05000317/LER-2005-001, Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Inoperability Due to Handswitch Wiring

Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Inoperability Due to Handswitch Wiring

ML050960095
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	03/31/2005
From:	Holm D Constellation Energy Group
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LER 05-001-00
Download: ML050960095 (6)

LER-2005-001, Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Inoperability Due to Handswitch Wiring

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
3172005001R00 - NRC Website

text

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Constellation Generation Group, LLC 1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway Lusby, Maryland 20657 Constellation I

Energy Group March 31, 2005 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTIENTION:

SUBJECT:

Document Control Desk Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit No. 1; Docket No. 50-317; License No. DPR 53 Licensee Event Report 2005-001 Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Inoperability Due to Handswitch Wiring The attached report is being sent to you as required under 10 CFR 50.73 guidelines. The condition was discovered on April 10, 2004, but not identified as a reportable condition until February 2, 2005. Should you have questions regarding this report, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours, for David A. Holm Plant General Manager DAH/MJY/bjd

Attachment:

As stated cc:

R. V. Guzman, NRC S. J. Collins, NRC Resident Inspector, NRC R. I. McLean, DNR

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NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/3012007 (6-2004)

, the NRC may digits/characters for each block) not conduct or sponsor and a person Is not required to respond to. the

3. PAGE Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit I 05000 317 1 OF 005

4. TITLE Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Inoperability Due to Handswitch Wiring

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED FACILrTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTAL RENV MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 NUBE NO i

i.

FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 04 10 2004 2005 - 001 -

00 03 31 2005 05000

9. OPERATING MODE

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Checkal that apply) o 20.2201(b) a 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

El 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 5 0 20.2201(d) a 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

[3 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) o 20.2203(a)(1)

E 20.2203(a)(4)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) a_ 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 0 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) a 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ox)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL 0 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(x)

Eo 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

El 50.36(c)(2)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

[I 73.71 (a)(4) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 0 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

El 73.71 (a)(5) 000 0 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 0 OTHER o 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

Dj 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify In Abstract below or In (if more space Is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Fonn 366A)

II.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The root cause of the improperly wired handswitch termination was Human Performance errors, which directly challenged the operability of l-FW-4517-MOV. Specific contributors to the Human Performance aspect of this event are as follows:

1.

A lack of proper application of Human Performance Event Free Tools ("Stop, Think, Act, and Review" Method, Peer Checks, and Independent Verification) prevented identification and restoration of the improperly wired lead in the correct location.

2.

Supervision was not informed of the potential problem when the wire in question came out of the compression termination during earlier maintenance. This failure prevented supervision from providing direction or guidance at the time the error was first identified.

3.

The initial error in the wiring was not detected because the Post-Maintenance Operational Test did not verify the CSAS/SGIS isolation function prior to returning the valve to service after the 2002 refueling outage.

4.

The cluttered and congested layout of the wiring underneath Control Room Panel 1C03 resulted in challenges to error free preventive and corrective maintenance when work was performed inside the panel.

III.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

This event is reportable in accordance with the following:

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B); "Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications."

Technical Specification 3.7.15, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs), Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) states, "Two MFIVs shall be OPERABLE." Condition A of this Technical Specification allows one or more MFIVs to be inoperable for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> while in Modes 1, 2, or 3. Condition B then requires action to reach Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The inability of 1-FW-4517-MOV to close on a SGIS caused the valve to be inoperable from June 16, 2002 until Unit 1 was shutdown and entered Mode 4 on April 10, 2004 for refueling. Unit 1 exceeded the LCO for inoperable MFIVs 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after entering Mode 3 on June 16, 2002 at 0021 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br />.

The safety function of the MFIVs is to provide isolation of the main feedwater flow in the event of a HELB upstream of the main steam isolation valves or downstream of the MFIVs. This function can still be maintained by other components in the Main Feedwater System in the event of a challenge to MFIV operability. While these components are not typically credited in the Updated

(If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space Is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

V.

A.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Component Identification Component Main Feedwater Isolation Valve (1 -FW-45 17-MOV)

Main Feedwater Header Check Valve (1-CKVFW-130) 12 Feedwater to Steam Generator Isolation Valve Handswitch (IHS4517)

IEEE 803 EIIS Function ISV VLV HS IEEE 805 System ID SJ SJ SJ Condensate and Feedwater PL Control Panel (1C03)

Main Steam Isolation Valve ISV Steam Generator Feed Regulating Valve FCV Steam Generator Feed Regulating FCV Bypass Valve Steam Generator Feedwater Pump P

B.

Previous Occurrences

No other previous similar events have occurred within the past three years.

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