05000344/LER-1982-005, Forwards LER 82-005/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-005/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20052E270
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	04/30/1982
From:	Steele R, Yundt C PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
Shared Package
ML20052E271	List: 05000344/LER-1982-005, Forwards LER 82-005/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000344/LER-1982-005-03, /03L-0:on 820331,failure to Perform Component Cooling Water Valve Cycling at Required Frequency Discovered.Caused by Personnel Error.Schedule Corrected
References
CPY-373-82, NUDOCS 8205100264
Download: ML20052E270 (3)

LER-1982-005, Forwards LER 82-005/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
3441982005R00 - NRC Website

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Portland General Electric Company April 30, 1982 Trojan Nuclear Plant 130 F.'" -3 &-973 82 0

P.O. Hox 439 N

Rainier, Oregon 97048 (503) 556-3713 [g;rg t; j ;,

,S-RECEIVED

- 06 MAY T h [Io N aastiinegr ggggg Mr. R. H. Engelken Regional Administrator "gN 88 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Creekside Oaks Office Park g,

1450 Maria Lane - Suite 260 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Dear Sir:

In accordance with the Trojan Plant Operating License, Appendix A, USNRC Technical Specifications 6.9.1.9.c, attached is Licensee Event Report No.

82-05 concerning a failure to perform component cooling water valve cycling at the required frequency. This was due to an inadequacy in the implemen-tation of administrative controls and threatened to reduce the degree of redundancy required by the Technical Specifications, paragraph 4.7.3.1.a.5.

Sincerely, C. PQundt General Manager [L

R. L. 'Steele, Manager Nuclear Projects Engineering CPY/GGB/

ga Attachments c:

LER Distribution File 93.24a(Q)

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REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 1.

Report No:

82-05 2.

Report Date:

April 30, 1982 3.

Occurrence Date:

March 31, 1982 4.

Facility: Trojan Nuclear Plant, PO Box 439, Rainier, Oregon 97048 5.

Identification of Occurrence:

The operability of power generated valves in the component cooling water (CCW) system is verified monthly by cycling the valves in accordance with routine surveillance testing procedures. This j

verification is required in accordance with Technical specification 4.7.3.1.a.5.

Due to an error in scheduling testing, the required surveillance was not performed for a period of four months between November 20, 1981 and March 31, 1982.

6.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

The plant was in Mode 5, cold shutdown, when the missed surveillance i

was discovered. The plant had operated in Mode 1 at 100% power during most of the previous four months.

7.

Description of Occurrence:

Operation of power-rperated valves in the CCW system is verified by performing routine surveillance testing (POT-8-1-DL). The testing is performed based upon a schedule prepared by the Operations Department. Following the last completion of this test on November 20, 1981 the schedule was revised and this test was inadvertently omitted from the next month's-scnedule. As a result the test was not performed in December. This error was carried forth on subse-g I

quent test schedules until the omission was discovered on March 31, 1982 during a periodic audit.

i 8.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The cause of this occurrence is attributed to personnel error. The j

Shift Supervisor assigned to prepare the routine test schedule inad-vertently omitted the surveillance test to cycle CCW valves from the schedule.

l 9.

Significance of Occurrence:

i This event had no effect on either plant or public safety. The valves

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were tested upon discovery of this event and were found to operate

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satisfactorily.

10.

Corrective Action

Immediate corrective action was taken to perform the required surveil-lance testing to confirm operability of the valves.

The test schedule was revised to reinsert this test requirement.

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8 Reportable Occurrence Page Two Subsequent corrective action was taken to reassign the responsibility for routine operating test scheduling to the Assistant Operations Supervisor. This will provide more continuity in preparing the schedule. The feasibility of using a computer program to track rou.

tine surveillance tests will be investigated and a tracking program developed if practical.