05000270/LER-1981-017, Forwards LER 81-017/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 81-017/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20038A986
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	11/13/1981
From:	Parker W DUKE POWER CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20038A987	List: 05000270/LER-1981-017, Forwards LER 81-017/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000270/LER-1981-017-01, /01T-0:on 810919,while Attempting to Initiate Decay Heat Cooling to Stop Steam Generator Tube Leak,Valve 2LP-2 Failed to Open Electrically or Manually.Apparently Caused by Bent Valve Stem.Valve Stem Replaced
References
NUDOCS 8111240562
Download: ML20038A986 (2)

LER-1981-017, Forwards LER 81-017/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2701981017R00 - NRC Website

text

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DUKE POWER COMPANYRC REGION $-

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November 13, 1981 3 7 2-e e' i

cir. James P. O'Reilly, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 J

Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-270

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Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report. u.0-270/81-17. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconec Nuclear Station Technical Specifi-cation 6.6.2.1.a(5), which describes a component malfunction which prevents, by itself, the fulfillment of the functional requirements of a system required to cope with an accident analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report.

This report describes an incident which is considered to be of no signifi-cance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

rm Very truly yours,,

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N cc: Director Records Center Office of Management and Program Analysis Insititute of Nuclear Power U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Washington, D. C. 20555 1820 Water Place Atlanta, Georgin 30339 Mr. W. T. Orders I

h2C Resident Inspector l

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4 DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE UNIT 2 Report Number:

R0- 270/81-17 Repott Date: November 13, 1981 Occurrence Date: September 19, 1981 Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence:

Inability to initiate decay heat cooling due to valve 2LP-2 failing to open electrically.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Reacter shutdown, cooldown in progress Description of Occurrence:

On September 19, 1981, while attempting to initiate decay heat cooling, valve 2LP-2 failed to open electrically. Three subsequent attempts to open valve LP-2 manually were unsuccessful. Valve 2LP-2 was opened using manual hoists after the operator was removed.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause of the failure of valve 2LP-2 to operate was a bent valve stem, which was identified when the valve was disassembled and inspected.

Analysis of Occurrence: This unit shutdown and cooldown were being conducted due to a steam generator tube leak. The inability to initiate decay heat co, ling resulted in a 17 hour1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br /> delay in reducing reactor coolant pressure and stopping the steam generator tube leakage. Personnel and plant systems adequately controlled this event; thus, the health and safety of the public were not adversely affected.

Corrective Action

After three attempts to open valve 2LP-2 using the manual operator, the operator was removed and the valve opened using manual hoists.

The valve stem was replaced, and the operator was tested after the torque settings were recalibrated.

Inspection and testing of valve 2LP-2 have l

verified that the valve is operating correctly. The need to modify or to change the size of the valve operator will be evaluated. Also, an evaluation of the safety analysis credit taken for the ability to go in to the LPI decay heat cooling mode during a steam generator tube rupture accident will be conducted.

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