05000400/LER-2022-006-01, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Inoperability
| ML23079A076 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 03/10/2023 |
| From: | Hoffman D Duke Energy Progress |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk |
| References | |
| RA-23-0014 LER 22-006-01 | |
| Download: ML23079A076 (1) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| 4002022006R01 - NRC Website | |
text
J'_-, DUKE
~ ENERGY~
David S. Hoffman Plant Manager Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant 5413 Shearon Harris Road New Hill, NC 27562-9300 10 CFR 50.73 March lO, 2023 Serial: RA-23-0014 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-400/Renewed License No. NPF-63 Subject: Licensee Event Report 2022-006-01 Ladies and Gentlemen:
Duke Energy Progress, LLC, submits the enclosed Licensee Event Report 2022-006-01 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 (HNP). This report describes a condition associated with inoperability of the auxiliary feedwater pumps. This event had no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.
This report is a planned supplement to LER 2022-006-00 submitted on December 20, 2022. The cause evaluation for the reported condition is in progress and a supplement to the enclosed LER will provide additional information from this evaluation.
There are no regulatory commitments contained within this report.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Sarah McDaniel at (984) 229-2002.
David S. Hoffman Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 2022-006-01 cc:
P. Boguszewski, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, HNP M. Mahoney, NRC Project Manager, HNP NRC Regional Administrator, Region II
Abstract
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1
00400 4
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Inoperability 10 27 2022 2022 006 01 03 20 2023 3
000
Sarah McDaniel, Regulatory Affairs Engineer (984) 229-2002 X
BA FCV M120 Y
07 15 2023 At 20:50 Eastern Daylight Time on October 27, 2022, with Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 (HNP), in Mode 3, conditions existed such that all auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps were declared inoperable. The capability to throttle flow to the
'B' steam generator was not maintained due to improper operation of a flow control valve, 1AF-51, which is located in the discharge piping line to the B steam generator from the common header of the motor-driven AFW pumps. Since 1AF-51 operation can impact AFW flow control from the common header of the motor-driven AFW pumps, both motor-driven AFW pumps were declared inoperable. The turbine-driven AFW pump was inoperable at the time of this event due to incomplete post-maintenance testing following planned maintenance. The motor-driven AFW pumps were able to supply discharge flow to the steam generators during this event since the 1AF-51 failure never impacted the valves ability to open. Based upon the declared inoperability of all three AFW pumps, this condition was reported on October 28, 2022, under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident, by event notification 56186. This event had no impact on the health and safety of the public. The cause of the 1AF-51 inoperability was an actuator malfunction. The actuator for 1AF-51 was replaced to restore proper flow control capability. Causal factors for the actuator malfunction will be determined from the ongoing cause evaluation.
l~\\
, i
~<t o.e.,
"......... ~
I Page of
- 3. LER NUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.
052 050 During the time period that 1AF-51 was inoperable, 1AF-93 was operable and available to isolate the B steam generator and to control B steam generator level to prevent an overfill condition. Operators have procedure guidance to use 1AF-93 as needed to control B steam generator level and did so following the reactor trip on October 30, 2022. There is a reasonable expectation that the safety function would have been fulfilled with 1AF-93 operation. 1AF-51 was considered inoperable due to the inability to throttle close to control and isolate AFW flow as needed. Therefore, the 1AF-51 inability to stroke close within its assumed ESF response time did not challenge assumptions in the HNP FSAR accident analysis, since 1AF-93 was available to isolate the B steam generator. The condition did not result in a safety system functional failure and had no adverse impact on the health and safety of the public.
NEI 99-02, Revision 7, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines," states the following for inclusion of events on the NRC Mitigating Systems Performance Indicator for Safety System Function Failures (SSFF), "The level of judgment for reporting an event or condition under paragraph (a)(2)(v) as an SSFF is a reasonable expectation of preventing the fulfillment of a safety function." Based on this guidance and the above analysis showing the safety function can be reasonably expected to be met within the required period, this event will not be counted as a SSFF.
F. Additional Information
There have been no events at HNP similar to the event documented in this LER in the past three years.
4 4
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 00400 2022 006 01
,,,..AA£G<,l
~(j l~\\
~
~
'0/-1, o{t I
I~
I I I I D