05000265/LER-1982-004, Forwards LER 82-004/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-004/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20050D538
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	03/31/1982
From:	Kalivianakis N COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20050D539	List: 05000265/LER-1982-004, Forwards LER 82-004/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000265/LER-1982-004-03, /03L-0:on 820224,while Performing Quarterly Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Steam Line High Flow Calibr & Functional Test,Differential Pressure Switch Qis 18,DPIS 2-1360-1B+ Failed to Operate.Caused by Instrument Drift
References
NJK-82-159, NUDOCS 8204120297
Download: ML20050D538 (2)

LER-1982-004, Forwards LER 82-004/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2651982004R00 - NRC Website

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Commonwealth Edison Quad CitiIs Nuctrar Power Station 22710 206 Asenue North Corcova, Illinois 61242 Telephone 309/654 2241 NJ K 159 March 31, 1982 c.

D J. Keppler, Regional Director 6

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1W21.b zggg p.1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road agig,$Qyy{f 8 G1en EI1yn, IL 60137 2

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/'U Re fe rence : Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station Docket Number 50-265, DPR-30, Unit Two Appendi x A, Sec t ion 6.6. B.2.a and Table 3.2.1 Enclosed please find Reportable Occurrence Report Number R0 82-04/03L-0 for Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station.

This report was originally submitted March 11, 1982, but was inadvertently numbered R0 82-03/03L-0.

This report is submitted to you in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.B. I.a, as an engineered safety feature safety setting which was found to be less conservative than those established in Technical Specifications but which did not prevent ful-fillment of the functional requi rements of the af fected system.

Very truly yours, COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWEBfSTATION

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N. J. Kallvianakis

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Station Superintendent NJK:HGL/bb Enclosure cc T.

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1.

LER NUMBER:

LER/R0 82-4/03L-0 11.

LICENSEE NAME:

Commonwealth Edison Company Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station 111.

FACILITY NAME:

Unit Two IV.

DOCKET NUMBER: 050-265 V.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On February 24, 1982, while performing Qls 18, RCIC Steam Line High Flow Calibration and Functional Test, it was found that switch DPIS 2-1360-1B+

would not operate.

Technical Specification 3.2.A. (Table 3.2.1. ) requi res that the trip setting be less than or equal to 300 percent of rated flow.

VI.

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The differential pressure cell monitors flow in the RCIC steam line in order to detect a potential break in the line.

At 300 percent of the rated flow, a signal is required to be initiated to give a Group V isolation signal.

Each of the two redundant differential pressure cells, DPIS 2-1360-1A and IB, has two switches; one each in the positive and negative direction.

The negative switches sense a low pressure sensing line break while the positive switches sense both a high pressure line break and high flow (DP). Any one of these four switches is capable of initiating the Group V lsolation signal.

The DPIS 2-1360-1A cell was found to function properly, thereby, ensuring the isolation would have been initiated had a steam line break occurred.

Vll.

CAUSE

The cause of this occurrence was setpoint drift of the high side switch, it is a Bellows Type, Model 288 Barton Instrument.

The switch was last calibrated and functionally tested on November 25, 1981.

Vill.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

186" H O (229 percent The switch was adjusted and recalibrated to trip at 2

of rated flow) and functionally tested satisfactorily on February 24, 1982.

Several of the RCIC high steam flow isolation differential pressure switches have recently shown an increased tendency to drift. This trend has been atrributed to normal contact wear.

As a precaution, all Unit One and Unit Two RCIC high steam flow micro switches will be replaced with new switches of the same type, if they have not been replaced recently.