05000285/LER-2015-001, Regarding Inadequate Design of High Energy Line Break Barriers
| ML15086A562 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 03/27/2015 |
| From: | Cortopassi L Omaha Public Power District |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LIC-15-0026 LER 15-001-00 | |
| Download: ML15086A562 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 2852015001R00 - NRC Website | |
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DPJiiJ Omaha Public Power Olslrfct 444 South 16 111 Street Mall Omaha, NE 68102-2247 LIC-15-0026 February March 27, 2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-40 NRC Docket No. 50-285 10 CFR 50.73
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 2015*001, Revision 0, for the Fort Calhoun Station Please find attached Licensee Event Report 2015-001, Revision 0. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), unanalyzed condition. There are no new commitments being made in this letter.
If you should have any questions, please contact Terrence W. Simpkin, Manager, Site Regulatory Assurance, at (402) 533-6263.
LPC/epm Attachment c:
M. L. Dapas, NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV C. F. Lyon, NRC Senior Project Manager S.M. Schneider, NRC Senior Resident Inspector
NRCFORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3160.0104 EXPIRES: 01/3112017 (02*2014)
Estimated biA'den per response to comply 1\\ith this mandatory collection request 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
Reported lessons learned are incorpo~aled into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
(See Page 2 for required number of Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections digits/characters for each block)
Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mai to lnfocolects.Resoun:eOnrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regllatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budge~ Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not !isplay a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to.
the infonnation collection.
- 3. PAGE Fort Calhoun Station 05000285 1 OF 3 Inadequate Design of High Energy Line Break Barriers
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LEA NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 09 30 2013 2015 001 - 00 03 27 2015 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 0 20.2201 (b) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 0 50. 73(a)(2)(vii) 0 20.2201 (d) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0 50. 73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 0 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 5 0 20.2203(a)(1) 0 20.2203(a)(4) 181 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 0 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 0 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A) 0 50. 73(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL 0 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A) 0 50. 73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 0 50. 73(a)(2)(x) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.36(c)(2) 0 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(A) 0 73.71(a)(4) 0 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 0 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 0 73.71(a)(5) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 0 OTHER 0 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 0 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Fonn 366A
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LEA LICENSEE CONTACT rELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Erick Matzke 402-533-6855 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU*
REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE FACTURER TOEPIX FACTURER TOEPIX
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
- 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR 0 YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) 181 NO SUBMISSION DATE f4\\BSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approKimate/y 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
On January 28, 2015, following a station initiated review of operability evaluations, it was determined that a penetration with inadequate jet impingement protection had been previously identified as part of station extent of condition reviews and constituted an unanalyzed condition, but, had not been reported as required. This issue was discovered during an extent of condition review of high energy line break issues that the station initiated due to previously identified concerns. This issue and the other issues identified during the extent of condition review were corrected prior to plant heatup.
The Shift Manager that approved the operability evaluation believed that the reportability aspect of the penetration had been previously reported to the NRC and that no further report was required. The Shift Manager did not confirm that the reportability had been completed under another LEA.
These issues were discovered during the Electrical Environmental Qualification Program Reconstitution Project. The deficiencies were discovered during extent of condition reviews. The deficiencies were properly remediated prior to plant startup in December 2013.
NRC FOAM 366 (02-2014)
~RC =
BACKGROUND
- 2. DOCKET YEAR 05000285 2015
- 6. LER NUMBER I
SEQUENTIAL I NUMBER 001 REV NO.
00
- 3. PAGE 2
OF Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) is a two-loop reactor coolant system of Combustion Engineering design.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On January 28, 2015, following a station initiated review of operability evaluations, it was determined that inadequate jet impingement protection for a penetration with an inadequate seal had been previously identified as part of station extent of condition reviews. This constituted an unanalyzed condition that had not been previously reported as required. The condition was initially identified on September 30, 2013. The station was shutdown and cooled down in mode 5 (refueling shutdown) at the initial time of discovery. The degraded condition was discovered during an extent of condition review of high energy line break (HELB) issues at the station initiated due to previously identified concerns. This issue and the other issues identified during the extent of condition review were corrected prior to plant heatup.
This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition.
CONCLUSION The station has reported several issues to the NRC concerning HELB issues identified at the station.
These LEAs include, 2012-009 (Inoperable Equipment due to Lack of Environmental Qualifications),
2012-015 (Electrical Equipment Impacted by High Energy Line Break Outside of Containment), 2012-017 (Containment Valve Actuators Design Temperature Ratings Below Those Required for Design Basis Accidents), 2013-011 (Inadequate Design for High Energy Line Break in Rooms 13 and 19 of the Auxiliary Building), 2013-015 (Unqualified Coating Used as a Water Tight Barrier in Rooms 81 and 82), 2013-016 (Reporting of Additional High Energy Line Break Concerns) and 2014-004 (Unqualified Limit Switches Render Safety Equipment Inoperable).
3 The Shift Manager that approved the Operability Evaluation believed that the reportability aspect of the penetration had been previously reported to the NRC and that no further report was required. The Shift Manager did not confirm that the reportability had been completed under another LEA.
Portions of the HELB barrier between room 81 (steam and feed line room) and room 56 (switchgear room) were found degraded. Specifically, several areas under the main steam and feedwater lines in room 81 lacked adequate protection from jet impingement. These areas included penetration 557 and several small areas of the floor in room 81. The floor slab in room 81 is the ceiling of room 56.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The degraded jet impingement barriers were discovered as part of the extent of condition reviews for the Electrical Environmental Qualification (EEQ) Program Reconstitution Project. The deficiencies were properly remediated prior to plant startup in December 2013. All other HELB issues found as part of the extent of condition reviews were reviewed and no other cases of failing to report events were identified.
NRC FORM 366 (02-2014)
~RC
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
- 6. LER NUMBER I
SEQUENTIAL I NUMBER 001 REV NO.
00
- 3. PAGE 3
OF Jet impingement protection did not meet the requirements for proper HELB mitigation. As a result, some equipment may have been impacted during potential high energy line breaks in room 81. Room 81 contains the main steam lines and the main feedwater lines. The barrier may not have performed its function for those HELBs that resulted in jet impingement directly on the degraded portion of the barrier. Under these conditions, a postulated HELB had the potential to impact the ability of safety systems to respond to the accident.
SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE This does not represent a safety system functional failure in accordance with NEI 99-02, revision 7.
PREVIOUS EVENTS 2012-009 (Inoperable Equipment due to Lack of Environmental Qualifications), 2012-015 (Electrical Equipment Impacted by High Energy Line Break Outside of Containment), 2012-017 (Containment Valve Actuators Design Temperature Ratings Below Those Required for Design Basis Accidents),
2013-011 (Inadequate Design for High Energy Line Break in Rooms 13 and 19 of the Auxiliary Building), 2013-015 (Unqualified Coating Used as a Water Tight Barrier in Rooms 81 and 82), 2013-016 (Reporting of Additional High Energy Line Break Concerns) and 2014-004 (Unqualified Limit Switches Render Safety Equipment Inoperable)
NRC FORM 366 (02*2014) 3