on 900124,discovered That Div II Solenoid Associated W/Secondary Containment Isolation Valve Did Not Operate During Quarterly Valve Stroke Time Tests.Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Procedures Changed |
- on 900124,discovered That Div II Solenoid Associated W/Secondary Containment Isolation Valve Did Not Operate During Quarterly Valve Stroke Time Tests.Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Procedures Changed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000416/LER-1990-003, :on 900215,identified Potential Single Failure Scenario That Could Result in Unavailability of Both Core Spray Sys for Long Term post-LOCA Core Cooling.Detailed Heatup Evaluation Performed for Power Bundle |
- on 900215,identified Potential Single Failure Scenario That Could Result in Unavailability of Both Core Spray Sys for Long Term post-LOCA Core Cooling.Detailed Heatup Evaluation Performed for Power Bundle
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000416/LER-1990-003-01, Corrected LER 90-003-01:on 900215,potential Single Failure Scenario Identified That Could Result in Unavailability of Both Core Spray Sys for post-LOCA Core Cooling.Detailed Heatup Evaluation Performed | Corrected LER 90-003-01:on 900215,potential Single Failure Scenario Identified That Could Result in Unavailability of Both Core Spray Sys for post-LOCA Core Cooling.Detailed Heatup Evaluation Performed | | | 05000416/LER-1990-004, :on 900406,discovered That Surveillance Procedure for Verifying Air Pressure in Containment Airlock Seal Flasks Did Not Fully Implement Tech Spec 4.6.1.3.d.2. Caused by Deficient Procedures |
- on 900406,discovered That Surveillance Procedure for Verifying Air Pressure in Containment Airlock Seal Flasks Did Not Fully Implement Tech Spec 4.6.1.3.d.2. Caused by Deficient Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000416/LER-1990-005, :on 900406,discovered That Current Surveillance Practices for Stroke Testing Fresh Air Makeup Intake Valves Could Have Resulted in Unfiltered Pathway.Administrative Controls Placed on Valves |
- on 900406,discovered That Current Surveillance Practices for Stroke Testing Fresh Air Makeup Intake Valves Could Have Resulted in Unfiltered Pathway.Administrative Controls Placed on Valves
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000416/LER-1990-006, :on 900502,review of Effluent Sample Analysis Revealed That Turbine Bldg Ventilation Exhaust Had Not Been Analyzed Exceeding Time Limit.Caused by Personnel Error. Training & Counseling Conducted |
- on 900502,review of Effluent Sample Analysis Revealed That Turbine Bldg Ventilation Exhaust Had Not Been Analyzed Exceeding Time Limit.Caused by Personnel Error. Training & Counseling Conducted
| | | 05000416/LER-1990-007, :on 900516,discovered That Actions Taken for Inoperable Reactor Water Level Transmitter Not Adequate to Comply W/Requirements for Tech Spec 3.3.2.Caused by Personnel Error.Meetings Held W/Personnel |
- on 900516,discovered That Actions Taken for Inoperable Reactor Water Level Transmitter Not Adequate to Comply W/Requirements for Tech Spec 3.3.2.Caused by Personnel Error.Meetings Held W/Personnel
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000416/LER-1990-008, :on 900521,discovered That Fire Rated Door Required by Tech Spec 3/4.7.7 Not Designated as Tech Spec Door in Ssurveillance Procedures.Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of Tech Spec Requirements |
- on 900521,discovered That Fire Rated Door Required by Tech Spec 3/4.7.7 Not Designated as Tech Spec Door in Ssurveillance Procedures.Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of Tech Spec Requirements
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000416/LER-1990-009, :on 900526,nonlicensed Personnel Performed Step Out of Sequence During Breaker rack-out & Caused LPCS Pump Breaker to Close.Operator Involved Counseled on Failure to Adhere to Breaker Operation Procedure |
- on 900526,nonlicensed Personnel Performed Step Out of Sequence During Breaker rack-out & Caused LPCS Pump Breaker to Close.Operator Involved Counseled on Failure to Adhere to Breaker Operation Procedure
| | | 05000416/LER-1990-010-01, :on 900706,error Discovered in Evaluation Used to Demonstrate Adequacy of Svc Water Flow to HPCS Pump Room Cooler.Matls Nonconformance Rept Generated to Document Discrepancy |
- on 900706,error Discovered in Evaluation Used to Demonstrate Adequacy of Svc Water Flow to HPCS Pump Room Cooler.Matls Nonconformance Rept Generated to Document Discrepancy
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000416/LER-1990-011-01, :on 900724,reactor Tripped on High Reactor Water Level W/Reactor Power in Process of Being Reduced in Attempt to Control Turbine Pump B Oscillations.Caused by Malfunction of Controller.Controller Calibr |
- on 900724,reactor Tripped on High Reactor Water Level W/Reactor Power in Process of Being Reduced in Attempt to Control Turbine Pump B Oscillations.Caused by Malfunction of Controller.Controller Calibr
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000416/LER-1990-013, :on 900725,instrument Cable from B Detector Disconnected Rather than C Detector While Performing Maint on Monitoring Sys.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Counseled on Methods for Self Verification |
- on 900725,instrument Cable from B Detector Disconnected Rather than C Detector While Performing Maint on Monitoring Sys.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Counseled on Methods for Self Verification
