05000339/LER-2014-001, Reagarding Manual Reactor Trip During Feedwater Transient
| ML14098A253 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 04/02/2014 |
| From: | Gerald Bichof Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 14-103 LER 14-001-00 | |
| Download: ML14098A253 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3392014001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
1 0CFR50.73 Virginia Electric and Power Company North Anna Power Station 1022 Haley Drive Mineral, Virginia 23117 April 2, 2014 Attention: Document Control Desk Serial No.:
14-103 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NAPS:
RAP Washington, DC 20555-0001 Docket No.: 50-339 License No.: NPF-7
Dear Sirs:
Pursuant to 10CFR50.73, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to North Anna Power Station Unit 2.
Report No. 50-339/2014-001-00 This report has been reviewed by the Facility Safety Review Committee and will be forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.
Sincerely, Gerald T. Biscof Site Vice President North Anna Power Station Enclosure Commitments contained in this letter: None cc:
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257 NRC Senior Resident Inspector North Anna Power Station
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/2017 (02-2014)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections
,'1' EVEN RE R
(Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by E EVENT R (LER) intemet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and (See Page 2 for required number of Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC rfor each b
,ock 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB digits/characters fcontrol number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE North Anna Power Station 05000339 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Manual Reactor Trip During Feedwater Transient
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YER YEAR SEQUENTLAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 NUMBER NO.
05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 02 02 2014 2014 -
001 00 04 02 12014 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
D 20.2201(b)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
E 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
E 20.2201(d)
E 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
[
50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(1)
D 20.2203(a)(4)
E] 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
L] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
[
50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
[
50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(l)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
[
50.73(a)(2)(x) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
[
50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) j] 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
E 73.71(a)(5) 100%
20.2203(a)(2)(v)
Li 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
(3 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
LI OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in (3
20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
(3 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
E3 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
NRCi=
1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT At 0859 on February 2, 2014, with Unit 2 operating at 100% power, the "A" MFW Pump, 2-FW-P-1A (EllS System - SJ, Component - P), had a motor lead connection that grounded and caused the power supply breakers for 2-FW-P-1A to trip open. The standby MFW pump, 2-FW-P-1C, auto started, as designed. The operating crew entered the abnormal procedure for Loss of Main Feedwater, 2-AP-31. The RO believed that one of the two tandem motors of the standby pump did not auto start, since one of the Control Room indicating lights did not illuminate as expected. The RO believed only one MFW pump was running with two required for operation greater than 70% power. Based on this indication and the perceived loss of MFW, the RO initiated a manual reactor trip as directed in 2-AP-31. Although the remaining control room team members were aware that the standby pump had auto-started, they were unable to intervene in time to prevent the manual trip. A 4-hour report per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) was made at 1101 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.189305e-4 months <br /> on February 2, 2014 for manual actuation of the reactor protection system.
Following the reactor trip, all control rods fully inserted into the core and the unit was stabilized in Mode 3 at normal reactor coolant system temperature and pressure. The Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps (EllS System - BA, Component - P) automatically started, as designed, following the reactor trip and provided makeup flow to the steam generators (EIIS System - AB, Component - SG). Steam generator levels were returned to normal operating level and the AFW pumps were returned to the normal, standby automatic alignment. An 8-hour report per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) was made at 1101 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.189305e-4 months <br /> on February 2, 2014 for automatic actuation of an ESF system.
2.0
SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
No significant safety consequences resulted from this event because the reactor was placed in a safe condition by the RO. Ultimately there was adequate feed water and 2-FW-P-1 C auto started so the unit could have remained at 100 percent power with 2-FW-P-1A tripped. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.
3.0
CAUSE
The root cause of this event is that the RO did not use diverse indications for determining if MFW Pump 2-FW-P-1C was running. Thus, the Response Not Obtained (RNO) step of 2-AP-31 was performed to trip the reactor. A contributing cause was that the Supervisor did not oversee performance of the Immediate Operator Actions (IOAs) by the RO in accordance with Operations Department standards.
4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)
The license qualification for the RO was administratively suspended pending further investigation of the event.
5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
An improvement plan will be implemented for the Supervisor to enhance oversight of control room performance. Additional corrective actions are being tracked to completion by the root cause evaluation.
6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE A remediation plan will be developed and implemented for the RO that addresses, at a minimum, the lapses in individual performance that occurred during this event.
7.0 SIMILAR EVENTS
No similar events have occurred at North Anna Power Station.
8.0 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Unit 1 continued operating in Mode 1,100 percent power during this event.