05000311/LER-1982-051, Forwards LER 82-051/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-051/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20058C088
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	07/14/1982
From:	Midura H Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20058C089	List: 05000311/LER-1982-051, Forwards LER 82-051/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000311/LER-1982-051-03, /03L-0:on 820618,elevation Containment Air Lock Seal Leakage Was Greater than Tech Spec Limit.Caused by Improperly Positioned Seal.Seal Repositioned
References
NUDOCS 8207260254
Download: ML20058C088 (3)

LER-1982-051, Forwards LER 82-051/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
3111982051R00 - NRC Website

text

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O PSIEG Putalic Service Ek<tric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

[

Salem Generating Station July 14, 1982 Mr.

R. C.

Ilaynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Ilaynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-051/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No.

2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-051/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, lb, Y" II.

J.

Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RF:k CC:

Diatribution 9207260254 020714 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S

PDR The Energy People

$b$

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Report Number:

82-051/03L Report Date:

07-14-82 Occurrence Date:

06-18-82 Facility:

Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

100' Elevation Containment Air Lock - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-155.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100% - Unit Load 1140.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0655 hours0.00758 days <br />0.182 hours <br />0.00108 weeks <br />2.492275e-4 months <br />, June 18, 1982, during the performance of Surveillance Procedure SP (0) 4. 6.1. 3A, an operator observed that the 100' Elevation Containment Air Lock total seal leakage was greater than the maximum allowed by the test.

Based on the test data, the leakage was assumed to be past the seals on the outer door.

The door was declared in-operable, and Technical Specification Action Statement 3.6.1.3.a was entered retroactive to the time of discovery.

Subsequent investi-gation of the problem, however, showed that the leakage was actually past the inner door seals.

The flow meter in the air line to the inner door was found to be throttled.

The resulting flow restriction had given an erroneous indication of satisfactory leakage.

The outer door was, in fact, operable, and was maintained closed during the occurrence.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of the excessive leakage was an improperly positioned seal.

Personnel slamming the door had caused the seal to be forced too far into the seal groove, and resulted in improper sealing of the knife edges against the seal surface.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The containment air lock doors allow for personnel access to the Containment Building while providing a redundant barrier as part of overall containment integrity.

This barrier prevents the release of radioactive contamination to the environment in the event of a design basis accident.

Since the outer door was operable and closed, containment integrity was maintained.

Consequently, no risk to the health or safety of the public was involved.

The occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

Action Statement 3.6.1.3.a requires:

With one containment air lock door inoperable, maintain at least the operable air lock door closed and restore the inoperable door to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or be in hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

As noted, the outer door was maintained closed, in compliance with the action statement.

The inner door seal was pulled out and properly repositioned, and the surveillance was satisfactorily performed.

The 100' Elevation Containment Air Lock was declared operable, and at 1140 hours0.0132 days <br />0.317 hours <br />0.00188 weeks <br />4.3377e-4 months <br />, June 18, 1982, Action Statement 3.6.1.3.a was terminated.

Proper operation of the air lock doors is presently addressed in radiation worker training.

Special emphasis will be placed on the importance of not slamming the doors, in view of recurrent problems with air lock seals.

Signs warning personnel not to slam the doors will be installed on each door.

Finally, a change to the Technical Specifications will be requested reducing pressure used to test air lock seals.

The present 47 to 50 PSIG range may not accurately simulate required seal performance.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable.

Preoared By R.

Frahm

/

,U tw Gen 6ral Manager -

~

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No.

82-68