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000416/LER-1990-014, :on 900810,retest Not Performed Prior to Returning Secondary Containment Isolation Valve to Operable Status.Caused by Programmatic Weaknesses in Administrative Controls.Plant Procedures Changed |
- on 900810,retest Not Performed Prior to Returning Secondary Containment Isolation Valve to Operable Status.Caused by Programmatic Weaknesses in Administrative Controls.Plant Procedures Changed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000416/LER-1990-015, :on 900823,discovered That Fire Rated Assembly Penetration Not Properly Sealed.Cause Not Determined. Nonconformance Rept Written & Work Order Initiated to Seal Penetration |
- on 900823,discovered That Fire Rated Assembly Penetration Not Properly Sealed.Cause Not Determined. Nonconformance Rept Written & Work Order Initiated to Seal Penetration
| | | 05000416/LER-1990-016-01, :on 900912,cooling Water Outlet Valve Failed to Stroke to Full Open Position & Div II Purge Sys Declared Inoperable |
- on 900912,cooling Water Outlet Valve Failed to Stroke to Full Open Position & Div II Purge Sys Declared Inoperable
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000416/LER-1990-017, :on 900916,reactor Scram Occurred Due to Loss of Balance of Plant Busses |
- on 900916,reactor Scram Occurred Due to Loss of Balance of Plant Busses
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000416/LER-1990-018-01, :on 901008,secondary Containment Doors Found Open During Refueling Outage |
- on 901008,secondary Containment Doors Found Open During Refueling Outage
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000416/LER-1990-019-01, :on 901014,during Refueling Outage Four,Three Events Occurred in Which Same Power Supply Breaker Inadvertently Opened |
- on 901014,during Refueling Outage Four,Three Events Occurred in Which Same Power Supply Breaker Inadvertently Opened
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000416/LER-1990-020-01, :on 901016,containment Cooling Sys Found on High Radiation Level |
- on 901016,containment Cooling Sys Found on High Radiation Level
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000416/LER-1990-021-01, :on 901024,uncontrolled Lowering of Fuel Bundle Occurred |
- on 901024,uncontrolled Lowering of Fuel Bundle Occurred
| | | 05000416/LER-1990-022, :on 901026,loss of Shutdown Cooling Due to Inadequate Procedure |
- on 901026,loss of Shutdown Cooling Due to Inadequate Procedure
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000416/LER-1990-022-01, :on 901026,breaker 52-15309,which Supplies Power to Common Suction Isolation Valve E12-F008,closed, Tripping RHR Pump B & Isolating Shutdown Cooling Sys.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Standing Order Issued |
- on 901026,breaker 52-15309,which Supplies Power to Common Suction Isolation Valve E12-F008,closed, Tripping RHR Pump B & Isolating Shutdown Cooling Sys.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Standing Order Issued
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000416/LER-1990-023, :on 901105,shutdown Cooling Isolation Occurred Due to Blown Fuse |
- on 901105,shutdown Cooling Isolation Occurred Due to Blown Fuse
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000416/LER-1990-024, :on 901114,standby Fresh Air Unit Actuation Occurred Due to Inadequate Test Instruction |
- on 901114,standby Fresh Air Unit Actuation Occurred Due to Inadequate Test Instruction
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000416/LER-1990-025, :on 901122,actuation of Reactor Protection Sys Occurred During Surveillance of Reactor Mode Switch.Caused by Diminishing Power Supply of Test Equipment.Evaluation Will Be Conducted |
- on 901122,actuation of Reactor Protection Sys Occurred During Surveillance of Reactor Mode Switch.Caused by Diminishing Power Supply of Test Equipment.Evaluation Will Be Conducted
| | | 05000416/LER-1990-026, :on 901124,manual Scram Inserted Following Lockup of Rod Pattern Control Sys During Reactor Startup. Caused by Transient of Reactor Water Level Attributed to Open Drain Valves.Startup Procedure Amended |
- on 901124,manual Scram Inserted Following Lockup of Rod Pattern Control Sys During Reactor Startup. Caused by Transient of Reactor Water Level Attributed to Open Drain Valves.Startup Procedure Amended
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000416/LER-1990-028, :on 901210,ESF,RPS & ECCS Hpsc Actuated, Resulting in Reactor Scram from Full Power.Caused by Failed Solder Joint in Instrument Air Sys & Leaking Root Valve. Joint Reinspected & Procedures Revised |
- on 901210,ESF,RPS & ECCS Hpsc Actuated, Resulting in Reactor Scram from Full Power.Caused by Failed Solder Joint in Instrument Air Sys & Leaking Root Valve. Joint Reinspected & Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000416/LER-1990-029, :on 901218,reactor Protection Sys Actuation Occurred,Resulting in Automatic Plant Shutdown Due to Reactor Feedwater Pump Trip.Caused by Air Supply Valve Not Fully Open.Air Supply Valve Replaced |
- on 901218,reactor Protection Sys Actuation Occurred,Resulting in Automatic Plant Shutdown Due to Reactor Feedwater Pump Trip.Caused by Air Supply Valve Not Fully Open.Air Supply Valve Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation |
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