05000354/LER-2009-004, Regarding Multiple Control Rod Drifts Resulting in a Reactor Scram
| ML092020258 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 07/14/2009 |
| From: | Jamila Perry Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-N09-0142 LER 09-004-00 | |
| Download: ML092020258 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3542009004R00 - NRC Website | |
text
PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 0 PSEG Nuclear LLC JUL 14o2009 LR-N09-0142 1 OCFR50.73 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-001 Hope Creek Generating Station Unit 1 Facility Operating License No NPF-57 Docket No. 50-354
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 2009-004 In accordance with 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), PSEG Nuclear LLC is submitting Licensee Event Report (LER) Number 2009-004.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. Timothy R. Devik at (856) 339-3108.
No regulatory commitments are contained in the LER.
Sincerely, John F. Perry 01i IL KV~
A~
Hope Creek Generating Station Attachment: Licensee Event Report 2009-004 A4~f?
95-2168 REV. 7/99
Page 2 LR-N09-0142 Document Control Desk cc:
Mr. S. Collins, Administrator - Region 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. R. Ennis, Project Manager Salem and Hope Creek U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North Mail Stop 08 B1 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - Hope Creek (X24)
P. Mulligan, Manager IV Bureau of Nuclear Engineering PO Box 415 Trenton, NJ 08625 Hope Creek Commitment Tracking Coordinator
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/2010 (9-2007)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the digits/characters for each block) information collection.
- 13. PAGE Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 1 OF4
- 4. TITLE Multiple Control Rod Drifts Resulting in a Reactor Scram
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR N/A NUMBER NO.N/
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05 17 2009 2009 - 004 - 000 07 14 09 N/A
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check al/ that apply)
El 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii).
[1 20.2201(d)
E: 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
El 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
[I 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
[3 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL E] 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
Z 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(x)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
El 73.71(a)(4)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
[1 73.71(a)(5) 100 El 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
El OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
The air leak caused CRD movement into the core and a resultant reactor scram. All systems performed as designed and there was no challenge to other plant systems. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
A review of this event determined that a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) has not occurred as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02.
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The RCE identified the following root causes:
(1) Failure of improperly soldered joint; (2) Communication of the test discrepancies not added to the corrective action program (CAP) by the individual who discovered the condition; and (3) Supplemental personnel expectations not clearly communicated with regards to reporting deficiencies found.
The testing in September of 2008 identified that the solder joint at HCU 22-11 had an air leak that was "beyond bubbling". The leak was blowing air out of the fitting almost one-half way around the Y2 inch fitting at a rate that did not allow bubbling of the snoop solution. The specific details of the leak were not communicated to the system manager directly. The leak was described in a note in the remarks portion of the work plan (CAP number 30164922) as "North HCU 1.5 inch header has a large leak at the 1/2 inch bull, feeding the H1 BF-221 1-V116 valve". This note was not detected by the system manager when compiling the notifications for addressing the discrepancies noted during the test.
A review of the pictures of the failed connection revealed that there was inadequate insertion of the tubing at the connection and that there was inadequate solder wetting along the connection as well. The review indicates that the joint was poorly made at the time of construction.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
The RCE noted that there were two previous events at Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS).
In 1989 a similar connection failed at HCU 34-59, also causing a reactor scram. The corrective actions included physically testing each similar connection, leak checking connections and radiography of similar joints prior to re-start. Long term corrective actions were to implement a testing program for instrument air piping during the current refuel outage.
In 1997 a similar connection separated during maintenance on a nearby fitting. The corrective action instituted was the performance of a single point vulnerability study that resulted in the surveillance that was being performed in September 2008 - perform periodic sonic inspections of the scram air header.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The RCE identified the following corrective actions to preclude recurrence (CAPRs):
(1) The separated joint was re-soldered and re-tested satisfactorily.
(2) Revise the supplemental contractor procedure (AP-1) to include the requirements for writing CAP notifications.
Additional corrective actions (CAs) reviewed and addressed include:
(1) Implement recurring PM to monitor the leaks in Technical Evaluation 80098784. Future threaded fitting leaks that cannot be repaired will use this Technical Evaluation.
(2) Present to the Plant Health Committee (PHC) for creation of a temporary modification or design change package that may be used if future leaks are identified on soldered joints (i.e. apply a clamp). This will be used for compensatory action for all future soldered fitting leaks that cannot be immediately repaired.
(3) Revise Maplewood Testing Services (MTS) Orientation and Certification Program to include training of MTS personnel on procedure AP-1. Add this specific OE to the orientation Training.
(4) Conduct Stand Down with MTS employees to clearly communicate requirements of the CAP.
(5) Review all orders assigned to MTS to ensure clear concise direction is given in terms of writing a CAP notification or supplying the data to the client organization.
COMMITMENTS
This LER contains no commitments.
NRC F-ORM 366A (9-2007)
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
--- PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER