05000369/LER-1982-001, Forwards LER 82-001/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-001/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20041A578
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire
Issue date:	02/03/1982
From:	Parker W DUKE POWER CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20041A579	List: 05000369/LER-1982-001, Forwards LER 82-001/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000369/LER-1982-001-01, /01T-0:on 820106,routine Review of Source Document Changes Revealed Class H Piping in Fire Protection Sys in Diesel Generator Room 1A Routed Above One Nuclear safety-related Essential Cable & Instrument Panel
References
NUDOCS 8202220302
Download: ML20041A578 (3)

LER-1982-001, Forwards LER 82-001/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
3691982001R00 - NRC Website

text

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DUKE POWER COMPANY lgjpg PowEn Burwiso

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WI LLI AM O. PA R K E R, J R.

February 3, 1982 7, t,,, o, c:,,,,,c.

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STCAM P.O Q u C t l O P.

373-4083 Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator "g

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Atlanta, Georgia 30303 J O,y/ i' 7 :,m

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Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 T!

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Docket No. 50-369 M

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Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrenca Report R0-360 '12-01.

This report concerns T.S.6.9.1.12(1), " Performance of structt...s,

systems, or components that requires remedial action or corrective measures to prevent operation in a manner less conservative than assumed in the accident analyses in the safety analysis report or technical specifi-cations bases;...".

This incident was considered to be of no signi-ficance with respect to the health and safety,of the public.

Very truly yours,

'/.

t[

William O. Parker, Jr.

PBN/jfw Attachments cc: Director Records Center Office of Management and Program Analysis Institute of Nuclear Power Operations U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1820 Water Place Washington, D. C.

20555 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Mr. P. R. Bemis Mr. Ralph Birkel Senior Resident Inspector-NRC Division of Project Management McGuire Nuclear Station Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 OFFICT \\L COPY 8202220302 820203 gDRADOCK05000

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DUKE POWER COMPANY McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT NO. 82-01 REPORT DATE: February 3, 1982 FACILITY: McGuire Unit 1, Cornelius, NC IDENTIFICATION: Non-Seismic Piping Located Above Nuclear Safety Related Equipment and Cable in Diesel Generator Room 1A.

DESCRIPTION

Class H, 4-inch piping in the Fire Protection System in Diesel Generator Room 1A is routed above one Nuclear Safety Related (NSR) essential cable and instrument panel with no provision to prevent inter-action. This situation violates criteria regarding non-seismic pipe interaction with NSR equipment and cables. Loss of the cable or instru-ment panel could limit the time of operation of Diesel Generator lA during and/or after an earthquake.

The problem was discovered during a routine review of Unit I source document changes. Apparently the piping had been overlooked when a walk-down inspection to correct problems of this type was conducted.

It is not applicable to McGuire Unit 2 where it will be resolved by routine implementation of criteria when the Unit 2 work is performed.

EVALUATION: Electrical instrumentation identified as Thermostatic Panel-1 is located below a run of 4-inch diameter Class H piping.

Loss of the integrity of instrumentation located in this panel would result in loss of Diesel Generator Room 1A ventilation air. Subsequent instru-mentation overheating could impair operation of Diesel Generator lA during and after a seismic event.

A NSR cable to a Day Tank Oil Level Switch is located directly under Thermostatic Panel-1 and the Fire Protection System piping. If this cable were severed during a seismic event, the transfer pump which l

replenishes the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Day Tank would fail to start.

Diesel Generator operation would be limited to less than two hours.

In view of the low probability of a safe shutdown intensity earthquake and the time available for corrective operator action, continued operation until a convenient opportunity to perform corrective action is acceptable.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

In order to deal with the specific potential interactions described above, a stress analysis including seismic conditions was performed on the subject Fire Protection System piping in Diesel Generator Room 1A.

l The analysis indicated that with the addition of four new support / restraints, the piping is adequately supported during a seismic event. Design of these supports is complete.

In addition, a study was undertaken to confirm that the deficiency iden-tified above is an isolated case. Non-Seismic interaction documentation was reviewed. Six sample areas in the Auxiliary Building were selected

Report No. 82-01 Page 2 to field verify that, in locations where necessary, non-seismic-piping is adequately supported. These areas were~ deliberately chosen where non-seismic piping existed above NSR equipment and/or cables. No un-acceptable interactions were identified by the field review. This confirms the original design for these areas, in.that potential inter-actions were prevented by upgrading the pipe support / restraints to sustain seismic loads or were found to be precluded by other design features already present. Therefore, this is not a generic problem.

The only outstanding corrective action is the installation of four Fire Protection System support / restraints. This will be accomplished as soon as possible, but no later than April 15, 1982.