05000369/LER-2004-001, Regarding Auxiliary Feedwater System in Prohibited Condition Due to Inadequate Procedure
| ML042720341 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 09/16/2004 |
| From: | Gordon Peterson Duke Power Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 04-001-00 | |
| Download: ML042720341 (8) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3692004001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
_Duke
'AWPowere A Duke Energy Company GARY R. PETERSON Vice President McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Power MG01 VP/ 12700 Hagers Ferry Rd.
Huntersville, NC 28078-9340 704 875 5333 704 875 4809 fax grpeters@duke-energy. corn September 16, 2004 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555
Subject:
McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2 Docket No. 50-369/50-370 Licensee Event Report 369/2004-01, Revision 0 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73, Sections (a)(l) and (d), attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) 369/2004-01, Revision 0.
On July 21, 2004, McGuire Nuclear Station identified an instance in 2001 where Unit 1 and Unit 2 were in a condition which rendered an Auxiliary Feedwater System pump inoperable on each Unit for a period in excess of the associated Technical Specification Completion Time.
This resulted in a failure to comply with Auxiliary Feedwater System Technical Specification requirements.
This event is being reported as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B).
Probabilistic risk assessment has determined this event to be of no significance to the health and safety of the public.
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this LER.
G. R. Peterson Attachment www. dukepower. corn
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission September 16, 2004 Page 2 of 2 cc:
W. D. Travers U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Administrator, Region II Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303 J. J. Shea (Addressee Only)
NRC Project Manager (McGuire)
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-7 Dll Washington, DC 20555-0001 J. B. Brady Senior Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission McGuire Nuclear Site Beverly 0. Hall, Section Chief Radiation Protection Section 1645 Mail Service Center Raleigh, NC 27699-1645
Abstract
approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
Unit Status:
At the time of the event, Unit 1 and Unit 2 were in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100 percent power.
Event Description
In October 2001, procedure actions were implemented to close and remove motive electrical power from valve CA86A, "A" train assured water supply to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.
This condition rendered each Unit's Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump inoperable for approximately eight days.
The failure to recognize this condition resulted in a failure to satisfy Auxiliary Feedwater System Technical Specification requirements.
This condition is reportable as per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B).
This event was not significant with respect to the health and safety of the public.
Event Cause
Inadequate procedure revision resulted in inoperable Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.
Corrective Action
Applicable procedures were revised to adequately address operability. Performed a review of other station procedures that close and remove motive electrical power from CA86A and revised any procedures with similar discrepancies or placed them on hold.
Evaluation will be performed to verify that procedure revisions were adequately justified.
NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)
(If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space Is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)
SAFETY ANALYSIS
A probabilistic risk assessment of this event determined that, for the amount of time that CA86A was closed and motive power removed beyond the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> allowed by TS 3.7.5, Condition B, the increase in the estimated core damage frequency (CDF) or large early release frequency (LERF) was insignificant.
The basis for this is the limited impact that the inoperable valve has on the functionality of the CA System given the availability of non-assured suction sources for the TDCA pump and the fact that the "A" and "B" MDCAPs remained operable.
Based upon the above, the condition described in this LER had a very minor impact on the ability to mitigate risk significant accidents and the risk increase attributable to this event was not significant with respect to the health and safety of the public.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
In October 2003, when it was recognized that the February, 1993 revisions to OP/1/A/6400/006 and OP/2/A/6400/006 were inadequate to maintain the TDCAPs operable, a reportability review was conducted.
That review failed to identify any reportable conditions.
This failure is being addressed by McGuire's corrective action program.
A review of the McGuire corrective action database did not identify any previous occurrences of a similar event.
Applicable Energy Industry Identification (EIIS) system and component codes are enclosed within brackets.
McGuire unique system and component identifiers are contained within parentheses.