05000387/LER-2005-001, Regarding Primary Containment Instrument Lines Located Outside Secondary Containment
| ML050310350 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 01/20/2005 |
| From: | Saccone R Susquehanna |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| PLA-5858 LER 05-001-00 | |
| Download: ML050310350 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3872005001R00 - NRC Website | |
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R. A.Saccono Vice President - Nuclear Operations PPL Susquehanna, LLC 769 Salem Boulevard Berwick, PA 18603 Tel. 570.542.3959 Fax 570.542-1504 rasacconeDpplweb.com I
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1,_N e e Clns U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Stop O-P1-17 Washington, DC 20555-0001 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-387/2005-001-00 PLA-5858 Docket 50-387 Attached is Licensee Event Report 50-387/2005-001-00. While analysis of the situation is not yet completed, there is a potential that six primary containment instrument lines found penetrating the Unit 1 Reactor Building's Railroad Bay could prevent structures or systems needed to control the release of radioactive material from fulfilling their safety function. Although the Railroad Bay can be aligned to Secondary Containment, it has not normally been placed in this configuration. The instrument line location is not consistent with station licensing documents that require containment of the lines from a dose analysis and a Secondary Containment design configuration standpoint. Accordingly, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C). There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
No new regulatory commitments have been created through issuance of this report.
Vice President - Nuclear Operations Attachment
- 022, Document Control Desk PLA-5858 cc:
Mr. S. J. Collins Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19408 Mr. A. J. Blarney Sr. Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 35 Berwick, PA 18603-0035 Mr. R. Osborne Allegheny Electric Cooperative P. 0. Box 1266 Harrisburg, PA 17108-1266 Mr. R. R. Janati Bureau of Radiation Protection Rachel Carson State Office Building P. 0. Box 8469 Harrisburg, PA 17105-8469
COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO.3150-01041 EXPIRES: 0630/2007
- stimated, the NRC nay rot conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the nformation collection.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)
- 1. FACILITY NAME Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 1
- 1. DOCKET NUMBER
- 3. PAGE 05000387
[
1 OF3
- 4. TITLE Primary Containment Instrument Lines Located Outside Secondary Containment
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILMES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEUENTIAL REV M
H DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME OCKET NUMBER NUMBERI NO.
MN-DY YA Susq. SES -Unit 2
~5000388 FACILITY NAME OCKET NUMBER 11 22 2004 2005 001 00 01 20 2005 5000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORTIS SUBMITTED PURSUANTTOTHE REOUREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 1 0 20.2201(b) al 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
- 10. POWER LEVEL 0 20.2201 (d) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) a] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) oI 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 15 E 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
El 73.71(a)(4)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
[I 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El 73.71 (a)(5) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
El OTHER 0 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or In (If more space Is required, ue adotoulaccpies of NRC Form 3664)
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On 11/22/2004, it was identified that six Primary Containment (EIIS Code: NH) instrument lines penetrated the Unit 1 Reactor Building's Railroad Bay (EIIS Code: NG). Two of the instrument lines are associated with the Unit 1 Reactor Recirculation system (EIIS Code: AD) while the remaining four are associated with the Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal system (EIIS Code: BO). These instrument lines have been located in the Railroad Bay since plant startup. Although the area can be aligned to Secondary Containment (EIIS Code: NH), it has not normally been configured as such since 1995.
The original Safety Analysis Review (SAR) did not rely upon instrument lines being located within Secondary Containment. The SAR was, however, changed in 1998 to credit Secondary Containment in the SAR accident analysis.
The instrument lines that are located in the Railroad Bay, and are thus typically located outside Secondary Containment, are not then consistent with assumptions currently found in station licensing documents.
The noncompliance described above is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (v) (C) as a condition that could have prevented structures or systems needed to control the release of radioactive material from fulfilling their safety function. No radioactive releases resulted from this event.
CAUSE OF EVENT
Preliminary results pending completion of the evaluation under the Corrective Action Process:
The principal causes for the current non-compliance with the licensing basis were the changes made to the accident analysis that credited Secondary Containment and the change in 1995 that established normal alignment of the Railroad Bay outside Secondary Containment.
ANALYSIS / SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE Preliminary analysis of Secondary Containment bypass leakage has concluded that the postulated leakage from these lines is within the margin available in the LOCA dose analysis for Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage. Further, the analysis indicates that the instrument lines, if cracked or broken, will not introduce radiological consequences that exceed those presented in the SAR for a break outside of Secondary Containment. Because these are only preliminary assessments, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented structures or systems needed to control the release of radioactive material from fulfilling their safety function.
(It more space Is required, use addtoznal ccoies of NRC Foan 366A)
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The following corrective actions have been completed:
Administrative controls have been enacted to align the Railroad Bay to the Secondary Containment Zone III when the Railroad Bay door is not open.
The following corrective actions are planned:
This non-conformance has been entered into the Corrective Action program for evaluation and resolution.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
None