05000361/LER-2008-005, Regarding Missed Surveillance and Plant Mode Change Causes TS Violation

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Regarding Missed Surveillance and Plant Mode Change Causes TS Violation
ML082170297
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 07/30/2008
From: Hochevar A
Edison International Co, Southern California Edison Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LER 08-005-00
Download: ML082170297 (2)


LER-2008-005, Regarding Missed Surveillance and Plant Mode Change Causes TS Violation
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
3612008005R00 - NRC Website

text

FSOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 1 EDISON An EDISON INTERNATIONAL Company July 30, 2008 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

Docket No. 50-361 Licensee Event Report No. 2008-005 San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

Dear Sir or Madam:

In compliance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), this submittal provides Licensee Event Report (LER) 2008-005 to report a missed surveillance preceding a Mode change.

Neither the health nor the safety of plant personnel or the public was affected by this occurrence.

If you require any additional information, please contact me.

Sincerely, Albert R. Hochevar Station Manager Unit 2 LER No. 2008-005 cc:

E. E. Collins, NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV G. G. Warnick, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 2 & 3 P.O. Box 128 San Clemente, CA 92674-0128 KiEQZ.

Abstract

On 6/9/08 at about 1314 PDT, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 entered Mode 2 from Mode 3 in accordance with startup procedures. At about 1443 PDT, the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) recognized that the Control Element Assembly (CEA) [AA] Alignment Surveillance Requirements (SR) 3.1.5.1 and SR 3.1.5.2 had not been completed prior to Mode change. (Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.5 is applicable in Modes 2 and 1, but not in Mode 3 or lower). Because SR 3.0.4 prevents entry into Modes without completion of all applicable SRs, SCE is reporting this occurrence in accordance with 1 OCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Operators completed the surveillances with satisfactory results. Consequently, there was no safety significance to this occurrence.

This event was caused by (1) a lack of detail in the applicable procedure and (2) lack of oversight by the Control Room Supervisor (Utility, Licensed). SCE has coached the Operators (Utility, Licensed) involved and will revise the affected procedure.

LER 3-2006-005, dated 1/26/07, reported an instance of exceeding 20 percent power without all required SRs completed. That event resulted from a boron dilution error during startup. LER 2-2007-002, dated 8/17/07, reported a missed TS SR required with the plant entered Mode 3 following a failure of the instrument air system and consequential plant trip.