05000369/LER-1981-193, Forwards LER 81-193/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 81-193/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20040E628
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire
Issue date:	01/22/1982
From:	Parker W DUKE POWER CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20040E629	List: 05000369/LER-1981-193, Forwards LER 81-193/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000369/LER-1981-193-03, /03L-0:on 811224,technicians Initiated Low Steam Line Pressure Safety Injection Actuation on Both Trains. Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Procedure to Be Corrected by 820122
References
NUDOCS 8202050187
Download: ML20040E628 (3)

LER-1981-193, Forwards LER 81-193/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
3691981193R00 - NRC Website

text

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DUKE POWER COMI%NY[I A 'T'.N Ti C p,ry' ['3 Powr.n licimixo

, 7 422 Sot?Tu Cititucu STREET, CHAHWTTE, N. C. ana4a

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January 22, 1982 Vier Persiergt T C L E PMO N E ARE A 704 STE Aw Pacouction 373-4083 Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II L

101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 Docket No. 50-369

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Picase find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-369/81-193. This report concerns T.S.6.9.1.13(c), " Observed inadequacies in the in.plementa-tion of administrative or procedural controls which threaten to cause reduction of degree of redundancy provided in reactor protection systems or engineered safety feature systems. This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

V y truly yours,

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William O. Parker, Jr.

PBN/jfw Attachment cc: Director Records Center Office of Management and Program Analysis Institute of Nuclear Power Operations U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1820 Water Place Washington, D. C.

20555 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Mr. P. R. Bemis Senior Resident Inspector-NRC McGuire Nuclear Station l

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DUKE POWER COMPANY McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT NO.81-193 REPORT DATE: January 22, 1982 FACILITY: McGuire Unit 1, Cornelius, NC IDENTIFICATION: A Low Steam Line Pressure Safety Injection was Actuated on Both Trains While the Pressurizer Pressure Controller was being Calibrated

INTRODUCTION

On December 24, 1981 technicians inadvertently initiated a safety injection (SI) actuation of both trains while calibrating the pressurizer pressure controller. The unit was in mode five, cold shutdown, at the time of the incident. Pressurizer pressure was nearly atmospheric. Both solid state protection system (SSPS) trains were operable and low pressurizer pressure SI was blocked by the P-11 permissive circuitry. A technician began to calibrate the pressurizer pressure controller using the appropriate calibration procedure.

Section 10.1.3 of the procedure required that all 7300 process control system channels which supply signals to the Lead / Lag amplifier cards be placed in the Test position. These channels also supply signals to the P-11 circuitry which enables the SI blocks. When these circuit cards were placed in the Test posi-tion, the block enable signals were removed from the SSPS circuitry. SSPS logic requires 2 out of 3 channels of pressurizer pressure indicating pressures above 1955 PSIG to reset or remove the SI blocks associated with P-11, Putting the cards which contain P-11 bistables into the Test position simulates a pressure greater than 1955 PSIC. When the technicians placed the second channel into the Test position, SI blocks in the SSPS logic were cleared and valid indications of low steam line pressure initiated the SI.

All safety systems responded as designed; however, both safety injection pumps and one centrifugal charging pump were tagged out and did not start. The other centrifugal charging pump started and injected the boron injection tank volume into the reactor coolant system.

The SI was caused by an inadequate procedure and is therefore classified as a Procedural Deficiency incident. This incident is reportable pursuant to Tech-nical Specification 6.9.1.13(c).

EVALUATION: Section 10.1.3 was added to the calibration procedure on May 8, 1980 to include the newly added Lead / Lag amplifier cards in the calibration process. The change was prepared and reviewed by personnel intimately familiar with the systems involved. Exactly why the section was written incorrectly was impossible to determine.

The technician who was running the test read through the section, including the restoration step 10.6, before starting work, and followed the procedure steps exactly in doing the work.

It appears that the SSPS cabinets were not operable when this procedure was last used, as Section 10.1.3 has been completed in the past without incident.

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4 Report 81-193 i

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CORRECTIVE ACTION

After the deficiency was found, all working copies were removed from the files and a note was attached to the control copy stating

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that no more working copies were to be made until the procedure was corrected.

A technician familiar with both the 7300 process cabinets and SSPS is rewriting the procedure to make it simplier and more flexible. The deficiency will also-be corrected in this rewrite. The new procedure will be available by January 22, 1982.

t VERIFICATION: The new procedure will be reviewed by personnel familiar with both 7300 process control systems and the SSPS.

SAFETY ANALYSIS

Due to the fail safe features of the SSPS, the procedural defj iency placed the unit in a more conservative position by initiating the 4

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The health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.

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