05000369/LER-1981-180, Forwards LER 81-180/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
| ML20039D945 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 12/28/1981 |
| From: | Parker W DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039D946 | List:
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| References | |
| NUDOCS 8201060364 | |
| Download: ML20039D945 (3) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| 3691981180R00 - NRC Website | |
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December 28* 1981 TE L E PuoN t:Anta704 Vier PatsiorNt STtaM PmODUCTION 373-4083 Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory-Commission Region 11 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 Docket No. 50-369
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-369/81-180. This report concerns T.S.3.6.1.5, " Primary containment average air temperature shall be maintained:...b. Between 100 F and 1200F in the containment lower compartment."
~This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the
- - health and safety of the public.
Note that this report is not being submitted within the specified 30 day period as was discussed in my letter dated December 14, 1981.
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. William O. Parker, Jr.
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~7 cc: Ditector-g Office of Management and Program Analysis Institute of Nuclear-P er Operations U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1820 Water Place Washington, D. C.
20555 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Mr. P. R. Bemis Senior Resident Inspector-NRC-McGuire Nuclear Station I
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s Report No.81-180 Page 2 and the BIF on Unit I was 1RN863. As a result, the NEO unintentionally isolated Unit 1 RV instead of Unit 2 RV.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
The immediate corrective action was to reopen 1RN153 (BIF) and restore cooling water to the VL units. 1Rus metal tags on the two valves were switched so that the labels agreed with the flow diagram and the Construc-tion valve documentation has been changed.
VERIFICATION: Approximately ten minutes after.1RN153 was reopened the containment temperature had decreased from 140 F to 130 F and was within Tech Spec limits at 1800. Switching the metal valve labels permanently corrected the primary cause of the incident.
. SAFETY ANALYSIS: The containment temperature was only excessive (140-145 F) for about ten minutes and was quickly brought under control once 1RN153 was reopened.
In addition, the lowest temperature rated cable in containment is designed to withstand 90 C (194 F) continuously. No equipment damage occurred during the ten minutes when the temperature was approximately 140 F.
The plant's concrete structures are designed to American Concrete Institute (ACI) 318-71 and there wculd be cause for concern if the temperature was greater than 150 F for prolonged periods of time.
The containment temperature, however,.was only 140 F for about ten minutes. Thus, no heat damage to containment and equipment occurred and the health and safety of the public were unaffected by this' incident.
DUKE POWER COMPANY McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT NO.81-180 REPORT DATE: December 28, 1981 FACILITY: McGuire Unit 1, Cornelius, NC IDENTIFICATION: Containment Temperature Exceeded the Technical Specification Limit
INTRODUCTION
On November 12, 1981 at 1520, the containment temperature exceeded Technical Specification 3.6.1.5 limits (120 F) and two temperature sensors indicated as high as-145 F.
For personnel safety reasons the containment was evacuated.
Prior to the incident Unit I was at 48% power with all four lower containment ventilation (VL) fans in high speed.
A nuclear equipment operator (NEO) who was working with an assistant operating engineer, was isolating the Unit 2 containment ventilation cooling water (RV) system from the Unit 2 nuclear service water (RN) system. At approximately 1510 he closed boundary valve 1RN153 (Unit 1 VL Return Tsolation) which had been labeled 1RN863 (Unit 2 VL Return Isolation) 1 r Construction. This caused an inadvertent isolation 0
of RV to the Unit 1 VL system. With no cooling water, the containment temperature began to increase. After the high temperature was discovered (containment evacua-tion alarm sounded), the NEO Dnmediately reopened 1RN153 restoring RV to the VL enits. Within ten minutes the containment temperature decreased from 1400F to 130 F and the temperature was within Technical Specification limits at 1800.
Since the temperature exceeded the limits specified in Tech Spec 3.6.1.5, this incident is reportable. The cause for this incident was determined to be an administrative deficiency.
EVALUATION: When the NEO initially closed 1RN153 (labeled as 1RN863) he noticed that he seemed to be throttling flow through the valve even though no flow should have existed and he notified the assistant operating engineer. The engineer rechecked the flow diagram and verified that 1RN863 was the correct valve to close. The engi-neer also notified a control room operator that the valve had been closed. By the time the control operator notified the NEO to reopen 1RN153, the containment tem-perature had exceeded the Tech Spec limit.
The mislabeling of IRN153 as 1RN863 was initiated several years ago when two twelve inch butterfly valves were ordered with the same label and item number (IRN153); one valve was a Pratt, the other a BIF. The Pratt was installed on Unit 2 when the system was initially built and was labeled as 1RN153. During the performance of the Isolation Valve Leak Rate Test in 1979 it was discovered that a corresponding Unit 1 valve was needed. The BIF model was available but it was also labeled as 1RN153 so it was decided to relabel it as 1RN863. The BIF manufacturer was notified to revise his paperwork to reflect the new valve number but he indicated that this would be difficult to do. -The Pratt manufacturer was then contacted and he indicated that a paperwork revision would not be difficult. Subsequently, the Pratt was renamed as IRN863 and the BIF was changed back to 1RN153. The flow diagram was updated to reflect this latest cht.nge but the Construction drawings were never revised; thus, the Pratt installed on Unit 2 was still labeled IRN153