05000369/LER-1981-078, Forwards LER 81-078/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 81-078/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20009G019
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire
Issue date:	06/04/1981
From:	Parker W DUKE POWER CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20009G020	List: 05000369/LER-1981-078, Forwards LER 81-078/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000369/LER-1981-078-03, /03L-0:on 810507,reset Pushbutton on Pressurizer Safety Injection Train B Pressed Instead of Safety Injection Reset Train 1B Button.Caused by Personnel Error.Different Method to Be Used to Reset Valve Timing Computer Program
References
NUDOCS 8108030249
Download: ML20009G019 (2)

LER-1981-078, Forwards LER 81-078/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
3691981078R00 - NRC Website

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June 4, 1981 373-.o83 k

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director

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101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 gq 1ggc31 7 p.12 jui G jot Atlanta, Georgia 30303 L

s 9.s.TM k(/;3 Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 7

Docket No. 50-369 N

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Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Repo'.t R0-369/81-78.

This report concerns an inadvertent safety injection. Thi. lacident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours, d

W 4

William O. Parker, Jr.

RWO:pw Attachment ec: Director Mr. Bill Lavallee Office of Management & Program Analysis Nuclear Safety Analysis Center U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 10412 Washington, D. C.

20555 Palo Alto, CA 94303 i

Ms. M. J. Graham Resident Inspector - NRC McGuire Nuclear Station s, I, 8109030249 810604 PDR ADOCK 05000369 S

PDR

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A MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION INCIDENT REPORT Report Number:

81-78 Report Date:

June 4, 1981 Occurrence Date:

May 7, 1981 Facility: McGuire Unit 1, Cornelius, N. C.

Identification of Occurrence: An inadvertent safety injection was initiated on Train B when the wrong button on the control board was pushed.

Condition Prior to Cccurrence: Mode 6, Cold Shutdown with head Labolted. Prior to initial criticality.

Description of Occurrence:

Valve timing tests were being conducted using a com-puter program on the Operational Aid Computer (OAC).

The safety injection reset pushbutton was to be depressed to reset the program.

Inadvertently the reset pushbutton on the " Pressurizer Safety Injection Train B" Reset / Block switch was depressed.

The " Pressurizer Safety Injection Train B" Reset / Block switch is about three inches above the " Safety Injection Reset Train IB" switch.

Apparent Cause: The wrong pushbutton was depressed unblocking the pressurizer low pressure signal to the Solid' State Protection System (SSPS).

Analysis of Occurrence:

The safety injection had little effect on the plant because the safety injection and centrifugal charging pumps on B Train were tagged out.

No significant change in Reactor Coolant (NC) System water volume occurred. The " Safety Injection Reset Train IB" Switeb has.one red pushbutton marked " Reset" (the switch name on both of these switches appears on a plastic tag directly above each switch).

The "Pzr. Safety Injection Train B" switch has a red pushbutton marked " Reset" and a green pushbutton marked " Blocking".

The reset pushbutton on the "Pzr. Safety Injection Train B" switch was depressed rather than the " Safety Injection Reset Train IB" switch three inches lower.

Safety Analysis

Since the unit was shutdown and no water volume was transferred, the incident had no effect on the plant nor ou the health and safety of the public.

A similar incident in which vater was transferred to the NC System could have been more serious.

Depressing the reset pushbutton the "Pzr Safety Injection Train B" switch with the unit at power would have had no effect because the pressurizer pressure would not have been low, i

Corrective Action

Immediate corrective action was taken to recover from the safety injection.

Another method will be used to reset the computer program in-i volved in the valve timing without depressing the safety injection reset switch.

l A collar has been placed around the pushbuttons used to block and unblock signals j

to the SSPS. A clear plastic cover will slide into the collar covering the push-buttons.

This will prevent depressing the pushbuttons accidently.

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